Supremacy, Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and State Liability Flashcards

1
Q

Developed doctrine of direct effect (rights and obligations conferred upon individuals and enforcement in national courts). New legal order of international law. Giant step towards achieving integration, uniformity and effectiveness in the application of EU law within the national legal systems of Member States. Enabling individuals to immediately invoke a European provision before a national or European court.

Criteria for direct effect:

  • The provision must be sufficiently clear and precise to give rise to an identifiable individual right.
  • It must be unconditional.

Vertical direct effect of a Treaty article fine (so long as criteria satisfied).

A

Van Gend en Loos

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2
Q

NO. EU law is supreme. Doctrine of supremacy. Supremacy of EU law as a necessary concomitant to direct effect and the new legal order created by the EC Treaty.

A

Costa v ENEL

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3
Q

Supremacy confirmed (in absolute terms) – ‘Any recognition that national legislative measures which encroach etc had any legal effect would amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness of obligations undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by Member States to the Treaty and would thus imperil the very foundations of the Community.’

A

Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA

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4
Q
Clarified/defined the 2 requirements for direct effect – 
Unconditional where it sets forth an obligation which is NOT qualified by any condition and NOT subject, in its implementation or effects, to the taking of any measure either by Community institutions or by Member States. 
Sufficiently precise (to be relied upon by an individual and applied by a national court) where it sets out an obligation in unequivocal terms.
A

Cooperativa Agricola Zootecnica S. Antonio and Others v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato

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5
Q

Flexibility of direct effect criteria by Court of Justice: Fine for provision to raise questions of interpretation which can be resolved by a court.

Directives are capable of having direct effect.
Justification (not well received by certain national courts in France and Germany who refused to give directives direct effect on this basis because they thought ECJ was exceeding its jurisdiction):
- Would be incompatible with the binding effect of directives to exclude direct effect.
- The useful effect of an obligation being imposed by a Directive would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts.

Directives capable of being vertically directly effective.

A

Van Duyn v Home Office

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6
Q

Flexibility of direct effect criteria by Court of Justice: Fine that Member State able to choose among several possible means of achieving the result required by the Directive.

(Example of failure to satisfy direct effect criteria.)

Principle of state liability: ‘It is a principle of Community law that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.’ Justification:

  • Article 4(3) TEU requirement on Member States to fulfil their Treaty obligations also included remedying the consequences of breaching those obligations.
  • Effectiveness of EU law would be circumscribed were Member States not obliged to provide a remedy in these situations.

3 conditions for state liability:

  1. Result prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals.
  2. It should be possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive.
  3. Existence of a causal link between the breach of the State’s obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.
A

Francovich & Bonifaci v Italian Republic

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7
Q

(Direct effect criteria in practice. Example of satisfaction of criteria.)

Horizontal direct effect of a Treaty article fine.

A

Defrenne v SABENA

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8
Q

(Example of failure to satisfy direct effect criteria.)

Established principle of indirect effect: provisions of directives (later all pieces of law) can be used by national courts in interpreting meaning and scope of national legislation.
‘…in applying the national law and in particular the provisions of national law specifically introduced in order to implement Directive…, national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result referred to in Article 288 TFEU.’
‘…in so far as it is given discretion to do so under national law’

A

Von Colson & Kamann v Land Nordhein-Westflen

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9
Q

No discretion left to Member States after deadline had passed, therefore not conditional. So an article imposing a positive obligation could have direct effect once the deadline has passed.

A

Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarlouis

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10
Q

Van Gend en Loos

A

FACTS: Urea formaldehyde imports from West Germany to Holland (by van Gend). Customs duty increase due to classification change. Article 12 prohibition on new customs duties (now Article 30 prohibition on all customs duties).

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11
Q

Costa v ENEL

A

FACTS: Costa is a shareholder in electricity company. Company nationalized by Italian government. Refused to pay electricity account (£1) because he says nationalization legislation is contrary to Community law. Italian government says, ‘But it’s our domestic law!’

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12
Q

Francovich & Bonifaci v Italian Republic

A

FACTS: Directive 80/987 – bankruptcy of a company + employees being able to claim outstanding wages from guarantee institution established by Member State. Italy had not implemented the directive, and there was no national law through which to claim. Held: Directive did not have direct effect because unclear whether guarantee institution should be public/private body. In Commission v Italy, Italy found to be in breach of its obligations in not having implemented, but people still needed to be compensated…therefore Court found that Italy could be held liable.

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13
Q

Defrenne v SABENA

A

FACTS: Air hostess vs employer (Belgian airline). Sex discrimination in terms of pay. Alleged infringement of Article 157 TFEU. Airline accepted discrimination but said article did not confer legal right which could be enforced in a national court. Held: Article was sufficiently clear and precise due to the level of detail provided re concepts of ‘pay’ and ‘work’, making it possible to identify when direct discrimination arose solely using criteria in article. BUT not indirect/disguised discrimination.
Article in question only referred to Member States, but held that unless it could have horizontal direct effect, the effectiveness of the principle of equal pay for equal work would be adversely affected by failure of Member States to exercise the principle.

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14
Q

Von Colson & Kamann v Land Nordhein-Westflen

A

FACTS: 2 women failed in applications to be social workers in male prison on grounds relating to their sex. Rejected in favour of less well-qualified male applicants. National court found they’d been discriminated against but, under West German law, could only award them travel expenses to compensate. Equal Treatment Directive: ‘such measures as are necessary to enable…persons… to pursue their claims by judicial process…’ Held: NOT unconditional or sufficiently clear/precise therefore no direct effect.
There was a German law implementing the Directive on which the women could rely. Court used Article 4(3) TEU to draw principle of indirect effect: Requires that Member States ‘take all appropriate measures’ to ensure that their obligations under EU law were fulfilled. Binding on ‘all authorities of Member States’ therefore national courts required to interpret in conformity with wording and purpose of directive.
Left to national court to apply interpretative duty, but said ‘any sanction that was imposed by the national court had to be such as to guarantee real and effective judicial protection of the right to equal treatment under Directive’ and real deterrent effect on employer.

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15
Q

Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarlouis

A

FACTS: Concerned Article 110 TFEU (prohibition on internal taxation measures which discriminate against goods from other Member States). At the time the Treaty was first agreed to, it also contained positive obligation to remove, by 1 Jan 1962, any existing measures that discriminated.

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16
Q

Van Duyn v Home Office

A

FACTS: Dutch scientologist offered work as a secretary at Church of Scientology HQ in London. Refused entry into the UK. Article 45 TFEU: free movement of workers, subject to derogations. Directive 2004/38 describes scope of measures taken by Member States to derogate. Van Duyn sought to rely on article 3 of Directive – any measure shall be ‘based exclusively on personal conduct of individual concerned’. Held that the directive could have direct effect.

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17
Q

Regulations are capable of being directly effective: ‘Regulations are directly applicable and therefore by virtue of their nature capable of producing direct effects.’

Decisions are capable of being directly effective: ‘It would be incompatible with the binding effect [of] decisions… to exclude in principle the possibility that persons affected may invoke the obligation imposed by a decision.’ (But only against party to whom decision was addressed - Carp Snc di L. Moleri e V. Corsi v Ecorad Srl).

A

Franz Grad v Finanzmant Traunstein

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18
Q

Regulations are capable of being directly effective. (Matter put beyond doubt.)

A

Politi s.a.s. v Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic

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19
Q

Regulations can have direct effect not only vertically but also horizontally.

A

Antonio Munoz y Cia SA v Frumer Ltd

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20
Q

Regulations must still comply with the Van Gend criteria to have direct effect. Example of 2 regulations not satisfying criteria therefore not having direct effect.

A

Azienda Agricola Monte Arcosu Srl v Regione Autonoma della Sardegna

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21
Q

Decisions are only capable of having direct effect against the party to whom the decision was addressed (because only binding on that party).

A

Carp Snc di L. Moleri e V. Corsi v Ecorad Srl

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22
Q

Recommendations and opinions are not binding therefore no direct effect possible.

ECJ effectively recognized that even recommendations and opinions can influence the interpretation of domestic law (i.e. have indirect effect).

A

Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles

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23
Q

Provided new rationale for directives being capable of having direct effect (that convinced the previously rebellious courts): ‘A Member State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive in the prescribed periods may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obligations the directive entails.’

A Directive can only have direct effect once the deadline for implementation has passed, thereby making it unconditional and satisfying this part of the Van Gend criteria.

A

Pubblico Ministero v Ratti

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24
Q

Ratti logic, that a Member State cannot rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obligations that the directive entails, applies equally where there’s merely partial or incorrect implementation (rather than blatant failure).

A

Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO) v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen

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25
Q

Even where a directive is completely and correctly implemented, an individual may seek to directly rely on a (clear, precise and unconditional) directive ‘where the national measures correctly implementing the directive are not being applied in such a way as to achieve the result sought by the directive’.

A

Marks & Spencer plc v Commissioners of Customs & Excise

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26
Q

No horizontal direct effect due to the nature of directives binding ‘each Member State to which it is addressed’ (Article 288 TFEU).

Doesn’t matter about the capacity in which the State is acting, be it public authority or employer. Court responded to argument that the State employees were thus in a better position by saying that the distinction would have been avoided if the Directive had been implemented correctly in the first place! (Not really an answer…)

Health authority evidently considered to be an emanation of the state (although no clear criteria set out here for establishing an emanation of the state).

A

Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health Authority (Teaching) (No 1)

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27
Q

The ECJ responded to AG Lenz by saying that the effect of extending the principle… to the sphere of relations between individuals would be to recognise a power in the Community to enact obligations for individuals with immediate effect, whereas it has competence to do so only where it is empowered to adopt regulations.’

A

Dori v Recreb Sri

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28
Q

Tax authorities evidently considered an emanation of the state (pre-bipartite + -tripartite tests).

A

Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt

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29
Q

Local authorities evidently considered an emanation of the state (pre-bipartite + -tripartite tests).

A

Fratelli Costanzo Spa v Comune di Milano

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30
Q

Constitutionally independent police force responsible for the maintenance of public order and safety evidently considered an emanation of the state (pre-bipartite + -tripartite tests).

A

Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC

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31
Q

The Bipartite Test (the Court looked at the types of bodies already treated as emanations):
A directive could be relied upon against organisations which…
EITHER – were subject to the authority or control of the State.
OR – had special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals.

The Tripartite Test:
A body, whatever its legal form, which…
1. Has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service AND
2. Is under the control of the State AND
3. Has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals
… is included in any event.

A

Foster v British Gas plc [1990]

32
Q

Example of application and satisfaction of tripartite test (through recommendation by Court of Justice).

A

Foster v British Gas (No 2) [1991]

33
Q

Example of application and failure of tripartite test.

Lord Musthill: The tripartite test should be applied in a general case of the same type as Foster v British Gas, but the wording “included in any event” made it clear that it was not to be applied in every case.

A

Doughty v Rolls Royce Plc

34
Q

Example of application and satisfaction of tripartite test post-British Gas (No 2).

A

Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd

35
Q

Court (of Appeal?) declined to apply the full tripartite test. Schiemann LJ: It’s wrong to treat the tripartite test in Foster as if it were a statutory definition. He observed that the case was not the same type as Foster and Doughty. (Not a commercial undertaking?) Arguable that conclusion reached here was compatible with bipartite test…

A

National Union of Teachers v Governing Body of St Mary’s Church of England School (Aided) Junior School

36
Q

Court of Justice didn’t refer to tripartite test at all (first time ECJ revisited tests since Foster). Used bipartite test. Also cited examples of bodies that would satisfy the test:

  • Local or regional authorities
  • Other bodies which, irrespective of legal form, have been given responsibility, by the public authorities and under their supervision, for providing a public service.
A

Kampelmann v Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe

37
Q

Example of bipartite test (rather than tripartite) being cited again by ECJ.

A

Sozialhilfeverband Rohrbach v Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich

(ECJ decided that 2 limited liability companies (which were established and owned by a local authority association and which provided social assistance to disabled persons by supplying a workplace) were emanations, using bipartite test.)

38
Q

Example of an EU court using tripartite test instead of bipartite (only Court of First Instance though…)

A

Salamander AG, Una Film City Revue GmbH and others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

(The applicants sought annulment of Directive 98/43/EC (advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products), but to be able to bring an action they had to show that they were directly and individually affected by the Directive etc.)

39
Q

Example of Court of Justice applying the tripartite test instead of bipartite and holding company was an emanation.

A

Reiser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen und Schellstrassen Finanzierungs AG (Asfinag)

(Concerned an Austrian company that had been incorporated as a private company but whose sole shareholder was the Austrian State etc.)

40
Q

Logic of reasoning in Von Colson effectively dispenses with any requirement to distinguish between vertical/horizontal indirect effect. Horizontal therefore fine.

A

Harz v Deutsche Tradax

41
Q

With indirect effect, it does not matter whether the provisions of national law in question were adopted before or after the directive.

Movement from ‘in so far as it is given discretion to do so under national law’ to ‘as far as possible’. Still retaining a limit to the interpretative exercise though. (N.B. End of judgment where no limit was mentioned…)

Provisions of an unimplemented directive could be used to interpret national law (even in a purely horizontal action).

A

Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA

42
Q

Confirmed Marleasing: Required ‘as far as possible’ to interpret.

Indirect effect would not be possible where the national law expressly contradicts the provision of EU law.

A

Wagner Miret v Fondo di Garantía Salarial

43
Q

Regarding indirect effect, national courts are not required to interpret national law contra legem i.e. against clear meaning of the words.

No reason why other forms of Community law cannot also be indirectly effective (framework decision considered in this case).

A

Pupino

44
Q

The obligation to interpret national law in conformity with a directive exists only once the deadline for implementation has passed.

A

Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG)

45
Q

Indirect effect limited by general principles of EU law, legal certainty and non-retroactivity in particular. (These principles prevented Member State from relying on a directive itself and independently of an implementing law to determine or aggravate criminal liability.)

A

Kolpinghuis Nijmengen BV

46
Q

Provided more specific guidance on interpretative obligation specific to the UK:

  • No need for statutory language to be ambiguous before interpreting.
  • Interpretation can change the meaning of a legislation in a way that involves a substantial departure from the language (more restrictively/expansively + can read words into legislation).
  • But must not rewrite legislation in a way that goes beyond interpretation (cannot read words into it that go against the grain of the legislation + cannot adopt meaning that departs from the fundamental feature of the legislation/cardinal principle of it).
  • Interpretation cannot entail court making a decision that involves making policy choices that it’s not equipped to make/where there will be practical repercussions which court not equipped to evaluate.
A

HM Revenue and Customs v IDT Card Services Ireland Ltd

47
Q

Principle of state liability applies to any case in which a Member State breaches EU law (not just directives), irrespective of whichever organ of the State was responsible (including national legislature) and even if the measure had direct effect.

(Not necessary for the Member State to have had limited discretion as to how it should act for there to be state liability – could also arise where the Member State had a wide discretion.)

3 conditions for state liability:

  1. The rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals.
  2. The breach must be sufficiently serious.
  3. There must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

What is meant by ‘sufficiently serious’? → Whether the Member State had ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion’.
Factors to take into account:
- Clarity and precision of the rule breached.
- Measure of discretion left to Member State by the rule.
- Whether the breach was intentional.
- Whether it was excusable.
- Extent to which a position taken by a Union institution may have contributed to the breach.
- Extent to which Member States had adopted/retained national measures contrary to EU law.

Beyond finding the breach of EU law by the State to be sufficiently serious, there was no need to establish fault.

A

Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany
and
R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd (No 4) (‘Factortame III’)

48
Q

Example of application of test in Brasserie and finding of State not liable because breach was excusable therefore not sufficiently serious:

  • Lack of precision in relevant provision of the directive.
  • Interpretation made in good faith.
  • Same interpretation had been made by other Member States.
  • Interpretation not manifestly contrary to wording/objective of directive.
  • No guidance available through EU case law and matter not raised when UK implemented.
A

R v HM Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications plc

49
Q

Example of application of test in Brasserie and… not sure about finding because second and third conditions left to national court.

‘Sufficiently serious’ test not confined only to situations in which Member States had wide discretion but also where limited or no discretion at all: ‘Where the Member State in question was not called upon to make an legislative choices and had only considerably reduced or no discretion, the mere infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.’

A

R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd

50
Q

Held that the conditions in Francovich and those in Brasserie were the same in substance. Suggestion is that any breach which would satisfy Francovich would also satisfy Brasserie. In this case, they chose to apply Brasserie, even though it was dealing with an unimplemented directive and deadline passed (as in Francovich).

A

Dillenkofer v Germany

51
Q

State liability extended to include breaches of EU law made by national courts where the 3 Brasserie conditions satisfied, but only in exceptional cases involving errors that are manifest, such as this one: Failure of a national court to make an obligatory reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

A

Kobler v Republik Osterreich

52
Q

Analogous form of liability (to state liability) for damage caused to individuals by private individuals through breaches of EU competition law…

A

Courage Limited v Crehan

53
Q

Azienda Agricola Monte Arcosu Srl v Regione Autonoma della Sardegna

A

FACTS: Provisions of 2 regulations did not have direct effect because they specifically required Member States to define the phrase ‘farmer practicing farming as his main occupation’ (further measures therefore required to implement provisions).

54
Q

Pubblico Ministero v Ratti

A

FACTS: Ratti was a head of a company whose board of directors decided to package solvents in conformity with Directive 73/173 and varnishes in conformity with Directive 77/728. Both directives had not been implemented in Italy. Italian national law was more stringent than the Directives, and Ratti was prosecuted for infringing the national law. Held that Directive 73/173 was past the deadline therefore had direct effect, but Directive 77/728 was not therefore did not have direct effect.

55
Q

Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health Authority (Teaching) (No 1)

A

FACTS: Female dietician dismissed past retirement age, but the female compulsory retirement age was 60 whereas for men it was 65. Marshall complained that her dismissal violated the Equal Treatment Directive (which prohibited discrimination in working conditions on grounds of sex).
One of the arguments made in response was that a directive could only have direct effect against a Member State when it was acting in its capacity as a public authority and NOT when it was acting as an employer, because 1) a directive could not impose obligations on an individual and 2) as a state employer is no different to a private employer, it would not be proper to put persons employed by a state employer in a better position than those by a private employer.

56
Q

Dori v Recreb Sri

A

FACTS: In which Advocate General Lenz argued that directives should be capable of having horizontal direct effect.
(To do with Doorstep Selling Directive).

57
Q

Foster v British Gas plc [1990]

A

FACTS: 6 women forced to retire at 60 in accordance with British Gas policy. This was 5 years earlier than their male counterparts. Sought to rely on Equal Treatment Directive. British Gas was nationalized at the time of dismissal (and subsequently privatized). Preliminary ruling sought to answer question, ‘At time of dismissal, was British Gas an emanation of the state?’ Court of Justice looked at the broad powers and duties that British Gas had under the Gas Act 1972 and powers the Secretary of State had over it.

58
Q

Foster v British Gas (No 2) [1991]

A

FACTS: Back in UK? Held that British Gas was an emanation.

  1. Supplied gas to citizens of the State generally.
  2. Control of the Secretary of State regarding policies and State retained its surplus revenue.
  3. Special monopoly power – could prevent anyone else supplying gas in the UK without its consent.
59
Q

Doughty v Rolls Royce Plc

A

FACTS: Was Rolls Royce an emanation? No, despite all of its shares being owned by the government and its nominees. Didn’t provide a public service and had no special powers.

60
Q

Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd

A

FACTS: Was South West Water Services an emanation? Yes, this privatized water company was an emanation – it satisfied all three elements of tripartite test.

  1. Responsible for providing public service by acting as a water and sewage undertaker under statute.
  2. Secretary of State had appointed it as water and sewage undertaker for the South West and exercised wide-ranging powers of control over it.
  3. It had a range of special powers, e.g. imposing hose-pipe bans, making by-laws, entering land and laying pipes.
61
Q

National Union of Teachers v Governing Body of St Mary’s Church of England School (Aided) Junior School

A

FACTS: The Board of Governors of a Church of England school had voluntarily accepted state aid and entered the state education system. The Court (of Appeal?) declined to apply the full tripartite test. Concluded that it was sufficient that
1. The Board provided a public service, and
2. Secretary of State and Local Education Authority were able to exercise sufficient degree of control, but
NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE SPECIAL POWERS.

62
Q

Kampelmann v Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe

A

FACTS: First time Court of Justice revisited the question of bipartite/tripartite tests after Foster v British Gas. Involved claims against a regional authority responsible for e.g. construction, maintenance and management of highways, and claims against 2 public undertakings, each responsible for supply of energy to a town. Referred to bipartite test rather than tripartite and then left it to national court to apply this to facts of the case.

63
Q

Sozialhilfeverband Rohrbach v Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich

A

FACTS: ECJ decided that 2 limited liability companies (which were established and owned by a local authority association and which provided social assistance to disabled persons by supplying a workplace) were emanations, using bipartite test.

64
Q

Salamander AG, Una Film City Revue GmbH and others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

A

FACTS: Not a direct effect case per se. The applicants sought annulment of Directive 98/43/EC (advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products), but to be able to bring an action they had to show that they were directly and individually affected by the Directive. Una Film argued it was affected because it was under the control of the State, therefore an emanation, and therefore the Directive would have direct effect against it. Court of First Instance held: Even though Una Film had no. 2 (under the control of the state) – which would satisfy the bipartite test – it didn’t have no. 1 (provide a public service) or no. 3 (special powers).

65
Q

Reiser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen und Schellstrassen Finanzierungs AG (Asfinag)

A

FACTS: Concerned an Austrian company that had been incorporated as a private company but whose sole shareholder was the Austrian State. Court of Justice applied the tripartite test and held that it was an emanation:

  1. The company was granted a contractual license by the Austrian State that made it responsible for construction, planning, operation, maintenance and financing of Austrian motorways and expressways (i.e. providing a public service).
  2. Under control of the State = Government had right to check all measures, demand information, impose objectives (about traffic organisation) and impose tolls. The company also had to submit costed plans for maintenance work.
  3. Special powers = the government-granted contractual license authorized it to levy tolls and user charges (in its own name etc.)
66
Q

Harz v Deutsche Tradax

A

FACTS: Similar facts to Von Colson but against private company. This was irrelevant though in terms of ECJ’s approach. Happened at same time as Von Colson decision.

67
Q

Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA

A

FACTS: Originated in Spain between 2 private companies. Company Law Directive (68/151) and pre-existing provisions of the Spanish Civil Code. Marleasing was a creditor of La Comercial. Marleasing sought to have La Comercial declared void for having been created to defraud creditors by putting assets beyond their reach. Sought on ground of ‘lack of cause’ which was provided for by Spanish civil code. La Comercial wanted to rely in defence on Directive because it contained exhaustive list of grounds on which declaration of nullity could be made, and ‘lack of cause’ was not on list. Directive had not been implemented though by Spain and the deadline had passed. No direct effect because it would be horizontal. Indirect effect available though.

68
Q

Wagner Miret v Fondo di Garantía Salarial

A

FACTS: Concerned directive that had been implemented by Spain this time (unlike Marleasing) but not in its entirety: Directive 80/987 (same as Francovich – guarantee institutions to pay outstanding wages…) Spain had specifically excluded senior management from the ambit of the guarantee fund. Wagner Miret was a senior manager of insolvent company. Sought to rely on directive itself, which did not exclude senior management. Vertical claim but not directly effective because too imprecise. So moved on to indirect effect.

69
Q

Pupino

A

FACTS: Concerned a framework decision.

70
Q

Kolpinghuis Nijmengen BV

A

FACTS: Concerned Directive 80/777 – required Member States to prohibit water from being marketed as natural mineral water where it did not satisfy certain specified requirements. Dutch law had been enacted but had not yet come into force. Dutch public prosecutor attempted to use indirect effect and argued ‘sound composition’ should be interpreted in light of Directive.

71
Q

Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany

A

FACTS: French brewers forced to stop beer exports to Germany because they failed to comply with the German purity requirement. Brasserie brought an action against the German government for compensation for losses. Article 34 TFEU – non-fiscal barriers to free movement of goods.

72
Q

R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd (No 4) (‘Factortame III’)

A

FACTS: Spanish fishermen effectively prevented from fishing in UK waters after UK legislation passed that required fishing vessels to be British owned and managed in the UK – UK Merchant Shipping Act 1988. Spanish fishermen brought claim for damages against UK because Act incompatible with Treaty – Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment).

73
Q

R v HM Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications plc

A

FACTS: BT sought damages for losses suffered following manner in which the UK implemented Directive 90/351 (procurement procedures in telecoms sector). Case referred to ECJ. Court agreed that UK had misunderstood what was required by the Directive and had incorrectly transposed it but UK held NOT to be liable for damages because breach excusable.

74
Q

R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd

A

FACTS: Hedley Lomas sought damages from Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in UK for refusing to grant export licences to allow live animals to be exported from UK to Spain. MAFF accepted this was a restriction of free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU) but sought to justify on grounds of protection of health and life of animals under Article 36 TFEU, as a number of slaughterhouses in Spain were allegedly not complying with Directive 74/577 (stunning of animals before slaughter). Held that Article 36 could not be relied upon – the Directive had already been correctly adopted in Spain. Down to Spanish authorities thereafter to carry out inspections instead of unilateral adoption of corrective/protective measures. Plus, MAFF had produced no proof of non-compliance with the Directive (in the slaughterhouses). Much of Brasserie test left to Spanish court to decide.

75
Q

Dillenkofer v Germany

A

FACTS: Failure by Germany to implement Directive 90/314 (package travel etc) and deadline passed. Holiday makers unable to benefit from rights in the directive regarding refunds if package organizer became insolvent. Court chose to apply Brasserie.

76
Q

Kobler v Republik Osterreich

A

FACTS: National court failed to make an obligatory reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

77
Q

Courage Limited v Crehan

A

FACTS: Breaches of EU competition law by private individual rather than state.