Takings Flashcards
Takings arise out of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution. Takings without just compensation are seen as a violation, however how far is too far?
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922)
Facts of the Case
Pennsylvania Coal Co. entered an agreement with H.J. Mahon in 1878 to gain full rights to mine the coal located beneath his surface-level property. However in 1921 the state of Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act, which prohibited miners from extracting below-surface coal that supported surface- level buildings. When Pennsylvania Coal notified Mahon that it would mine coal beneath his property, Mahon filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas to prohibit mining in accordance with the Kohler Act. The court denied his suit but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and allowed the ban on mining. Pennsylvania Coal contended that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protected its contractual rights to the coal.
Question
Did the Kohler Act restrict coal mining to an extent that violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by depriving mine owners of coal without compensation?
The Court ruled that the Kohler Act violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The state exceeded its police powers by significantly diminishing the value of the land estates without having a strong public interest reason to do so. The Court reasoned that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
Penn Central Transportation Corp. v. City of New York (1978)
The Court ruled that the rejection of building a modern office space above Penn Central Station was not consistent with a taking because the modern office building was not consistent with the HIstoric Preservation Plan and there was an allowance for TOD air rights transfer.
Factors included:
- Economic impact of plaintiff
- Extent regulations interferes with “distinctive investment backed expectations.”
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan (1982)
The court ruled that regulations that mandates physical invasion of property violates the 5th Amendment, even if it is just a thin television cable.
Keystone Bituminous Coal v. De Benedictis (1987)
Must look at the entire parcel’s value impact not just the part that was “taken”.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1987)
Facts of the Case
In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.
Question
Did the ordinance violate the Fifth Amendment (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth) which prevents government from taking private property for public use without providing just compensation to the owner of the property?
The Court held that complete destruction of the value of property constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment even if that taking was temporary and the property was later restored.
Nollan v. California Costal Commission (1987)
Facts of the Case
The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.
Question
Did the requirement constitute a property taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
The Court ruled that it the state of California is to use the power of eminent domain to do so, it must provide just compensation to the Nollans and other beachfront property owners for the public use of their land.
There needs to be a rational nexus for exactions.
Lucas v. Souther Carolina Costal Council (1992)
Facts of the Case
In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.
Question
Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a “taking” calling for “just compensation” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
The Court ruled that compensation was required where regulation takes all economic use of the land.
Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994)
Facts of the Case
Florence Dolan wanted a permit from the City of Tigard to expand her store and pave her parking lot. The city agreed to grant her permit on the condition that she dedicate part of her land for (1) a greenway along a nearby creek to help alleviate runoff from the pavement, and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion from the city’s growing business district.
Question
Did the city’s conditions for the permit violate the 5th Amendment’s “takings” clause as absorbed by the 14th Amendment’s due process clause?
The Court ruled that the city did not present conclusive evidence that the walkway/bicycle path would reduce traffic congestion, and so could not require Dolan to give up her property as a condition of the permit. In addition, the city did not explain why a public greenway was necessary, as opposed to a private one. There must be an “essential nexus” between a legitimate state interest and the permit requirements (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission), and the city failed to demonstrate that the benefits would justify the requirements.
Lingle v. Chevron, USA, Inc. (2005)
Facts of the Case
Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state’s largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii’s asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is “a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking “if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?”
The Court ruled that takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest.
Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002)
Facts of the Case
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA’s actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.
Question
Does a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause?
The Court held that that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the moratoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowners’ property. The Court reasoned that whether a taking occurred depended upon the considerations of landowners’ expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons for the moratoria. Moreover, the Court concluded that the adoption of a categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constituted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing land use applications.
Loretto Type Taking
Physical Taking
Lucas Type Taking
Total Type Regulatory Taking
Nollan or Dolan Type Taking
Exactions Taking
Penn Central Type Taking
Regulatory Taking