The Middle East: Chapter 3 [Tension and Conflict, 1956 - 1973] Flashcards
1
Q
NASSER AND ARAB AIMS [CAIRO CONFERENCE OF 1964]
A
- UAR failed
- Syria disputing Israel over River Jordan
- Nasser determined to show leadership so invited Arabs to Cairo Conference classifying Israel wanting to divert sources of River Jordan as threat to all Arabs
- Headwater Diversion Plan: Egyptian and Saudi money used to divert 2/3 of river’s sources and prevent them from flowing into Sea of Galilee where Israel would channel fresh water from them for farms and settlements
- failure of above plan = Arabs to prepare for war to destroy Israel
- PLO [united, lead and care for welfare of Palestinians in refugee camps] set up and they set PLA
- Nasser proved anti-Israeli beliefs without war
2
Q
IMPACT ON ISRAEL
A
- not threatened immediately = Egyptian and Syrian forces were poorly trained
- had French and American equipment
- peacekeepers in Sinai
- PLA had only 12,000 soldiers
- April 1967: Israeli airstrikes in Syria to prevent Headwater Diversion Plan
- 6 day war caused
3
Q
FATAH
A
- PLO and PLA made no difference to most Palestinians
- 1959: Arafat founded Fatah
- rejected PLO, believed Israel shouldn’t exist and that Palestinians could no longer wait for other Arabs to solve their problems
- prepared to use violence
- BUt Fatah = small and unknown and many abandoned it for PLA
- 1 January 1965: destroyed Israel’s Sea of Galilee Canal to win back support
- failure = bomb defused by Israelis
- Israeli publicity of act made Arafat gain fame and appear heroic
- thousand sto Fatah
4
Q
SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR FATAH
A
- launched 100 raids from Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian bases
- Syria provided weapons, funds, explosives and training
- Feb 1966: new gov increased Fatah support and accused Nasser of doing nothing [Nasser signed defence pact]
- Fatah raids = failures not destroying and provoking retaliation on Jordan and Lebanon
- both nations lessened in support for Arafat’s tactics
- BUT Arafat’s popularity grew
5
Q
ISRAELI SAMU RAIDS [13 NOV 1966]
A
- 11 Nov: 3 Israelis killed and 6 injured driving over landmine on Jordanian border
- King Hussein wrote letter of condolence to Levi Eshkol wanting no retaliation
- arrived too late
- 600 Israeli troops, 60 vehicles and 11 tanks into Arab Samu settlement in West Bank
- 100 Jordanian soldiers found raid
- 15 Jordanians, 3 villagers and 1 Israeli killed
- Samu reduced to ruins
6
Q
CONSEQUENCES
A
- Eshkol criticized by Israelis and UN
- USA = furious = Eshkol had destroyed relations with Jordan [only US ally in region and only country trying for peace with Israel]
- almost destroyed King Hussein
- protests and riots regarding failure to protect Palestinians in Jordan
- abandoned Israeli peace efforts to fix image
- couldn’t afford war so tried stopping Fatah attacks from West Bank
- above = conflict of interests = no one believed his ‘anti-Israeliness’
- accused Nasser of cowardice and hiding behind UN to defend reputation
7
Q
DOG FIGHT [7 APRIL 1967]
A
- Syrians attacked Israeli tractor in DMZ by Sea of Galilee
- Israeli retaliation with aeroplanes that hit Syrian Golan Heights villages
- Syrians sent jets
- Israelis shot down 6 Syrian jets and chased rest to Damascus
8
Q
TENSION GROWS [ACTIONS OF USSR AND NASSER]
A
- Israel demanded end of Syrian support of Fatah raids
- 13 May 1967: USSR told Nasser Israel would attack Syria
- Nasser under pressure [defence pact and Hussein’s accusations]
- began fierce anti-Israel propaganda campaign
- Nasser believed Eshkol weak and Arab victory possible
- 15 May: Egyptian troops to Sinai
- 16 May: UN troops told to leave
- 18 May: UN left and Egyptian troops to Israeli border
- 23 May: Nasser closed Straits [and therefore oil and trade]
- 29 May: demanded Israel return land stolen in 1948-49 and allow Palestinians to return home
- 30 May: signed defence treaty with Jordan and Jordanian troops under Egyptian general
- Israel [300,000 soldiers and 300 jets] vs. Arabs [500,000 soldiers and 900 jets]
9
Q
ISRAEL AND USA
A
- Eshkol didn’t give in to demands
- Israel on military alert with reserves called up
- shelters dug and parks consecrated and prepared to become mass cemetaries
- emergency appeals pushed Israelis abroad to donate and fly in
- Eshkol reluctant to move first bu Straits had to be reopened
- hoped for USA intervention which didn’t come
- USA supported Israel reopening Straits themselves
- 4 June 1967: Moshe Dayan pushed for Israeli surprise attack on Arab armies in Straits
- Israeli gov agreed and pretended to announce reserve troops could go home for weekend
10
Q
THE SIX DAY WAR [5 JUNE - 10 JUNE 1967]
A
- Israel attacked
- Israeli air force set off for Egypt where 309/340 aircraft destroyed and 19 airfields bombed by midday
- then Syrian and Jordanian airfields targeted winning sky supremacy
- IDF tanks moved across Sinai and destroyed Egyptian tanks
- 7 June: Israel reached Suez and fighting Jordan in Jerusalem [won East]
- 8 June: IDF took West Bank ignoring Jordanian ceasefire request
- 9 June: IDF took Golan Heights advancing 50km into Syria
- 10 June: Israeli acceptance of UN ceasefire
11
Q
ISRAELI GAINS AND TACTICS
A
- victory
- 779 deaths vs. 200,000 deaths, aircraft and tank destruction and land loss
- pre-emptive strike [use of surprise]
- ensured air control first
- took enemies one at a time
- IDF = well-trained and motivated
- superior tanks and weaponry
12
Q
ARAB WEAKNESSES
A
- unprepared
- poorly trained and equipped
- agreed to truces at different times
13
Q
IMPACT ON EGYPT
A
- Nasser humiliated
- Egyptian forces destroyed and Sinai and Gaza taken
- Suez blocked by sunken ships
- Egypt rearmed with Soviet aid and began bombarding and raiding Israelis in Sinai and near Suez
- Israeli warship and fierce Israeli retaliation by bombs [on cities and refineries] and raids destroyed economy
- 1970: War of Attrition over Suez killing Israelis and causing 1.5 million Egyptians to flee
- USSR gave Egypt fighter planes and SAM-3 missiles to defend Aswan Dam and sent 20,000 troops to build missile bases
- USA supplied weapons and aid to Israel
- 1970: ceasefire
14
Q
IMPACT ON ISRAEL
A
- victory
- East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai and Golan Heights won
- 350% bigger
- captured Soviet weapons
- high morale
- BUT problems of what to do with land
- Giving It Back: taking land = illegal and if land unreturned problems will be caused therefore Land for Peace = only way forward
- Keeping It: growing Israeli population needs land and resources, greater territories = greater security and border control and captured lands = Promised Lands given by God
- had to consider International Law [cannot annex or indefinitely occupy territory gained by force and cannot bring own people to live there], Arabs [annexing would mean 1 million Arabs become citizens and vote and almost outnumber Jews] and Military Occupation [expensive, resented by Palestinians and criticized internationally]
15
Q
TERRITORIAL SIGNIFICANCE
A
- East Jerusalem: Wailing Wall and Temple Mount = holiest [Israel] vs. Dome of Rock and Al-Aqsa = holiest [Arabs]
- West Bank: bufferzone to Jordan, growing population needs fertile land of River Jordan and part of Promised Land [Israel] vs. home to 600,000 and already annexed by Jordan [Arabs]
- Gaza: clamp down on Fedayeen raids [Israel] vs. home to 350,000 and occupied by Egypt since 1948 who allowed some self-governance [Arabs]
- Sinai: bufferzone to Egypt and trade through Straits safer and useful oil resources [Israel] vs. belongs to Egypt, contains only Egyptian oil supplies and occupation would prevent collection essential Suez tolls [Arabs]
- Golan Heights: Syria no longer able to fire on farms in Galilee if occupied and invaluable fresh water and fertile land [Israel] vs. can threaten by firing on Syria, home to 100,000 and important fertile land and fresh water [Arabs]
- extreme left view of returning land = ignored
- Communists had little Knesset influence
- East Jerusalem = annexed
- rest of captured land under military as “occupied territories”
- War of Attrition = expensive and led many to believe Sinai should be returned to Egypt for lasting peace but Golda Meir disagreed
