1
Q
the problem of evil
A
- uses the existence of evil in the world to argue that God (as defined in the concept of God) does not exist
- these arguments can be divided into two forms:
1. the logical problem of evil - deductive argument that says the existence of God is logically impossible given the existence of evil in the world
2. the evidential problem of evil - an inductive argument which says that, while it is logically possible that God exists, the amount of evil and unfair ways it is distributed in our world is pretty strong evidence that God doesn’t exist
2
Q
evil
A
- evil is any kind of suffering
- moral evil - evil that comes from human choices
- natural evil - evil that comes from a natural source
3
Q
what is god like
A
- omnipotent - all powerful
- omnibenevolent - all good
- omniscient - all knowing
- omnipresent - exists everywhere
- many philosophers think that an omnipotent being would have to be omniscient and omnipresent, so sometimes these do not get mentioned as it is assumed they are covered by omnipotence
4
Q
deduction and induction
A
arguments can be divided into two kinds:
- deductive: an argument where the conclusion follows logically from the premises - if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true
- inductive: an argument where the conclusion is evidentially supported by the premises - if the premises are true, then the conclusion is very likely to be true
5
Q
the logical problem of evil
A
- if god were all powerful, he would have the ability to stop evil
- if god were all loving, he would want to stop evil
- if god had the ability to stop evil and wanted to stop evil, then evil would not exist
- evil exists
- therefore, god is not all powerful, or not all loving, or both
- the logical problem of evil claims that it is impossible for god to exist, and for there to be any amount of evil in the world
6
Q
the evidential problem of evil
A
- there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good, or permitting some evil equally bad or worse
- an omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse
- (therefore) there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being (Rowe 1979:336)
7
Q
the factual premise
A
- premise 1 is a statement of fact: there exists gratuitous evil
- gratuitous evil is any evil where there is no reason that would justify permitting that evil to exist
- Rowe’s example: ‘in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. in the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering’
- Rowe claims that it is very likely that something like this has happened, and that no good has come from it
- so, it is very likely gratuitous evil exists
8
Q
the theological premise
A
- premise 2 above is the theological premise: a statement about what religion claims about god
- it is less controversial than premise 1
- it claims that god would prevent any suffering that was not achieving some greater good
- one exception is William Hasker: he argues against premise 2 - if god did not allow gratuitous evil, we would have no reason to try to stop evil
9
Q
theodicy
A
- theodicy - a justification of god in the face of the presence of evil
- a response to the logical problem only requires showing that it is possible for god and evil to both exist
- a response to the evidential problem requires showing that the existence of evil does not make it likely that god does not exist
10
Q
response to the logical problem of evil - good could not exist without evil
A
- without evil, good couldn’t exist
- Mackie’s response: imagine if we lived in a world where everything was red, presumably, we wouldn’t have created a word for ‘red’, nor would we know what it meant if someone tried to explain it to us. But it would still be the case that everything is red, we just wouldn’t know - God could have created a world in which there was no evil. Like the red example, we wouldn’t have the concept of evil. But it would still be the case that everything is good – we just wouldn’t be aware of it
11
Q
response to the logical problem of evil - the world is better with some evil than none at all
A
- some evil is necessary for certain types of good
- e.g., you could not be courageous (good) without having to overcome fear of pain, death, etc. (evil)
- we can define first and second order goods: first order good (e.g., pleasure), second order good (e.g., courage)
- second order goods seek to maximise first order goods
- and second order goods are more valuable than first order goods
- but without first order evils, second order goods couldn’t exist
- Mackie’s response: if we accept that first order evil is necessary for second order good to exist, how is second evil order explained; second order evils seek to maximise first order evils such as pain, so, for example, malevolence or cruelty are examples of second order evils. But we could still have a world in which people were courageous (second order good) in overcoming pain (first order evil) without these second order evils
- so why would an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God allow the existence of second order evils if there is no greater good in doing so?
12
Q
response to the logical problem of evil - we need evil for free will
A
- we can develop the second order evil argument above further and argue that second order evil is necessary for free will
- and free will is inherently such a good and valuable thing that it outweighs the bad that results from people abusing free will to do evil things
- so, while allowing free will brings some suffering, the net good of having free will is greater than if we didn’t
- therefore, it’s logically possible that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow evil (both first order and second order) for the greater good of free will
- Mackie’s response: an omnipotent God can create any logically possible world, if it’s logically possible to freely choose to act in a way that’s good on one occasion, then it’s logically possible to freely choose to act in a way that’s good on every occasion
- so, an omnipotent God could create a world in which everyone freely chooses to act in a way that’s good, there is a logically possible world with both free will and without second order evils
- this, surely, would be the best of both worlds and maximise good most effectively: you would have second order goods, plus the good of free will, but without second order evils, this is a logically possible world – the logically possible world with the most good
- so, why wouldn’t an omnipotent and omniscient God create this specific world? Second order evils do not seem logically necessary, and yet they exist
13
Q
evil in an ancient world
A
- for many ancient philosophers, the existence of evil was explained by some fundamental evil in the world
- e.g., Plato thought the matter was inherently evil (chaotic and disordered), and that the forms were good (they brought order to the physical world)
- for monotheists, this cannot be correct as that would mean that god would have created evil
14
Q
Augustine
A
- Augustine claimed that god created everything and that he made all things good
- why is evil even possible
- Augustine claimed that if something good exists, then evil is always possible because evil is a privation of good
- evil is the absence of something good, e.g., sickness is the absence of a well functioning body
- Augustine thought this explained why evil was possible, but not why it actually exists
15
Q
free will
A
- Augustine thought that human free will explains the existence of evil
- god gave humans free will and humans have used that to bring about evil
- therefore, god is not responsible
- two key claims:
1. god cannot stop us freely choosing evil
2. free will is a significant moral good
16
Q
objection to free will - free will is not worth it
A
- is it really better to have free will and evil, than to be happy automatons
- reply: reasons for thinking free will is a moral good - it is required for relationships (with god and other humans), it is required for a morally significant life
17
Q
objection to free will - why cannot god just make us choose good
A
- if god is all powerful, he can make us choose instead of evil
- reply - this is logically impossible, if god forces us, then it is not free will
- counter reply - (Mackie) ‘if there is no logical impossibility in a man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on serval, occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion’
- Mackie claims it must be possible for god to make beings that freely always choose good
18
Q
theodicy v. defence
A
- to try to answer the question, ‘why does god allow evil’, to give a reason, is to offer a theodicy
- to try to show only that god’s existence is logically compatible with evil is to offer a defence
- this does not require that we discover the true explanation for why evil exists - perhaps we cannot know
- Plantinga claims that we cannot only offer a defence because we cannot know all of the god’s reasons
19
Q
Plantinga’s free will defence
A
- a world containing creatures that are significantly free is better than a world containing no free creatures
- god can create significantly free creatures
- to be significantly free is to be capable of both moral good and moral evil
- if significantly free creatures were caused to do only what is right, they would not be free
- therefore, god cannot cause significantly free creatures to do only what is right
- therefore, god can only eliminate the moral evil done by significantly free creature by eliminating the greater good of significantly free creatures
- the conclusion is not defended as true, but as possible
- if it is possible, then the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of god
20
Q
transworld depravity
A
- if it is possible for a free person to always choose the good, then cannot god bring about that possibility
- Plantinga says no
- he says that there are facts about how a person would choose if created
- a person with transworld depravity is one who always choose some evil in any possible world were they have morally significant freedom
- Plantinga says that is possible that all possible persons are transworld depraved
- therefore, it may not be possible for god to create a world with morally significant free will and no evil
21
Q
objection to free will - natural evil
A
- but appealing to free will only deals with moral evil, what about natural evil
- Plantinga’s reply - it is possible that satan exists and that natural evil is the effects of his actions, so natural evil is a form or consequence of moral evil
- therefore, it is possible that god can only eliminate natural evil by eliminating the greater good of significantly free creatures
- the conclusion is not asserted as true, but as possible
- it is possible that there is no better balance of good and evil than the one that exists
22
Q
the evidential problem and free will
A
- perhaps free will can show that it is possible that god and evil co exist, but that does not show that it is likely
- in other words, does this give us a response to the evidential problem of evil
- Plantinga’s reply - the free will defence is not supposed to show that god’s existence is likely, he claims that his argument shows that evil does not give us evidence for or against god’s existence
23
Q
objection to free will - specific instance of evil
A
- Plantinga only considers that ‘total amount’ of evil, rather than kinds and distribution of evil or specific instances (e.g., Rowe’s fawn)
- it is these that provide evidence that a better balance is possible
- is free will so good that god would never interfere with it: is a better or more limited type of free will possible; in particular is satan’s free will so good as to justify all natural evil; surely god could occasionally interfere with free will
24
Q
response to the specific instance of evil objection
A
- perhaps god has interfered, such instances would be considered miracles
- god would keep these to a minimum because otherwise our free will would cease to be morally significant
- morally significant free will requires that we are able to reasonably predict the consequences of our actions (if we could not, it would not be possible to judge whether an action would have a good or bad outcome)
- prediction requires that we live is law governed world, with laws we can comprehend
- if god frequently preformed miracles, then our world would not be rule governed, and we would not have morally significant free will
- counter reply: Rowe’s fawn - does this explain the suffering of the fawn in the forest fire, how would our free will be undermined if god prevented that
- reply - maybe god did prevent it, perhaps god prevents all evils that free beings are unaware of since they are not required to preserve free will
25
natural evil as a form of moral evil
- the free will defence explains why an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow moral evil
- but it doesn’t explain natural evil
- when innocent people are killed in natural disasters, it doesn’t seem this is the result of free will
- so, even if an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow moral evil, why does this kind of evil exist as well?
- Plantinga argues that it’s possible natural evil is the result of non-human actors such as Satan, fallen angels, demons, etc. - this would make natural evil another form of moral evil, the existence of which would be explained by free will
- even if this doesn’t sound very plausible, it’s at least possible
- Plantinga’s argument is that we only need to show evil is not logically inconsistent with God’s existence to defeat the logical problem of evil
26
Hick - vale of soul making
- we are unfinished creations
- stage 1 - evolution of creatures capable of a relationship with god
- stage 2 - individual development towards virtue and relationship with god
- this process requires evil - becoming good is a process that happens over time
- such virtuous development is impossible unless thee is evil to respond to and correct
- this applies to both natural and moral evils
- god does not seek to minimise pain, because it enables us to develop
27
virtue and value
- god can create creatures with 'ready made' virtues
- but the virtues we achieve that result from challenges, discipline, and overcoming temptation, are 'good in a richer and more valuable sense'
- and god cannot create beings that respond to god in authentic faith and love without free will
28
objections to Hick
- animal suffering - animals do not grow spiritually, so how is the natural evil that they suffer justified
- terrible evils - it is plausible that terrible evils are really necessary for our moral and spiritual growth (are they worth it)
- pointless evils - a great deal of evil does not (appear to) contribute to spiritual growth (evil that does not achieve anything)
29
Hick - animals
- animals live in the present without fear of death or of future pains or dangers
- and to be alive means to be subject to pain (much of our suffering they do not share, e.g., self pity)
- objection - would not a world without animals and their pain be better, why did god even create animals
- Hick's response - in such a world, we would lose our 'cognitive freedom' : to respond to god freely, we need to be able to understand the world as one in which god does not exist, animals provide such an account of our existence (life without god = what is like to be an animal)
- thus, animals are necessary for our development
30
Hick - terrible evils
- terrible evils are terrible in contrast to more 'ordinary' evils
- if we remove the terrible ones, the next to terrible ones will seem exceptional, and we will wonder why those are permitted
- if we remove more evils, the world with little evil is also a world with little human freedom, responsibility, and development
31
Hick - pointless evil
- evil that appears not to contribute to soul making cannot be rationalised
- however, the existence of such irrational evils is part of the process of soul making
- imagine such a world in which we knew, on every occasion when someone suffered, that it was for the best, we would lack deep sympathy, faith, and hope
- for us to develop, it must look like evil is unjustified
32
Hick - life after death
- unless evil does lead to development, it is unjustified
- therefore, there must be life after death
- in fact, there must be universal salvation
33
soul making
- Hick argues that humans are unfinished beings
- part of our purpose in life is to develop personally, ethically and spiritually – he calls this ‘soul making’
- it would be impossible for people to display (second order) virtues such as courage without fear of (first order) evils such as pain or death
- similarly, we couldn’t learn virtues such as forgiveness if people never treated us wrongly
- of course, God could just have given us these virtues right off the bat
- but, Hick says, virtues acquired through hard work and discipline are 'good in a richer and more valuable sense'
- there are some virtues, such as a genuine and authentic love of God, that cannot simply be given (otherwise they wouldn’t be genuine)
- this explanation goes some way towards explaining why God would allow the amount and distribution of evil we see
- he then addresses some specific examples of evils that may not seem to fit with an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god
metaphysics of god
flashcards
Decks in class (6)
# Cards
