Theme 5 Seneca Flashcards

1
Q

Economic Weaknesses in the USSR by 1985- centralised economy

A

The centralisation of the economy made it inefficient and this contributed to its weakness.
It was impossible to run the economy across the whole USSR from Moscow.
Bureaucrats sometimes failed to coordinate fertiliser shipments and they arrived at farms at the wrong time.
Incorrect steel and oil products were sent to factories.

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2
Q

Economic Weaknesses in the USSR by 1985- Lack of incentives

A

There were few incentives within the communist economy for working hard or innovating. This led to lower productivity levels. Industrial targets were always based on quantity, not quality. Goods produced were often useless.

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3
Q

Economic Weaknesses in the USSR by 1985- US rivals

A

American farms were six times more productive than Soviet farms but required far fewer workers.

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4
Q

Economic Weaknesses in the USSR by 1985- undeveloped aspects of the economy

A

Transport links remained undeveloped throughout the period.

Storage facilities remained undeveloped, so a lot of product was wasted.

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5
Q

Military Expenditure by 1985

A

Military expenditure was a significant portion of the USSR’s GNP. This took a toll on the stagnant economy.

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6
Q

Expenditure Between 1965 and 1985

A

Soviet military spending was incredibly high.
During the two decades after 1965, spending on defence went up from 12-17%.
In this phase of the Cold War, the US spent around 6% on defence.

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7
Q

Military expenditure: an economic burden?

A

By 1985, there was no growth any more in the Soviet economy. Inefficiencies and long-term problems were undermining the USSR.

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8
Q

Economic Reforms Between 1985 and 1990

A

Alongside long-term factors, Gorbachev’s failed economic reforms accelerated the fall of the USSR in the short term.

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9
Q

Result of economic reforms

A

Market reforms led to economic chaos. They fell through the gap between a socialist planned economy and a true free market alternative.
Shortages of essential goods became more and more severe.
Distribution of goods such as grain became ever more tricky.
GDP fell 4% from 1986-90.

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10
Q

Rationalisation 1985-1986

A

Uskorenie (acceleration) meant a programme of investment and modernisation.
It failed because borrowing money from Western governments led to a huge rise in the national debt.
This led to inflation.
Investment in energy did not have the desired effect.
Andropov’s anti-alcohol campaign continued.
But as the state cut alcohol production, people began buying alcohol illegally.
Alcohol revenues fell by 67 million roubles, and as such, the burden of the alcohol ban became too great.

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11
Q

500 Day Programme

A

Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s programme in 1990 was designed to transition the economy rapidly to a market model
Gorbachev ended up turning away from the programme after criticism from hard-line Communists.
January 1991: Supreme Soviet introduced private property.
Further reforms allowed ownership of stocks and shares.
The reforms continued to fail. Production of oil fell 9%, while steel production fell 12%.
The government was effectively bankrupt by 1991.

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12
Q

Gorbachev’s reforms came in three phases:

A

Rationalisation: Gorbachev tried to make improvements to the existing state-controlled command economy.
Reform: Gorbachev tried to introduce some free market measures into the existing economic structure. He wanted a hybrid of socialism and capitalism.
Transformation: Gorbachev abandoned the state-controlled command economy entirely.

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13
Q

Spinner’s view of the USSR’s economic weakness

A

Most symptoms of the crisis [of the Soviet Union] and the ultimate breakdown of the system can, in fact, be attributed to the impact of economic failure. Whereas economic modernisation was the motor of success in the earlier decades of the Soviet Union, the economy became the weakest link of the Soviet system.’

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14
Q

McCauley’s view of Gorbachev’s leadership

A

‘China and Vietnam have demonstrated that it is possible to move from a command to a market economy without undermining the power of the Communist Party. Hence the reasons for the failure of economic reform are political. Gorbachev removed the ideological and political pillars on which the Soviet Union was built.’

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15
Q

Historical views on the impact of Gorbachev’s economic reforms

A

Some have said that the policies failed because they did not fit with the existing institutions and approaches.
Gorbachev was constantly modifying his approach, so his policies had no time to mature.
Others have suggested that the system was too weak anyway for Gorbachev’s policies to succeed.

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16
Q

Oliver’s view of Gorbachev’s leadership

A

‘While the Soviet economic model suffered from inherent flaws, these were not the fundamental cause of collapse…By the early 1980s, woefully bad economic signs forced the Soviet leadership to embrace radical policies. Under Gorbachev’s over-confident leadership, the introduction of a heady mixture of political and economic reforms fatally undermined the Soviet system and ensured its ultimate collapse.’

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17
Q

McCauley’s view of the USSR’s economic weakness

A

The collapse was the result of unintended consequences of government policies. The economy played a key role here. In an attempt to stimulate a slowing economy, the leadership adopted policies which fatally weakened the political and ideological pillars which sustained the system. This brought down the whole edifice…The conclusion is that poor leadership provoked political and economic collapse.’

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18
Q

Historical views on Gorbachev’s role in the collapse of the USSR

A

Some say the economy would have collapsed regardless of Gorbachev’s interventions. His attempts may have simply hastened the process.
Others argue that Gorbachev’s economic reforms could have worked. The mistake he made was that he attempted both economic and political reform at the same time. In doing so, he allowed citizens to protest when the economy failed. This led to the fall of the regime.

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19
Q

Gorbachev’s Aims for Reforming the Communist Party- Aim of democracy

A

Gorbachev wanted to move the Leninist one-party dictatorship towards a democracy. After all, under the communist theory, the phase where the country was ruled by dictatorship should have been temporary.
Gorbachev presented the idea that Lenin had wanted to move towards democracy in the long-term.
Gorbachev wanted to use democracy as a way to purge corrupt officials from the Party.

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20
Q

Purging old members

A

Gorbachev purged Party leaders who had been closely allied with Brezhnev. New ministers joined the government, who favoured more reform.
Nikolai Ryzkhov became Prime Minister.
Viktor Chebrikov became KGB head.
Boris Yeltsin became head of the Communist Party in Moscow.

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21
Q

After Glasnost, Gorbachev’s later political reforms centred around moves towards democracy.

A

1988: The Party Conference allowed elections to Soviets involving several candidates.
Citizens could choose between different candidates from within the Communist Party.
The first election of this sort took place in 1989. 5 members of the Central Committee lost their seats, and more radical (reforming) Communists were more successful.
Radicals like Boris Yeltsin did well. He won 89% in Moscow.

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22
Q

1990 Republic elections

A

A further weakening of the Communist Party happened during the nationwide elections of 1990. ‘Democratic Russia’ secured 85% of the seats in Moscow.
It became increasingly clear that Gorbachev’s reforms were backfiring.

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23
Q

Impact of Gorb’s reforms- Internal conflict in the Communist Party

A

Reforms divided the Communist Party into the more traditional Communist hardliners, more moderate members and the most radical Communists who supported attempts to reform the system.

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24
Q

Impact of political reforms- knowledge of Soviet history

A

Public knowledge about Soviet history, such as what the government had done during the Great Terror, shocked the population and led to the even greater unpopularity of the government.

25
Q

Impact of reforms- freedom of speech

A

Freer media led to the most important organ of the government, the Communist Party, being undermined.

26
Q

New positions in govt - effect of reforms

A

Gorbachev created the position of ‘President’, which had not previously existed in the Soviet Union. He thought this would give him more legitimacy, but the position was not elected.
Newly elected politicians had much more authority than him.

27
Q

Historical Assessment - Gorbachev’s Role in USSR’s Collapse: Strayer’s view

A

‘Between 1987 and 1990, Gorbachev engineered something close to a political miracle… But at the same time those victories for political reform bypassed, diminished, divided and demoralised the Communist Party. Here, clearly, is one of the central elements in the collapse of the Soviet Union.’

28
Q

Historical Assessment - Gorbachev’s Role in USSR’s Collapse: Brown’s view of the Soviet economy

A

‘There is no doubt that the attempt to reform the Soviet economy ended in failure. Part of the reason for that was the tension between reforming an existing system to make it work better and replacing that system by one which had a quite different logic. In the early years of ‘perestroika’ [restructuring] the first aim was being pursued - and with only limited success’.

29
Q

Historical Assessment - Gorbachev’s Role in USSR’s Collapse: Brown’s view cont.

A

‘By 1990-1, while there was not a consensus, there was at least a broad body of support among specialists for the idea that the command economy had to give way to the market economy. It was clearer to Gorbachev than to Yeltsin that this would mean tens of millions of citizens becoming worse off for some years to come. Freeing prices would improve the supply of goods and services but would also raise those prices to a level the majority could ill afford.’

30
Q

National Resurgence of the Late 1980s

A

Gorbachev’s reforms created a climate where nationalism flourished and undermined the Soviet Government

31
Q

National sentiment in the USSR

A

There were 15 Republics in the Soviet Union. These consisted of various national and ethnic groups.

32
Q

Impact of Gorbachev’s purges

A

After Gorbachev’s purges, he frequently replaced the local supporters who had worked for Brezhnev with his own supporters, who were usually ethnic Russians.
At the top, Gorbachev’s Politburo only had one member who was not Russian. This led to discontent in the regions of the Soviet Union.
When the Russian leaders took over, this coincided with a decline in living standards in the Republics. People blamed the Russian leaders for these economic problems.

33
Q

Glasnost and Nationalism

A

Glasnost enhanced anti-Russian sentiment. This led to several nationalist protests.

Glasnost was the policy of ‘openness’ under Gorbachev.
Because the government revealed Stalin’s poor treatment of national minorities, many were very angry.
Soviet citizens also became increasingly aware of how bad their living conditions were compared to those in the West.

34
Q

Glasnost and nationalism 2

A

Nationalist groups in the regions could publish anti-Russian material more freely and demanded more freedom.

35
Q

Activism

A

There were protests against the regime in 1988 in Azerbaijan and in 1989 Uzbeks killed Meskhetians, members of a Muslim minority group, while protests erupted in Georgia.
Environmental activism gathered pace following the explosion at Chernobyl.
In the Baltic states, popular resistance fronts developed as people sought their independence.

36
Q

Nationalism in the Eastern Bloc- Renegotiating the relationship

A

From 1990 to 1991, Gorbachev tried to negotiate a treaty to decentralise the Soviet Union.
Mid-July 1991: Eight of the leaders of the republics had agreed on the Union of Sovereign States treaty.

37
Q

Cohen’s view on nationalism

A

In reality, no anti-Soviet revolution from below ever took place, certainly not in Russia… In an unprecedented referendum held in Russia and eight other republics in March 1991, which included 93 percent of the entire Soviet population, 76.4 percent of the very large turnout voted to preserve the Union - only nine months before it was abolished.’

38
Q

Beissinger’s view on nationalism

A

In many narratives of the end of communism, nationalism is portrayed merely as a consequence of communism’s demise, not as a cause of the process of collapse itself. Such a story, however, leaves a number of critical issues unaddressed. Within the Soviet Union, enormous mobilisations involving millions of people occurred during these years, with nationalist demands being the most prominent among the banners under which people mobilised.’

39
Q

Coup Against Gorbachev

A

18 August 1991: Eight Communist leaders announced that they were forming the Emergency Committee.
This body would bring an end to Gorbachev’s rule.
Gorbachev’s deputy and the heads of the KGB and the army were part of the coup.
Yeltsin opposed the coup. The army tried to arrest him, but the soldiers refused to do so.
The army did not support the coup, so it failed.

40
Q

End of the USSR

A

In the first free elections the USSR held, nationalities voted for secession. The USSR disintegrated.

41
Q

Aftermath of the coup

A

Although the coup had failed, the country was now in a perilous position.
Yeltsin’s opposition to the leading communist hardliners who had tried to overthrow Gorbachev made him more popular.

42
Q

Lacking support for the Communist Party

A

Yeltsin now had the authority to outlaw the source of the coup, the Communist Party, on 6 November 1991.
Gorbachev stuck loyally to the Communist Party. But most people now wanted the end of Communism and stopped supporting Gorbachev.

43
Q

Independence

A

Nationalists in Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan had declared independence in September.
1 December 1991: 90% of Ukrainians voted in a plebiscite (people’s vote) to separate from the USSR. With 20% of the Soviet population living there, this was a crucial step.
This ended Gorbachev’s attempts to save the Union by talking individually to the leaders of the Republics.

44
Q

The Minsk Agreement

A

Yeltsin, along with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus, signed the Minsk Agreement.
The USSR was replaced with the CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States.
11 out of 15 Soviet Republics were members by the end of 1991.
The USSR existed no longer.

45
Q

Gorb’s responsibility for collapse- his reforms

A

Gorbachev’s reforms changed the very nature of the Soviet Union by 1990.
A key way to frame Gorbachev’s reforms is through the idea of ‘new thinking’.
Gorbachev introduced the terms ‘pluralism’ and ‘markets’ into the language of Soviet politics. He added the word ‘socialist’ in front of them to suggest a union between Communism and elements of the free market.
‘Perestroika’ meant ‘restructuring’. Gorbachev used the word to characterise his reforms.

46
Q

Gorb’s responsibility- relaxing control

A

Gorbachev stated publicly that he would not use violence to hold together the Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc countries.
Previous leaders had used violence frequently to deal with opposition. This approach weakened the Party’s grip on the country.
Instead, Gorbachev placed more of an emphasis on respecting the rights of individuals.
He did not want to repeat the terror Stalin had used, which had been revealed through the policy of glasnost.

47
Q

Gorb’s errors

A

Some people have argued that the fact that Gorbachev thought reform of the USSR was possible was enough to set the country on a collision course.
He had not realised that the Soviet people could still be tempted by ideas such as nationalism.
It was not possible to restructure industry and increase output simultaneously. As such, the policy of ‘uskorenie’ (acceleration) could never work because restructuring typically leads to lower output in the short term.

48
Q

Gorb’s failures- Economic and political reform

A

When economic and political reform were combined, this made the problem even worse.
Gorbachev constantly changed his approach and tried to introduce too many reforms too quickly.
He did not replace the Communist Party with a new power base, and this also fueled the collapse.

49
Q

Failures- Gorb’s tactics

A

Certain historians argue that it was Gorbachev’s tactics, and not his policies themselves, which caused the end of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev was not able to win support from the Communist Party for his ideas. Internal resistance meant that his new ideas would never take hold in the country at large.
Gorbachev tried to introduce democracy but refused to stand for election himself to be President.

50
Q

Gorb’s failures- comparison with China

A

Historians sometimes look to communist China in the same period to compare with Gorbachev’s failed reforms.
China embraced free market solutions more quickly and with less reservation. The Chinese economy kept growing during the reform years. Gorbachev’s reforms were slower, and the Communists lost authority because they could not show people that their reforms were effective in improving living standards. China did not allow any political freedom.

51
Q

Yelsin’s role

A

Yeltsin had initially supported Gorbachev. But, as an electable and popular politician himself, he wanted Gorbachev to go further.
Yeltsin was popular for addressing the corruption and privileges of the Communist Party in a public way. He was able to win 89% of the votes in Moscow in 1989.

52
Q

Yeltsin’s resignation

A

Yeltsin actually resigned from the Communist Party in July 1990. This led to a fall in the Communist Party’s popularity, but not in his own. General party membership dropped by three million people that year.
Yeltsin went as far as positioning himself as a direct rival to Gorbachev. He proposed a non-Communist government

53
Q

Yeltsin and nationalism

A

Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin was a supporter of nationalist movements. This was the case for both Russian nationalists and those in the other republics.
In 1990 Yeltsin went to a number of different republics around the USSR. He told the leaders of those regions to take a much sovereignty (power) from Moscow as they could.
When the republics declared independence, Yeltsin supported them.

54
Q

Yeltsin’s power

A

Yeltsin was able to develop a more powerful base of support by winning the election for the Russian presidency and the elections to the Russian parliament.
By contrast, Gorbachev had never faced an election. Gorbachev became increasingly illegitimate.
After the coup, Yeltsin banned the Communist Party and seized its wealth.
Yeltsin and the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus decided to form the CIS, in opposition to Gorbachev’s Union Treaty.

55
Q

Marsh’s view of Gorbachev

A

‘The first real phase of the collapse began between March and December 1989, from the initial elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies to the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. By this time ‘perestroika’ had run into trouble… During the second phase of collapse, from January 1990 to August 1991, collapse of the system became an increasingly possible outcome of reform.’

56
Q

Breslauer’s view of Yeltsin

A

‘Yeltsin polarized politics during these last two to three years of Gorbachev’s leadership. No matter what Gorbachev proposed in domestic policy, Yeltsin criticized the Party leader for conservatism and half-measures. He supported centrifugal forces in the union republics at a time when Gorbachev was trying to contain.’

57
Q

Brown’s view of Yeltsin

A

‘Although Gorbachev’s reforms had sown the seeds of destruction, the most immediate causes of the breakup were, however, Yeltsin’s playing of the Russian nationalist card against the Union.’

58
Q

Beissinger’s view of Gorbachev

A

‘Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost and the political liberalisation that it produced were obviously the critical institutional conditions that allowed the collapse of communism to occur. Without glasnost, the forces that most directly brought about the collapse could never have materialised or been able to act.’

59
Q

Suny’s view of Gorbachev

A

The death of the Soviet Union represented a failure of Gorbachev’s triple revolution. The system fell because the leadership tried simultaneously to dismantle the old practices of the command economy and Communist Party dominance.’