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Cooperation and Competition > Terms > Flashcards

Terms Flashcards

1
Q

Cooperation

A

Any action which is intended to benefit others, regardless of whether the actor also benefits in the process

Fails more often than it works

Tendency to emphasize positive outcomes for self and other

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2
Q

Competition

A

Tendency to emphasize relative advantage over others

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3
Q

Interdependence

A

People can affect others’ outcomes and lives through actions

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4
Q

Social Dilemmas

A

Conflicts between short-term self interests and long-term collective interests

One behavior will produce the best outcome for the self and a reduced outcome for the collective, while another behavior will produce the best outcome for the collective and a reduced outcome for the self

Individual rationality leads to collective irrationality

If everyone chooses the best outcome for themselves, then everyone ends up with a worse outcome than if everyone had chosen the best outcome for the collective

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5
Q

Prisoner’s Dilemma

A

Basic and abstract

To get the most, take advantage of someone who cooperates

Worst outcome is to cooperate and be taken advantage of

Temptation to defect MUST be greater than the reward for cooperating

Talking to each other and deciding what to do in front of others changes one’s thought process

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6
Q

Social Trap

A

Situations where a positive outcome for the self leads to negative outcomes for the collective

Immediate, small positive outcome for self may have large, delayed, negative outcome for the collective

RESOURCE DILEMMA

Examples: pollution, overfishing

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7
Q

Social Fence

A

Actions with initial negative self-consequences and delayed collective positive consequences

Immediate negative cost to self but long-term positive benefit to collective

PUBLIC GOODS DILEMMA

Examples: donating to public radio, paying taxes

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8
Q

Public Goods Dilemma

A

Models real-world interactions by making a contribution to a dyad or group

Temptation to free-ride on other’s donations

Requires: Jointness of supply (no matter how many people use the public good, it will never be fully consumed) and impossibility of exclusion (people cannot be excluded from using the public good)

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9
Q

Step-level public goods

A

Require a minimum amount to be provided in full

Sometimes in best interest to cooperate, depending on what others choose

Examples: building a bridge

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10
Q

Continuous public goods

A

Resource is provided based on amount given; any amount contributes to enhancing the good’s quality and provision

Best strategy is to always defect regardless of others

Changing a continuous good to a step-level good may increase cooperation

Examples: a playground that can grow more as money is donated, public radio

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11
Q

Public goods lab based task

A

Give money to either a group fund, which gains interest, or a self fund

Group account is equally split among the group regardless of the donation amount

Temptation to defect (keep more money for self) but reward for cooperation (more money in group fund = more interest = more return)

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12
Q

Resource dilemma

A

People decide how much to take from a common resource

Temptation to take as much as possible for oneself

Requires: Resource replenishment rate; optimal harvest level at which resource is sustainable

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13
Q

Resource dilemma lab based task

A

There is a 4 person group where members consume from a shared resource over 15 trials

Limit on harvest amount each trial, and a standard replenishment rate

People tend to take as much as they can and then it crashes

Without communication, people take more than is sustainable

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14
Q

Cooperation Index

A

Degree to which there are conflicting interests in a situation
The degree to which interests influence the behavior of others varies across situations

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15
Q

Structural solutions to social dilemmas

A

changing the situation to promote cooperation

create situations where interests are more aligned (e.g., incentives)

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16
Q

Motivational solutions to social dilemmas

A

change the way an individual decides and behaves in certain situations

Affecting cognitive, affective, and motivational processes underlying individual behavior in the social dilemma

(e.g., communication, trust, self-efficacy, social identity)

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17
Q

Normative approach to social dilemmas

A

What should people do in these situations

Used in economics, game theory

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18
Q

Descriptive approach to social dilemmas

A

what people actually do in these situations

Used by social psychologists

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19
Q

Collective rationality

A

cooperative behavior by both individuals yields greater outcomes than does non-cooperative behavior by both

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20
Q

Evolutionary Theory

A

Assumes that humans have evolved behavioral strategies for social interactions
Outlines problems in past human environments that may have led to adaptations relevant to resolving conflicts

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21
Q

Rational Choice Theory

A

Assumes that humans are rational actors that seek to maximize their self-interests
Uses theoretical formulas to generate predictions about how perfectly rational actors should behave

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22
Q

Interdependence Theory

A

Assumes that the possible structural outcomes of social interactions can be understood and related according to six fundamental dimensions of the structure
Identifies the structure of the social interaction and makes predictions about how that structure affords particular person and situation variables to affect behavior

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23
Q

3 views on mixed-motive concepts

A

Epicurus: people should be driven by long-term goals, even if that means short-term pain

Pyrrho: People should give in to short-term pleasure because no cause and effect relationships are ever truly known (skepticism)

Zeno: People’s ultimate goal should be stable emotional reactions in everyday life (stoicism)

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24
Q

Give-some game

A

Each participant could give to the resource, but giving is not required for using

(Step-level and continuous public goods)

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25
Q

Take-some game

A

has a finite pool from which all can draw, but if everyone draws too much than no one gets any

Different from resource dilemmas because they have a FINITE pool

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26
Q

Puzzle of cooperation

A

Start with a mutually cooperative group –> mutation in population to not cooperate –> defecting phenotype emerges –> all have non-cooperative phenotype

By the end, everyone is a defecting individual because it is the most beneficial strategy

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27
Q

Adaptations for cooperation

A

Must fir the organism to the environment
Needs to solve a problem for reproduction and increase its likelihood
Accumulated output of selection process

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28
Q

4 aspects of adaptations

A

species-typical (reoccurring among members of the species)

Is incorporated in physical design of organism

Coordinated with environmental structure

Has a functional outcome (including the replication of genes)

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29
Q

4 levels of analysis in cooperation

A

Mechanisms - what is going on within the person at the time he or she helps

Development- how the psycholgical mechanisms underlying cooperation develop within the lifespan; how genes and environment interact

Function-why an individual would develop in such a way as to have that psychology mechanism and what selective pressures cause it to persist

Phylogeny- how and when the mechanism evolved in our evolutionary history, and what prior traits it could have evolved from

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30
Q

4 Evolutionary theories of human cooperation

A

Kin Selection, Direct Reciprocity, Indirect Reciprocity, Costly Signaling

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31
Q

Kin Selection

A

Promote own genetic future by making sacrifices for those who share genes with them

People are more likely to help kin than non-kin, especially in life-threatening situations

Cues of kinship include facial features and early life co-residence (but these cues can misfire)

Limitations: requires that others be perceived as kin

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32
Q

Direct Reciprocity

A

Tit-for-tat: people act cooperatively towards others, and expect something to be returned in the future

Important for populations in which members interact regularly

Can maintain cooperation at high levels and across generations

Falls prey to mistakes and potential mutual non-cooperation

Requires ability to monitor others’ behaviors

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33
Q

Shadow of the future

A

knowing there will be a future interaction increases cooperation

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34
Q

Strong Reciprocity

A

punishing non-cooperators or norm violators at a cost to oneself, even if they will not interact again in the future

People do pay a cost to punish others, and this punishment increases cooperation

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35
Q

Indirect Reciprocity

A

We cooperate with others we may never meet again, but we will meet their group again

Cooperation may be to indirectly gain benefits

Having a helpful reputation tells others that they should help you

Cognitively demanding due to need for monitoring and memory

Language and gossip facilitate reputations - people tend to believe the gossip about others

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36
Q

Milinski et al. (2002), Indirect Reciprocity

A

People were more likely to be cooperative in an indirect reciprocity game

Were more likely to receive money when they had a cooperative reputation

people refused to help others who did not cooperate in a public goods dilemma and people who did not help on the first trial of indirect reciprocity

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37
Q

Social cynicism

A

belief about the extent to which other people are trustyworthy

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38
Q

Individual vs. Group Selection Theories

A

Individual: tradition Darwinian logic; genes-focused view

Group: behavioral trait can emerge from one group being more cooperative than another

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39
Q

Intersexual selection

A

Some type of process for attracting a mate

Women may cooperate more in a mixed-gender group to signal to men that they are cooperative and kind

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40
Q

Intrasexual selection

A

Competition within sex to reproduce with the right mate

Male intrasexual selection has a tendency towards cooperation
Patrilocality: men were less likely to migrate to a new group than women

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41
Q

Male coalitional psychology

A

men tend to cooperate with in-group more than outgroup members, and compete more with male outgroup members

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42
Q

Sex differences in cooperation

A

Stereotype of American women is that they’re more cooperative

Expectation is for women to be more cooperative, but men and women generally do not differ

Male same-sex groups were more cooperative than female same-sex groups

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43
Q

Criticisms of evolutionary approach

A

Genetic determinism is false (my genes cause me to act this way)

Difficult to know the early environment before adaptations were present

People can create an evolutionary story about anything

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44
Q

Ultimate causes of behavior

A

What caused humans to possess a dispositions for behaving a certain way

Focus of evolution

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45
Q

Proximate causes of behavior

A

Current features of person and environment which influence people to behave a certain way

Focus of social sciences

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46
Q

Individualism

A

tendency to maximize outcomes for self with minimal regard for outcomes for others

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47
Q

Altruism

A

Tendency to maximize outcomes for others with minimal regard for outcomes for self

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48
Q

Aggression

A

Tendency to minimize outcomes for the other without regard for outcomes for self

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49
Q

Cultural variation in cooperation

A

Vary greatly across cultures

Individualist cultures have a tendency to pursue personal goals

Collectivistic cultures have tendencies to pursue group goals

Greater exposure to different cultures increases a willingness to support global public goods

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50
Q

Hermann et al. Social Dilemma

A

Used a public goods dilemma to evaluate cross-cultural differences in cooperation

Over time and across countries, contributions decrease

Large difference on average between countries, but no country gave everything

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51
Q

What is culture?

A

Culture consist of explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts

Cultural patterns may be product of action or motivating elements of further action

Key aspects: Part of our environment and in our minds

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52
Q

Third Party Punishment

A

Two people play the dictator game, and a third person watches
The third-party observer can pay to take money away from the dictator after they have decided how much to give
Henrich et al. (2006) found that people are willing to punish others for not being kind or generous

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53
Q

Dictator Game

A

Participant is given finite amount of resource
Recipient has no control over how much they receive - have to take whatever they are given
It is in the participant’s best interest to give no money, as giving money would come at a cost to self

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54
Q

heinrich et al. (2006) punishment

A

Willingness to punish should positively relate to local social norms of cooperation

In countries which had higher amounts of giving in the dictator games, these countries also had people who were more willing to punish others who were not cooperative in the other games

55
Q

Punishment

A

People punish those that contribute/cooperate less AND more than expected
They think that punishment will increase cooperation in the group
More effective in some societies than others
Societies that have cooperative norms use punishment to sustain these norms

56
Q

Anti-social punishment

A

Punishment of cooperators by non-cooperators

57
Q

Trust (definition)

A

A construct used to explain why and when people cooperate

A willingness to make oneself vulnerable in a social situation with the perception that the other person will not take advantage of them

Expectation that another person will treat you benevolently when you perceive that they have a tempting option that may hurt you or damage the relationship

58
Q

Trust within vs. Between cultures

A

Gachter et al. (2010) partitioned Hermann’s 16 cities into six cultural groups

Found greater differences between cultures than within cultures

Variation in cooperation was explained more by cultural group than physical loccation

More important for cooperation in some countries than others

59
Q

Does trust predict cooperation?

A

YES.

Should matter most in situations with high degree of conflict.

K moderates the relationship between trust and cooperation, where a lower k value means a stronger relationship

Important mostly when conflict of interest is present

60
Q

Social norms

A

behaviors that are expected by others in a group, and failure to behave accordingly results in negative evaluations by others (including sanctions)

Limitations of norms: can only apply when a person is being monitored or the possibility of punishment is present.

61
Q

Cultural values

A

Abstract ideas that indicate good, appropriate, and desirable behavior in a specific society

Influential construct for cultural differences

Norms can transition to be values

62
Q

Collectivist cultures

A

Emphasize promoting group goals, social norms, and shared beliefs

Tend to believe that their group will work together to achieve a public good

Less cooperative with outgroup members than in group members

Raising awareness of their interdependence does not increase cooperation

63
Q

Individualist cultures

A

Emphasize individuals as autonomous and pursue personal goals

Cooperate more with each other when they are aware of their interdependence

64
Q

Beliefs

A

Ideas of explaining patterns and associations in every day life

Most important belief is TRUST, which is the belief in the idea that others value your welfare and will not harm you

Belief in a powerful god may promote cooperation

65
Q

Incentives

A

Structural (proximate) cause

Any adjustment to the direct outcome of the social interaction

changes make cooperation more aligned with self0interest and reduce conflict of interest

Cost time, resources, effort - may be inefficient in the short term, but pay off in the long run

When removed, there is lower trust and less cooperation

66
Q

Punishment and reward

A

Punishments had slightly larger effect sizes on cooperation than rewards

For punishment to work, people need to know it will continually occur

More effective when an individual behaves the same way repeatedly in the same context

Antisocial punishment reduces cooperation and is not good for the punisher or the punished

67
Q

Communication

A

More efficient and effective than incentives

Most effective immediate cause of cooperation

Enhances trust and expectations of cooperation (Cohen et al., 1996)

Face to face communication is the best kind

68
Q

Social vs. Personal Norms

A

Social norms: we must have the possibility of being monitored and punished by others for these to affect behavior

Personal norms: we will sanction ourselves if we violate these norms; do not require that our behavior is observed by others

69
Q

Social Value Orientation

A

A stable, individual difference variable

The weights people assign to their own and other’s outcomes during interdependent situations

Dispositional, trait-like variable

Most people are, in actuality, between individualism and cooperation

70
Q

SVO Measurement

A

Triple dominance Measure

Make a preference for how to distribute resources between the self and another person, who is simultaneously choosing their outcomes as well

71
Q

Cooperators

A

maximize joint gain and quality

72
Q

Competitors

A

Maximize own gain relative to others’ gain

73
Q

Prosocials

A

Altruists and cooperators

Tend to think that intelligent others will cooperate (collective rationality)

Behaviorally assimilates to a competitor

Tend to evaluate behaviors along a good-bad dimension where cooperation is good and moral

Tend to choose more equal outcomes over joint maximum outcome

74
Q

Proselfs

A

Individualists and competitors

Tend to think that intelligent others will defect (individualistic rationality)

Will take advantage of an unconditional cooperator, but will cooperate playing TFT

Evaluate behaviors along a strong-weak dimension where cooperation is seen as weak

75
Q

What encourages people to expect cooperation?

A 
Knowing the person has already cooperated
Intention to cooperate was communicated
Presence of incentive to cooperate
Knowing the other is dependent on them
Viewing the other as similar to the self
76
Q

Prosocial expectations

A

Expect more cooperation

Self-fulfilling prophecy where people will start to respond appropriately to your behavior

Egocentric bias, where you think that others will respond like you would

77
Q

Competitors expectations

A

Certain about their expectations of others’ behavior

Think it’s a dog-eat-dog world

May elicit competitive behavior from others

78
Q

Social Identity Theory Definition/Background

A

Mere categorization into a group is enough to elicit intergroup discrimination

Focuses on self-concept and self-esteem as explanatory mechanisms causing ingroup favoritism

Metacontrast principle: ingroup favoritism requires intergroup comparisons and the presence of an outgroup

79
Q

SIT Predictions

A

People will not discriminate in the absence of a salient outgroup

In interdependent tasks people will evaluate in group members more positively and see them as more trustworthy, increasing cooperation

80
Q

SIT Outcomes

A

Not as empirically supported as BGR

People do cooperate more with ingroup members compared to unclassified strangers, indicating presence of an outgroup is not required for ingroup favoritism

Categorization along natural and artificial lines can create discrimination between groups

81
Q

Bounded Generalized Reciprocity Theory Definition/Background

A

Evolutionary framework suggesting that in the past, systems of indirect reciprocity were likely contained within the ingroup

Groups were important for the survival and reproductive success of the individuals

Cooperate with someone because it gives you a good reputation so others will cooperate with you in the future; bounded by group membership

Humans have created a type of heuristic strategy to cooperate with ingroup members because this results in a good reputation and indirect benefits of being a cooperative partner

82
Q

BGR Predictions

A

Ingroup favoritism will only be invoked when it makes a person’s reputation better

Unilateral knowledge of group membership decreases cooperation

Discriminate to help the ingroup, not to harm the outgroup

People will discriminate in favor of ingroup members in absence of interdependence because of concerns about reputation and expectation of indirect benefits

83
Q

BGR Outcomes

A

Interdependence is not needed for ingroup favoritism to emerge

The possibility of direct reciprocity via sequential exchange weakens ingroup favoritism by weakening the effect of group membership

More ingroup love than outgroup hate on average

84
Q

Greater support for BGR than SIT

A

Common knowledge of group identity (reputation) had bigger effect size than unilateral knowledge (no reputation)

Interdependent games (social dilemmas) had bigger effect sizes than independent games (dictator game)

Simultaneous decisions (social dilemmas) had bigger effect sizes than sequential decisions (trust game)

85
Q

In group favoritism

A

Members of a group positively evaluate other members of the group, and have greater empathy, trust and helping behaviors towards members; give greater rewards to members, and work harder to accomplish ingroup goals

Direct reciprocity employed more with outgroup while indirect reciprocity employed with ingroup

Emerges more from promotion of ingroup than harming of outgroup

Ingroup > outgroup; Ingroup > unclassified stranger; outgroup = unclassified stranger

People expected more from ingroup members than outgroup members

86
Q

Outgroup derogation

A

Ingroup > outgroup

Ingroup > unclassified stranger

Outgroup < unclassified stranger

87
Q

Intergroup coperation

A

Humans find themselves part of many different groups that do not have set boundaries and can change over time

We cooperate along group divisions

People give more to ingroup members in trust game

88
Q

Trust game

A

Two participants
Participant one gives some amount of money to participant two
Money given triples
Participant two gives some amount back to participant one

Participants gave more to recipients from their own countries

89
Q

Minimal group paradigm in a lab

A

Participants would come to the lab and look at paintings

Assigned a group based on painting preference, manipulating group membership to an abstract measure

Participate in social dilemmas with new ingroup

Ingroup treated better than outgroup by d = 0.32, showing favoritism

90
Q

Inter-individual vs. inter-group

A

Relations between groups tend to be more competitive than between individuals

Individuals are less trusting in groups and think groups are more competitive

Trust is more important for individuals than groups as it makes an inference about a single person, not a group of people

Perceived similarity of group and individual leads to more trust

91
Q

Schema-based distrust of groups and individuals

A

Intergroup interactions may be considered in the schema of competition and are therefore inherently competitive

Anticipated interactions produce cognitive and affective responses wherein group are competitive, untrustworthy, hostile, and abrasive

92
Q

Wolf et al., 2008 Competition

A

Align interests of two competing groups and examine interactions

Removing dilemmas encourages cooperation

Can make groups behave similarly to individuals in situations with less conflict and increasing cooperation

93
Q

Intergroup social dilemmas

A

step-level public goods: individuals contribute to a group effort to achieve a goal; any group just needs to do better than the other; people contribute more in this type of dilemma because they see their contributions as critical to the good (e.g., elections)

Continuous public goods: involves increased, constant effort to group which will increase rewards for group members (e.g., warfare)

94
Q

Intergroup Prisoner’s dilemma

A

Continuous benefit for one group having more players cooperate than the other group

95
Q

Halevy et al., 2008 Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma

A

Two groups of three people, and each person has 10 points
Contribute to a group or individual fund (2 versions)
Group fund gains interest for each group members and takes away from members of other group
Individual fund just gives points to self
Additional condition: Group fund W, where points given to group fund increase with no changes to other group’s funds
(Option: give to group fund because they care about group or dislike outgroup)

Communication increased competition, but general preference was to benefit the ingroup without harming the outgroup

96
Q

Halevy et al. 2012 Follow Up Experiment

A

Focused on prior experience with between group conflict

Group either played 60 trials with possibility of within group donation, or 30 trials with only between group and 30 trials with within group

When given the chance to donate within the group after not having had the option, they gave as much to ingroup as those who had always had the option, and did not give significantly more to hurt the outgroup

Showed that when given the chance, people will promote ingroup love over outgroup hate

97
Q

Human warfare

A

best for each individual not to participate

best for one group for everyone to participate

best for each group for no one to participate

Affects the group, the individuals, and the individuals in a group

Reasons for going to war vary from ingroup love to outgroup hate

98
Q

Oxytocin and altruism

A

Oxytocin increases ingroup trust and investment in the ingroup

Increased contributions to the ingroup but not to harm the outgroup

99
Q

Phylogeny

A

development of a species over time

100
Q

Ontogeny

A

Development on an individual over time

101
Q

Animal and human similarities

A

Chimps, orangutans, and 2 year olds performed similarly on cognitive tasks about space, quantity, and causality

All inhabit similar environments

Both engage in collaborative tasks with adults

102
Q

Animal and human differences

A

Two year olds perform better during social tasks

Children can understand collaborative actions towards a goal

103
Q

Instrumental Helping

A

A person is trying to achieve their goal

Occurs in absence of explicit reward for helping

Drop an object on the floor and see if chimp/child will pick it up

Both infants and chimps will help in this situation

104
Q

Sharing Food

A

Involves dividing a resource

Chimps compete for food and are reluctant to share the valuable resource

Humans have been sharing food for a long time and have social norms around sharing food

105
Q

Information Sharing

A

Can be a form of prosocial behavior

Infants will point to direct a person towards the sought object

Chimp information is self-serving

106
Q

Children’s cooperation (Olson and Spelke, 2008)

A

Had young children help a ‘protagonist’ doll distribute resources to others

Children distinguished between relatives, friends, and strangers, giving more to relatives and friends than strangers (Kin altruism)

Children employed and cooperated more with direct reciprocity than indirect

Children would give equally on average, and would only give differently when equality was not an option

107
Q

Egalitarianism in Children (Fehr et al., 2008)

A

Children at different ages were asked to exchange several types of resources with an anonymous person in the other room
Then made an exchange with either ingroup or outgroup member
Willingness to share increased with age
Spiteful preferences decreased with age
Inequality aversion explained their decisions more so than maximizing joint gain

More egalitarian at all ages within ingroup
Effect was stronger among boys and older children
Boys were less inequality averse with an ingroup member than an outgroup member

Children without siblings were more likely to share than children with siblings

108
Q

Theory of mind

A

ability to perceive that actors have internal mental states that differ from our own

Making inferences about the mind of another in an interaction

Tested using a false belief test to see if kids can understand the difference between the mind and the world

Occurs across cultures (human universal)

Those with more ToM give fairer offers in the ultimatum game

109
Q

Empathy and prosocial behaviors

A

Adult manipulation of empathy involves perspective taking

12-18 month olds begin to react to other’s emotions, sometimes engaging in prosocial responses

Empathy is important for adult cooperation, even when a partner defects in a situation

110
Q

Organizational Citizenship behaviors

A

Performance of extra-role behaviors for the good of the company

Behaviors that benefits others and the organization

Increase productivity and profit

Social dilemma within company

111
Q

Social dilemmas within companies

A

Social fences

Behaviors are discretionary (the person performing them has a choice), are unlikely to be rewarded, and benefit others

People percieved the immediate personal costs and organizational, individual benefits

People understood OCBs as social dilemmas and were able to see long-term benefits

112
Q

What promotes OCBs?

A

Justice and direct reciprocity

Identification with the organization - to what extent the company is part of a person’s self-concept

Status at work, including security of position

Personality (including individual differences in empathy, SVO)

Job satisfaction, organizational commitment

113
Q

Types of justice

A

Perceived (in)justice leads to reciprocity

Procedural (i.e., promotion processes)

Distributional (i.e., outcomes, salary increases, firing)

Transactional (i.e., employee-management interactions)

114
Q

Organization identification

A

extent to which the worker sees the organization as part of their self-concept

Team success = personal success

SIT: motivated to maintain a positive sense of self; cooperate with ingroup to maintain self-esteem

BGR: humans evolved in groups; cooperate to maintain reputational benefits; coopreate to avoid the cost of exclusion

115
Q

Unionization

A

Step-level public good

SVO can determine who is likely to join a union and their motives for doing so

Union exists based on employee contributions, but not every employee has to join the union

Benefits from union negotiations go to all employees regardless of their membership

Reputation is important, and indirect reciprocity plays a large role in unions

116
Q

first vs. second order social dilemmas

A

First order is the initial dilemma, and leads to elementary cooperation

Second order is the dilemmas that one may face when choosing whether to contribute to a costly system that might promote cooperation in the first order dilemma, leads to instrumental cooperation

117
Q

2 questions researchers ask

A

What is the logical, rational solution? What promotes a cooperative choice?

118
Q

3 ideas underlying mixed-motive concepts

A

1) desire to do well for oneself
2) one’s outcomes are partially influenced by others as their outcomes are partially affected by our actions
3) doing wrong by others leaves on open to possible retaliation if interaction is ongoing

119
Q

Utility

A

Tendency to promote a maximum amount of ‘happiness,” defined as pleasure with corresponding absence of pain

120
Q

Hobbes (cooperation)

A

People will cooperate, but only because they are forced to, and failure to cooperate will cause punishment

121
Q

Static vs. dynamic modeling of choice

A

Static = one decision

Dynamic = choosing unfolds over time and multiple decisions

122
Q

Fitness

A

An individual’s reproductive success

123
Q

Direct fitness

A

eventual benefits outweigh the costs for an individual

124
Q

Indirect fitness

A

eventual benefits outweigh costs for copies of one’s genes residing in other bodies

125
Q

Costly signaling

A

assumes cooperation is a signal that can benefit one’s reputation

Not just in terms of cooperation, also in access to sexual mates and resources

Some traits evolve because the allow individuals to do better in competition for a partner

126
Q

Gene-culture co-evolutionary model

A

Pays attention to interactions between evolved cooperative sentiments and cultural learning biases

Changes in genes lag behind environmental changes

127
Q

Given matrix

A

Hedonic, self-interested preferences

Summarizes consequences of individual’s actions and another person’s actions on individual’s outcomes

128
Q

Effective matrix

A

Summarizes a person’s broader preferences beyond pursuit of self-interest

129
Q

Dual-concern model

A

Assumes concerns about own and other’s outcomes

130
Q

Problem solving (concern)

A

function of high self concern and high other concern

131
Q

Yielding (concern)

A

low self concern and high other concern

132
Q

Contending (concern)

A

high self concern and low other concern

133
Q

Inaction (concern)

A

low self concern and low other concern

134
Q

overassimilation

A

Tendency for cooperative individuals to behave eventually even more non-cooperatively than the fairly non-cooperative partner with whom they interact

Cooperation and Competition (1 decks)

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