Terrorism and counterterrorism Flashcards
is terrorism a new concept?
no (200 years)
many waves of terrorism show that its existed since at least the 1880s
what are the 4 waves of terrorism? (Rapaport)
- 1880s: Anarchists (Golden age of assassination)
- 1920s: anti-colonial wave
- 1960s: New Left Wave: 3rd world vanguards
- 1979-….: Religious wave
what is the theory about the potential 5th wave?
- debate on what the 5th wave will be
- some say: catastrophic terrorism (more lethal, vague goals, networks (vs. orgs))
why is there a lack of definition on terrorism?
- terrorism = subjective concept
- delegitimization and criminalization of certain groups (contradicting lists due to political pressure)
- many forms and manifestations of terrorism
- changed meaning over time
why is having a definition important?
- agreement for int cooperation
- judicial measures
- avoid abuse
- research comparisons
what is the essence of terrorism?
- instrument to achieve goals
- use of force isn’t the gol
- fear emphasis (vs. death)
- direct targets aren’t the ultimate targets
- media, politicians, public figures role in impact
what is the history of terrorism studies?
pre-9/11: - little counterterrorism interest - gradual decrease in academic interest post-9/11: - boom - increase in training, policy advice, consultancy, research centers
what are the 4 approaches of terrorism studies?
- rational organizational/instrumental approach (cost-benefit)
- psychological approach (thinking/behaviour, recruitment…)
- multi-causal approach
(4. political/structural approach (preconditions and precipitants))
what are key challenges in terrorism studies?
- no accepted definition
- subjective and politicized (biased info)
- small-n
- always changing
- secrecy
- ethical issues (too understanding, national security…)
- reliability and validity (fooled interviewer)
what is the current state of the art (limitations of current terrorism studies today)?
- niche focus -> overinflates
- assumption of big increasing threat
- selection bias to west
- event-driven research (focus on present threat rather than history)
- policy-oriented research (little independence)
- lack of empirical development
what are the 5 key assumptions on terrorism?
- terrorism is caused by poverty
- terrorists are crazy
- terrorism is increasingly lethal
- terrorism is predominately anti-western
- terrorism is a successful strategy
what supports the assumption that terrorism is caused by poverty
- poverty -> lack of opportunities to improve life
- so angry at those better off and gov
- violence is last resort for attention
- perceived correlation of where they think most terrorists are from
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is caused by poverty
- empirical evidence!
1. many terrorists not actually that poor (Osama Bin Laden)
2. not poorer than citizens or other migrants in the country
3. most countries with high terrorism: not low income countries
4. no indicators of poverty are data linked to terrorism
what supports the assumption that terrorists are crazy
- no sane person can commit terrorism (esp. suicide attacks)
- white supremacists tend to have (had) mental health issues (Bubolz and Simi)
what contradicts the assumption that terrorists are crazy
- difficult to judge objectively a terrorist act
- following rational approach: act is by rational actor and rational (cost-benefit analysis) behaviour
- following psychological approach: groups often exclude unstable indivs due to security risk
- no terrorism personality
- can fight against by making community disapprove (so has to be rational)
what supports the assumption that terrorism is increasingly lethal
- defining feature of our era (post-9/11 world)
- deadlier tech
- big impact
- depends on interpretation of ‘terrorist acts’ (syria and iraq -> many casualties)
- empirically (Piazza): - increase in number of victims per int attacks
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is increasingly lethal
- terrorism is about the impact -> so seems like a bigger (more lethal) threat than it is
- empirically (Piazza):
- no increase in total numbers
what supports the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western?
- jihadi terrorism (IS, Al Qaeda) = anti-wester (new type of terrorism?)
- anti-west rhetoric
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western?
- low terrorist in the west (74% deaths in Middle East, Africa)
- most victims are muslim
- just that most terrorism in europe is jihadists
- > not mostly western victims
what supports the assumption that terrorism is a successful strategy?
- creates fear and gains attention
- daily headlines in the media
- both in U.S. and the EU, there is kinda high concern by the populations of being a victims (still among top 10 concerns in the west)
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is a successful strategy?
- level of fear is fading out in the west (U.S. and EU back to pre-9/11 levels)
- rarely achieves political goals (only 7%) -> poor rate inherent to nature of terrorism
- paradox of terrorism: often succeed tactically (attention) but not with own goals - goals itself usually vague and changing
what are key assumptions on counterterrorism?
- one can recognize a terrorist
- deradicalization is possible
- decapitations works
- terrorism can’t be defeated
- terrorism is best managed by a holistic approach
what supports the assumption that one can recognize/profile a terrorist?
- helpful technology
- used in the past (Jack the Ripper, Mad Bomber…)
what contradicts the assumption that one can recognize/profile a terrorist?
- no terrorist personality
- too few terrorists to gather enough data to profile well
- focusing on behaviour -> unreliable and difficult
- disproportional
- ethical implications
what supports the assumption that deradicalization is possible?
- occurred in the past: deradicalized terrorists became experts
- there are deradicalization programmes
- some successes of programmes
(if a. voluntary, b. personal commitment)
what contradicts the assumption that deradicalization is possible?
- issues of deradicalization definition: leaving group but not ideas, is that still deradicalization?
- > academics: leaving terrorism isn’t derad. (disengagement)
- > disengagement doesn’t eliminate risk of violence
- > academics: leaving terrorism isn’t derad. (disengagement)
- empirically some terrorists have gone back after being “deradicalized”
what supports the assumption that decapitations works as a strategy?
- included in many counterterrorism strategies (widely practiced)
- assumption that organizations’ success depends on leadership
- > operational struggle of finding new leader
- > charismatic leadership (destabilizes)
- works in the long-term since these groups need leadership
- > esp. earlier it is and type of group
what contradicts the assumption that decapitations works as a strategy?
- on short-term rarely works (only 17% of the time)
- > depends on size, age, type of group
- many possible negative side effects
- no one size fits all
what supports the assumption that terrorism can’t be defeated?
- military forces only results in defeat 7% of the time
- whole of terrorism cannot be defeated (always new waves)
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism can’t be defeated?
- 40% of the time: police + intelligence services and political engagement contribute to the end of terrorist groups
- defeats the tool of ter (political engagement) and some terrorist organizations
- depends on defeated definition
what supports the assumption that terrorism is best managed by a holistic approach?
- international level (UN) counterterrorism approach is based on this
- national level counterterrorism approaches are also based on this (Indonesia worked)
- academic consensus that it works
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is best managed by a holistic approach?
- no actual assessment on the effectiveness of a holistic approach (no empirical evidence)
- no prioritization of finite resources
- differences between short-term vs long-term requirements
- easier said than done
have counterterrorism measures been successful in reducing fear? what are the implications
no, mostly just preventing terrorism
- distrust and stereotyping
- action-oriented policies only + too simple explanations
- risk avoidance society
- self-fulfilling prophecy of creating bigger impact
(e. g. political slogans)
- > leads to polarization -> further radicalization
what are 2 vital aspects of counterterrorism?
- communication
- resilience
- > limit chance + impact of an attack
what are 3 important dimensions of impact management?
- organization (actors cooperation; deal with and monitor unrest)
- communication (Golden Hour, be aware and listen)
- resilience to terrorism (facilitate self-efficacy desire, care for indirect victims too)
what is meaning-making?
- framing of the attack through description and reflection
- reflected and created through commemoration events
how important are commemoration events? what about them is important
- very for meaning-making
- opportunity to emphasize values
- differ completely between countries and attacks
- authority-citizen cooperation importance
- focus shift away from the terrorists
is it possible to predict future trends of terrorism?
- no
- past attempts very poor
- > failed to predict 9/11
- > mostly vague and imprecise
what is important in improving predictions of future trends of terrorism?
- including more people that are not today:
a. non-western
b. young - taking a systematic approach
how does research on foreign fighters resemble today?
- mainly descriptive (no explanations)
- little on individual level, organizational level, reintegration process, why some don’t go
- post-2012 boom
what are some key findings on foreign fighters?
- ideological (religious) motivations
- part of larger movement, organized travel
- mainly young and male
- (in)directly state-sponsored
who are the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?
- from worldwide (Middle East, Europe, Balkans…)
- those from EU:
- > mostly nationals (vs. migrants, refugees…)
- > most ethnic backgrounds
- > most converts
- > mostly young men
what are pull factors for foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?
- R2P (purpose, duty)
- religious motivations (protect own community, caliphate, be part of new world)
- comradeship and group processes
- adventure, action, weapons
- become a martyr (heaven)
what are push factors for foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?
- personal problems
- trouble with authorities
- socio-economic and socio-political climate (marginalized)
but little evidence on this
why do some perceive returned foreign fighters as a big threat in Europe?
very home-centric
- will incite others to join
- involved in european violence
- fight infidels
- further radicalization by coming back with larger network
- traumatized -> violence
- polarization and clash
what are key dimensions of measures taken for foreign fighters
- security (military force, no passports…)
- legislative (prosecute)
- preventive (invest in knowledge, train to recognize…)
mix is ideal
why are foreign fighters that don’t return home also a threat
career foreign fighters:
- rank up in expertise (take leadership positions)
- bring violence to more conflicts (vs. returning home)
- when will return home: much more expertise
why do career foreign fighters move groups?
material and social incentives
