Task 8 - Cooperation Flashcards
Cooperation
Cooperation to other people involves some sacrifice
- > give up time, invest cognitive/physical effort, contribute financially
- > takes many forms (helping friend to move, paying taxes, recycling waste
- > not everyone cooperates
involves consideration of others and taking perspectives
Fear, greed an punishment
Several studies examined effect that fear and greed might have on rates of cooperation in social dilemmas
Fear appears to party explain generosity of most proposers in anonymous ultimatum game
In dictator game, proposers offer less when there is no possibility of rejection, but offer more than they would if they were behaving out of pure self-interest
There is also evidence that dictators are even less generous when great pains are taken to convince them that their responses are anonymous and their identity is hidden
-> Greed may flip side of fear: people often behave in greedy fashion once fear is removed
Ahn et al. (2001): found effect of fear and greed in repeated-play prisoners dilemma, but only when participants were randomly paired in each game
-> Linked greed and fear to particular payoff relationships in the task
Four possible outcomes:
1. Temptation (T)
2. Reward (R)
3. Punishment (P)
4. Sucker (S)
T>R>P>S
Greed is based on payoff obtained if you defect when other player cooperates (T-R)
Fear based on cost of cooperating when other player defects (P-S)
Greed had stronger effect on behavior than did fear
–>Table of all possibilities in literature list
Prisoners Dilemma / Games
Used to investigate cooperation
Strategies open:
- COOPERATION: not telling anything
- DEFECTION: implicating partner
Game theory makes specific prediction: implicating is best strategy
Many games have NASH EQUILIBRIUM
- > combination of strategies that cannot be improved upon, as long as other player sticks with chosen strategy
- > In prisoners dilemma, joint defection is nash equilibrium, because only one equilibrium, point mutual defection is regarded as the dominant strategy
- > Best they can get if they are both rational actors pursuing their self interest
PUBLIC GOODS GAME / RESOURCE ALLOCATION TASK
-> Generalization of prisoner’s dilemma
-> Players have token grant they can simultaneously invest in any proportion to a private or public project
Collectively rational action is to contribute whereas individually rational action is to withhold contribution
-> Parallels with real life situations (BBC Example)
DICTATOR GAME
- > Dictator is given a bunch of money he can allocate between himself and recepeints
- > Allocation are sensitive to details of: hoe game is described, dicator’s knowledge of recipient, and whether recipient knows he is part of the game
ULTIMATUM GAME
- > Recipient can reject the proposed allocations, if they do, both players receive nothing
- > Rejections: evidence of negative reciprocity
- > Across small-scale societies ultimatum offers = more generous when cooperative activity and market trade are more common
THIRD PARTY PUNISHMENT GAME
- > Dictator A and Recipient B
- > Potential punisher C observes how much A gives to B
- > C can spend a proportion of his endowment on punishing A
- > Punishment option can be used to measure economic willingness to punish violation of any social nrom
TRUST GAME
- > Players A and B: each have an initial donation
- > A decides to keep his endowment or send it to B
- > B observes A’s action and decides whether to keep amount or share some with A
- > Experimenter doubles / triples A’s transfer : both players are better of if A transfers money and B sends back sufficient amount
Trust, generosity and communication
TRUST
= willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations about another’s behavior
Trust and trustworthiness appear to vary considerably by country
People are more likely to trust people with a good reputation
GENEROSITY
= quality of being kind & generous
One drawback is NOISE
-> Refers to an erroneous response
In real life we are sometimes let down by other people, or we ourselves let others down, through circumstances beyond our control rather than intentionally (e.g.: car braking down)
In some situations people may not be able to act in generous way
-> In such circumstances communication can overcome the problem of noise, particularly for people who show low levels of dispositional trust who otherwise tend to respond more negatively to noise
COMMUNICATION:
Communication can help overcome the problems caused by noise in social dilemmas. Other studies have found that cooperation is increased when group members are allowed to communicate
Various reasons have been proposed as to why communication increases cooperation, though Kerr and Kaufmann-Gilliland (1994) concluded that only two explanations are supported:
1. Communication promotes group solidarity
2. Communication allows group members to express their commitment to mutually cooperate
Wilson and Sell (1997) pointed out that misleading communications could potentially decrease cooperation, if people do not live up to their promises
- > Conducted public good study, giving rise to four conditions:
1. Information about past investments only
2. Information about announcements only
3. Information about past investments and announcements
4. Information about neither past investments nor announcements - -> Found that average group contributions were highest when there was no information at all and lowest when there is only one type of information available
Scharlemann et al. (2001): people are more inclined to cooperate with people who others agree look cooperative
Why hate the good guy?
ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT:
= punishing people who behave in a good way
-> Occurs when lowest co-operators target highest co-operators
–>Antisocial punishment may attempt to stop high-cooperators from looking to good, and to stop antisocial punisher from looking selfish in comparison
->Often verbally reprimanded, excluded from cooperative interaction, or ostracized completely = MORALISTIC PUNISHMENT (fosters group cooperation)
DO-GOODER GEROGATION
= people who help others get criticized or ridiculed for their efforts
WHY?
-> Retaliation by low co-operators against those whom they think punished them or might do in the future
-> Because they deviate from group norms (theories of normative conformity)
-> Spiteful way of reducing other’s payoff to have higher payoff
-> To make them look bad so they look better in comparison
BIOLOGICAL MARKETS THEORY
=organisms choose partners for cooperative interactions, leading to organisms outbidding each other to be chosen as partner
Appraisal theory
= emotions are adaptive responses that are elicited based on how an agent evaluates its situation
APPRAISALS
= an act of assessing something or someone
-> Usually directly related to motivational goals and occur in response to external and internal thoughts
Usually precede emotions –> they prepare agent to make adaptive responses via action tendencies
ACTION READINESS
= state of translating feelings and goals into behavioral actions
Examples:
-> Guilt: arises from appraisal that one has failed to live up to expectations of partner and motivates reparative action tendencies
-> Anger: arises from appraisal that progress toward a goal is blocked, or social / moral norm has been disobeyed, and motivates punishment
Guilt & Anger Games
Guilt aversion; Trust game (described in Literature)
- > Player B returns in trust game is directly proportional to amount that they believe Player A expects them to return
- > Players exhibit concern for their co-players’ expecations
- > Behavioral evidence that belief dependent guilt enables cooperation in manner consistent with predictions of guilt aversion theory
NEURAL ACTIVITY WHILE MAKING DECISIONS
-> 2 distinct brain system associated with value
AS if guilt averse -> increased activity in the insula, ACC, DLPFC and tempoparietal junction
-> Network thought to be involved in processing negative affect, salinece, cognitive control, and theory of mind
Maximizing financial self-interest -> increased activation in the ventromedial PFC, ventral striatum, and DMPFC
–> Regions involved in reward processing and mentalizing
Participants would have experienced more guilt had they returned lesser amount of money; correlated with the scale of response in their insula when they behaved as-if guilt averse
ANGER
Ultimatum Minigame (described in Literature)
Anger = function of blame player A places on player B for his frustration
-Frustration: difference between best outcome player A can still receive in game and material payoff player A initially expected
Threat of punishment ensures cooperative outcomes
Differences between expectations and outcomes = anger -> drives costly punishment
Players more likely to reject offers that deviated from initial expectations
Extend of deviation from expectations correlated with activity in the dorsal ACC and the anterior insula, a network reliaibly associated with error-monitoring and emotions
-> Magnitude of trial-to-trial deviations from expectations correlated with the anterior insule, dACC and ventral striatum
-Frustrated anger model: captures the appraisal computation accurately -> the consequent feelings of anger motivate decisions to punish an offender
–> Models that incorporate social emotions theoretically predict enhance cooperation in both trust and bargaining games
Social Neuroeconomics
NEUROECONOMICS APPROACH
Rejects premise of unobservability, seeks micro foundation of social and economic activity in neural circuitry
Neural circuitry: involved in altruistic, fair, and trusting behaviors
Brain processes that govern deviations from purely self-interested behavior
2 viewpoints about why prosocial behaviors occur:
1. Behavior in one-shot anonymous games indicate a reflexive behavior that is highly adapted for repeated interactions in which immediate pro social behavior erns future benefits
2. Pro-social behavior reflects robust social preferences for treating other generously or reciprocally and those preferences are like preferences for other kinds of primary and secondary rewards
THEORIES OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES
model the motivational forces driving deviations from economic self-interest in precise way
-> based on the concept of decision utility
THEORIES OF RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS
Players are assumed to positively value kind intentions, and to negatively value hostile intentions of other players
DECISIONS UTILITY
numerical measure thought to underlie observed behavior
-> NOT EXPERIENCED UTILITY: pleasant or unpleasant experience associated with the consumption of a good or an events
-> From anticipated utility = anticipation of experienced utility at the time of decision making
Social Class and unethical Behavior
Upper class have greater resources, freedom and independence which gives rise to self-focused social cognitive tendencies
They value their own welfare over welfare of others and have more positive attitudes towards greed
Greed is found to be determinant of unethical behavior
Their relative independence from others and increased privacy in professions may account for that
Study 1&2: upper class drivers are found to be more likely to cut off other cars and more likely to drive through crosswalks
Study 3: 8 different scenarios were presented where actor benefited from something –> social class predicted unethical decision making tendencies or likelihood they would engage in these scenarios
Study 4: participants were induced with mind set -> those in upper rank condition were more likely to take more candy from a jar meant for children
Study 5: Participants indicated total sum of five different dice rolls: social class predicted cheating and more favorable attitudes towards greed
Study 6: increasing positive attitudes towards greed - lower class individuals were as unethical as upper-class individuals when primes with positive features of greed ->Positive features of greed moderate class-based differences in unethical behavior
Addressing Empathic failures
Empathy is critical for social functioning, but it often wanes when it is needed most
- > Resulting empathic failures precipitate and worsen social conflict
- > Conflict-reduction interventions prioritize developing empathy in order to achieve harmony
Recent research has indicated that such interventions can benefit from a more nuanced understanding of empathy
->Empathy is a multidimensional construct, including understanding, sharing and feeling concern for others’ emotions
Expression of empathic processes if further influenced by psychological factors that “tune” people toward or away from empathy
Interventions must therefore diagnose the specific nature and precursors of empathic failures and tailor interventions appropriately
Empathy alone may be insufficient to produce prosocial behavior, especially when parties differ in status or power
-> Interventions should promote equitable goals and norms in addition to empathy
By understanding component processes and boundary conditions, practitioners can work to promote empathy in maximally effective ways
Economic, Education and Greed
GREED
excessive self-interest that imposes costs on the well-being of others
ECONOMIC THEORY
always assumes self-interest maximization
GAME THEORY
emphasizes approach to interpersonal behavior that might contribute to increase greedy behavior
Moral emotions are between the most important elements of morality and provide the motivation necessary for appropriate behavior
Rational approach of economic theories might become stronger and force out effect of salient emotions
HYPOTHESIS
increase exposure to economic theory might give people frameworks that licence greed
-> Increases in economics education associated with increasingly greedy action and decreasing concers for fairness
-> Increases in economics education associated with increasingly positive perceptions of greed
RESULT
economic training increases the beliegs that others are motivated by self-interest which in turn can lead individuals to justify their own self-interst behavior
-> CONFIRMED HYPOTHESIS that buisness education increases greedy behavior
Studies further described in literature
