THei part 2 Flashcards
1
Q
Context/ Why Constitutional Treaty
A
There were leftover issues from the Nice Treat.
- They had to legitimise the EU due to Euroscepticism and referenda.
There were subsidiarty issues in form of delineation of competences of EU member states.
The EU became more complex: who does waht? - The issue of the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
- Aim to simplify treaties without changing the substance.
International context of 9/11 and war on terror which dominated the international context.
Matters for EU due of NATO, attack on one member = attack on all.
EU response caused division: some wanted to help, other member states did not.
2
Q
How would the Constitutional Treaty happen?
A
Laeken Declaration in 2001.
The goal here was to bring citizens closer to the EU by democratising and legitimising. Simplifying political system in an enlarged union.
The EU had to become a stabilising factor and model in the world.
This all would be done by a convention, IGC and an European Consitution. Different procedureL normally a convention would not be first
3
Q
How was the Constitutional Treaty convention set up?
A
There were national government representatives and national parliament respresentatives.
Candidate member states + Commission respresentatives as well.
D’Estaing was Chairman. This was done due only government representatives would not be legitimate
4
Q
Consitutional Treaty convention GOAL
A
The goal of the Consitutional Treaty convention was optimising the EU legitimacy part of the diabolic triangle.
- there was however, a weak Commission.
- National parliaments were new = inexperienced + uncoordination.
- European Parliament’s field so this gave them more legitimacy
–> national governments not really involved (IGC would follow)
The convention was mostly for show, as only the national governments of Member States had to accept.
–> It was consitutional because they came with an anthem + flag.
Came with President of EU to fix XI Jinping issue.
Binding Charter of Fundamental Rights instead of non-binding.
Legal acts = laws
No more IGCs, just conventions
5
Q
Why did the Constitutional Treaty fail?
A
Failedu due to politisation due to referenda (NL+ France) –> UK .
EU presidency said to stop ratification and have a reflection pause.
Dutch referendum was unprepared.
Fear EU consititution is gonna be more important than national.
Another reason for no = Turkey applying for EU membership.: countries against it.
Old treaty stuff on table again, people voting against due first time hearing of these.
6
Q
Context/ Why Lisbon Treaty
A
Continuation after reflection pause of Constitutional Treaty
7
Q
How did the Lisbon Treaty happen?
A
After UK precidency; German presidency to prepare recommendations on institutional issues.
Merkel: wait of depolicisation + proposes a small + technical agenda of QMV reform with a stronger role for national parliament +limited competences of EU in taxation + social policy.
Franco-German engine: when France + Germany agree: they almost always get the rest on board.
Merkel + Sarkozy (office in 2007)
Treaty, start IGC, agreement and signing of TEU/TFEU (Treaty on European Union (roof) –> what is the EU, Treaty of Functioning EU (policies) –> pillars)
8
Q
What changed in Lisbon Treaty compared to Consitutional Treaty?
A
Not consitutional; but amending treaties (not replacing)
- terminology
-charter of Fundamental rights= declaration, not binding
2 new treaties: TEU, TFEU
9
Q
What changed in Lisbon Treaty compared to Nice when it comes to decision-making part of diabolic triangle?
A
There was an extension of decision-making through QMV.
The qualified majority vote went to 55%
Member states: 65% of population.
Reform due to the fact that small countries, with small population had same power as big countries.
President European Council
Stronger HIgh Representative of the Union + stronger EEAS (EU diplomatic service )
10
Q
What changed in the Lisbon Treaty compared to Nice when it comes to the legitimacy part of diabolic triangle
A
European Parliament co-legislater in 95% of cases= co-decision.
largest party in EP determines political colour of Commission president.
Right of initiative for EU citizens.
> if EU citizens want to put something on the agenda they can by getting 1 million signatures
11
Q
What changed in the Lisbon Treaty compared to Nice when it comes to the National control part of diabolic triangle
A
Clear delineation of competences. Exclusive, shared and supported.
Support means EU has no right to meddle in policy area.
Yellow card procedures for breaching subsidiarity principle
European Council strengthened: broad guidance formalised
Exit procedure
12
Q
Aftermath of Lisbon Treaty
A
Ratification issues:
* Ireland referendum. 53% no with 53% turnout
* Germany unsuccesful court challenge
* Czech Republic refuses to sign because of the Charter of Fundamental Rights over Benes decrees. (After war a lot of Germans in Czech, all Germans got kicked out –> fear document can be used to contest this. They got an opt-out for this.)
Issues resolved by 2009
13
Q
EMU’s influence on start of Euro Crisis
A
- the European Monetary Union had an unsolid structure.
- Monetary policy was made by ECB (European Central Bank) and the same for all Member states, but the economic policies were different between Member states.
(intergovernmental)
–> governments could not be punished by EU for spending too much - Economies were diverging due to this (growing in different pace, different issues)
and in order to converge them different monetary policies were needed: impossible. - No bail-out clause which meant that all debts + deficits were a porblem of the state and not other states as well.
14
Q
External shock causing Euro crisis
A
2008 American Financial Crisis caused by mismanagment + lack of control and supervision in housing sector.
This blew over to Europe due interconnectedness of US and European economies.
All European countries became very much indebted
Monetary Union weakened → financial markets responds → aggravated situation
Greece tumbled into deep trouble, followed by Ireland, Portugal and Spain
15
Q
Consequences Euro crisis
A
GDP growth stagnated.
This meant that governments had lower income.
Borrowing money= expensive, so only choice was austerity (spending cuts/ tax increases)
–> high unumployment rates in southern countries.
–> unable to pay unemployment benefits
Northern countries less hit. Southern states wanted bail-outs for Stability + Growth Pact rules, but northern countries did not want to allow this.
16
Q
Measures to help improve financial/ conjunctural situation
A
Made the EMU more supranational
- European Central Bank president Mario Dragi:
‘’ Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me it will be enough.’’
–> sudden faith in currency (even eurosceptics)
–> making them speculate in favour - Banks were bailed countries, due as seen of being too important for financial sector
3.Steps made for a banking union (more banking regulatons on suprantional level) - The intergovernmental European Stabilty Mechanism (ESM)
was created in order to loan money from rich to poor Member states - Loans from ESM with conditionality
(meaning the borrowing states had to
reorganise their economies) for Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania,
Spain and most of all for Greece. - There were also some fiscal and economic measures, such as the strengthening of
the SGP. - European Semester to give recommendations to countries’ economic policy to make economies move together
17
Q
different views on Eurocrisis (monetarist/economists neutrals)
A
Monetarist/debtors:
‘‘end austerity, bail us out’’ –> end strict rules
Economists/creditors:
‘’ obey rules, reform economies, stop spending’’
Neutrals:
‘‘WTF is happening’’
18
Q
The diabolic triancle after Euro Crisis measures
A
- More EU capacity due to more power/ competences towards European Central Bank
+ better reputation due to saving actor - National control increased because everyting of EC has to be approved by Council of Ministers
- EU legitimacy decreases due to European Parliament is on the sideliness
19
Q
Case of Greece crisis
A
The Euro crisis hti the hardest in Greece. There was a very high unemployment rate and very high debt.
Greece had been lying about debts + deficits it had had over previous years.
the northern countries wanted to loan money to Greece but only if Greece would make some structural changes to its economy management.
The Greek government accepted this, because it otherwise would have gone bankrupt.; and it especially ut expenses on social polcy.
–> dissatisfaction among Greek people –> election of left wing populist government.
They held a referendum on acting out the agreements. With a 61,3% no-vote they re-entered negotiations and they still had some conditions, but they were a little bit less strict than in the previous agreement.
20
Q
Cause of Refugee crisis
A
Arab spring: civil wars caused millions of Arabians to flee towards Europe.
21
Q
European sentiment towards Refugee crisis
A
Terrorist attacks in Europe, which led to more anti-migration sentiments.
22
Q
Two-sides in Europea towards Refugee crisis
A
- Help refugees and threat them as humanely as possible
Merkel ‘‘wir schaffen das.’’ - No refugees and push them back,.
They were seen by this side as people seeking to profit from western prosperity, rather than refugees. Led by right-wing populists.
23
Q
Reaction towards Refugee crisis
A
The bordering states were most refugees entered were in distresesd and asked for help. The other states refused and pointed towards the Dublin Treaty, which said that migrants should seek asylum in the first country they enter in the Schengen-area. This came from a time where most refugees came by plane, however. Bordering states threatened to send migrants wherever they wanted to go, which caused the north-western states to agree to proportionally reallocate migrants across Europe. Central and eastern Europe did not agree and rejected the proposal for a Common European Asylum System.
24
Q
Measures for Refugee crisis
A
- After rejecton of the Common European Assylum System; by centarl + eastern Europe: the system was set up on voluntary basis.
- Frontex was empowered as EU border + coast guard agency
- EU-Turkey deal to control refugee flow
25
EU-Turkey deal
1. EU return all illegal migrants entering thorugh Greece via Turkey
2. EU pays Turkey for doing so,
3. EU regularly accepts Syrian migrants from Turkey
4. Turkey combats illegal migration
5. EU and Turkey reopen EU-citizenship talks
6. EU and Turkey discuss liberalization of visa requirements for Turkish citizens
26
Diabolic triangle during Refugee crisis
1. National control = okay/ increasing as member states do not give any power away
2. EU capacity a bit of increase; only towards fortress Europe idea- no common asylum system: bad for capacity
3. No democratic oversigh on how this works so EU legitimacy goes down
27
Normative legitimacy
if a regime or institution lives up to a set of standards by which is judged
(moral or ethical standars, for example not committing genocide, proper representation)
28
Sociological legitimacy
if people believe a regime or insitution is normatively legitimate
(more empirical, public support for a regime)
You might think a regime isn’t normatively legitimate, but the majority of people in that country thinks the government is legitimate, it is sociologically legitimate
29
Drivers of EU politcisation
1. economic
2. cultural
3. insititutional
This is conditonal on political entrepeneurs and their ability to policise the EU, which also depends on electoral system in which they find themselves.
30
Economic drivers of EU politicization
1. Backlash against embedded neo-liberalism.
--> bias towards free market EU
2. Winners versus lowers of globalisation due to neoliberal economics in EU
31
Cultural drivers of EU politicization
1. struggle of nationalism versus suprantionalism
(refugees, transfer of competences to EU level)
2. discussion of liberalism versus conservatism
32
Insitutional drivers of EU politicisation
1. Authority transfer towards Brussels
--> integration by STEALTH
--> public was not aware of integration
2. Crises+ capability to handle them
-- EU + democratic deficit
.3. EU democratic + communication deficit
- who takes credit?
National leaders will claim good decisions the EU makes and blame the EU when something goes wrong. It’s also hard for the EU to reach national citizens due to 27 different countries with different languages.
33
Trends in EU politicization
1. Increases when new Treaties, crises or other noticable development
2. Increse in Euroscepticism in national parliaments since start of century due to populists exploiting crises + elite sentiments for more nationalist attittudes
3. in 2014 EP had 130 seats that are for abolition of EU
4. Euroscepticism is all over Europe, causes vary per region
34
Trends in voting for European Parliament
1. Turnout is decreasing
2. There was increase after Brexit due to more interest
3. People have disinterest in EU and are more likely to votefor national elections
35
Summary UK relationship with EU
Uk left negotiations for EEC + Euratom.
EC membership was vetoed twice by France
1975 referendum on EU membership was 67% yes
caused trouble with obstructionist attitude of UK.
BBQ
opt-outs of EMU
obstruction of deeper integration of Amsterdam Treaty and reluctance in NIce
Opt-outs in Eurocrisis
Big part in slowing process of European integration
BREXITTTTT
36
Timeline of 2016 UK referendum on EU membership
1. David Cameron elected as tory PM
2. Massive win for UKIP in EP election
3. Cameron re-elected and announces EU referendum due to domestic pressure, which also came from within his party. This was a gamble to please his own party members, as he believed the UK would vote to stay in and he even campaigned for this.
4. EU proposes talks for a better deal with UK, if they choose to stay
5. Brexit referendum with 52% vote for leaving
37
Remain campaign Bexit
Key message for the remain campaign was that it may be bad now, but it will be worse if we leave. It would lose access to the EU single market, it would lead to a reduction of workers’ rights protection and it would decrease the stability of the country in general. It was a weak campaign, mostly about stability.
38
Leave campaign Brexit
Much stronger.
Boris Johnson more charismatic + new.
key message: ''lets take back control over our money, borders, our security and our taxes.''
They claimed it would lead to freedom.
Painted the EU as distant, unaccountable and elitist. Leaving would be beneficial for the ‘working people’ of this country, instead of the elitists. They even said: “the people of this country have had enough of experts”
39
Tabloids role in anti-EU sentiment
Populist character. Headlines such as: “EU wants to merge the UK with France”, “EU killers and rapists we’ve failed to report”, and “EU to ban selling eggs by the dozen”.
40
Factors in majority of leaving EU in UK
1. stronger campaign to leave than to stay
2. Tabloids populist headlines
3. lack of EU-know-how
4. Nationalist sentiment
41
Labiur versus conservative attitude towards EU switch
Initially Labour was Eurosceptic and Conservative pro-Europe.
This switched (Even divide in Conservatives, majority of the parliamentary votes to stay in EU came from Tories) due to economic issues becoming less important, while cultural and identity issues became more important.
42
Nationalist sentiment in UK
Sentiment that UK would still be a global superpower. Reinforced by the fact that UK still had the Commonwealth.
43
Aftermath of Brexit referendum timeline
1. Cameron resigns, Theresa May takes over
2. May triggers article 50 to leave, loses elections she called for; due wanted stronger mandate
3. May + EU get agreement on withdrawal, but rejected 3 times by British parliament, deadline for Brexit extended twice
4. Johnson takes over from May, asks for third extension and wins elec
5. Johnson passes withdrawal bill in Parliament and in EP
6. EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement agreed upon, end of transition period.
This was all over the course of 4 years lol
44
EU/UK negotiations main issues
1. What to do with UK citizens, who, due to EU-citizenship, moved to EU territory?
2. What to do with the Northern-Ireland/Ireland border? The EU and Ireland wanted it to be open, but UK didn’t want open borders on their territory
3. How to financially settle the split?
The EU did not want to discuss anything on how the relationship between the EU and the UK would be in the future, before they had agreement on the Irish border question, which is why this question is also called the Irish backstop.
45
Consequence Brexit for UK
1. Aspired to have a new, global role in the world. Due of this independent role, they were able to respond quicker to Russias invasion in Ukraine.
This did come with scepticism, because it meant they were cutting themselves off from international relations
2. Northern Ireland
issue resolved by opening borders between Ireland/Northern Ireland, but by checking on border between UK mainland and Northern Ireland.
3. Boost for mainly scottish, but also Welsh and Northern Irish independent movements to rejoin the EU.
46
Consequences of Brexit for the EU
1. Changing power relations, there was one major player less. (obstructionist one)
- more integration
- stronger Franco-German axis
2. Opportunity to reinvent EU.
Brexit was wake-up call to show that EU should do things different. Push towards a possible Treaty reform (pfffff nog een bhah)
3. Brexit vote was an inspiration for ideas of other countries to leave, especially pushed by far-right actors
47
Origins of neofunctionalism
1. Based on functionalism
Very first theory in International Relations that tried to explain the process of international cooperation through international organisations and a way to counter nationalism
2. focus on shared interest of states and non-state actors in international relations (monnet)
3. Mitrany (first functionalist) wanted to move beyond nationalism due to horrors of WWII and nationalism leading to wars.
48
Mitrany's functionalisms main idea
Do away with nation states and organising government based on functionality along territorial borders. This mismatch occurs between the lvel of structure of the problems and the level on which governments acto to solve it.
This creates pressures to jurisdictional reform.
This integrtion is achieved by incremental steps in technical policy areas, where citizens can really notice improvement.
* climate change/ security --> bigger issues than national solutions
* Monnet: ideas of incremental steps in policy areas surfaced in his time
49
Creation of neofunctionalism
Haas interested in functionalism + applied this to European integration to create neo-functionalism.
He was interested in suprantionalism, as he is jewish and had to flee du eto oppresive nation state + saw reconstruction in previous country after War.
50
Popularity of neo-functionalism
It is the main theory on EU funcitoning at the time (50s/60s)
due to being the first grand theory on the EU.
Due to stagnation of EU integratoin due to the Empty chair crisis in 60s/70s the theory faded to the background.
in the 80s/90s the theory had a revival due to empirical evidence for hypotheses and relevance.
51
2 principles of neofunctionalism
1. Self-sustainabilty
- Once EU integration is put into motion --> it will lead to more integration
2. Undirectionality --> there is one way and it is forward
52
3 hypotheses of neofunctionalism
1. Spillover hypothesis
2. Elite socialition hypothesis
2. Interest group hypothesis
53
Spill-over hypothesis
You do something with a goal in mind, only to find out that you need to do more or go further to achieve this goal.
Cooperation in one field, makes it necessary or creates pressure for cooperation in another.
In this case more policy areas means more effective integration.
--> Think of ECSC to Euratom or from open bordders to common migration and asylum policy
54
3 types of Spillover
1. Functional spillover:
- is caused by practical need for cooperation.
Example: industrial policy will lead to need of climate policy
2. Political spillover:
- is caused by societal actors demanding cooperation, which is usually done by usinng arguments of functional spillover.
3. Cultivated spillover:
caused by supranational actors demanding cooperation, such as European Commission.
The distinction between these are quite blurry
55
Elite socialisation hypothesis
Means that national elites have to work together and commit to cooperate on EU-level.
this is causing htei loyalties to shift from national to European level.
As politicians and elite engage in project of EU-integration, this causes loyalty shift.
Cooperation becomes the default solution, which means thatneofunctionalism assumes a transformation of preferences in EU-ntegration from an exception to the standard. Therefore, neofunctionalism is also called a transformative theory.
56
Interest group hypothesis
As supranational insitutions gain more authority --> interest groups will reorganise at EU-level and demand even more integraton.
(political spillover)
They will develop supranational interests due to supranational reorganisation + will cooperate with institutions for more integraton.
--> transformative
57
Link between spillover, elite socialisation and Europeanisation of interest groups
1. Europeanisation of interest groups + political spillover influence each other
2. elite socialisation + cultivated spillover influence each other
3. fuctional spillover influence political + cultivated spillover
3. political + cultivated spillover lead to integration, so all of this indirectly results in more integration
58
Assumptions neofunctionalists base their way of thinking on, which are conditions for the correctness of the theory
1. Permissive consensus
(representatives good for citizens)
2. Benighn elitism
(good elites)
3. Integration = postive-sum
4. Incrementalism combined with bounded rationality leads to crises
(no forseen consequences)
59
Permissive consensus
Assumption + condition neofuncionalism
--> Citizens will quietly support integration by the elites, because it brings them benefits
60
Benigh elitsm
Assumption and condition of neofunctionalism. Elites drive integration and operate in the best interest of the Europeans
61
Integration is positive-sum
assumption and condition of neofunctionalism.
--> integrton benefits everyone; there are no winners and losers in this cooperation
62
Incrementalism combined with bounded rationality leads to crisis
Assumption adn condition of neofunctionalism.
The principle of incrementalism (small policy changes based on compromises))
combined with the fact that there is bounded rationality (imperfect politicians) could lead to unintended consequences: crises.
63
Empirical critiques on neofunctionalism
1. There was an absence of European integratoin during 60-70s due to Empty Chair crisis:
this means that there was no automaticity (self-sustaining/ undirectional)
2. Publics did not follow elites, and thus did not keep up with permissive consensus --> which led to constrained consensus.
64
Theoretical critiques on neofunctioinalism
1. It underestimates the importance of individual leaders (such as De Gaulle, Thatcher, Merkel)
--> it only talks about elites + interest groups
2. it disregards conflict between or attitutes of national governments + fact that they may have different opions on issues/ integration
3. It can not explain beginning, ending or revversal of integration.
65
Origins of liberal intergovernmentalism
Moravcsik combined liberalism + intergovernmanetalism into liberal intergovernmentalism.
He claimed that neofunctionalism was overly comprehensive, incompletly specified and therefore not falsifiable.
He also added to the pluralist idea of neofunctionalism (policies are result of various pressure groups influence during decision-making process)
That this may be true, but according to Moravcsik: not all pressure groups have equal power + resources
66
Origins/ idea of intergovernmentalism
(Harvard- Internal relations)
‘’ European cooperation is not driven by spillover’’
1. States are unitary actors: meaning the entire government has the same opinion (on international level)
2. State interests in negotiations are shpaed by geopolitical + economic concerns
3. Indiivual deciison-makers matter (head of governments/ states)
67
Liberal part of liberal intergovernmentalism
1. Came from David Ricardo's economic liberalism + theory of comparative advantage.
Self-interested cooperation is beneficial for all participating states, even for economically weaker partners.
The comparative advantage means an economy's ability to produce particular goods or services at a lower realtive opportunity cost than another eocnomy.
This means that it is rational for both countries to specialise + trade with each other.
2. Putnam's two-level game: governments are both on international level in a game with other internatioinal actors, as well as on the domestic level with domestic actors.
68
4 core assumptions/ stages of Liberal Intergovernmentalism
1. National stage of preferencing
2. International stage of bargaining
3. International stage of delegating
4. National stage of selling
69
National stage of preferencingn (liberal intergovernmentalism)
Preferences are formed on national level.
1.These preferences are shaped by issue-specific conflicts, meaning that there is no overriding policy concern that always prevails.
2. These conflicts are between societal groups vying for the attention of governmental elites
70
international stage of bargaining liberal intergovernmentalism
Governments rationally defend interest of their state
1. The state is an unitary actor once it operates on international level
2. The interdependence between states is assymmetrical: uneven distribution of benefits of an agreements
3. States have market power + states with larger markets are more attractive partners
4. Exit power or availabilty o foutside options strenghtens bargaining position of state,
therefore states with larger markets can threaten non-participation
5. in conclusion: market power + exit power = political power
71
International stage of delegating liberal intergovernmentalism
International negotiations are purely intergovernmental
1. The Supranational institutions have no role in negotiating, but only in delegating these decisions, so that netural institutions can acto on them.
2. The Suprantional insititutions are efficient, for theylower:transaction costs, by lowering:
* information costs (Expertise)
* Coordination costs (resources)
* enforcement costs (compliance)
3. The supranational isnitutions create credible commitment: by having other coutnries giving away control + sovereignty to supranational institutions
4. Supranational insitutions can facilitate, but not drive integration: they are passive actors: no power to push their preferences
72
National stage of selling liberal intergovernmentalism
Naitonal governmetns employ a two-level strategy
with the aim to overcome domestic oppostion more succesfully:
1. unpopular decisions are blamed on Europe
2. Popular decisions are taken national political credit for
(Schelling's paradox reversed)
73
Schellings paradox
In bargaining, weakness is often strengt.
The constrained negotiator can squeeze the range of indeterminacy to the point most favourable to him.
A state with a domestic weak position can demand more in international negotiations: it must present an agreeable deal at domestic front.
74
Schellings paradox reversed
unpopular decisions made by national governments are blamed on EU
75
Empirical critiques of liberal intergovernmentalism
1. It is limited to big treaty reforms + there is no explanation for ordinary legislative procedures + how these supranationalist institutions function
when it comes to European integration.
2. Liberal intergovernmentalism is applied selectively (vertification bias)
--> Moravscik would not apply his theory to cases which disprove his theory
3. Moravsciks sources are not verifiable (mentioning document/interviews that were never found)
76
Theoretical critiques on liberal intergovernmentalism
1. Moravscik uses the outcome to explain what the interests of states were before decision was made
2. Liberal intergovernmentalism does not cover supranational organisations + transnational interest groups properly
3. Two-level game does not refelct multilevel European Union
4. Conception of state interests is mainly in economic terms
5. Influence of international bargains on domestic preferences is not covered.
77
Creation of Post-functionalism
Hooghe + Marks came up with the theory of postfunctionalism
They were not satisfied with neofunctionalism + liberal intergovernmentalism, because these thoeries conceive EU integraiton as a cooperative process among interest groups and governmens
78
Origins of postfunctionalism
1. Inspiration from comparative politics:
The idea of party competition being key to understanding how party-based democratic political sysems work. For example far left + far right being more Eurosceptic than middle.
2. Political sociology: identity formation. Who belongs to a community? Political cleavages: how are different social groups structured?
3. Politicial psychology: what shapes voter's opinions and attitudes?
Priming --> what information is presented
framing --> how is the information presented
Cueing --> linking information to values
are all important
4. Multi-level governance. Effective governance involves many different levels with the principal of subsidiarity .
Poli5. ticisation. Tries to incorporate politicisation of the EU in EU integration thinking.
79
Idea behind Postfunctionalism
the GAL-TAN cleavage (Green, Alternative, Libertarian versus Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalists)
This cleavage has been the cleavage since early 2000s.
They believed that the political spectrum was no longer based on original cleavages + familiar horizontal left-right specttrum
but there is another axis: the vertical GAL-TAN one.
80
The core assumptions of postfunctionalism
1. Functionality + effiency are not sufficient to ensure public support
(suggestion of neofunctionalism: organising governments at level in which issues occur
2. Public opion affects voting on EU matters, and therefore EU integration
3. EU integration also affects public opinion
4. States do not have monopoly on representation
(which liiberal intergovernmentalism suggests: states are unitary actors)
Political parties are key in integraton
5. Public opinon on EU is structured along economic + identity cleavages, identity is often decisive.
81
Postfuncitonalists model on how European integration works
1. Mismatch between the ''form (jurisdictional framework) and the pressure to keep functioning leading to a discussion on reform
2. Public/ interestgroups pick up on discussion + role of political parties is central to how discussion evolves
3. Arena rules are the formal rules --> that steer a discussion into a certain area
4. Issues go to the mass-arena when discussion is politicised, with an identity (gal/tan) or distributional (eocnomic left/right)
There is also the interest griup-arena: where the discussion goes if it is depoliticissed: there is business as usual and distributional logic
5. The conflict is structured according to a certain logic: resulting from the choice of the arena.
An idenity logic leads to GAL-TAN sepctrum where as an economic/logic issues goes towards distributional (economic left/right) spectrum
82
Empirical critique on postfunctionalism
The empirical critique on postfunctionalism is that it does not explain integration despite politicisation. (For example Eurocrisis where there was a lot of politicisation, but more integration)
83
Theoretical critique on postfunctionalism
Theory is vauge on how identities are constructed and change
84
Aftermath of postfunctionalist model
More itnegration makes it so:
1. European Union issues more ofen end up in mass arena
2. There is more GAL-TAN polarisation in public opinion and party systems
2. There will be even more issues in mass arena
4. There will be even more polarization
85
Core idea of institutional approaches
institutions regulate human behaviour.
institons here can be defined as set of norms + rules that structure social interactions.
(Moral/ legal rules, role expectations, organisations)
86
Key features by which institutions are recognizable
1. institutions are structural boundaries on social behaviour
2. institutions are the product of social interactions, including power imbalances
3. insitiutions are sticky/ stable/ durable, but can change over time
4. institutions are generally perceived as legitimate
5. insititutions can generally be enforced
87
Institutional approaches: what shapes human behaviour?
Socialisation camp; social structures cause individual behaviour
Autonomy camp: human agency causes social structure
the 2 are interconnected
88
three different ways of looking at institutions
1. Rational choice institutionalism
2. Historical institutionalism
3. Sociological institutionalism
89
Rational choice institutionalism
1. Institutions are set up by rational actors to maximise their utility
2. institutuions subsequently constrain agency of these actors
90
Historical insitutionalism
1. Has the same principle as Rational Choice institutionalism
2. On top of that: it focues on how institutions change over time.
3. On top of that: it focuses on how earlier choices constrain future ones
91
Sociological insittutionalism
1. Human agents do not exist independently form insitutuions
2. norms, values and meaning-making shape institutions
3. intistitutions shpae norms, values and meaning-making
92
Assumptions of rational choicse institutionalism
1. Actors are boundedly rational meaningly they behave strategically to maximise utility in a given situation
2. norms and rules may constrain actors strategic behaviour, but they may also enable specific courses of action, as effect of institution.
in other words: institutions can both constrain + support interests of actors
3. institutions are rules of the game
(game theory)
93
Areas ratonal choice insittuinalism has covered
1. spacial voting
2. coalition formation
3. principle-agent framework
4. veto player analysis
94
joint- decision trap
If there is a situation where national governments are taking decisions, every country has a veto and a situation where the status quo will stay when there is no decision made.,
the lowest level at which a policy works will be accepted.
Not everyone will be happy, but its the lowest denominator solutions (CAP is example)
95
Theoretical critiques on rational choice insitutionalism
1. Actors do not have perfect information
2. Actors are not perfectly rational
3. There is no focus on insitutional change
4. a very narow concept of utility, with no room for norms, values and culture
96
Important terms in historical insitutionalism
1. Sunk costs --> costs that have already been incurred (favor of time) and are unrecoverable
2. Switching costs --> costs associated with switching to alternatives (factor of change)
3. Sunk cost fallacy --> the wrong idea that sunk costs are too valuable to throw away, even though changin is very much worth it.
4. increasing returns --> how actors adapt their beahviour to existing insitutions and benefit from their stability.
5. Network externalities: the more an institution is used, the more beneficial it is for all users.
97
Focus on historical institutionalism and how institutions are seen
How institutions develop over time
Institutions as:
1. Standard operating procedures
2. The way things are done
3. Stabilising forces over time
98
Key concept in historical institutionalism
Path dependency: the decisions you make now decide the opportunities and decisions you will face later.
This can be in the form of psoitive feedback loops, which means that positive experiences in the past can create opportunities in the future
99
Path deviation
related to path dependency
Gradual change caused by negative feedback loops
For example: vetos block EU integration a lot; so eventually there can be a desie to change the concept of vetoing
100
Path departure of radical change
Related to path dependency: caused by an exogenous schock (crisis)
for example: Eurocrisis, steps taken after can be seen as radical change
101
Theoretical critiques on istorical insitutionalism
1. It is a description, rather than explanation
2. It cannot explain exogenous shocks (crises)
102
Normative critique on historical insitutionalism
it is confirmatory of status-que.
it says things are just the way they are, because of what they were
103
Starting point of sociological insitutionalsim
critiques the other two. Constructivism is used as alternative
104
Assumptions of sociological institutionalism
1. it applies a subjectivies epistemology:
what we know about reality and how we learn it is subjective.
Reality is mental construct, it is perceived through the mind
2. It is embedded in critical theory, which is about how collective consturciton of reality is based on chances and not 100% verifiable hard facts.
it can be intentionally influenced.
3. it is related to social constructivsm, claiming human behaviour depends on interpretation of ''real'' world
105
Empirical critique of sociological insitutionalism
can not show how ideas work (what causes them/ shapes them)
106
Key concept of sociological insitutioinalism
norms, values, meaning-making shape insitutions shape norms, values, and meaning-making
Key concept is Europeanisation: process through which EU political and eoncomic dnamics become part of organisational logic of national politics + policy-making
107
Theoretical critique on sociological institutionalism
Role of material interests is moslty ignored
108
normative critique on sociological insitutionalism
Constructivists ignore the international manipulaion of actors mental constructions
109
3 core assumptions of governance approaches
1. inegration processes evolve unevenly in different policy fields.
2. integration processes are both intergovernmental as supranational.
3. integration procesess are driven by both public and private actors, from various levels.
110
Origins of governance approaches
1. approaches came about due to crisis of 70s and 80s.
There was a lot of public mis-management + new public management to run the government as a business
2. in this period there was also a lot of corporaton decision-making.
Where government faciliated grand bargains between different trade unions and employers, instead of fulling a more hierarchical role.
3. discourse on what good governance is.
111
goal of governance approaches
understand an overflow of governing structures + mechansism in EU
as well as these different actors involved in EU policy implementation, and
to understand the administrative procedures + agencies
112
definition of governance
a set of insitutionalised modes of coordination through which collectively binding decisions are adopted and implemented to provide common goods.
113
Key points governance theory
We have moved from simply having a government to actual governance actors involved in providing public goods in a coordinated instutionalised way. The government is involved in governance, but governance is not exclusively the business of governments; it is broader.
114
Key concepts governance theory
1. Multilevel governance
2. Coordination dilemma
3. types of coordination
4. EU governance models
115
Multilevel governance
Effective governance involves many different levels.
There have been formulated 2 ideal types of multi-level governance.
Because they are ideal: they will never exactly be like this.
There is a fragmented type 1 and fluid type 2.
National governments are more type 1, and EU is more type 2
116
Type 1 multilevel governance
Fragmented
1. General-purpose jurisdiction based on community
2. jurisdictions do not intersect at any level
3. Tehre is a limited number of jurisdictions and they are organised in a limited number of level
4. there is a lasting, system-wide architecture
117
Type 2 of multilevel governance
Fluid:
1. it has more task-specific jurisdiciton, based on policy area
2. jurisdictions are inersecting at all levels
3. there is an unlimited number of jurisdictions and there is no liimit to the number of jurisdictions
4. Architecture is more ad-hoc, making them fluid + exist in size or ata all depending on urgency or elvancy of issue
118
Coordination dilemmas
Due to spillovers to different policy areas, some coordination is needed
between jurisdictions, which is conceived as second-order coordination problem,
because it involves coordination among institutions that coordinate human acivity in order to
solve a societal problem that different institutions have. (first-order coordinaitno)
119
EU governance models
1. Supranational joint decision making: co-decision
2. Supranational delegation : Member States permitting EU to decide
--> decisions are as apolitical as possible
3. Political competition: intergovernmental disagreement + competition
4. inter- and transgovernmental networks cooperating agencies to regulate some policies, no hierarchy
5. intergovernmental coordination
6 Corporatism
7. Public-private partnerships (such as on research + innovation)
120
Theoretical criques on governance approaches theory
1. It may provide useful heuristic + description, but it does not offer analytically relevant, causal explanations
2. Role of nation-states as possible veto players is underestimated in many governance approaches
3. Governance approaches tend to ignore political conflict + power imbalances:
- it is about coordination + cooperation and not about conflict.
