Survey - Britain, France, and the policy of appeasement

Question 1

Acts of appeasement

Answer 1

1933 Germany rearmament
-Accepted a sad but inevitable consequence of the failure of the disarmament conference 1932
- Germany played up the fear of communism
- after all, Germany was only seeking equality

1935 Hoare-laval plan
- the French and British Foreign Ministers Offered to carve up abyssinia for Italy. Italy would be given enough landscape 1.5 metres people in a return for an end to the fighting
- the offer came as weak sanctions had been imposed on Italy. the plan caused outrage

1936 remilitarisation of the Rhineland
- Hitler’s action contravened the terms of the 1925 locarno packed which guaranteed Western European Frontiers
- Pm Baldwin try to argue at the locarno made Britain a mediator not a guarantor the terms of the locarno agreement did not support this view
Beyond a protest note Britain and france did nothing, a great boost for Hitler standing
-the British view was about Hitler was merely ‘going into his backyard’

1936-1939 Spanish Civil war
- Britain and France avoided involvement in Spain and push for Norton intervention
-Germany in Italy fully nationalists and no action was taken against
only the Soviet Union assisted the Republican cause

1938 Germany and Austria
- Hitler’s march into Austria was greeted with shock and bewilderment
- The shock became resignation and britain accepted ‘anschluss’ as inevitable
- After all, the austrians were german speaking

Question 2

Phases of appeasement

Answer 2

Orthodox

The orthodox view was that British and French policy makers had been wrong to appease Hitler, that the policy stemmed from political and moral ineptitude and that appeasement contributed to the war. Tends to blame outbreak of war on people such as Chamberlain.

Revisionist

To explain and evaluate the policy of appeasement scholars shifted their attention from individual politicians to the political, economic, strategic, and social factors that influenced these decisions. Revisionists concluded that the circumstances of the 1920s-1930s gave the British and French government little option but to adopt appeasement

Counter and post revisionist

One side of counter revinist reaffirms the criticisms of the policy and its supports. At the same time, post revinist works have developed complex and multifaceted histories of appeasement, while acknowledging the issue of structural limitations on policy makers, also contend then appeasing Hitler to the extent they did.

Question 3

Appeasement the constraints of british foreign policy

Answer 3

Public opinion against war
Belief in ‘new diplomacy’, especially disarmament through and settling debate through league of nations
USSR seen as main threat in 1930s. Hitler was anti-communist- he won over british conservatives.
Germany had been dealt harshly at treaty of versailles. Reparations, guilt, not extending self determination, until March 1939 Hitler was seen as simply trying rebuild germany and claimed he wanted peace
Economic depression meant reluctance to spend on arms
British and French prioritisation of empire
Belief Hitler was pro-british

Question 4

Appeasement correlation to WW2

Answer 4

● appeasement supported by French/British publics and leaderships in 1930s
○ both alarmed by rise of Nazi Germany, however had differing perspectives on dealing with threat
■ early 1920s France’s aggressive enforcement of Treaty of Versailles evaporated by late 1920s
● realised Germany’s larger population/industrial base would remain threat, ∴ provisions of Versailles alone could not guarantee security
○ developed defensive mindset
■ 1929: beginning of Maginot Line defensive works
● reasons behind French/British placating German demands
○ desire among French/British to avoid conflict at all costs
○ fear of Luftwaffe
○ British/French rearmament
■ considered Germans had advantage on Allies, who need more time to better prepare for war
○ British particularly perceived that peace settlement of 1919 was too harsh on Germany
○ especially in Britain, varying degrees of conservative politicians had come to admire Hitler and his anticommunist stance
○ Anticommunist outlook → perhaps a revitalised Germany could be a valuable ally against USSR?
● 1935-40: despite being traditionally bellicose, the British Conservative Party (government) determined to avoid war at all costs
○allowed Nazis significant foreign policy gains
■ 1936 remilitarisation of Rhineland; 1938 anschluss with Austria
● ↑ prestige of Hitler, gave him the impression of a “charmed negotiator”
■ for various reasons, mostly conservative British leaders felt German needs should be met
● Anschluss with Austria
○ Hitler’s foreign policy successes by 1938: rearmament, return of Saar territory, remilitarisation of Rhineland
○ 1938: annexed Austria
○ 1934: Nazi-inspired assassination of Austrian chancellor Dollfuss → new Chancellor Schuschnigg forced to cooperate with Hitler to avoid aggression
○ 1936: German-Austrian Agreement recognised Austria’s independence in exchange for its foreign policy being consistent in Germany + allowing Nazis to hold official posts in Austria
○ 1938:
■ Hitler demanded Austrian Nazi, Seyss-Inquart be named Minster of the Interior (police and law), ordered Austrian Nazis to cause chaos/damage
■ in response, Schuschnigg declared referendum on whether Austria was to join Germany
■ Hitler ordered generals to prepare to invade → Schuschnigg conceded/resigned
■ Seyss-Inquart named Chancellor → Germans invited into Austria → Anschluss complete
● invasion of the Sudetenland/Munich Conference
○ after Anschluss, Hitler began to demand return of 3 million Germans living in Sudetenland
○ May 1938: draw plan for military invasion of Czechoslovakia
○ September 1938: Munich Conference resulted in “cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory”
■ 1 October 1938: British/French/Italian leaders gave Sudetenland – neither Czechs nor Russians invited
■ foreign policy success for Germany
■ ultimate example of appeasement: unreasonable demand the resulted in stronger German military, increased access to resources and a more bold Hitler
■ Churchill: “It is a total defeat. Czechoslovakia will be swallowed up by the Nazis. And do not suppose this is the end. This is only the beginning.”
● appeasement
○ France
■ Great Depression
■ 1917-40: political instability
● influenced by communism/fascism
● 43 PMs during time period
■ 1938: PM Daladier firm stance on Germany, Foreign Minister Bonnet favoured appeasement
■ under-resourced, unprepared ∴ relied on Britain to share resolve to act, this was not forthcoming
○ Chamberlain
■ received written undertaking this would be Hitler’s last territorial claim, ∴ willing to appease Hitler
■ Considered Munich Conference triumph of diplomacy → “peace in our time” → public relief palpable
● after the Munich Conference
○ Hitler obviously broke promise of no further claims
○ March 1939: Czechoslovakian Prime Minister summoned to Berlin, kept waiting, threatened with immediate war if he didn’t agree to Germany occupying Czech territory → forced to agree
○ March 1939: threatened Lithuania with invasion → forced to hand over Memelland
○31 March 1939: UK pledged their/French support to guarantee independence of Poland, Belgium, Romanian, Greece, Turkey
■ 6 April: Poland/UK agreed to formalise as military alliance, pending negotiation