TASK 1 - AWARENESS Flashcards

1
Q

consciousness

A

= probed through the subject’s report of his or her own mental states

  • not directly and straightforwardly observable
  • psychological attributes of conscious processing:
    1. active maintenance of mental representations
    2. strategical processing
    3. spontaneous intentional behaviour
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

third-person data

A

= brain processes, behaviour, environmental interaction
- EEG, brain imaging, single cells studies and so on
x stem from technological + ethical limitations rather than conceptual barriers

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

first-person data

A

= subjective conscious experience (= central data we want science to explain)

  • can’t wholly be expressed in terms of first-person data
  • introspection, phenomenologists…
  • serious obstacles BUT they should not provide barriers to initial development of methods
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

first-person data

- obstacles

A

x all have serious limitations and none have been integrated into contemporary science (e.g. lack of incorrigible access to experience)

(1) lack of access to our experience
(2) introspecting an experience changes the experience
(3) impossibility of accessing all our experience at once
(4) grand illusions

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

first-person data

- formalism

A

= simple language that is imprecise + relies on perspective (can the content of experience even be captured in language?)

  • obstacles: (greater) whether the content of experience can be captured wholly in language –> easier to capture structural (e.g. structure of visual field) aspects than non-structural (e.g. sensation of a colour) aspects of experience
  • even in the non-structural we can find an underlying structure (e.g. decomposing colour experiences into brightness, saturation, and hue)
  • -> develop a theory of proto qualia
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

formalism

- proto qualia

A

= qualia we experience are systematically built up from simple building blocks which are present across many experiences

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

science of consciousness

A

= relating third-person to first-person data

  • come up with broad connecting principles: certain experiences go along with certain processes in the brain/ information processing
  • be able to formulate simple + universal laws underlying these connecting principles: “fundamental theory” of consciousness
  • -> necessary to develop more sophisticated methodologies & formalisms (especially with respect to first-person data)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

neural correlate of consciousness

A

= NCC = neural system/ system primarily associated with conscious experience

  • cannot be measured directly
  • need to use principle of interpretation (=pre-experimental bridging principles) to determine whether someone is conscious of something
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

NCC

- pre-experimental bridging principles

A

= principles of interpretation = by which we interpret physical systems to judge the presence of consciousness

  • identify (1) whether or not systems are conscious now + (2) which information they are conscious of, and which they are not
  • principles by which we make inferences from facts about processing –> to facts about consciousness
  • conceptually prior to experiment
  • philosophical reasoning: we have to make leap between (1) conceptual judgements about what counts as a conscious process and (2) information from our first-person perspective of our own consciousness
  • -> need to pay careful attention to the reasoning involved
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

bridging principles

1. principle of verbal report

A

= when information is directly available for verbal reported, it is conscious
- only subjects that have language

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

bridging principles

2. principle of global control

A

= when information is directly available for an arbitrary response OR for global control (any motor modality) in a cognitive system, then it is conscious (first-person evidence)

  • primary criterion for consciousness
  • applicable when language is not present
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

NCC

- rational reconstruction

A
  • with these principles we can produce rational reconstructions of the search for the NCC
    = maybe things do not work exactly like this in practice, but the rational underpinnings of the procedure have something like this form
    1) consciousness global availability (bridging principle)
    2) global availability neural process N (empirical work)
    3) consciousness neural process N (conclusion)
    –> instead of measuring consciousness directly, we detect the functional property (e.g. global availability) –> when present = correlated with a specific neural process
    –> combining the pre-empirical premise with the empirical result –> get to the conclusion that this neural process is a candidate for the NCC
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

NCC
- consequences of rational reconstruction/for bridging principles
1.

A
  • NCC MUST BE a mechanism that subserves global availability in the brain (only other option would be that it’s a symptom of global availability, would be dissociable)
  • consciousness can be present even when the neural process in question is not
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

NCC
- consequences of rational reconstruction/for bridging principles
2.

A
  • neural process associated with consciousness will do 2 things:
    1. explain global availability (= how info is made available for global control in the brain)
    2. isolate the processes that underlie consciousness itself (if bridging principle is granted)
  • can never FULLY explain consciousness, it can only isolate the basis for it
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

NCC
- consequences of rational reconstruction/for bridging principles
3.

A
  • likely that there will be many NCCs:
    (1) because there will be many mechanisms of global availability (e.g. mechanisms in different modalities: visual availability, auditory availability, etc.)
    (2) many mechanisms at different stages in processing whereby information is made globally available (early/late)
  • can co-exist because they’re compatible in one way
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

NCC
- consequences of rational reconstruction/for bridging principles
4.

A
  • there is a possibility for a consciousness module (= functionally localisable, internally integrated area through which all global availability runs)
  • resembles Baars’ global workspace: functional are responsible for integrating information and disseminating it to multiple non-conscious specialised processes
  • BUT, just as likely that we will find multiple independent mechanisms of global availability, scattered around without mutual integration
17
Q

NCC
- consequences of rational reconstruction/for bridging principles
5.

A
  • if a given area in V1 projects to the PFC it may well be a mechanism of direct availability (PFC is associated with control processes)
  • if it doesn’t, it is less likely to be such a mechanism (might at best be indirectly associated)
18
Q

NCC
- consequences of rational reconstruction/for bridging principles
6.

A
  • we should not follow reasoning that “if NCC is discovered, then the NCC itself will be used as a consciousness meter” –> we do not have a way of establishing an NCC as an independent test for consciousness
  • NCC suggestions are only relevant because of their role in satisfying bridging principles (global availability, verbal report) –> it is not clear that anything follows when the functional criterion is thrown away
  • -> there is no way of definitely establishing a given NCC as an independent test for consciousness (it is relevant only in combination with the bridging principles)
19
Q

vegetative state

A

= patients who emerge from coma appear to be awake but show no signs of awareness

  • no reproducible evidence for purposeful behaviour in response to external stimulation
  • found islands of preserved brain function (exist in small percentage of patients)
20
Q

awareness in vegetative state

  • owen
    (1) study 1
A
  • measure neural responses to spoken sentences, compare with responses to acoustically matched noise sequences
  • activity matched that of controls
    A. bilateral activation in middle + superior temporal gyri
    B. left inferior frontal region (especially in response to sentences that contained ambiguities)
    –> sentences containing ambiguous words produced an additional significant response (reflecting speech comprehension)
  • BUT not evidence for conscious awareness: speech perception and semantic processing can happen in the absence of conscious awareness
21
Q

awareness in vegetative state

  • owen
    (2) study 2
A
  • spoken instructions to perform mental imagery (play tennis + walk through own house)
  • activity was indistinguishable from that of healthy controls
    A. imagining playing a game of tennis: supplementary motor area (SMA)
    B. imagining visiting all rooms in the house: para-hippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal cortex, and lateral premotor cortex
    –> represents clear act of intention = confirms conscious awareness of herself + surroundings
22
Q

awareness in vegetative state

  • owen
    (3) results
A
  • patient retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or movement
  • some non-communicative, vegetative, minimally conscious patients may be able to use available cognitive capacities to communicate their thoughts to those around by modulating their own neural activity
23
Q

awareness in vegetative state

- naccache

A
  • we should not generalise from a single patient (who suffered few cerebral lesions) to most other vegetative patients (who typically have massive structural brain lesions)
  • current behavioural and neuro-imaging evidence suggests that conscious processing is abolished during a vegetative state –> do not report mental states, do not spontaneously engage in intentional actions (aspects of consciousness)
  • long-range neural integration observed during conscious processing is lacking (only found residual local and specific brain activation patterns)
  • owen: study paves way for future functional brain-imaging studies
24
Q

awareness in vegetative state

- burton

A
  • can see activation but not the images transition from the unconscious to the conscious perception
  • can’t say anything until we know if a choice is truly deliberate or just the unconscious activation of neural circuitry
  • preservation of isolated neural networks shouldn’t be construed as representing conscious awareness
  • -> there is activity but we don’t know whether it can be attributed to consciousness
  • -> need to understand what neural states correspond to specific conscious experiences –> until then fMRI pronouncements only speculations
  • -> fMRI accuracy, reliability, and interpretations remain debatable
  • owen: possibly her injury destroyed her ability to make unconscious thoughts conscious BUT left her auditory pathways and subconscious processing mechanisms sufficiently intact to hear and respond to the researchers’ questions (not conscious intention and choice)
25
Q

awareness in vegetative state

- monti

A
  • 40% misdiagnosis: new methods
  • main goals of clinical assessment:
    1) capacity for a purposeful response to a stimulation, however inconsistent
  • suggests at least partial awareness (distinguishes minimally conscious from vegetative state)
  • behaviour often ambiguous and inconsistent = difficult to distinguish between reflexive and voluntary behaviour
    2) transform any available response into form of reproducible communication, however rudimentary
  • consistent communication defines the upper boundary of a minimally conscious state
26
Q

minimally conscious state

A

= show inconsistent but reproducible signs of awareness

- including ability to follow commands, but remain unable to communicate interactively

27
Q

monti

- imagery task

A
  • aim: what proportion can modulate their fMRI responses
  • access patient’s ability to generate wilful BOLD responses during two established mental-imagery tasks
  • 54 patients
28
Q

monti

- imagery task results

A
  • 5 were able to wilfully modulate their brain activity
  • -> 3 showed sign of awareness with additional bedside testing
  • -> 2 showed no remaining voluntary behaviour
    1) 5 patients: motor imagery showed considerable activation of SMA
    2) 4/5 patients: spatial imagery showed activation in parahippocampal gyrus
    3) time course of activity within two regions of interest was associated with delivery of verbal cues (sustained for 30s)
  • small portion of patients in vegetative or minimally conscious state have brain activation reflecting awareness and cognition
  • careful clinical examination could result in reclassification of some of the patients
29
Q

monti

- communication task

A
  • aim: can they communicate yes/no responses (one type of imagery (motor vs. spatial) as affirmative, one as negative answer)
  • develop and validate a method that allows patients to functionally communicate yes-or-no responses
  • -> by modulating their own brain activity, without training + without the need for any motor response
    1. patient who had reliable responses during two imagery tasks in the fMRI
    2. patient asked to respond to yes-or-no autobiographical questions by thinking of one type of imagery (motor or spatial) for an affirmative answer and the other for a negative answer
30
Q

monti

- communication task results

A
  • one patient was able to use technique to answer yes or no questions during fMRI
  • -> for 5/6 of the questions: activity was within bounds of normal variability
  • -> pattern produced always matched the factually correct answer
  • -> BUT impossible to establish communication at bedside with the patient
  • approach could be used in future to address important clinical questions: feeling pain + determine whether analgesic agents should be administered
  • if developed further: express thoughts, control environment –> increase quality of life
31
Q

monti

- limitations

A
  • impossible to determine whether, in patients who showed no significant fMRI changes, negative findings were the result of low sensitivity of method, or a genuine reflection of the patients’ limited cognitive abilities
  • some patients could have been unconscious (permanently or transiently) during scanning
  • task could have exceeded the residual cognitive capabilities of those in a minimally conscious state