Test #1

Question 1

Varieties of mental states

Answer 1

• Sensation, Perception• Language-like thinking/ reasoning / conceptualizing• Emotion• Imagery
Assume these states may be conscious or unconscious
​• sensation - passive reception of stimuli
​• Perception - top down interpretation of that stimuli
Conceptualizing is a superior form of reasoning.

Question 2

Qualia

Answer 2

Conscious experiences have qualitative character. My visual experience of seeing a red object has phenomenal character redness. The phenomenal character of conscious perceptual states.

Question 3

Intentionality

Answer 3

The ability to think of things that don’t exist is a feature of intentionality that sets it apart from natural indication relations.(Antony)
Aspect of mentality, has to do with the fact that most mental states are about things
Our mental states are directed to object: “Imagining a pink elephant” mental state is an image, the object does not exist, profound that it can be about anything

Question 4

Content

Answer 4

The content of a state of mind is what you would put into words.
In sensation or perception there may be non- conceptual content which cannot be put into words.

Question 5

Propostional Attitude

Answer 5

An attitude we take to a proposition, and attitude we take in connection to a sentence. Beliefs, desires, hopes, judgements.

Question 6

Physicalism

Answer 6

The doctrine that all objects, properties, phenomena lie within the domain of physics. Property = feature. Distinguish objects by talking about their structure. Physicalism re-defined as the doctrine that every object/phenomenon either reduces to a physical property or is realized by a physical property.

Question 7

Reduction

Answer 7

Properties and substances can be reduced to arrangements of physical parts.
E.g. Water reduces to H20. The reduction is complete. H20 is only and always water.

Question 8

Realizability

Answer 8

Various (i.e. not just one) lower-order sets of physical properties/substances realize a higher order physical phenomenon/ function. My physical brain and body realizes a mental state.

Question 9

Multiple realizability

Answer 9

Pen: writing instrument, could be plastic or metal, multiply realized. Physicalist with mental states - mental state type can be realized multiply. Multiply realizability is in support of functionalism.

Question 10

Functionalism

Answer 10

Mental states are functional states, and are multiply realizable. Minds exist at a level of abstraction.So creatures made of different physical stuff can have minds.Explains mentality in multiply realizability. Different kinds of mental states that have different kinds of functions. External stimuli - mental state - brain state. But there are no limits on the physical systems that could realize a mind (problem).

Question 11

Conceptual vs. Non-conceptual

Answer 11

“Today is Friday” - conceptual content
“Greenness” - non-conceptual content/phenomenal content
Thoughts have conceptual content, propositional attitudes have conceptual content, representational perceptions have non-conceptual content. If qualitative property does have greenness, then the greenness has content.

Question 12

Brentano: 3 claims in respect to intentionality

Answer 12

​1. The directedness of mental states
​2. Intentional inexistence: all mental states are directed at an object of content that is internal to the mind
​3. Thesis: only mental states exhibit the two above properties, this marks off the mental from the physical

The object is internal to the mind. The object is imminent if the object exists in the real world, external to the thinker.

Question 13

Identity Theory

Answer 13

Mental states reduce to biophysical and neurological processes.​ Same way water reduces to H2O…Mental states completely reduce to biological processes. There is an explanatory gap between the physical and qualitative state. Problem: There is an explanatory gap between the physical and the qualitative.

Question 14

Pictorial vs. Linguistic

Answer 14

Mental representation: mental image carries information, is a possibility that something has a different format than a linguistic type
Linguistic representation: can put content into words

Question 15

Vehicle

Answer 15

The way in which the content is realized. A drawing - the vehicle is the chalk and the board. For analog representation, the grooves of the record are the vehicle for the sound.

Question 16

Heil’s position

Answer 16

Something functions as a representation only in so far as it is given a use by a representing agent. All conscious thought is imagistic. Thinking is using images– putting them to work. Where cognition is concerned, there is nothing special about language. No cognition necessarily requires language. We do represent linguistically, but if it’s not necessary the content could be realized a different way. The dog Spot example: Instead of saying Spot lacks the capacity for representation, we can think that Spot lacks the need of tensed representation/Spot lacks a use for tensed representation.
Heil: language isn’t necessary for thought, it happens for us that it’s a useful tool, but cognition could be carried out in a different way using a different tool (the vehicles could be different). Representation is deployed when it’s used (pictorial and linguistic representations are both images).

Question 17

Davidson’s position

Answer 17

Higher order thoughts (thoughts about thoughts) are thinkable only by creatures capable of language. A capacity for thought requires a capacity for higher order thought. You need to be able to ascribe thoughts to others in order to think.Ascribing a belief to others requires a truth concept, and this requires a capacity for higher-order representation.In higher-order representation the contents are definite/ determinate. Only a creature possessing the concept of belief could have belief, this is so because you need to understand that the belief could be false (i.e. misrepresent). You can only ascribe/represent a belief with determinate content linguistically. Only linguistic representation could be a representation of a representational state with definite/determinate content.
Davidson: when you have a belief or attribute a belief to someone else, you have to have a concept of belief, and have respected that a belief can be true or false.In order to have an explicit understanding of the concept of belief that could be true or false, you need a higher order capacity to be able to ascribe it to other people.

Question 18

Bermudez’ position

Answer 18

He says mute creatures can have sophisticated thoughts. But higher order propositional thoughts must be linguistic. Thinking about our own thoughts is reflexive. The vehicles must be linguistic. Representation requires the holding of a structural isomorphism between representation and represented state of affairs.Bermudez wants to isolate higher order thoughts, structure mapping (isomorphism.

Question 19

HOT thought

Answer 19

A capacity for thought requires a capacity for higher order thought, You need to be able to ascribe thoughts to others in order to think. Higher order thoughts (thoughts about thoughts) are thinkable only by creatures capable of language. Davidson and Bermudez - natural language is required for HOT thought. Heil - natural language is NOT required for HOT thought.
Meta-representation (second order): representing your first order perception, thinking wow that’s beautiful (what I’m perceiving). A capacity for thought requires a capacity for higher order thought. You need to be able to ascribe thoughts to others in order to think.