Tariff Flashcards

1
Q

Historic Trade Policy?

A

Post repeal of corn-laws (1846) Britain was the paragon of free trade

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2
Q

1914 and onward trade policy?

A

WW1 led to loss of markets and the collapse of global trade.
First movements away from free trade (Mckenna duties on inelastic demand luxuries in 1915: revenue raising), Safeguarding of industries act 1921

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3
Q

General Tariff imposition?

A

GD and Cons into gov 1931
Import Duties Act 1932: Min of 10% except on exemptions, such as staple food
Set up Import Duties Advisory Committee for further tariffs

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4
Q

Imperial preference was solidified where and when

A

Ottowa conference 1932

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5
Q

What is EPR

A

Ex ante: Compares forecasts of where resources should be influenced to flow by tariff assuming ceteris paribus.
Takes into account nom tariff rate of inputs and outputs. Resources should flow to most protected

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6
Q

Capie EPR findings? (year)

A

1978
Negative correlation of EPR and growth.
Main drivers of growth (building at -7.2% and iron/steel at 7.8% EPR) harmed by tariff
Thus, conclude that recovery and growth of these industries were in spite of tariff

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7
Q

Criticisms of Capie: KSW

A

Kitson, Solomou, Weale (1991): Assumes raw materials as only input, distorting EPRs. Now, iron/ steel at 34%

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8
Q

Criticisms of Capie: FP

A

Foreman Peck (1981):
Must also know PED. When we consider this, we find that iron/steel actually benefitted third most of all industries analysed.
Further, consider General Eqm: Building may have been helped by income effects!

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9
Q

What is Import Replacement ratio?

A

(Change in Output - Change in X)/(Change in M)

Value closer to 1 implies closer to perfect import substitution

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10
Q

Richardson IRR?

A

Richardson (1967): IRR 1930-35: Newly prot=3.0, but 2.0 in others.
Suggests tariffs did not lead to import substitution!

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11
Q

Criticism of Richardson: KS

A

Kitson and Solomou (1990):
R ignores initial conditions! Compare change in growth 1924-30 and 1930-35: NP stagnant to 3.8%, others: no significant change.
This increase in output was due to productivity growth, not employment

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12
Q

DiD?

A

Lloyd and Solomou (2020): DiD=4.2% and significant for >10% level and positive, but not significant for 10% level.
However, R^2 value low so can’t explain all of variation!

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13
Q

SR industry effects?

A

Broadberry and Crafts (2012) and Horsewood et al (2009)

Short run positive, but more modest GDP effects on GDP/ productivity

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14
Q

Long run effects?

A
  • Improved productivity of protected has significant reversion in 1935-48 (Broadberry and Crafts 2012)
  • We never see full return to pre Depression levels of trade
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15
Q

What is theory of second best?

A

In the context of additional distortions, additional distortions may be welfare improving

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16
Q

Tariffs in other countries?

A

KS 1990: Germany, Italy, France avg tariff of 40% in 1931

17
Q

Why is partial eqm result not satisfactory?

A

Takes the fall in global demand as a given!
In fact, Albers (2019) finds trade multipliers of 0.7-1.2 in GDP for small, open economies at this point. Thus, major role for tariffs driving this output contraction!

18
Q

Conclusion of gen eqm tariffs

A

Even in SR, the positive effect of tariffs has been overstated.

19
Q

Why imperial preference/trading blocs?

A

Attempt to mitigate the trade collapse: Down 30% 1929-32 and still 10% below 1929 level in 1938

20
Q

Changing proportions of trade with empire?

A

Glickman 1947: %imports from Empire 30 to 40% 1931-38

21
Q

Imperial preference pre 1932?

A

Mckenna duties 1/3 lower and 1931 Emergency tariff did not apply to empire

22
Q

Agreements of 1932 Ottowa Conference?

A

Exempt Empire from tariff and never revoke GT without consent of Empire.
Also, increased protection for what empire exported: agriculture/raw materials

23
Q

Historical stance on imperial preference?

A

Policy fairly non-impactful: trade with empire as % of total trade was rising anyway!

24
Q

Gravity model of trade imperial preference?

A

Eichengreen and Irwin 1995:
Regression including imperial preference variables (same currency/trading bloc)
Finds: magnitude of empire importance up in 1930s indicating trade creation of policy, with no effect of other groups (no trade diversion)

25
Q

Did empire benefit?

A

Hicks et al (2013): Britain benefited, but empire did not

26
Q

Extent of impact of IP?

A

de Bromhead et al (2017)
Estimates using elasticities of trade wrt tariffs
Counter-factual: No change in policy: Empire % of trade would have = 35% of trade, not 40%
Policy accounted for 50-70% of trade with empire increase

27
Q

Did the policy backfire post WW2?

A

Solomou: UK cut itself off from the growing intra-European trade 50s/60s.

28
Q

Could UK have changed IP policy post WW2

A

Arguably, yes.
Although would take time to adjust trading routes.
Also, would involve revoking GT, which, under Ottowa Conference rules, would require consent of dominions!