Test 2

Question 1

Virginia v. Black (2003)

Answer 1

Presumption of act of cross burning as evidence of intent to intimidate violates constitution. But limitation of conduct was within constitutional power of government based on “true threats doctrine” if restrict conduct only with intent to intimidate.

Question 2

RAV v. City of St. Paul (1992)

Answer 2

The 1st Amendment prevents the government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Government has no authority “to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the others to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules.” Certain areas of speech “can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) - not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination”

Question 3

Cohen v. California (1971)

Answer 3

“Fuck the Draft” - Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”

Question 4

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)

Answer 4

The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and “fighting words.” He found that Chaplinsky’s insults were “fighting words” since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace.

Question 5

Limited Classes of Speech (Chaplinsky)

Answer 5

the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace

Question 6

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

Answer 6

Under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. Disclosure requirements and some regulations fo BCRA still constitutional.

Question 8

McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014)

Answer 8

Two-year aggregate limit is unconstitutional. Does little to address the concerns addressed by BCRA and limited participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the righteous standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional

Question 9

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Answer 9

Upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans. Segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination

Question 10

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938)

Answer 10

By establishing Lincoln University as a state university for black students, the state of Missouri established precedent for providing equal opportunity in higher education for both black and white students. Therefore, the denial of access to legal education was unlawful discrimination. The state’s intent to eventually create a law school at Lincoln university was not enough to absolve the responsibility to provide a legal education in this case.

Question 11

Sweatt v. Painter (1950)

Answer 11

The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The alternative “black” law school would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students’ ability to compete in the legal arena.

Question 12

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) - Brown I

Answer 12

Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal, violating the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children

Question 13

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)

Answer 13

Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, the Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, like the 14th Amendment. Lacking an equal protections standard to invalidate the District’s segregation, Warren creatively relied on the 5th Amendment’s guarantee of “liberty” to find the segregation of DC schools unconstitutional.

Question 14

Brown II

Answer 14

The Brown I decision shall be implemented “with all deliberate speed.” The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. The court refused to order the schools to integrate right away, like the NAACP had wanted. It also did not set any clear deadline for when schools needed to be desegregated. It also meant that the Court was denying relief to the Black students in the Brown lawsuits.

Question 15

Cooper v. Aaron (1958)

Answer 15

The relief the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The Court held that the Arkansas officials were bound by federal court orders that rested on the SCOTUS prior decision in Brown - it was constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause to maintain law and order by depriving the black students of their equal rights under the law. The precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education was the supreme law of the land and was therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws contradicting it.

Question 16

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968)

Answer 16

SCOTUS held that the “freedom of choice” plan was not a sufficient step to bring about a desegregated unitary school system. While the freedom of choice plan may work in some situations, school districts must provide a plan that works to dismantle the segregated system in their district.

Question 17

Green factors

Answer 17

Courts used five criteria identified to assess whether school systems had sufficiently desegregated: (1) faculty, (2) staff, (3) transportation, (4) extracurricular activities and (5) facilities)

Question 18

Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education (1969)

Answer 18

SCOTUS held that it was the obligation of every school district to immediately terminate any and all segregated school systems and to only operate integrated schools. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals should not have allowed any more motions for additional time to desegregate because, in the Court’s opinion, the standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation was no longer constitutionally permissible

Question 19

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986)

Answer 19

Court argued that Wygant’s layoff stemmed from race and therefore was unconstitutional. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: (1) to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and (2) to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose

Instead, racial preferences had to be based on prior discrimination. Layoff preferences incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring practices since “denial of a future employment opportunity was not as intrusive as loss of an existing job”

Question 20

City of Richmond v. Croson (1989)

Answer 20

the Court held that “generalized assertions” of past racial discrimination could not justify “rigid” racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts/ Noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to “any injury suffered by anyone” and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. Allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: “those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classification.

Question 21

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995)

Answer 21

The Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. They must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.

Question 22

Regents of California v. Bakke (1978)

Answer 22

Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Justice Powell agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal protection clause. The remaining four judges held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria.

Upheld affirmative action, allowing race to be one of several factors in college admission policy but ruled that specific racial quotas were impermissible.

Question 23

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Answer 23

The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.

Question 24

Fisher v. University of Texas (2016)

Answer 24

Based on previous judicial precedent in cases dealing with minority admissions, the Court has held that such cases are reviewable under the 14th Amendment and that they must be reviewed under a standard strict scrutiny to determine whether the policies are “precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” If the policy does not meet this standard, race may not be considered in the admissions process. The University has an ongoing obligation to use available data “to assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative action measures it deems necessary.

Question 25

Bradwell v. Illinois (1872)

Answer 25

Court upheld decision of Illinois Court and ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment did not include the right to practice a profession. Therefore, it was properly regulable by the states.
Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and immunities which individual states cannot take away, but did not agree that the right to practice law in a state’s courts is one of them. There was no agreement that this right was dependent on citizenship.

Question 26

Reed v. Reed (1971)

Answer 26

The Court held that the law’s dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The COurt argued that “to give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment…The choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.” Using the generic standard of scrutiny - ordinary or rational basis review - asked “whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective.

Question 27

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)

Answer 27

The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated,” violating the Due Process Clause and the equal protection requirements that clause implied. A majority could not agree on the standard of review however. The plurality opinion written by Brennan applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification as it would to racial classification, found that the government’s interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices.

Question 28

Craig v. Boren (1976)

Answer 28

The Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the 21st Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard of review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review - rational basis - but less demanding than the highest standard - strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard - intermediate scrutiny; Under intermediate scrutiny, the state must prove the existence of specific important governmental objectives and the law must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.

The Court also acknowledged that parties economically affected by regulations may challenge them “by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function.”

Question 29

United States v. Virginia (1996)

Answer 29

The Court held that VMI’s male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show “exceedingly persuasive justification” for VMI’s gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause. The Court held that the 4th Circuit’s substantive comparability standard was a displacement of the Court’s more exacting standard, requiring that all gender-based classifications today be evaluated with heightened scrutiny.

Question 30

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

Answer 30

Divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy and that states could outlaw those practices. Argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or when they are deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of “judge-made constitutional law” and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy.

Question 31

Romer v. Evans (1996)

Answer 31

Court held that the state amendment violated the equal protection clause. Amendment singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group so long as it can be shown to “advance a legitimate government interest.” This amendment failed to advance such a legitimate interest, and thus failed rational basis review.

Question 32

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Answer 32

The Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process clause.

Struck down sodomy laws, making all forms fo private, consensual non-procreative sexual activities between two consenting individuals of either sex legal in every US state and territory. The court did not speak of private sexual activity as a fundamental right that might require the highest “strict scrutiny” standard of judicial review, instead focused on why the Court’s decision in Bowers was wrong.

Question 33

US v. Windsor (2013)

Answer 33

The Court held that states have the authority to define marital relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a “disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma” on same-sex couples in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.

Question 34

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Answer 34

Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the 14th Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Question 35

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Answer 35

A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of RIghts, and thai right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal. Court ruled that Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of RIghts create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 9th amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void.

Question 36

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Answer 36

A state law that broadly prohibits abortion without respect to the stage of pregnancy or other interests violates rights to privacy. Although the state has legitimate interests in protecting the health of pregnant women and the potentiality of human life, the relative weight of each of these interests varies over the course of pregnancy and the law must account for this variability.

Doctrine of Substantive Due Process → Due Process clause’s protection of liberty extends beyond simple procedures and protects certain fundamental rights.

Question 37

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022)

Answer 37

Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey are overruled. The Constitution does not mention abortion. The right is neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” The five factors that should be considered in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled support overruling previous abortion landmark cases: (1) they “short-circuited the democratic process,” (2) both lacked grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent, (3) the tests they established were not “workable,” (4) they caused distortion of law in other areas, and (5) overruling them would ot upend concrete reliance interests.

Returned the decision regarding abortion regulations back to the states.

Question 38

Strict Scrutiny

Answer 38

Requires the government to prove that: (1) there is a compelling state interest behind the challenged policy and (2) the law or regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve its result.

Question 39

Intermediate Scrutiny

Answer 39

A law must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to achieving the objective.

Question 40

Rational basis review

Answer 40

The person challenging the law must prove either (1) the government has no legitimate interest in the law or policy; or (2) there is no reasonable, rational link between that interest and the challenged law.