TaS Finals

Question 1

Language Games

Answer 1

Ludwig Wittgenstein. The meaning of words and statements are determined in a social linguistic context, and language is no longer a representation or image of reality. There are many different language games, implying that a word does not have a single meaning. There are no private languages, languages, as in games, have public rules. One cannot make their own rules.
Example: “God is good.” This sentence has meaning in the language of religion, but not in the language of science.

Question 2

Relativism

Answer 2

Ludwig Wittgenstein. Everything is relative to the context. The truth is relative to the community you are in and therefore everyone has their own truth.

Question 3

Constructivism

Answer 3

Observations themselves are “contaminated” by our thinking. Thinking along these lines, reality becomes our own construction. When our theories change, what we consider to be facts that make up reality changes with them: constructivism. “reality” and “truth” are no longer to be taken at face value.

Question 4

Theory-ladenness of observations

Answer 4

Theory guides our observations. There are no neutral observations. We see what we see in the light of already acquired expectations and preconceptions.

Question 5

Paradigm

Answer 5

Thomas Kuhn. Not well defined, as there have been 22+ meanings. A paradigm is namely a set of universally recognised principles: theoretical perspective, shared worldview and methodological processes. This paradigm refers to the work of a “scientific community” in a certain era. They are incommensurability according to Kuhn.

Question 6

Incommensurability

Answer 6

You cannot compare them and scientist cannot communicate with someone in a different paradigm. There is no objective way to compare the paradigms, as you would need to look from the point of one paradigm. Kuhn later said that even though it was impossible to translate certain terms from one paradigm to another, scientists could still understand each other.

Question 7

Pre-science

Answer 7

Thomas Kuhn. As much opinions as there are researchers. No paradigm, no consensus about theories, techniques, methodology, etc.

Question 8

Normal Science

Answer 8

Thomas Kuhn. Begins with the emergence of a paradigm. Within the paradigm, puzzles are solved, which leads to rational activity: expansion and elaboration of the paradigm.

Question 9

Anomalies

Answer 9

The phenomena that cannot be explained from within the paradigm.

Question 10

Crisis / abnormal science

Answer 10

Thomas Kuhn. A crisis is a period in which abnormal science takes place. Sometimes, the anomalies don’t get solved and accumulate crisis. This is a condition for a scientific revolution.

Question 11

Scientific revolution

Answer 11

Thomas Kuhn. A paradigm shifts takes place: scientists jump (irrational) from one paradigm to another. Kuhn calls them revolution because of three reasons:
1. A small group of people became aware of the shortcomings.
2. Change from within is impossible.
3. One cannot achieve consensus in a political discourse if one’s goal is totally different.
It’s like a Gestalt switch, a process whereby someone’s perspective changes from one thing to another.

Question 12

Logical rationality

Answer 12

It is according to objective, logical rules and about the application of these rules. Induction and deduction are there, so there should be a formal aspect to get to go by a logical analysis. Scientists determine it from the outside what it should entail.
Lakatos, Popper and LP try to find the rationality of science. According to them, they could find this in logic.

Question 13

Scientific rationality

Answer 13

Rationality is not the result of application of logic, but it is about the exchange of reasons (arguments and justifications) and trying to come to the best possible solution by using the best reasons available and coming to a consensus. Scientists are still human and they determine it from within.
Tied to Kuhn and Peirce. By coming to a consensus, it is true. Pragmatic form of rationality (Peirce), and the paradigm shift of Kuhn.

Question 14

The Strong Programme

Answer 14

David Bloor and Barry Barnes. Also called “the Edinburg school”. Argued that Kuhn was not radical enough in his views. We have to look at every belief and their social processes, not only the irrational ones. We have to search for the causes of why they came to a consensus about this belief. It is a more neutral understanding of the belief and each community has a different type of belief/knowledge. It has four basic tenets:
1. Causality: cause and effect, the logical causes as why people come to a belief.
2. Impartiality: we have to be impartial to irrational beliefs.
3. Symmetry: causes explain both true and false beliefs, other ones are not. Truth and rationality can’t explain why we have these beliefs.
a. Equivalence postulate: similar types of causes explain both true and false beliefs. Look for the causes of their credibility (why do people accept them as true?) and there should be empirical investigation.
4. Reflexivity: sociology of knowledge is itself a form of knowledge production. They are themselves in a community, then why should we accept their views as true?

Question 15

Research program

Answer 15

Imre Lakatos. A series of theories with a hard core (definition of the theory, unfalsifiable) and a protective belt (auxiliary hypotheses) around it. The protective belt makes the core concrete: comes with examples, these can be falsified and then changed based on this. It protects the core against falsification.
Testing of the programme always occurs in the belt. Scientists adjust in one of two ways when the belt is confronted with an anomaly.
Degenerative: ad hoc and after the fact adjustments just to save the theory, unscientific.
Progressive: adjustments that lead to new predictions and expand.

Question 16

Sophisticated falsificationism

Answer 16

Imre Lakatos. A scientific theory is falsified if and only if another theory has been proposed with the following characteristics: it can predict new things that the other theory couldn’t, all old things work in the new theory or some theories have been confirmed.

Question 17

Methodological anarchism

Answer 17

Paul Feyerband. There is no scientific method, pluralism (different RP’s have to co-exist) necessary to deal with the complexity of the world. All methods one should want to try should be allowed.

Question 18

Undertermination of theory

Answer 18

Bas van Fraassen. Underdetermination of theory by data. The same data can be explained by an infinite number of logically incompatible, yet empirically equivalent theories. The theories might contradict each other, but they still account for the same theory (empirically equivalent). There are an infinite number of alternative ontologies of unobservables possible.

Question 19

Instrumentalism

Answer 19

Theories are only useful instruments that enable us to make predictions and manipulate the world successfully. Scientific theories do not have a true value, they are just instruments, not real. A form of anti-realism. Three example fields:
Metaphysical: the world that science describes does not exist.
Semantical: the scientific language cannot be interpreted literally. They are not describing things, they have no truth value, they are just using an instrument.
Epistemological: scientific theories are helpful for making predictions, they are not true.

Question 20

Scientific realism

Answer 20

the assumption that science tells us something about reality and so that scientific theories are (approximately) true. Three example fields:
Metaphysical: the world that science describes is real. If scientists describe neutrons, then neutrons exist.
Semantical: the scientific language has to be interpreted literally. Refers to the meaning of language, if scientists say electrons exist, they really exist.
Epistemological: scientific theories are true or approximately true.

Question 21

The Miracle Argument

Answer 21

Putnam. The success of science would be regarded as a miracle if successful scientific theories were not at least approximately true. If scientific theories were not true, then the success of science would be a miracle.

Question 22

Inference to the best explanation (IBE)

Answer 22

This hypothesis provides the best possible explanation. So, the hypothesis is true. It provides a better answer than something else, the example of the blackbird: if there was a blackbird, there would be a nest → there is a nest → a blackbird has made this next. We are confronted with something and we come up with an account of what we observe. We observe something and we try to give the best possible account of what to observe. However, it is not always a logically conclusive from of reasoning.

Question 23

Anti-realism

Answer 23

It is impossible to know whether the unobservables that account for the phenomena are actually true. We don’t say whether something is true or not, they just are.

Question 24

Pessimistic induction of the history of science

Answer 24

Popular theories turned out to be false (e.g. flogiston, the substance that was responsible for burning things), and unpopular were true (e.g. place tectonics, natural selection), meaning their status doesn’t say if they are true or not. Empirical success of a theory is no guarantee for its truth not is empirical failure indicative of falsehood.

Question 25

Inference to the only explanation (IOE)

Answer 25

This hypothesis provides the only explanation and nothing more, no competitor. We assume that one explanation is the truth, since that is the only one that feels satisfactory. E.g. electron theory provides the only explanation for electric phenomena, therefore, electron theory is true. Current argument for scientific realism?

Question 26

Unobservables

Answer 26

Bas van Fraassen. The theoretical world. Things, the underlying structures of the world and processes that we cannot see with the naked eye, but are nevertheless there. Van Fraassen says that we don’t need to believe in unobservables to still be able to conduct science. But it may be handy to act as if there unobservables exist.

Question 27

Empirical adequacy

Answer 27

Bas van Fraassen. Concept that says that a theory is empirically adequate when the observations and predictions based on that theory match with our observations.

Question 28

English concept of rationality

Answer 28

Bas van Fraassen. Everything is permitted that is not explicitly forbidden → empirical adequacy: theories are undetermined by data so one has the freedom to believe.

Question 29

Prussian concept of rationality

Answer 29

Bas van Fraassen. Everything is forbidden that is not explicitly permitted → scientific realism: it is only rational to accept reality as described by science.

Question 30

Constructive empiricism

Answer 30

Bas van Fraassen, form of anti-realism. Knowledge stems from the senses, but we construct the world of unobservables ourselves. We cannot tell whether unobservables exist or not, so we need to accept it as empirically adequate alone and do not have to believe it is true. We can’t see the unobservables, so we construct them.

Question 31

Pragmatism

Answer 31

An approach to science that avoids the sceptical challenge. It has a practical approach to beliefs, it is about being able to act and do things based on the theories. Belief revision will be done if need to be, there is no room for scepticism, because when you are in doubt you can’t act.
Rationality and truth avoid the sceptic. We don’t have to find a philosophical justification for scientific knowledge, as long as it works it is fine now.

Question 32

Pragmatic principle

Answer 32

Charles Peirce. For any statement to be meaningful, it must have practical bearings and sensible effects. In order to understand a concept and give it meaning, you have to look at its sensible effects and the practical bearings.

Question 33

Paper doubt

Answer 33

Charles Peirce. Doubt that one can put on paper. One does not really feel the doubt, they are merely pretending to be doubting. It is fake doubt, not real. Not willing to do away with current beliefs but tries to hold onto them (even though they don’t work).
Peirce claims that Descartes was merely in paper doubt.

Question 34

Living doubt

Answer 34

Charles Peirce. Doubt that feels uncomfortable. One wants to know what the world is like. We can’t do anything when we are in doubt, so we need true beliefs in order to act again. Science is the best way to remove this doubt and clear out thoughts by using a form of inquiry.

Question 35

Naturalism

Answer 35

W.O. Quine. It suggests that we study science with science. It lies on a continuum with other sciences and it holds that scientific statements are always hypothetical and it is just a net people cast over the world. Philosophy is in line with other sciences, it is just like any other form of inquiry. Philosophers have to rely on scientific insights to deal with other problems.

Question 36

Naturalized epistemology

Answer 36

W.O. Quine. No armchair philosophy. We have to look at how we do it and we need to do it together with other scientists. We produce knowledge in specific environments and interactions and we need to investigate how they actually produce scientific beliefs.

Question 37

“Common sense, only more so.”

Answer 37

Susan Haack. Science is no different than other forms of inquiry. We see that there are certain patterns in our lives as well as science, and science relies on normal patterns. It is a form of inquiry, but the differences between everyday inquiries and science is that scientist use help. Scientists are no different, they try come up with answers for the research problems they are trying to solve. They rely on more help however, a support team. Like how people use glasses to see, it’s support. It is about informed conjectures, imagination, intellectual honesty and good judgement.
Example: “Where are my keys?” → thinking about where my keys are → testing hypothesis by looking at these places.

Question 38

Positivism

Answer 38

Auguste Comte. All sciences are the same, the only thing when you move from one form of science to another is that we see that things become less abstract and more complex. In all these disciplines they work in the same way, we just need to find the laws (stages).
Comte is the defender of positivism, he could see a pattern in humans. There is the law of three stages:
Theological stage: all phenomena result from the actions of supernatural agents.
Metaphysical stage: supernatural causes are replaced by abstract entities.
Positive/scientific stage: explanations on the basis of observed phenomena in combination with reasoning and people start to develop scientific explanations.

Question 39

Hermeneutics

Answer 39

Wilhelm Dilthey. It is about interpreting humans and discovering the hidden meanings. Natural sciences is about Erklären and the social sciences are about Verstehen. It went on to be the foundation of the social sciences: we have to work in different ways than the natural sciences, because we can’t describe everything in physical terms.