The right to effective assistance of counsel Flashcards
Strickland v Washington
Facts
During a 10-day period in September 1976, David Washington committed a series of violent crimes, including three stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft.
After his accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to the police and confessed. He was indicted for kidnapping and murder, among other charges, and was appointed an experienced criminal lawyer. Washington pleaded guilty to all charges, including the capital murder charges, against his lawyer’s advice.
At the sentencing hearing, his counsel did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination, judging that evidence concerning Washington’s character and emotional state would not overcome the evidentiary effect of his confessions. The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances and sentenced Washington to death for each of the three counts of murder.
Issue
The central issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant’s conviction or death sentence must be set aside due to the Constitution’s requirement that counsel’s assistance at trial or sentencing be effective. Specifically, the case addresses the standards for judging a defendant’s claim that their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.
Holding
The Supreme Court held that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or a fair sentencing proceeding. The Court found that Washington failed to meet both prongs of this test and therefore affirmed the denial of his claim.
Reasoning
Justice O’Connor, delivering the opinion of the Court, outlined a two-part test for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, which means that counsel made errors so serious that they were not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, it must be shown that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, meaning there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
The Court concluded that Washington’s counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue additional character or psychological evidence due to the overwhelming evidence against Washington. This strategic choice was within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Moreover, Washington failed to demonstrate prejudice as the omitted evidence would not have changed the outcome of the sentencing due to the aggravating factors of the crimes committed. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel’s strategy through the distorting effects of hindsight.
**Justice Marshall argues that the majority’s “standard of reasonableness” for attorney performance is too vague and malleable, potentially leading to inconsistent application across different courts. He fears that the standard effectively tells courts very little, leaving judges to rely on their personal intuitions about what constitutes professional representation. This, according to Marshall, abdicates the Court’s responsibility to provide a clear constitutional interpretation and hinders the development of more detailed standards that could better guide defense counsel’s performance.
Critique of the Prejudice Standard
Marshall objects to the majority’s requirement that a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s errors. He points out the inherent difficulty in retrospectively assessing how a trial might have unfolded with competent legal representation, noting that seemingly strong cases can be dismantled by skilled defense counsel. Marshall contends that the requirement to demonstrate prejudice imposes an undue burden on defendants, particularly when the record may not fully capture the impact of counsel’s incompetence.
Moreover, Marshall argues that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel serves not only to prevent wrongful convictions but also to ensure that convictions are obtained through fundamentally fair procedures. He believes that any departure from the standards of effective assistance violates the defendant’s constitutional rights, regardless of whether the defendant can demonstrate specific prejudic
Padilla v Kentucky
Facts
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 40 years, faced deportation after pleading guilty to drug trafficking charges in Kentucky. Padilla, who had served honorably in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War, was advised by his counsel that he did not need to worry about immigration consequences due to his long residency in the U.S. This advice turned out to be incorrect, as his conviction made him subject to automatic deportation under U.S. immigration law. Padilla claimed that he would have insisted on going to trial had he been properly informed about the deportation risks associated with his guilty plea.
Issue
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to inform him that his guilty plea would result in deportation from the United States. The case centered on whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel extends to advice regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.
Holding
The Supreme Court held that counsel must inform a client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation, marking a departure from the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision. The Court concluded that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised Padilla that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. The decision underscored that deportation is an integral part—sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.
Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning focused on the drastic changes in federal immigration law over the years, which have made deportation a nearly inevitable consequence for noncitizens convicted of certain crimes. The Court observed that the landscape of federal immigration law has changed significantly, with a broad class of deportable offenses and limited judicial discretion to prevent deportation. This evolution has increased the importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes. The Court rejected the distinction between direct and collateral consequences, finding that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court applied the two-pronged Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, focusing on whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Court determined that Padilla’s counsel’s failure to provide accurate advice about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea constituted deficient representation under the Sixth Amendment. The case was remanded to determine if Padilla was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance, a determination not reached by the lower court.
