TERM 1: CA & endowment economy Flashcards

1
Q

small economy =

A

taken world IR & prices as given

Cannot influence them

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2
Q

Choice variables for households

A

C1, B1* (bond holdings)

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3
Q

Initial wealth inherited from past

A

(1+r0)B0*

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4
Q

Period 1 BC

A

C1 + B1* - B0* = r0B0* + Q1

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5
Q

Period 2 BC

A

C2 + B2* - B1* = r1B1* + Q2

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6
Q

Transversatility condition

A

B2*=0

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7
Q

Intertemporal BC

A

C1 + C2/(1+r1) = (1+r0)B0* + Q1 + Q2/(1+r1)

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8
Q

Lifetime utility function

A

U = ln(C1) + ln(C2)

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9
Q

4 properties of ICs

A
  1. downwards sloping
  2. monotonic
  3. Ics do not cross
  4. ICs convex to origin
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10
Q

What’s does ICs convex to origin imply about preferences?

A

Diminishing MRS of C2 for C1

As we have more C1, only willing to give up a small amount of C2 for one extra unit C1.

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11
Q

Where is the optimal graphically

A

Where intertemporal BC tangent to IC.

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12
Q

Optimal C* depends on (4)

A

Preferences, endowments, initial wealth, IR

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13
Q

Wealth (exogenous) =

A

W = (1+r0)B0* + Q1 + Q2/(1+r1)

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14
Q

How do C2 and C1 relate from FOCs

A

C2* = (1+r1)C1*

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15
Q

C2* as a fucntion of W and r1

A

C2* = 1/2 W(1+r1)

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16
Q

C1* as a fucntion of W

A

C1* = 1/2 W

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17
Q

C1* as a fucntion of r0, B0*, Q1, Q2, r1

A

C1* = 1/2[(1+r0)B0* + Q1 + Q2/(1+r1)]

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18
Q

C1* is increasing in

A

Q1, Q2, (1+r0)B0*

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19
Q

C1* is decreasing in

A

r1

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20
Q

TB1 is equal to

A

TB1 = Q1 - C1

difference between output and consumption

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21
Q

IF C1 > Q1

A

Must import from ROW therefore TB1 < 0

22
Q

IF C1 < Q1

A

Export to ROW therefore TB1 > 0

23
Q

CA1 =

A

CA1 = r0B0* + TB1

24
Q

TB1* formula

A

1/2[-(1+r0)B0* + Q1 - Q2/(1+r1)]

25
CA1* formula
1/2[-(1-r0)B0* + Q1 - Q2/(1+r1)]
26
What does free K mobility mean? Implicationfor IR too
households can borrow and lend in international financial market. r1 = r* i.e. domestic IR = world IR
27
If r1 > r* what happens?
investors borrow in international markets, lend in domestic markets. Excess supply in dom = r1 falls. Excess demand in inter. = r* rises. Arbitrage opporuntities disappear.
28
A temporary output shock
Q1 rises, Q2 stays the same.
29
How does a temporary +VE output shock affect CA1*? Explain.
Housholds know shock is temporary, want to smooth consumption, so increase C1 but also increase S1 to save for period 2. Increase in Q1 > increase in C1. Therefore TB1 improves, CA1 improves as more saving.
30
Formula for effect of permanent output shock on CA1*. Explain.
change CA1* = 1/2 r*/(1+r*) change in Q1. | Smaller change in CA1 as do not need to increase saving to smooth consumption as Q2 increases too.
31
Difference between impact of temporary and permanent shocks
Finance tempoary shocks by running CA surpluses/deficits to smooth consumption. Adjust to permanent shocks by changing consumption in the LR to keep CA stable.
32
What have we assumed so far avout the goods?
That there's just one good which is consumed, imprted and exported.
33
Terms of trade = + formula
The relative price of exportable goods in terms of importable goods. TT = Px/Pm
34
Now we assume bonds are denominated specifically in terms of...
Importable goods Pm
35
Period 1 and 2 BC including TT
C1 + B1* - B0* = r0B0* + TT1 Q1 | C2 + B2* - B1* = r1B1* + TT2 Q2
36
Intertemporal BC including TT
C1 + C2/(1+r1) = (1+r0)B0* + TT1Q1 + TT2Q2 /(1+r1)
37
How are TT determined in a small open economy?
They are GIVEN
38
A TT shock is just like an...
endowment shock
39
temporary TT shock effect on CA
large effect on TB & CA to smooth consumption
40
permanent TT shock on CA
small effecr on TB & CA
41
What about the shock matters to determine impact on CA?
whether agents THINK the shock is permanent/temporary, doesnt actually matter whether it was ex-post
42
2 effects higher IR can have on C1 and CA1
1. SE - higher r* = C2 more attractive relative to C1 = C1 falls, S1 rises = CA1 improves 2. WE - higher r* = makes debtors poorer, lenders richer. C1 falls for debtors = CA improves; C1 rises for lenders. = CA worsens
43
Which effect dominates? Under what condition?
SE > IE. When utility preferences are log.
44
Explain effect of rise in r* graphically for debtor
Steeper BC = pivots around endowment point Original equilibrium not feasible C1 falls and C2 rises TB1 & CA1 improve
45
Rationale for K controls
To curb CA deficits which arguably risk future crises and reduce C2
46
Strong form of K controls requires:
B1* >=0 | Can lend but cannot borrow
47
Impact of K controls on C1 and C2 - new equilibrium
C1 falls so C1=Q1 C2 rises so C2=Q2 New equi at endowment point
48
What has to happen to domestic IR to make the endowment point the new optimum after K controls?
Increase domestic IR r1 above r* world IR | Encourages saving so now happy not to borrow = no longer a debtor.
49
formula for r1 under K controls scenario
C2=(1+r1)C1 C2 = Q2 and C1 = Q1 therefore: r1 = (Q2 / Q1) - 1
50
How r1 related to Q2 and Q1
The lower Q1 is relative to Q2, the more households want to borrow against future income. To make them not do this, r1 has to be even higher.