summary Flashcards

1
Q

Phishing

A

• Social engineering with a touch of spoofing
– Often delivered by email, text, etc.
– Very remarkable when well done
• Don’t be fooled
– Check the URL
• Usually there’s something not quite right
– Spelling, fonts, graphics

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2
Q

Tricks and misdirection

A

• How are they so successful?
– Digital slight of hand - it fools the best of us
• Typosquatting
– A type of URL hijacking - https://professormessor.com
– Prepending: https://pprofessormesser.com
• Pretexting
– Lying to get information
– Attacker is a character in a situation they create
– Hi, we’re calling from Visa regarding an automated
payment to your utility service…

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3
Q

Pharming

A

• Redirect a legit website to a bogus site
– Poisoned DNS server or client vulnerabilities
• Combine pharming with phishing
– Pharming - Harvest large groups of people
– Phishing - Collect access credentials
• Difficult for anti-malware software to stop
– Everything appears legitimate to the user

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4
Q

Phishing with different bait

A
• Vishing (Voice phishing) is done
over the phone or voicemail
– Caller ID spoofing is common
– Fake security checks or bank updates
Smishing (SMS phishing) is done by text message
– Spoofing is a problem here as well
– Forwards links or asks for personal information
• Variations on a theme
– The fake check scam, phone verification code scam,
– Boss/CEO scam, advance-fee scam
– Some great summaries on
https://reddit.com/r/Scams
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5
Q

Finding the best spot to phish

A
• Reconnaissance
– Gather information on the victim
• Background information
– Lead generation sites
– LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram
– Corporate web site
• Attacker builds a believable pretext
– Where you work
– Where you bank
– Recent financial transactions
– Family and friends
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6
Q

Spear phishing

A

• Targeted phishing with inside information
– Makes the attack more believable
• Spear phishing the CEO is “whaling”
– Targeted phishing with the possibility of a large catch
– The CFO (Chief Financial Officer) is commonly speared
• These executives have direct access to
the corporate bank account
– The attackers would love to have those credentials

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7
Q

1.1 - Impersonation The pretext

A

• Before the attack, the trap is set
– There’s an actor and a story
• “Hello sir, my name is Wendy and I’m from Microsoft
Windows. This is an urgent check up call for your
computer as we have found several problems with it.”
• Voice mail: “This is an enforcement action executed by
the US Treasury intending your serious attention.”
• “Congratulations on your excellent payment history! You
now qualify for 0% interest rates on all of your credit
card accounts.”

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8
Q

1.1 - Impersonation

A

• Attackers pretend to be someone they aren’t
– Halloween for the fraudsters
• Use some of those details from reconnaissance
– You can trust me, I’m with your help desk
• Attack the victim as someone higher in rank
– Office of the Vice President for Scamming
• Throw tons of technical details around
– Catastrophic feedback due to the
depolarization of the differential magnetometer
• Be a buddy
– How about those Cubs?

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9
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Eliciting information

A

• Extracting information from the victim
– The victim doesn’t even realize this is happening
– Hacking the human
• Often seen with vishing (Voice Phishing)
– Can be easier to get this information over the phone
• These are well-documented psychological techniques
– They can’t just ask, “So, what’s your password?”

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10
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Identity fraud

A

• Your identity can be used by others
– Keep your personal information safe!
• Credit card fraud
– Open an account in your name, or use your credit card information
• Bank fraud
– Attacker gains access to your account or opens a new account
• Loan fraud
– Your information is used for a loan or lease
• Government benefits fraud
– Attacker obtains benefits on your behalf

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11
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Protect against impersonation

A
• Never volunteer information
– My password is 12345
• Don’t disclose personal details
– The bad guys are tricky
• Always verify before revealing info
– Call back, verify through 3rd parties
• Verification should be encouraged
– Especially if your organization owns
valuable information
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12
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Identity fraud

A

• Your identity can be used by others
– Keep your personal information safe!
• Credit card fraud
– Open an account in your name, or use your credit card information
• Bank fraud
– Attacker gains access to your account or opens a new account
• Loan fraud
– Your information is used for a loan or lease
• Government benefits fraud
– Attacker obtains benefits on your behalf

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13
Q

1.1 - Shoulder Surfing

A
• You have access to important information
– Many people want to see
– Curiosity, industrial espionage, competitive advantage
• This is surprisingly easy
– Airports / Flights
– Hallway-facing monitors
– Coffee shops
• Surf from afar
– Binoculars / Telescopes
– Easy in the big city
– Webcam monitoring
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14
Q

1.1 - Shoulder Surfing • Preventing shoulder surfing

A
• Control your input
– Be aware of your surroundings
• Use privacy filters
– It’s amazing how well they work
• Keep your monitor out of sight
– Away from windows and hallways
• Don’t sit in front of me on your flight
– I can’t help myself
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15
Q

1.1 - Hoaxes Computer hoaxes

A
• A threat that doesn’t actually exist
– But they seem like they COULD be real
• Still often consume lots of resources
– Forwarded email messages, printed memorandums, wasted time
• Often an email
– Or Facebook wall post, or tweet, or...
• Some hoaxes will take your money
– But not through electronic means
• A hoax about a virus can waste as much time as a regular virus
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16
Q

De-hoaxing

A
• It’s the Internet. Believe no one.
– Consider the source
• Cross reference
– http://www.hoax-slayer.net
– http://www.snopes.com
• Spam filters can help
– There are so many other ways...
• If it sounds too good to be true...
– So many sad stories
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17
Q

1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks

A
• What if your network was really secure?
– You didn’t even plug in that USB key
from the parking lot
• The attackers can’t get in
– Not responding to phishing emails
– Not opening any email attachments
• Have the mountain come to you
– Go where the mountain hangs out
– The watering hole
– This requires a bit of research
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18
Q

1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks Executing the watering hole attack

A

• Determine which website the victim group uses
– Educated guess - Local coffee or sandwich shop
– Industry-related sites
• Infect one of these third-party sites
– Site vulnerability
– Email attachments
• Infect all visitors
– But you’re just looking for specific victims
– Now you’re in!

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19
Q

1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks Because that’s where the money is

A

• January 2017
• Polish Financial Supervision Authority, National Banking
and Stock Commission of Mexico, State-owned
bank in Uruguay
– The watering hole was sufficiently poisoned
• Visiting the site would download malicious JavaScript files
– But only to IP addresses matching banks and
other financial institutions
• Did the attack work?
– We still don’t know

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20
Q

Watching the watering hole

A

• Defense-in-depth
– Layered defense
– It’s never one thing
• Firewalls and IPS
– Stop the network traffic before things get bad
• Anti-virus / Anti-malware signature updates
– The Polish Financial Supervision Authority attack code
was recognized and stopped by generic signatures in
Symantec’s anti-virus software

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21
Q

1.1 - Spam

A
• Unsolicited messages
– Email, forums, etc.
– Spam over Instant Messaging (SPIM)
• Various content
– Commercial advertising
– Non-commercial proselytizing
– Phishing attempts
• Significant technology issue
– Security concerns
– Resource utilization
– Storage costs
– Managing the spam
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22
Q

1.1 - Spam Mail gateways

A

• Unsolicited email
– Stop it at the gateway before it reaches the user
– On-site or cloud-based

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23
Q

Identifying spam

A

• Allowed list
– Only receive email from trusted senders
• SMTP standards checking
– Block anything that doesn’t follow RFC standards
• rDNS - Reverse DNS
– Block email where the sender’s domain doesn’t match the IP
address
• Tarpitting
– Intentionally slow down the server conversation
• Recipient filtering
– Block all email not addressed to a valid recipient email address

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24
Q

1.1 - Influence Campaigns Hacking public opinion

A
• Influence campaigns
– Sway public opinion on political and social issues
• Nation-state actors
– Divide, distract, and persuade
• Advertising is an option
– Buy a voice for your opinion
• Enabled through Social media
– Creating, sharing, liking
– Amplification
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25
Q

1.1 - Influence Campaigns Hybrid warfare

A
• Military strategy
– A broad description of the techniques
– Wage war non-traditionally
• Not a new concept
– The Internet adds new methods
• Cyberwarfare
– Attack an entity with technology
• Influence with a military spin
– Influencing foreign elections
– “Fake news”
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26
Q

1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Tailgating

A
• Use an authorized person to gain unauthorized
access to a building
– Not an accident
• Johnny Long / No Tech Hacking
– Blend in with clothing
– 3rd-party with a legitimate reason
– Temporarily take up smoking
– I still prefer bringing doughnuts
• Once inside, there’s little to stop you
– Most security stops at the border
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27
Q

1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Watching for tailgating

A
• Policy for visitors
– You should be able to identify anyone
• One scan, one person
– A matter of policy or mechanically required
• Mantrap / Airlock
– You don’t have a choice
• Don’t be afraid to ask
– Who are you and why are you here?
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28
Q

1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Invoice scams

A
• Starts with a bit of spear phishing
– Attacker knows who pays the bills
• Attacker sends a fake invoice
– Domain renewal, toner cartridges, etc.
– From: address is a spoofed version of the CEO
• Accounting pays the invoice
– It was from the CEO, after all
• Might also include a link to pay
– Now the attacker has payment details
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29
Q

1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Credential harvesting

A

• Also called password harvesting
– Attackers collect login credentials
• There are a lot of stored credentials on your computer
– The attacker would like those
– Chrome, Firefox, Outlook, Windows Credential Manager, etc.
• User receives an email with a malicious Microsoft Word doc
– Opening the document runs a macro
– The macro downloads credential-harvesting malware
• User has no idea
– Everything happens in the background

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30
Q

1.1 - Principles of Social Engineering Effective social engineering

A

• Constantly changing
– You never know what they’ll use next
• May involve multiple people
– And multiple organizations
– There are ties connecting many organizations
• May be in person or electronic
– Phone calls from aggressive “customers”
– Emailed funeral notifications of a friend or associate

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31
Q

1.1 Social engineering principles

A

• Authority
– The social engineer is in charge
– I’m calling from the help desk/office of the CEO/police
• Intimidation
– There will be bad things if you don’t help
– If you don’t help me, the payroll checks
won’t be processed
• Consensus / Social proof
– Convince based on what’s normally expected
– Your co-worker Jill did this for me last week
• Scarcity
– The situation will not be this way for long
– Must make the change before time expires
• Urgency
– Works alongside scarcity
– Act quickly, don’t think
• Familiarity / Liking
– Someone you know, we have common friends
• Trust
– Someone who is safe
– I’m from IT, and I’m here to help

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32
Q

1.1 - Principles of Social Engineering Effective social engineering How I Lost My $50,000 Twitter Username

A

• Naoki Hiroshima - @N
– https://professormesser.link/twittername
• Attacker calls PayPal and uses social engineering to get
the last four digits of the credit card on file
• Attacker calls GoDaddy and tells them he lost the card,
so he can’t properly validate. But he has the last four,
does that help?
– GoDaddy let the bad guy guess the first
two digits of the card
– He was allowed to keep guessing until he got it right
– Social engineering done really, really well

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33
Q

1.1 - Principles of Social Engineering Effective social engineering How to steal a $50,000 Twitter name

A
• Attacker is now in control of every domain name
– And there were some good ones
• Attacker extorts a swap
– Domain control for @N
– Owner agrees
• Twitter reviewed the case for a month
– Eventually restored access to @N
• How I Lost My $50,000 Twitter Username
– https://professormesser.link/twittername
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34
Q

1.2 Malware

A
• Malicious software
– These can be very bad
• Gather information
– Keystrokes
• Participate in a group
– Controlled over the ‘net
• Show you advertising
– Big money
• Viruses and worms
– Encrypt your data
– Ruin your day
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35
Q

Malware Types and Methods

A
  • Viruses
  • Crypto-malware
  • Ransomware
  • Worms
  • Trojan Horse
  • Rootkit
  • Keylogger
  • Adware/Spyware
  • Botnet
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36
Q

How you get malware

A

• These all work together
– A worm takes advantage of a vulnerability
– Installs malware that includes a remote access
backdoor
– Bot may be installed later
• Your computer must run a program
– Email link - Don’t click links
– Web page pop-up
– Drive-by download
– Worm
• Your computer is vulnerable
– Operating system - Keep your OS updated!
– Applications - Check with the publisher

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37
Q

Virus

A

• Malware that can reproduce itself
– It needs you to execute a program
• Reproduces through file systems or the network
– Just running a program can spread a virus
• May or may not cause problems
– Some viruses are invisible, some are annoying
• Anti-virus is very common
– Thousands of new viruses every–
Is your signature file updated?

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38
Q

Virus types

A
Program viruses
– It’s part of the application
• Boot sector viruses
– Who needs an OS?
• Script viruses
– Operating system and browser-based
• Macro viruses
– Common in Microsoft Office
Fileless virus
• A stealth attack
– Does a good job of avoiding anti-virus detection
• Operates in memory
– But never installed in a file or application
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39
Q

Fileless virus

infection process

A

Malicious link to website- Website exploits flash/java/windows vulnerabilty-launches powershell and downloads payload in RAM- Runs Powershell Scripts and executables in memory, exfiltrates data, damages files- Adds Autostart to Registry

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40
Q

Worms

A

• Malware that self-replicates
– Doesn’t need you to do anything
– Uses the network as a transmission medium
– Self-propagates and spreads quickly
• Worms are pretty bad things
– Can take over many systems very quickly
• Firewalls and IDS/IPS can mitigate
many worm infestations
– Doesn’t help much once the worm gets inside

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41
Q

Worm Process

A

Infected Computer searches for vulnerable system-vulnerable system exploited-Backdoor installed and downloads worm.

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42
Q

1.2 - Ransomware and Crypto-malware

A
our data is valuable
• Personal data
– Family pictures and videos
– Important documents
• Organization data
– Planning documents
– Employee personally identifiable information (PII)
– Financial information
– Company private data
• How much is it worth?
– There’s a number
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43
Q

Ransomware

A

• The attackers want your money
– They’ll take your computer in the meantime
• May be a fake ransom
– Locks your computer “by the police”
• The ransom may be avoided
– A security professional may be able to remove
these kinds of malware

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44
Q

Crypto-malware

A

• A newer generation of ransomware
– Your data is unavailable until you provide cash
• Malware encrypts your data files
– Pictures, documents, music, movies, etc.
– Your OS remains available
– They want you running, but not working
• You must pay the bad guys to obtain the decryption key
– Untraceable payment system
– An unfortunate use of public-key cryptography

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45
Q

Protecting against ransomware

A
• Always have a backup
– An offline backup, ideally
• Keep your operating system up to date
– Patch those vulnerabilities
• Keep your applications up to date
– Security patches
• Keep your anti-virus/anti-malware signatures up to date
– New attacks every hour
• Keep everything up to date
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46
Q

Trojan horse

A

Used by the Greeks to capture
– Troy from the Trojans
– A digital wooden horse
• Software that pretends to be something else
– So it can conquer your computer
– Doesn’t really care much about replicating
• Circumvents your existing security
– Anti-virus may catch it when it runs
– The better Trojans are built to avoid and disable AV
• Once it’s inside it has free reign
– And it may open the gates for other programs

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47
Q

Potentially Unwanted Program (PUP)

A
• Identified by anti-virus/anti-malware
– Potentially undesirable software
– Often installed along with other software
• Overly aggressive browser toolbar
• A backup utility that displays ads
• Browser search engine hijacker
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48
Q

Backdoors

A

Backdoors
• Why go through normal authentication methods?
– Just walk in the back door
• Often placed on your computer through malware
– Some malware software can take advantage of
backdoors created by other malware
• Some software includes a backdoor (oops)
– Old Linux kernel included a backdoor
– Bad software can have a backdoor as part of the app

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49
Q

Remote Access Trojans (RATs)

A
• Remote Administration Tool
– The ultimate backdoor
– Administrative control of a device
• Malware installs the server/service/host
– Attacker connects with the client software
• Control a device
– Key logging
– Screen recording /screenshots
– Copy files
– Embed more malware
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50
Q

Protecting against Trojans and RATs

A
• Don’t run unknown software
– Consider the consequences
• Keep anti-virus/anti-malware signatures updated
– There are always new attacks
• Always have a backup
– You may need to quickly recover
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51
Q

Rootkits

A
• Originally a Unix technique
– The “root” in rootkit
• Modifies core system files
– Part of the kernel
• Can be invisible to the operating system
– Won’t see it in Task Manager
• Also invisible to traditional anti-virus utilities
– If you can’t see it, you can’t stop it
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52
Q

Kernel drivers

A
• Zeus/Zbot malware
– Famous for cleaning out bank accounts
• Now combined with Necurs rootkit
– Necurs is a kernel-level driver
• Necurs makes sure you can’t delete Zbot
– Access denied
• Trying to stop the Windows process?
– Error terminating process: Access denied
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53
Q

Finding and removing rootkits

A
• Look for the unusual
– Anti-malware scans
• Use a remover specific to the rootkit
– Usually built after the rootkit is discovered
• Secure boot with UEFI
– Security in the BIOS
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54
Q

Adware

A
• Your computer is one big advertisement
– Pop-ups with pop-ups
• May cause performance issues
– Especially over the network
• Installed accidentally
– May be included with other software
• Be careful of software that claims to remove adware
– Especially if you learned about it from a pop-up
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55
Q

Spyware

A
• Malware that spies on you
– Advertising, identity theft, affiliate fraud
• Can trick you into installing
– Peer to peer, fake security software
• Browser monitoring
– Capture surfing habits
• Keyloggers - Capture every keystroke
– Send it back to the mother ship
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56
Q

Why is there so much adware and spyware?

A
• Money
– Your eyeballs are incredibly valuable
• Money
– Your computer time and bandwidth
is incredibly valuable
• Money
– Your bank account is incredibly valuable
– Yes, even your bank account
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57
Q

Protecting against adware/spyware

A
• Maintain your anti-virus / anti-malware
– Always have the latest signatures
• Always know what you’re installing
– And watch your options during the installation
• Where’s your backup?
– You might need it someday
– Cleaning adware isn’t easy
• Run some scans - Malwarebytes
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58
Q

Bots (Robots)

A

• Once your machine is infected, it becomes a bot
– You may not even know
• How does it get on your computer?
– Trojan Horse (I just saw a funny video of you! Click here.) or…
– You run a program or click an ad you THOUGHT was legit,
but…
– OS or application vulnerability
• A day in the life of a bot
– Sit around. Check in with the Command and Control (C&C)
server. Wait for instructions.

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59
Q

Botnets

A
• A group of bots working together
– Nothing good can come from this
• Distributed Denial of service (DDoS)
– The power of many
• Relay spam, proxy network traffic,
distributed computing tasks
• Botnets are for sale
– Rent time from the botnet owner
– Not a long-term business proposition
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60
Q

Stopping the bot

A
• Prevent the initial infection
– OS and application patches
– Anti-virus/anti-malware and updated signatures
• Identify an existing infection
– On-demand scans, network monitoring
• Prevent command and control (C&C)
– Block at the firewall
– Identify at the workstation with a
host-based firewall or host-based IPS
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61
Q

Logic Bomb

A

• Waits for a predefined event
– Often left by someone with grudge
• Time bomb
– Time or date
• User event
– Logic bomb
• Difficult to identify
– Difficult to recover if it goes off
Real-world logic bombs
• March 19, 2013, South Korea
– Email with malicious attachment sent to
– South Korean organizations
– Posed as a bank email
– Trojan installs malware
• March 20, 2013, 2 p.m. local time
– Malware time-based logic-bomb activates
– Storage and master boot record deleted, system
reboots
– Boot device not found.
– Please install an operating system on your hard disk.
• December 17, 2016, 11:53 p.m.
– Kiev, Ukraine, high-voltage substation
– Logic bomb begins disabling electrical circuits
– Malware mapped out the control network
– Began disabling power at a predetermined time
– Customized for SCADA networks
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)

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62
Q

Preventing a logic bomb

A
• Difficult to recognize
– Each is unique
– No predefined signatures
• Process and procedures
– Formal change control
• Electronic monitoring
– Alert on changes
– Host-based intrusion detection, Tripwire, etc.
• Constant auditing
– An administrator can circumvent existing systems
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63
Q

1.2 - Password Attacks - Plaintext / unencrypted passwords

A

• Some applications store passwords “in the clear”
– No encryption. You can read the stored password.
– This is rare, thankfully
• Do not store passwords as plaintext
– Anyone with access to the password file or database
has every credential
• What to do if your application saves
passwords as plaintext:
– Get a better application

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64
Q

1.2 - Password Attacks-Hashing a password

A

• Hashes represent data as a fixed-length string of text
– A message digest, or “fingerprint”
• Will not have a collision (hopefully)
– Different inputs will not have the same hash
• One-way trip
– Impossible to recover the original message
from the digest
– A common way to store passwords
The password file
• Different across operating systems and applications
– Different hash algorithms

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65
Q

1.2 password attacks- Spraying attack

A

Spraying attack
• Try to login with an incorrect password
– Eventually you’re locked out
• There are some common passwords
– https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_
common_passwords
• Attack an account with the top three (or more) passwords
– If they don’t work, move to the next account
– No lockouts, no alarms, no alerts

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66
Q

1.2 password attacks-Brute force

A

• Try every possible password combination
until the a hash is matched
• This might take some time
– A strong hashing algorithm slows things down
• Brute force attacks - Online
– Keep trying the login process
– Very slow
– Most accounts will lockout after a number
of failed attempts
• Brute force the hash - Offline
– Obtain the list of users and hashes
– Calculate a password hash, compare it to a stored hash
– Large computational resource requirement

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67
Q

1.2 password attacks-Dictionary attacks

A

• Use a dictionary to find common words
– Passwords are created by humans
• Many common wordlists available on the ‘net
– Some are customized by language or line of work
• The password crackers can substitute letters
– p&ssw0rd
• This takes time
– Distributed cracking and GPU cracking is common
• Discover passwords for common words
– This won’t discover random character passwords

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68
Q

1.2 password attacks-Rainbow tables

A
• An optimized, pre-built set of hashes
– Saves time and storage space
– Doesn’t need to contain every hash
– Contains pre-calculated hash chains
• Remarkable speed increase
– Especially with longer password lengths
• Need different tables for different hashing methods
– Windows is different than MySQL
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69
Q

1.2 password attacks-Adding some salt

A

• Salt
– Random data added to a password when hashing
• Every user gets their own random salt
– The salt is commonly stored with the password
• Rainbow tables won’t work with salted hashes
– Additional random value added to the
original password
• This slows things down the brute force process
– It doesn’t completely stop the reverse engineering
• Each user gets a different random hash
– The same password creates a different hash

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70
Q

1.2 password attacks-When the hashes get out

A
• January 2019 - Collection #1
– A collection of email addresses and passwords
– 12,000+ files and 87 GB of data
• 1,160,253,228 unique emails and passwords
– A compilation of data breach results
• 772,904,991 unique usernames
– That’s about 773 million people
• 21,222,975 unique passwords
– You really need a password manager
• https://haveibeenpwned.com/
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71
Q

1.2 - Physical Attacks-Malicious USB cable

A

• It looks like a normal USB cable
– It has additional electronics inside
• Operating system identifies it as a HID
– Human Interface Device
– It looks like you’ve connected a keyboard or mouse
– A keyboard doesn’t need extra rights or permissions
• Once connected, the cable takes over
– Downloads and installs malicious software
• Don’t just plug in any USB cable
– Always use trusted hardware

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72
Q

1.2 - Physical Attacks-Malicious flash drive

A

• Free USB flash drive!
– Plug it in and see what’s on it
– That’s a bad idea
• Older operating systems would automatically run files
– This has now been disabled or removed by default
• Could still act as a HID (Human Interface Device) /
Keyboard
– Start a command prompt and type anything
without your intervention
• Attackers can load malware in documents
– PDF files, spreadsheets
• Can be configured as a boot device
– Infect the computer after a reboot
• Acts as an Ethernet adapter
– Redirects or modifies Internet traffic requests
– Acts as a wireless gateway for other devices
• Never connect an untrusted USB device

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73
Q

1.2 - Physical Attacks-Skimming

A

• Stealing credit card information,
usually during a normal transaction
– Copy data from the magnetic stripe:
– Card number, expiration date, card holder’s name
• ATM skimming
– Includes a small camera to also watch for your PIN
• Attackers use the card information for other financial
transactions
– Fraud is the responsibility of the seller
• Always check before using card readers

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74
Q

1.2 - Physical Attacks-Card cloning

A
• Get card details from a skimmer
– The clone needs an original
• Create a duplicate of a card
– Looks and feels like the original
– Often includes the printed CVC (Card Validation Code)
• Can only be used with magnetic stripe cards
– The chip can’t be cloned
• Cloned gift cards are common
– A magnetic stripe technology
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75
Q

Machine learning

A

• Our computers are getting smarter
– They identify patterns in data and improve
their predictions
• This requires a lot of training data
– Face recognition requires analyzing a lot of faces
– Driving a car requires a lot of road time
• In use every day
– Stop spam
– Recommend products from an online retailer
– What movie would you like to see? This one.
– Prevent car accidents

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76
Q

Poisoning the training data

A

• Confuse the artificial intelligence (AI)
– Attackers send modified training data that causes
the AI to behave incorrectly
• Microsoft AI chatter bot named Tay
• (Thinking About You)
– Joins Twitter on March 23, 2016
– Designed to learn by interacting with Twitter users
– Microsoft didn’t program in anti-offensive behavior
– Tay quickly became racist, sexist, and inappropriate

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77
Q

Evasion attacks

A

• The AI is only as good as the training
– Attackers find the holes and limitations
• An AI that knows what spam looks like can be
fooled by a different approach
– Change the number of good and bad words in the
message
• An AI that uses real-world information can release
confidential information
– Trained with data that includes social security
numbers
– AI can be fooled into revealing those numbers

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78
Q

Securing the learning algorithms

A
• Check the training data
– Cross check and verify
• Constantly retrain with new data
– More data
– Better data
• Train the AI with possible poisoning
– What would the attacker try to do?
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79
Q

1.2 - Supply Chain Attacks

A

• The chain contains many moving parts
– Raw materials, suppliers, manufacturers,
distributors, customers, consumers
• Attackers can infect any step along the way
– Infect different parts of the chain without suspicion
– People trust their suppliers
• One exploit can infect the entire chain
– There’s a lot at stake

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80
Q

Supply chain security

A

• Target Corp. breach - November 2013
– 40 million credit cards stolen
• Heating and AC firm in Pennsylvania was infected
– Malware delivered in an email
– VPN credentials for HVAC techs was stolen
• HVAC vendor was the supplier
– Attackers used a wide-open Target network to
infect every cash register at 1,800 stores
• Do these technicians look like an IT security issue?
• Can you trust your new
server/router/switch/firewall/software?
– Supply chain cybersecurity
• Use a small supplier base
– Tighter control of vendors
• Strict controls over policies and procedures
– Ensure proper security is in place
• Security should be part of the overall design
– There’s a limit to trust

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81
Q

1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks

A

Attacks can happen anywhere
• Two categories for IT security
– The on-premises data is more secure!
– The cloud-based data is more secure!
• Cloud-based security is centralized and costs less
– No dedicated hardware, no data center to secure
– A third-party handles everything
• On-premises puts the security burden on the client
– Data center security and infrastructure costs
• Attackers want your data
– They don’t care where it is

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82
Q

1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks - On-premises security

A

• Customize your security posture
– Full control when everything is in-house
• On-site IT team can manage security better
– The local team can ensure everything is secure
– A local team can be expensive and difficult to staff
1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks
• Local team maintains uptime and availability
– System checks can occur at any time
– No phone call for support
• Security changes can take time
– New equipment, configurations, and additional costs

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83
Q

1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks - Security in the cloud

A

• Data is in a secure environment
– No physical access to the data center
– Third-party may have access to the data
• Cloud providers are managing large-scale security
– Automated signature and security updates
– Users must follow security best-practices
• Limited downtime
– Extensive fault-tolerance and 24/7/365 monitoring
• Scalable security options
– One-click security deployments
– This may not be as customizable as necessary

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84
Q

1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks

A

• You’ve encrypted data and sent it to another person
– Is it really secure? How do you know?
• The attacker doesn’t have the combination (the key)
– So they break the safe (the cryptography)
• Finding ways to undo the security
– There are many potential cryptographic shortcomings
– The problem is often the implementation

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85
Q

1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks - Birthday attack

A

• In a classroom of 23 students, what is the chance of
two students sharing a birthday? About 50%.
– For a class of 30, the chance is about 70%
• In the digital world, this is a hash collision
– A hash collision is the same hash value for two
different plaintexts
– Find a collision through brute force
• The attacker will generate multiple versions of
plaintext to match the hashes
– Protect yourself with a large hash output size

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86
Q

1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks - Collisions

A

• Hash digests are supposed to be unique
– Different input data should never create the same hash
• MD5 hash
– Message Digest Algorithm 5
– Published in April 1992, Collisions identified in 1996
• December 2008: Researchers created CA certificate
that appeared legitimate when MD5 is checked
– Built other certificates that

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87
Q

1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks - Downgrade attack

A

• Instead of using perfectly good encryption, use
something that’s not so great
– Force the systems to downgrade their security
• 2014 - TLS vulnerability - POODLE (Padding Oracle
On Downgraded Legacy Encryption)
– On-path attack
– Forces clients to fall back to SSL 3.0
– SSL 3.0 has significant cryptographic vulnerabilities
– Because of POODLE, modern browsers won’t fall back
to SSL 3.0

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88
Q

1.3 - Privilege escalation

A

• Gain higher-level access to a system
– Exploit a vulnerability - Might be a bug or design flaw
• Higher-level access means more capabilities
– This commonly is the highest-level access
– This is obviously a concern
• These are high-priority vulnerability patches
– You want to get these holes closed very quickly
– Any user can be an administrator
• Horizontal privilege escalation
– User A can access user B resources

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89
Q

1.3 - Privilege escalation - Mitigating privilege escalation

A
• Patch quickly
– Fix the vulnerability
• Updated anti-virus/anti-malware software
– Block known vulnerabilities
• Data Execution Prevention
– Only data in executable areas can run
• Address space layout randomization
– Prevent a buffer overrun at a known
memory address
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90
Q

1.3 - Cross-site Scripting

A

• XSS
– Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) are something else entirely
• Originally called cross-site because of browser security flaws
– Information from one site could be shared with another
• One of the most common web application
development errors
– Takes advantage of the trust a user has for a site
– Complex and varied
• Malware that uses JavaScript - Do you allow scripts? Me too.

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91
Q

1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Non-persistent (reflected) XSS attack

A

• Web site allows scripts to run in user input
– Search box is a common source
• Attacker emails a link that takes advantage of this
vulnerability
– Runs a script that sends credentials/session IDs/cookies
to the attacker
• Script embedded in URL executes in the victim’s browser
– As if it came from the server
• Attacker uses credentials/session IDs/cookies to steal
victim’s information

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92
Q

1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Persistent (stored) XSS attack

A

• Attacker posts a message to a social network
– Includes the malicious payload
• It’s now “persistent” - Everyone gets the payload
• No specific target - All viewers to the page
• For social networking, this can spread quickly
– Everyone who views the message can have it
posted to their page
– Where someone else can view it and propagate it further…

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93
Q

1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Hacking a Subaru

A

• June 2017, Aaron Guzman
– Security researcher
• When authenticating with Subaru, users get a token
– This token never expires (bad!)
• A valid token allowed any service request
– Even adding your email address to someone
else’s account
– Now you have full access to someone else’s car
• Web front-end included an XSS vulnerability
– A user clicks a malicious link, and you have
their token

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94
Q

1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Protecting against XSS

A

• Be careful when clicking untrusted links
– Never blindly click in your email inbox. Never.
• Consider disabling JavaScript
– Or control with an extension
– This offers limited protection
• Keep your browser and applications updated
– Avoid the nasty browser vulnerabilities
• Validate input
– Don’t allow users to add their own scripts to an
input field

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95
Q

1.3 - Injection Attacks - Code injection

A
• Code injection
– Adding your own information into a data stream
• Enabled because of bad programming
– The application should properly handle
input and output
• So many different data types
– HTML, SQL, XML, LDAP, etc.
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96
Q

1.3 - Injection Attacks - SQL injection

A
• SQL - Structured Query Language
– The most common relational database
management system language
• SQL Injection
– Modifying SQL requests
– Your application shouldn’t really allow this
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97
Q

1.3 - Injection Attacks -XML injection and LDAP injection

A

• XML - Extensible Markup Language
– A set of rules for data transfer and storage
• XML injection
– Modifying XML requests - a good application will validate
• LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
– Created by the telephone companies
– Now used by almost everyone
• LDAP injection
– Modify LDAP requests to manipulate application results

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98
Q

1.3 - Injection Attacks - DLL injection

A

• Dynamic-Link Library
– A Windows library containing code and data
– Many applications can use this library
• Inject a DLL and have an application run a program
– Runs as part of the target process

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99
Q

1.3 - Buffer Overflows

A

Overwriting a buffer of memory
– Spills over into other memory areas
• Developers need to perform bounds checking
– The attackers spend a lot of time looking for openings
• Not a simple exploit
– Takes time to avoid crashing things
– Takes time to make it do what you want
• A really useful buffer overflow is repeatable
– Which means that a system can be compromised

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100
Q

1.3 - Replay Attacks

A

• Useful information is transmitted over the network
– A crafty hacker will take advantage of this
• Need access to the raw network data
– Network tap, ARP poisoning, malware on the victim computer
• The gathered information may help the attacker
– Replay the data to appear as someone else
• This is not an on-path attack
– The actual replay doesn’t require
the original workstation
• Avoid this type of replay attack with a salt
– Use a session ID with the password hash to
create a unique authentication hash each time

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101
Q

1.3 - Replay Attacks - Pass the Hash

A

Client Authenticates to server with username and hashed password - During Authentication the attacker captures the username and password hash - Attacker sends his own authentication request using the captured credentials.

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102
Q

1.3 - Replay Attacks - Header manipulation

A
• Information gathering
– Wireshark, Kismet
• Exploits
– Cross-site scripting
• Modify headers
– Tamper, Firesheep, Scapy
• Modify cookies
– Cookies Manager+ (Firefox add-on)
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103
Q

1.3 - Replay Attacks - Prevent session hijacking

A

• Encrypt end-to-end
– They can’t capture your session ID if they can’t see it
– Additional load on the web server (HTTPS)
– Firefox extension: HTTPS Everywhere, Force-TLS
– Many sites are now HTTPS-only

• Encrypt end-to-somewhere
– At least avoid capture over a local wireless network
– Still in-the-clear for part of the journey
– Personal VPN (OpenVPN, VyprVPN, etc.)

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104
Q

1.3 - Replay Attacks - Browser cookies and session IDs

A

• Cookies
– Information stored on your computer by the browser
• Used for tracking, personalization, session management
– Not executable, not generally a security risk
– Unless someone gets access to them
• Could be considered be a privacy risk
– Lots of personal data in there
• Session IDs are often stored in the cookie
– Maintains sessions across multiple browser sessions

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105
Q

1.3 - Replay Attacks - Session hijacking (Sidejacking)

A

Victim Authenticates to Server - Server provides a Session ID to Client - Attacker intercepts the session ID and uses it to access the server with the victims credentials.

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106
Q

1.3 - Request Forgeries Cross-site requests

A

• Cross-site requests are common and legitimate
– You visit ProfessorMesser.com
– Your browser loads text from the
ProfessorMesser.com server
– Your browser loads a video from YouTube
– Your browser loads pictures from Instagram
• HTML on ProfessorMesser.com directs
requests from your browser
– This is normal and expected
– Most of these are unauthenticated requests

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107
Q

1.3 - Request Forgeries The client and the server

A
• Website pages consist of client-side
code and server-side code
– Many moving parts
• Client side
– Renders the page on the screen
– HTML, JavaScript
• Server side
– Performs requests from
the client - HTML, PHP
– Transfer money from one
account to another
– Post a video on YouTube
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108
Q

1.3 - Request Forgeries Cross-site request forgery

A

• One-click attack, session riding - XSRF, CSRF (sea surf)
• Takes advantage of the trust that a web application
has for the user
– The web site trusts your browser
– Requests are made without your consent or your knowledge
– Attacker posts a Facebook status on your account
• Significant web application development oversight
– The application should have anti-forgery techniques added
– Usually a cryptographic token to prevent a forgery

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109
Q

1.3 Cross-site request forgery process

A

Attacker creates fund transfer request- request is sent as a hyperlink to a user who may already be logged into the bank website - Visitor Clicks link and unknowingly sends the transfer request to the bank website-Bank validates the transfer and sends the visitors funds to the attacker

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110
Q

1.3 Request Forgeries- Server-side request forgery (SSRF)

A
• Attacker finds a vulnerable web application
– Sends requests to a web server
– Web server performs the request on
behalf of the attacker
• Caused by bad programming
– Never trust the user input
– Server should validate the input
and the responses
– These are rare, but can be critical vulnerabilities
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111
Q

1.3 Request Forgeries - Capital One SSRF breach - March 201

A

• Attacker is able to execute commands
on the Capital One website
– This is normally stopped by a WAF
(Web Application Firewall)
– The WAF was misconfigured
• Attacker obtained security credentials for the WAF role
• WAF-Role account listed the buckets on Amazon S3
• Attacker retrieved the data from the Amazon buckets
• Credit card application data from 2005 through 2019
– 106 million names, address, phone, email, DoB
– 140,000 Social Security numbers,
80,000 bank accounts

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112
Q

1.3 Server-side request forgery (SSRF) process

A

attacker sends request that controls a web application- web server sends request to another service, such as cloud storage- cloud storage sends response to web server- web server forwards response to attacker

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113
Q

1.3 - Driver Manipulation-Malware hide-and-go-seek

A

• Traditional anti-virus is very good at identifying
known attacks
– Checks the signature
– Block anything that matches
• There are still ways to infect and hide
– It’s a constant war
– Zero-day attacks, new attack types, etc.
our drivers are powerful
• The interaction between the hardware and your
operating system
– They are often trusted
– Great opportunity for security issues
• May 2016 - HP Audio Drivers
– Conexant audio chips
– Driver installation includes audio control software
– Debugging feature enables a keylogger
• Hardware interactions contain sensitive information
– Video, keyboard, mouse

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114
Q

1.3 - Driver Manipulation-Shimming

A
• Filling in the space between two objects
– A middleman
• Windows includes it’s own shim
– Backwards compatibility with previous
Windows versions
– Application Compatibility Shim Cache
• Malware authors write their own shims
– Get around security (like UAC)
• January 2015 Microsoft vulnerability
– Elevates privilege
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115
Q

1.3 - Driver Manipulation-Refactoring

A
• Metamorphic malware
– A different program each time it’s downloaded
• Make it appear different each time
– Add NOP instructions
– Loops, pointless code strings
• Can intelligently redesign itself
– Reorder functions
– Modify the application flow
– Reorder code and insert unused data types
• Difficult to match with signature-based detection
– Use a layered approach problem
– Works on SSL and TLS
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116
Q

1.3 - SSL Stripping - SSL stripping / HTTP downgrade

A

• Combines an on-path attack with a downgrade attack
– Difficult to implement, but big returns for the attacker
• Attacker must sit in the middle of the conversation
– Must modify data between the victim and web server
– Proxy server, ARP spoofing, rogue Wi-Fi hotspot, etc.
• Victim does not see any significant problem
– Except the browser page isn’t encrypted
– Strips the S away from HTTPS
• This is a client and serve

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117
Q

1.3 - SSL Stripping - SSL and TLS

A
SSL and TLS
• SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) 2.0 - Deprecated in 2011
• SSL 3.0
– Vulnerable to the POODLE attack
– Deprecated in June 2015
• Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0
– Upgrade to SSL 3.0, and a name change
from SSL to TLS
– Can downgrade to SSL 3.0
• TLS 1.1
– Deprecated in January 2020 by modern browsers
• TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 - The latest standards
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118
Q

1.3 - Race Conditions

A

• A programming conundrum
– Sometimes, things happen at the same time
– This can be bad if you’ve not planned for it
• Time-of-check to time-of-use attack (TOCTOU)
– Check the system
– When do you use the results of your last check?
– Something might happen between the check
and the use
Race conditions can cause big problems
• January 2004 - Mars rover “Spirit”
– Reboot when a problem is identified
– Problem is with the file system, so reboot because
of the file system problem
– Reboot loop was the result
• GE Energy - Energy Management System
– Three power lines failed at the same time
– Race condition delayed alerts
– Caused the Northeast Blackout of 2003
• Therac-25 radiation therapy machine in the 1980s
– Used software interlocks instead of hardware
– Race condition caused 100 times the normal dose of radiation
– Six patients injured, three deaths

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119
Q

1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Memory vulnerabilities

A

• Manipulating memory can be advantageous
– Relatively difficult to accomplish
• Memory leak
– Unused memory is not properly released
– Begins to slowly grow in size
– Eventually uses all available memory
– System crashes
• NULL Pointer dereference
– Programming technique that references a
portion of memory
– What happens if that reference points to nothing?
– Application crash, debug information displayed, DoS
• Integer overflow
– Large number into a smaller sized space
– Where does the extra number go?
– You shouldn’t be able

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120
Q

1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Directory traversal

A
• Directory traversal / path traversal
– Read files from a web server that are outside of
the website’s file directory
– Users shouldn’t be able to browse
the Windows folder
• Web server software vulnerability
– Won’t stop users from browsing past the
web server root
• Web application code vulnerability
– Take advantage of badly written code
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121
Q

1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Improper error handling

A
• Errors happen
– And you should probably know about it
• Messages should be just informational enough
– Avoid too much detail
– Network information, memory dump,
stack traces, database dumps
• This is an easy one to find and fix
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122
Q

1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Improper input handling

A

• Many applications accept user input
– We put data in, we get data back
• All input should be considered malicious
– Check everything. Trust nobody.
• Allowing invalid input can be devastating
– SQL injections, buffer overflows,
denial of service, etc.
• It takes a lot of work to find input that
can be used maliciously
– But they will find it

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123
Q

1.3 - Other Application Attacks - API attacks

A

• API - Application Programming Interface
• Attackers look for vulnerabilities in this new
communication path
– Exposing sensitive data, DoS, intercepted

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124
Q

1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Resource exhaustion

A

• A specialized DoS (Denial of Service) attack
– May only require one device and low bandwidths
• ZIP bomb
– A 42 kilobyte .zip compressed file
– Uncompresses to 4.5 petabytes (4,500 terabytes)
– Anti-virus will identify these
• DHCP starvation
– Attacker floods a network with IP address requests
– MAC address changes each time
– DHCP server eventually runs out of addresses
– Switch configurations can rate limit DHCP requests

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125
Q

1.4 - Rogue Access Points and Evil Twins- Rogue access points

A
• An unauthorized wireless access point
– May be added by an employee or an attacker
– Not necessarily malicious
– A significant potential backdoor
• Very easy to plug in a wireless AP
– Or enable wireless sharing in your OS
• Schedule a periodic survey
– Walk around your building/campus
– Use third-party tools / WiFi Pineapple
• Consider using 802.1X (Network Access Control)
– You must authenticate, regardless of the
connection type
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126
Q

1.4 - Rogue Access Points and Evil Twins - Wireless evil twins

A

• Looks legitimate, but actually malicious
– The wireless version of phishing
• Configure an access point to look like an existing network
– Same (or similar) SSID and security settings/captive portal
• Overpower the existing access points
– May not require the same physical location
• WiFi hotspots (and users) are easy to fool
– And they’re wide open
• You encrypt your communication, right?
– Use HTTPS and a VPN

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127
Q

1.4 - Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing - Bluejacking

A

Bluejacking
• Sending of unsolicited messages to another
device via Bluetooth
– No mobile carrier required!
• Typical functional distance is about 10 meters
– More or less, depending on antenna and interference
• Bluejack with an address book object
– Instead of contact name, write a message
– “You are Bluejacked!”
– “You are Bluejacked! Add to contacts?”
• Third-party software

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128
Q

1.4 - Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing - Bluesnarfing

A

• Access a Bluetooth-enabled device and transfer data
– Contact list, calendar, email, pictures, video, etc.
• First major security weakness in Bluetooth
– Marcel Holtmann in September 2003 and
– Adam Laurie in November 2003
– This weakness was patched
• Serious security issue
– If you know the file, you can download it without
authentication

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129
Q

1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks

A
• Surfing along on your wireless network
– And then you’re not
• And then it happens again
– And again
• You may not be able to stop it
– There’s (almost) nothing you can do
– Time to get a long patch cable
• Wireless disassociation
– A significant wireless
denial of service (DoS) attack
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130
Q

1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks - 802.11 management frames

A

• 802.11 wireless includes a number of
management features
– Frames that make everything work
– You never see them
• Important for the operation of 802.11 wireless
– How to find access points, manage QoS, associate/
disassociate with an access point, etc.
• Original wireless standards did not add
protection for management frames
– Sent in the clear
– No authentication or validation

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131
Q

1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks - Protecting against disassociation

A

• IEEE has already addressed the problem
– 802.11w - July 2014
• Some of the important management frames
are encrypted
– Disassociate, deauthenticate,
channel switch announcements, etc.
• Not everything is encrypted
– Beacons, probes, authentication, association
• 802.11w is required for 802.11ac compliance
– This will roll out going forward

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132
Q

1.4 - Wireless Jamming - Radio frequency (RF) jamming

A
• Denial of Service
– Prevent wireless communication
• Transmit interfering wireless signals
– Decrease the signal-to-noise ratio at
the receiving device
– The receiving device can’t hear the good signal
• Sometimes it’s not intentional
– Interference, not jamming
– Microwave oven, fluorescent lights
• Jamming is intentional
– Someone wants your network to not work
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133
Q

1.4 - Wireless Jamming -

A

• Many different types
– Constant, random bits / Constant, legitimate frames
• Data sent at random times
– Random data and legitimate frames
• Reactive jamming
– Only when someone else tries to communicate
• Needs to be somewhere close
– Difficult to be effective from a distance
• Time to go fox hunting
– You’ll need the right equipment to hunt down the jam
– Directional antenna, attenuator

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134
Q

1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - RFID (Radio-frequency identification)

A
• It’s everywhere
– Access badges
– Inventory/Assembly line tracking
– Pet/Animal identification
– Anything that needs to be tracked
• Radar technology
– Radio energy transmitted to the tag
– RF powers the tag, ID is transmitted back
– Bidirectional communication
– Some tag formats can be active/powered
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135
Q

1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - RFID Attacks

A
• Data capture
– View communication
– Replay attack
• Spoof the reader - Write your own data to the tag
• Denial of service - Signal jamming
• Decrypt communication
– Many default keys are on Google
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136
Q

1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - Near field communication (NFC)

A
• Two-way wireless communication
– Builds on RFID, which is mostly one-way
• Payment systems
– Many options available
• Bootstrap for other wireless
– NFC helps with Bluetooth pairing
• Access token, identity “card”
– Short range with encryption support
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137
Q

1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - NFC Security Concern

A
• Remote capture
– It’s a wireless network
– 10 meters for active devices
• Frequency jamming
– Denial of service
• Relay / Replay attack
– On-path attack
• Loss of NFC device control
– Stolen/lost phone
138
Q

1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography - Cryptographic nonce

A

• Arbitrary number
– Used once
– “For the nonce” - For the time being
• A random or pseudo-random number
– Something that can’t be reasonably guessed
– Can also be a counter
• Use a nonce during the login process
– Server gives you a nonce
– Calculate your password hash using the nonce
– Each password hash sent to the host will be
different, so a replay won’t work

139
Q

1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography -Initialization Vectors (IV)

A

• A type of nonce
– Used for randomizing an encryption scheme
– The more random the better
• Used in encryption ciphers,WEP, and some
SSL implementations

140
Q

1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography - Salt

A

• A nonce most commonly associated with password
randomization
– Make the password hash unpredictable
• Password storage should always be salted
– Each user gets a different salt
• If the password database is breached, you can’t correlate
any passwords
– Even users with the same password have different
hashes store

141
Q

1.4 - On-Path Network Attack

A
• How can an attacker watch without you knowing?
– Formerly known as man-in-the-middle
• Redirects your traffic
– Then passes it on to the destination
– You never know your traffic was redirected
• ARP poisoning
– ARP has no security
– On-path attack on the local IP subnet
142
Q

1.4 - On-Path Browser Attack

A

• What if the middleman was on the same computer as the victim?
– Malware/Trojan does all of the proxy work
– Formerly known as man-in-the-browser
• Huge advantages for the attackers
– Relatively easy to proxy encrypted traffic
– Everything looks normal to the victim
• The malware in your browser waits for you to login to your bank
– And cleans you out

143
Q

1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - The MAC address

A
• Ethernet Media Access Control address
– The “physical” address of a network adapter
– Unique to a device
• 48 bits / 6 bytes long
– Displayed in hexadecimal
144
Q

1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - LAN switching

A

• Forward or drop frames
– Based on the destination MAC address
• Gather a constantly updating list of MAC addresses
– Builds the list based on the source MAC address of
incoming traffic
– These age out periodically, often in 5 minutes
• Maintain a loop-free environment
– Using Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)

145
Q

1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - Learning the MACs

A

• Switches examine incoming traffic
– Makes a note of the source MAC address
• Adds unknown MAC addresses to the MAC address table
– Sets the output interface to the received interface

146
Q

1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - MAC flooding

A

• The MAC table is only so big
• Attacker starts sending traffic with different source
MAC addresses
– Force out the legitimate MAC addresses
• The table fills up
– Switch begins flooding traffic to all interfaces
• This effectively turns the switch into a hub
– All traffic is transmitted to all interfaces
– No interruption in traffic flows
• Attacker can easily capture all network traffic!
• Flooding can be restricted in the switch’s port
security settings

147
Q

1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - MAC cloning / MAC spoofing

A

• An attacker changes their MAC address to match
the MAC address of an existing device
– A clone / a spoof
• Circumvent filters
– Wireless or wired MAC filters
– Identify a valid MAC address and copy it
• Create a DoS
– Disrupt communication to the legitimate MAC
• Easily manipulated through software
– Usually a device driver option

148
Q

1.4 - DNS Attacks - DNS poisoning

A

• Modify the DNS server
– Requires some crafty hacking
• Modify the client host file
– The host file takes precedent over DNS queries
• Send a fake response to a valid DNS request
– Requires a redirection of the original request
or the resulting response

149
Q

1.4 - DNS Attacks - Domain hijacking

A

• Get access to the domain registration,
and you have control where the traffic flows
– You don’t need to touch the actual servers
– Determines the DNS names and DNS IP addresses
• Many ways to get into the account
– Brute force
– Social engineer the password
– Gain access to the email address that manages the account
– The usual things
Domain hijacking
• Saturday, October 22, 2016, 1 PM
• Domain name registrations of
36 domains are changed
– Brazilian bank
– Desktop domains, mobile domains, and more
• Under hacker control for 6 hours
– The attackers became the bank
• 5 million customers, $27 billion in assets
– Results of the hack have not been publicly released

150
Q

1.4 - DNS Attacks - URL hijacking

A
• Make money from your mistakes
– There’s a lot of advertising on the ‘net
• Sell the badly spelled domain to the actual owner
– Sell a mistake
• Redirect to a competitor
– Not as common, legal issues
• Phishing site
– Looks like the real site, please login
• Infect with a drive-by download
– You’ve got malware!
151
Q

1.4 - DNS Attacks - Types of URL hijacking

A
• Typosquatting / brandjacking
– Take advantage of poor spelling
• Outright misspelling
– professormesser.com vs. professormessor.com
• A typing error
– professormeser.com
• A different phrase
– professormessers.com
• Different top-level domain
– professormesser.org
152
Q

1.4 - DNS Attacks - Domain reputation

A

• The Internet is tracking your security posture
– They know when things go sideways
• Email reputation
– Suspicious activity
– Malware originating from the IP address
• A bad reputation can cause email delivery to fail
– Email rejection or simply dropped
• Check with the email or service provider to check
the reputation
– Follow their instructions to remediate
• Infected systems are noticed by the search engines
– Your domain can be flagged or removed
• Users will avoid the site
– Sales will drop
– Users will avoid your brand
• Malware might be removed quickly
– Recovery takes much longer

153
Q

1.4 - Denial of Service

A
Denial of Service
• Force a service to fail
– Overload the service
• Take advantage of a design failure or vulnerability
– Keep your systems patched!
• Cause a system to be unavailable
– Competitive advantage
• Create a smokescreen for some other exploit
– Precursor to a DNS spoofing attack
• Doesn’t have to be complicated
– Turn off the power
A “friendly” DoS
• Unintentional DoSing - It’s not always a ne’er-do-well
• Network DoS - Layer 2 loop without STP
• Bandwidth DoS - Downloading multi-gigabyte Linux
distributions over a DSL line
• The water line breaks
– Get a good shop vacuum
154
Q

1.4 - Denial of Service - Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

A

• Launch an army of computers to bring down a service
– Use all the bandwidth or resources - traffic spike
• This is why the attackers have botnets
– Thousands or millions of computers at your command
– At its peak, Zeus botnet infected over 3.6 million PCs
– Coordinated attack
• Asymmetric threat
– The attacker may have fewer resources than the victim

155
Q

1.4 - Denial of Service - DDoS amplification

A

• Turn your small attack into a big attack
– Often reflected off another device or service
• An increasingly common DDoS technique
– Turn Internet services against the victim
• Uses protocols with little (if any) authentication or checks
– NTP, DNS, ICMP
– A common example of protocol abuse

156
Q

1.4 - Denial of Service - Application DoS

A

• Make the application break or work harder
– Increase downtime and costs
• Fill the disk space
– A 42 kilobyte .zip compressed file
– Uncompresses to 4.5 petabytes (4,500 terabytes)
– Anti-virus will identify these
• Overuse a measured cloud resource
– More CPU/memory/network is more money
• Increase the cloud server response time
– Victim deploys a new application instance - repeat

157
Q

1.4 - Denial of Service - Operational Technology (OT) DoS

A
• The hardware and software for industrial equipment
– Electric grids, traffic control, manufacturing plants, etc.
• This is more than a web server failing
– Power grid drops offline
– All traffic lights are green
– Manufacturing plant shuts down
• Requires a different approach
– A much more critical security posture
158
Q

1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Scripting and automation

A
• Automate tasks
– You don’t have to be there
– Solve problems in your sleep
– Monitor and resolve problems before they happen
• The need for speed
– The script is as fast as the computer
– No typing or delays
– No human error
• Automate the attack
– The hacker is on borrowed time
159
Q

1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Windows PowerShell

A
Windows PowerShell
• Command line for system administrators
– .ps1 file extension
– Included with Windows 8/8.1 and 10
• Extend command-line functions
– Uses cmdlets (command-lets)
– PowerShell scripts and functions
– Standalone executables
• Attack Windows systems
– System administration
– Active Domain administration
– File share access
160
Q

1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Python

A
• General-purpose scripting language
– .py file extension
• Popular in many technologies
– Broad appeal and support
• Commonly used for cloud orchestration
– Create and tear down application instances
• Attack the infrastructure
– Routers, servers, switches
161
Q

1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Shell script

A
• Scripting the Unix/Linux shell
– Automate and extend the command line
– Bash, Bourne, Korn, C
• Starts with a shebang or hash-bang #!
– Often has a .sh file extension
• Attack the Linux/Unix environment
– Web, database, virtualization servers
• Control the OS from the command line
– Malware has a lot of options
162
Q

1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Macros

A

• Automate functions within an application
– Or operating system
• Designed to make the application easier to use
– Can often create security vulnerabilities
• Attackers create automated exploits
– They just need the user to open the file
– Prompts to run the macro

163
Q

1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)

A

• Automates processes within Windows applications
– Common in Microsoft Office
• A powerful programming language
– Interacts with the operating system
• CVE-2010-0815 / MS10-031
– VBA does not properly search for ActiveX
controls in a document
– Run arbitrary code embedded in a document
– Easy to infect a computer

164
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Threat actors and attributes

A

• The entity responsible for an event that has
an impact on the safety of another entity
– Also called a malicious actor
• Broad scope of actors
– And motivations vary widely
• Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
– Attackers are in the network and undetected
– 2018 FireEye report:
Americas: 71 days,
EMEA: 177 days,
APAC: 204 days

165
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Insiders

A

• More than just passwords on sticky notes
– Some insiders are out for no good
• Sophistication may not be advanced,
but the insider has institutional knowledge
– Attacks can be directed at vulnerable systems
– The insider knows what to hit
• Extensive resources
– Eating away from the inside

166
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Nation states

A

• Governments
• National security, job security
• Always an external entity
• Highest sophistication
• Military control, utilities, financial control
• United States and Israel destroyed 1,000 nuclear
centrifuges with the Stuxnet worm
• Constant attacks
• Commonly an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

167
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Hackers

A
• Experts with technology
– Often driven by money, power, and ego
• Authorized
– An ethical hacker with good intentions
– And permission to hack
• Unauthorized
– Malicious, violates security for personal gain
• Semi-authorized
– Finds a vulnerability, doesn’t use it
168
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Hacktivist

A
• A hacker with a purpose
– Social change or a political agenda
– Often an external entity
• Can be remarkably sophisticated
– Very specific hacks
– DoS, web site defacing, release of private documents, etc.
• Funding is limited
– Some organizations have fundraising options
169
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Script kiddies

A
• Runs pre-made scripts without any knowledge
of what’s really happening
– Not necessarily a youngster
• Can be internal or external
– But usually external
• Not very sophisticated
• No formal funding
– Looking for low hanging fruit
• Motivated by the hunt
– Working the ego, trying to make a name
170
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Organized crime

A

• Professional criminals
– Motivated by money
– Almost always an external entity
• Very sophisticated
– Best hacking money can buy
• Crime that’s organized
– One person hacks, one person manages the exploits,
another person sells the data, another handles
customer support
• Lots of capital to fund hacking efforts

171
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Shadow IT

A
• Going rogue
– Working around the internal IT organization
• Information Technology can put up roadblocks
– Shadow IT is unencumbered
– Use the cloud
– Might also be able to innovate
• Not always a good thing
– Wasted time and money
– Security risks
– Compliance issues
– Dysfunctional organization
172
Q

1.5 - Threat Actors - Competitors

A
• Many different motivations
– DoS, espionage, harm reputation
• High level of sophistication
– Based on some significant funding
– The competitive upside is huge (and very unethical)
• Many different intents
– Shut down your competitor during an event
– Steal customer lists
– Corrupt manufacturing databases
– Take financial information
173
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors

A
• A method used by the attacker
– Gain access or infect to the target
• A lot of work goes into finding vulnerabilities in these
vectors
– Some are more vulnerable than others
• IT security professional spend their career watching
these vectors
– Closing up existing vectors
– Finding new ones
174
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Direct access attack vectors

A

• There’s a reason we lock the data center
– Physical access to a system is a significant attack
vector
• Modify the operating system
– Reset the administrator password in a few minutes
• Attach a keylogger
– Collect usernames and passwords
• Transfer files
– Take it with you
• Denial of service
– This power cable is in the way

175
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Wireless attack vectors

A
  • Default login credentials
  • Modify the access point configuration
  • Rogue access point
  • A less-secure entry point to the network
  • Evil twin
  • Attacker collects authentication details
  • On-path attacks
  • Protocol vulnerabilities
  • 2017 - WPA2 Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK)
  • Older encryption protocols (WEP, WPA)
176
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Email attack vectors

A
• One of the biggest (and most successful) attack vectors
– Everyone has email
• Phishing attacks
– People want to click links
• Deliver the malware to the user
– Attach it to the message
• Social engineering attacks
– Invoice scam
177
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Supply chain attack vectors

A

• Tamper with the underlying infrastructure
– Or manufacturing process
• Gain access to a network using a vendor
– 2013 Target credit card breach
• Malware can modify the manufacturing process
– 2010 - Stuxnet disrupts Iran’s uranium enrichment program
• Counterfeit networking equipment
– Install backdoors, substandard performance and availability
– 2020 - Fake Cisco Catalyst 2960-X and WS-2960X-48TS-L

178
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Social media attack vectors

A

• Attackers thank you for putting your personal information
online
– Where you are and when
– Vacation pictures are especially telling
• User profiling
– Where were you born?
– What is the name of your school mascot?
• Fake friends are fake
– The inner circle can provide additional information

179
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Removable media attack vectors

A
• Get around the firewall
– The USB interface
• Malicious software on USB flash drives
– Infect air gapped networks
– Industrial systems, high-security services
• USB devices can act as keyboards
– Hacker on a chip
• Data exfiltration
– Terabytes of data walk out the door
– Zero bandwidth used
180
Q

1.5 - Attack Vectors - Cloud attack vectors

A

• Publicly-facing applications and services
– Mistakes are made all the time
• Security misconfigurations
– Data permissions and public data stores
• Brute force attacks
– Or phish the users of the cloud service
• Orchestration attacks
– Make the cloud build new application instances
• Denial of service
– Disable the cloud services for everyone

181
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence -

A

• Research the threats - And the threat actors
• Data is everywhere
– Hacker group profiles, tools used by the attackers,
and much more
• Make decisions based on this intelligence
– Invest in the best prevention
• Used by researchers, security operations teams,
and others

182
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence -Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

A
• Open-source
– Publicly available sources
– A good place to start
• Internet
– Discussion groups, social media
• Government data
– Mostly public hearings, reports, websites, etc.
• Commercial data
– Maps, financial reports, databases
183
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Closed/proprietary intelligence

A

• Someone else has already compiled the threat information
– You can buy it
• Threat intelligence services
– Threat analytics, correlation across different data sources
• Constant threat monitoring
– Identify new threats
– Create automated prevention workflows

184
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Vulnerability databases

A

• Researchers find vulnerabilities
– Everyone needs to know about them
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
– A community managed list of vulnerabilities
– Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA)
• U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
– A summary of CVEs
– Also sponsored by DHS and CISA
• NVD provides additional details over the CVE list
– Patch availability and severity scoring

185
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Public/private information-sharing centers

A

• Public threat intelligence
– Often classified information
• Private threat intelligence
– Private companies have extensive resources
• Need to share critical security details
– Real-time, high-quality cyber threat information sharing
• Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA)
– Members upload specifically formatted threat intelligence
– CTA scores each submission and validates
across other submissions
– Other members can extract the validated data

186
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Automated indicator sharing (AIS)

A

• Intelligence industry needs a standard way to share
important threat data
– Share information freely
• Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)
– Describes cyber threat information
– Includes motivations, abilities, capabilities, and
response information
• Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII)
– Securely shares STIX data

187
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Dark web intelligence

A
• Dark web
– Overlay networks that use the Internet
– Requires specific software and configurations to access
• Hacking groups and services
– Activities
– Tools and techniques
– Credit card sales
– Accounts and passwords
• Monitor forums for activity
– Company names, executive names
188
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Indicators of compromise (IOC)

A
• An event that indicates an intrusion
– Confidence is high
– He’s calling from inside the house
• Indicators
– Unusual amount of network activity
– Change to file hash values
– Irregular international traffic
– Changes to DNS data
– Uncommon login patterns
– Spikes of read requests to certain files
189
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence -Predictive analysis

A

• Analyze large amounts of data very quickly
– Find suspicious patterns
– Big data used for cybersecurity
• Identify behaviors
– DNS queries, traffic patterns, location data
• Creates a forecast for potential attacks
– An early-warning system
• Often combined with machine learning
– Less emphasis on signatures

190
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Threat maps

A

• Identify attacks and trends
– View worldwide perspective
• Created from real attack data
– Identify and react

191
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - File/code repositories

A

• See what the hackers are building
– Public code repositories, GitHub
• See what people are accidentally releasing
– Private code can often be published publicly
• Attackers are always looking for this code
– Potential exploits exist
– Content for phishing attacks

192
Q

1.5 - Threat Research -

A
• Know your enemy
– And their tools of war
• A never-ending process
– The field is constantly moving and changing
• Information from many different places
– You can’t rely on a single source
193
Q

1.5 - Threat Research -Vendor websites

A

• Vendors and manufacturers
– They wrote the software
• They know when problems are announced
– Most vendors are involved in the disclosure process
• They know their product better than anyone
– They react when surprises happen
– Scrambling after a zero-day announcement
– Mitigating and support options

194
Q

1.5 - Threat Research - Vulnerability feeds

A
• Automated vulnerability notifications
• National Vulnerability Database
(https://nvd.nist.gov)
• CVE Data Feeds (https://cve.mitre.org)
• Third-party feeds
• Additional vulnerability coverage
• Roll-up to a vulnerability management system
• Coverage across teams
• Consolidated view of security issues
195
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Conferences

A
• Watch and learn
– An early warning of things to come
• Researchers
– New DDoS methods, intelligence gathering,
hacking the latest technologies
• Stories from the trenches
– Fighting and recovering from attacks
– New methods to protect your data
• Building relationships - forge alliances
196
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Academic journals

A

• Research from academic professionals
– Cutting edge security analysis
• Evaluations of existing security technologies
– Keeping up with the latest attack methods
• Detailed post mortem
– Tear apart the latest malware and
see what makes it tick
• Extremely detailed information
– Break apart topics into their smaller pieces

197
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Request for comments (RFC)

A

• Published by the Internet Society (ISOC)
– Often written by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF)
– Internet Society description is RFC 1602
• Not all RFCs are standards documents
– Experimental, Best Current Practice,
Standard Track, and Historic
• Many informational RFCs analyze threats
– RFC 3833 - Threat Analysis of the Domain
Name System
– RFC 7624 - Confidentiality in the Face of
Pervasive Surveillance:
– A Threat Model and Problem Statement

198
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Local industry groups

A

• A gathering of local peers
– Shared industry and technology, geographical presence
• Associations
– Information Systems Security Association,
Network Professional Association
– Meet others in the area, discuss local challenges
• Industry user groups
– Cisco, Microsoft, VMware, etc. - Secure specific technologies

199
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Social media

A

• Hacking group conversations - Monitor the chatter
• Honeypot monitoring on Twitter
– Identify new exploit attempts
• Keyword monitoring - CVE-2020-*, bugbounty, 0-day
• Analysis of vulnerabilities - Professionals discussing the details
• Command and control - Use social media as the transport

200
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence -Threat feeds

A
• Monitor threat announcements - Stay informed
• Many sources of information
– U.S. Department of Homeland Security
– U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
– SANS Internet Storm Center
– VirusTotal Intelligence:
– Google and Facebook correlation
201
Q

1.5 - Threat Intelligence - TTP

A

• Tactics, techniques, and procedures
– What are adversaries doing and how are they doing it?
• Search through data and networks
– Proactively look for threats
– Signatures and firewall rules can’t catch everything
• Different types of TTPs
– Information on targeted victims (Finance for energy
companies)
– Infrastructure used by attackers (DNS and IP addresses)
– Outbreak of a particular malware variant on a service type

202
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Zero-day attacks

A

• Many applications have vulnerabilities
– We’ve just not found them yet
• Someone is working hard to find the next
big vulnerability
– The good guys share these with developers
• Attackers keep these yet-to-be-discovered holes
to themselves
– They want to use these vulnerabilities for
personal gain
• Zero-day
– The vulnerability has not been detected or published
– Zero-day exploits are increasingly common
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
– http://cve.mitre.org/

203
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Open permissions

A

• Very easy to leave a door open
– The hackers will always find it
• Increasingly common with cloud storage
– Statistical chance of finding an open permission
• June 2017 - 14 million Verizon records exposed
– Third-party left an Amazon S3 data repository open
– Researcher found the data before anyone else
• Many, many other examples
– Secure your permissions!

204
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Unsecured root accounts

A

• The Linux root account
– The Administrator or superuser account
• Can be a misconfiguration
– Intentionally configuring an easy-to-hack password
– 123456, ninja, football
• Disable direct login to the root account
– Use the su or sudo option
• Protect accounts with root or administrator access
– There should not be a lot of these

205
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Errors

A

• Error messages can provide useful information
to an attacker
– Service type, version information, debug data
• September 2015 - Patreon is compromised
– Used a debugger to help monitor and troubleshoot
web site issues
– Was left exposed to the Internet
– Effectively allowed for remote code executions
– Gigabytes of customer data was released online

206
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Weak encryption

A

• Encryption protocol (AES, 3DES, etc.)
– Length of the encryption key (40 bits, 128 bits,
256 bits, etc.)
– Hash used for the integrity check (SHA, MD5, etc.)
– Wireless encryption (WEP, WPA)
• Some cipher suites are easier to break than others
– Stay updated with the latest best practices
• TLS is one of the most common issues
– Over 300 cipher suites
• Which are good and which are bad?
– Weak or null encryption (less than 128 bit key sizes),
outdated hashes (MD5)

207
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Insecure protocols

A

• Some protocols aren’t encrypted
– All traffic sent in the clear - Telnet, FTP, SMTP, IMAP
• Verify with a packet capture
– View everything sent over the network
• Use the encrypted versions- SSH, SFTP, IMAPS, etc.

208
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Default settings

A

• Every application and network device has a default login
– Not all of these are ever changed• Mirai botnet
– Takes advantage of default configurations
– Takes over Internet of Things (IoT) devices
– 60+ default configurations
– Cameras, routers, doorbells, garage door openers, etc.
• Mirai released as open-source software
– There’s a lot more where that came from

209
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Open ports and services

A
• Services will open ports
– It’s important to manage access
• Often managed with a firewall
– Manage traffic flows
– Allow or deny based on port number or application
• Firewall rulesets can be complex
– It’s easy to make a mistake
• Always test and audit
– Double and triple check
210
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Improper patch management

A
• Often centrally managed
– The update server determine when you patch
– Test all of your apps, then deploy
– Efficiently manage bandwidth
• Firmware - The BIOS of the device
• Operating system- Monthly and on-demand patches
• Applications
– Provided by the manufacturer as-needed
211
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Legacy platforms

A

• Some devices remain installed for a long time
– Perhaps too long
• Legacy devices
– Older operating systems, applications, middleware
• May be running end-of-life software
– The risk needs to be compared to the return
• May require additional security protections
– Additional firewall rules
– IPS signature rules for older operating systems

212
Q

1.6 - Third-party Risks -

A

• IT security doesn’t change because it’s a third-party
– There should be more security, not less
• Always expect the worst
– Prepare for a breach
• Human error is still the biggest issue
– Everyone needs to use IT security best practices
• All security is important
– Physical security and cybersecurity work hand-in-hand

213
Q

1.6 - Third-party Risks - System integration risk

A

• Professional installation and maintenance
– Can include elevated OS access
• Can be on-site
– With physical or virtual access to data and systems
– Keylogger installations and USB flash drive data
transfers
• Can run software on the internal network
– Less security on the inside
– Port scanners, traffic captures
– Inject malware and spyware, sometimes inadvertently

214
Q

1.6 - Third-party Risks - Lack of vendor support

A

• Security requires diligence
– The potential for a vulnerability is always there
• Vendors are the only ones who can fix their products
– Assuming they know about the problem
– And care about fixing it
• Trane Comfortlink II thermostats
– Control the temperature from your phone
– Trane notified of three vulnerabilities in April 2014
– Two patched in April 2015, one in January 2016

215
Q

1.6 - Third-party Risks - Supply chain risk

A

• You can’t always control security at a third-party location
– Always maintain local security controls
• Hardware and software from a vendor can contain malware
– Verify the security of new systems
• Counterfeit hardware is out there
– It looks like a Cisco switch…Is it malicious?

216
Q

1.6 - Third-party Risks - Outsourced code development

A
• Accessing the code base
– Internal access over a VPN
– Cloud-based access
• Verify security to other systems
– The development systems should be isolated
• Test the code security
– Check for backdoors
– Validate data protection and encryption
217
Q

1.6 - Third-party Risks - Data storage

A

• Consider the type of data
– Contact information
– Healthcare details, financial information
• Storage at a third-party may need encryption
– Limits exposure, adds complexity
• Transferring data
– The entire data flow needs to be encrypted

218
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts -

A

• Malicious cyber activity cost the U.S. economy between
$57 billion and $109 billion in 2016
– The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy,
– The Council of Economic Advisers, February 2018
• Many other non-economic impacts - Far reaching effects
• These are the reasons we patch vulnerabilities

219
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Data loss

A
• Vulnerability: Unsecured databases
– No password or default password
• July 2020 - Internet-facing databases are being deleted
– No warning, no explanation
• Thousands of databases are missing
– I hope you had a backup
• Overwrites data with iterations of the word “meow”
– No messages or motivational content
220
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Identity theft

A

• May through July 2017 - Equifax
– Data breach of 147.9 million Americans,
– 15.2 million British citizens, 19,000 Canadian citizens
– Names, SSNs, birthdates, addresses, some driver’s
license numbers
• Apache Struts vulnerability from March 7, 2017
– Breach started March 12th
– Wasn’t patched by Equifax until July 30th after
discovering “suspicious network traffic”
– September 7th - Public disclosure
• September 15th - CIO and CSO depart Equifax
• July 2019 - Equifax pays $575 million in fines

221
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Financial loss

A

• March 2016 - Bank of Bangladesh
– Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT)
• Attackers sent secure messages to transfer nearly one
billion dollars in reserves to accounts in Philippines
and Sri Lanka
– Fortunately, most of the messages were
incorrectly formatted
• Thirty-five requests were acted upon
– $81 million lost and laundered through the
Filipino casino industry
• Similar SWIFT vulnerabilities: $12 million from
Wells Fargo, $60 million from Taiwanese Far Eastern
International Bank

222
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Reputation impacts

A

• Getting hacked isn’t a great look
– Organizations are often required to disclose
– Stock prices drop, at least for the short term
• October 2016 - Uber breach
– 25.6 million Names, email addresses, mobile numbers
• Didn’t publicly announce it until November 2017
– Allegedly paid the hackers $100,000 and had them
sign an NDA
– 2018 - Uber paid $148 million in fines
• Hackers pleaded guilty in October 2019
– August 2020 - Uber’s former Chief Security Officer

223
Q

1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Availability loss

A
• Outages and downtime - Systems are unavailable
• The pervasive ransomware threat
– Brings down the largest networks
• September 2020 - BancoEstado
– One of Chile’s three biggest banks
– Ransomware attack over the weekend
• Bank closed for an extended period
– Segmented network - Only hit internal systems
– Wipe and restore everything
224
Q

1.7 - Threat Hunting -

A
• The constant game of cat and mouse
– Find the attacker before they find you
• Strategies are constantly changing
– Firewalls get stronger, so phishing gets better
• Intelligence data is reactive
– You can’t see the attack until it happens
• Speed up the reaction time
– Use technology to fight
225
Q

1.7 - Threat Hunting - Intelligence fusion

A

• An overwhelming amount of security data
– Too much data to properly detect, analyze, and react
• Many data types
– Dramatically different in type and scope
• Separate teams
– Security operations, security intelligence, threat
response
• Fuse the security data together with
big data analytics
– Analyze massive and diverse datasets
– Pick out the interesting data points
and correlations

226
Q

1.7 - Threat Hunting - Fusing the data

A

• Collect the data
– Logs and sensors, network information,
Internet events, intrusion detection
• Add external sources
– Threat feeds, governmental alerts, advisories and
bulletins, social media
• Correlate with big data analytics
– Focuses on predictive analytics and user behavior
analytics
– Mathematical analysis of unstructured data

227
Q

1.7 - Threat Hunting - Cybersecurity maneuvers

A

• In the physical world, move troops and tanks
– Stop the enemy on a bridge or shore
• In the virtual world, move firewalls and operating systems
– Set a firewall rule, block an IP address, delete malicious
software
• Automated maneuvers
– Moving at the speed of light
– The computer reacts instantly
• Combine with fused intelligence
– Ongoing combat from many fronts
• Tomorrow it’s a different fight

228
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans -

A
• Usually minimally invasive
– Unlike a penetration test
• Port scan
– Poke around and see what’s open
• Identify systems
– And security devices
• Test from the outside and inside
– Don’t dismiss insider threats
• Gather as much information as possible
– We’ll separate wheat from chaff later
229
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Scan types

A

• Scanners are very powerful
– Use many different techniques to identify
vulnerabilities
• Non-intrusive scans
– Gather information, don’t try to exploit a
vulnerability
• Intrusive scans
– You’ll try out the vulnerability to see if it works
• Non-credentialed scans
– The scanner can’t login to the remote device
• Credentialed scan
– You’re a normal user,
emulates an insider attack

230
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Identify vulnerabilities

A
• The scanner looks for everything
– Well, not everything - The signatures are the key
• Application scans
– Desktop, mobile apps
• Web application scans
– Software on a web server
• Network scans
– Misconfigured firewalls, open ports, vulnerable devices
231
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Vulnerability research

A

• The vulnerabilities can be cross-referenced online
– Almost all scanners give you a place to go
• National Vulnerability Database: http://nvd.nist.gov/
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE):
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/
• Microsoft Security Bulletins:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/current.aspx
• Some vulnerabilities cannot be definitively identified
– You’ll have to check manually to see if a
system is vulnerable
– The scanner gives you a heads-up• National Vulnerability Database: http://nvd.nist.gov/
– Synchronized with the CVE list
– Enhanced search functionality
• Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
– Quantitative scoring of a vulnerability - 0 to 10
– The scoring standards change over time
– Different scoring for CVSS 2.0 vs CVSS 3.x
• Industry collaboration
– Enhanced feed sharing and automation

232
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Vulnerability scan log review

A
• Lack of security controls
– No firewall
– No anti-virus
– No anti-spyware
• Misconfigurations
– Open shares
– Guest access
• Real vulnerabilities
– Especially newer ones
– Occasionally the old ones
233
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Dealing with false positives

A

• False positives
– A vulnerability is identified that doesn’t really exist
• This is different than a low-severity vulnerability
– It’s real, but it may not be your highest priority
• False negatives
– A vulnerability exists, but you didn’t detect it
• Update to the latest signatures
– If you don’t know about it, you can’t see it
• Work with the vulnerability detection manufacturer
– They may need to update their signatures for your
environment

234
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Configuration review

A

• Validate the security of device configurations
– It’s easy to misconfigure one thing
– A single unlocked window puts the entire home at risk
• Workstations
– Account configurations, local device settings
• Servers - Access controls, permission settings
• Security devices - Firewall rules, authentication options

235
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans -

A

• National Vulnerability Database: http://nvd.nist.gov/
– Synchronized with the CVE list
– Enhanced search functionality
• Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
– Quantitative scoring of a vulnerability - 0 to 10
– The scoring standards change over time
– Different scoring for CVSS 2.0 vs CVSS 3.x
• Industry collaboration
– Enhanced feed sharing and automation

236
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Vulnerability scan log review

A
• Lack of security controls
– No firewall
– No anti-virus
– No anti-spyware
• Misconfigurations
– Open shares
– Guest access
• Real vulnerabilities
– Especially newer ones
– Occasionally the old ones
237
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Dealing with false positives

A

• False positives
– A vulnerability is identified that doesn’t really exist
• This is different than a low-severity vulnerability
– It’s real, but it may not be your highest priority
• False negatives
– A vulnerability exists, but you didn’t detect it
• Update to the latest signatures
– If you don’t know about it, you can’t see it
• Work with the vulnerability detection manufacturer
– They may need to update their signatures for your
environment

238
Q

1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Configuration review

A

• Validate the security of device configurations
– It’s easy to misconfigure one thing
– A single unlocked window puts the entire home at risk
• Workstations
– Account configurations, local device settings
• Servers - Access controls, permission settings
• Security devices - Firewall rules, authentication options

239
Q

1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - SIEM

A

• Security Information and Event Management
– Logging of security events and information
• Log collection of security alerts
– Real-time information
• Log aggregation and long-term storage
– Usually includes advanced reporting features
• Data correlation - Link diverse data types
• Forensic analysis - Gather details after an event

240
Q

1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - Syslog

A
• Standard for message logging
– Diverse systems, consolidated log
• Usually a central log collector
– Integrated into the SIEM
• You’re going to need a lot of disk space
– No, more. More than that.
– Data storage from many devices over
an extended timeframe
241
Q

1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - SIEM data

A
• Data inputs
– Server authentication attempts
– VPN connections
– Firewall session logs
– Denied outbound traffic flows
– Network utilizations
• Packet captures
– Network packets
– Often associated with a critical alert
– Some organizations capture everything
242
Q

1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - Security monitoring

A
• Constant information flow
– Important metrics in the incoming logs
• Track important statistics
– Exceptions can be identified
• Send alerts when problems are found
– Email, text, call, etc.
• Create triggers to automate responses
– Open a ticket, reboot a server
243
Q

1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - Analyzing the data

A

• Big data analytics
– Analyze large data stores
– Identify patterns that would normally remain invisible
• User and entity behavior analytics (UEBA)
– Detect insider threats
– Identify targeted attacks
– Catches what the SIEM and DLP systems might miss
• Sentiment analysis
– Public discourse correlates to real-world behavior
– If they hate you, they hack you
– Social media can be a barometer

244
Q

1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - SOAR

A

• Security orchestration, automation, and response
– Automate routine, tedious, and time intensive activities
• Orchestration
– Connect many different tools together
– Firewalls, account management, email filters
• Automation - Handle security tasks automatically
• Response - Make changes immediately

245
Q

1.8 - Penetration Testing -

A

• Pentest
– Simulate an attack
• Similar to vulnerability scanning
– Except we actually try to exploit
the vulnerabilities
• Often a compliance mandate
– Regular penetration testing by a 3rd-party
• National Institute of Standards and Technology
Technical Guide to Information Security Testing
and Assessment
– https://professormesser.link/800115 (PDF)

246
Q

1.8 - Penetration Testing - Rules of engagement

A
• An important document
– Defines purpose and scope
– Makes everyone aware of the test parameters
• Type of testing and schedule
– On-site physical breach, internal test,
external test
– Normal working hours, after 6 PM only, etc.
• The rules
– IP address ranges
– Emergency contacts
– How to handle sensitive information
– In-scope and out-of-scope devices
or applications
247
Q

1.8 - Penetration Testing - Working knowledge

A
• How much do you know about the test?
– Many different approaches
• Unknown environment
– The pentester knows nothing about the
systems under attack
– “Blind” test
• Known environment
– Full disclosure
• Partially known environment
– A mix of known and unknown
– Focus on certain systems or applications
248
Q

1.8 - Penetration Testing - Exploiting vulnerabilities

A

• Try to break into the system
– Be careful; this can cause a denial of service or
loss of data
– Buffer overflows can cause instability
– Gain privilege escalation
• You may need to try many different vulnerability types
– Password brute-force, social engineering,
database injections, buffer overflows
• You’ll only be sure you’re vulnerable if you can
bypass security
– If you can get through, the attackers can get through

249
Q

1.8 - Penetration Testing - The process

A

• Initial exploitation - Get into the network
• Lateral movement
– Move from system to system
– The inside of the network is relatively unprotected
• Persistence
– Once you’re there, you need to make sure there’s a
way back in
– Set up a backdoor, build user accounts, change or
verify default passwords
• The pivot
– Gain access to systems that would normally not
be accessible
– Use a vulnerable system as a proxy or relay

250
Q

1.8 - Penetration Testing - Pentest aftermath

A

• Cleanup
– Leave the network in its original state
– Remove any binaries or temporary files
– Remove any backdoors
– Delete user accounts created during the test
• Bug bounty
– A reward for discovering vulnerabilities
– Earn money for hacking a system
– Document the vulnerability to earn cash

251
Q

1.8 - Reconnaissance -

A
• Need information before the attack
– Can’t rush blindly into battle
• Gathering a digital footprint
– Learn everything you can
• Understand the security posture
– Firewalls, security configurations
• Minimize the attack area
– Focus on key systems
• Create a network map
– Identify routers, networks, remote sites
252
Q

1.8 - Reconnaissance - Passive footprinting

A
• Learn as much as you can from open sources
– There’s a lot of information out there
– Remarkably difficult to protect or identify
• Social media
• Corporate web site
• Online forums, Reddit
• Social engineering
• Dumpster diving
• Business organizations
253
Q

1.8 - Reconnaissance - Wardriving or warflying

A
• Combine WiFi monitoring and a GPS
– Search from your car or plane
– Search from a drone
• Huge amount of intel in a short period of time
– And often some surprising results
• All of this is free
– Kismet, inSSIDer
– Wireless Geographic
– Logging Engine
– http://wigle.net
254
Q

1.8 - Reconnaissance - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

A

• Gathering information from many open sources
– Find information on anyone or anything
– The name is not related to open-source software
• Data is everywhere - https://osintframework.com/
• Automated gathering - Many software tools available

255
Q

1.8 - Reconnaissance - Active footprinting

A
• Trying the doors
– Maybe one is unlocked
– Don’t open it yet
– Relatively easy to be seen
• Visible on network traffic and logs
• Ping scans, port scans, DNS queries,
OS scans, OS fingerprinting, Service scans, version scans
256
Q

1.8 - Security Teams -

A

• Cybersecurity involves many skills
– Operational security, penetration testing,
exploit research, web application hardening, etc.
• Become an expert in your niche
– Everyone has a role to play
• The teams
– Red team, blue team, purple team, white team

257
Q

1.8 - Security Teams - Red team

A
  • Offensive security team - The hired attackers
  • Ethical hacking - Find security holes
  • Exploit vulnerabilities -Gain access
  • Social engineering - Constant vigilance
  • Web application scanning - Test and test again
258
Q

1.8 - Security Teams - Blue team

A
  • Defensive security - Protecting the data
  • Operational security - Daily security tasks
  • Incident response - Damage control
  • Threat hunting - Find and fix the holes
  • Digital forensics - Find data everywhere
259
Q

1.8 - Security Teams - Purple team

A
• Red and blue teams
– Working together
• Competition isn’t necessarily useful
– Internal battles can stifle organizational security
– Cooperate instead of compete
• Deploy applications and data securely
– Everyone is on-board
• Create a feedback loop
– Red informs blue, blue informs red
260
Q

1.8 - Security Teams - White team

A
• Not on a side
– Manages the interactions between red teams
and blue teams
• The referees in a security exercise
– Enforces the rules
– Resolves any issues
– Determines the score
• Manages the post-event assessments
– Lessons learned
– Results
261
Q

2.1 - Configuration Management -

A

• The only constant is change
– Operating systems, patches, application updates, network
modifications, new application instances, etc.
• Identify and document hardware and software settings
– Manage the security when changes occur
• Rebuild those systems if a disaster occurs
– Documentation and processes will be critical

262
Q

2.1 - Configuration Management - Diagrams

A

• Network diagrams - Document the physical wire and device
• Physical data center layout
– Can include physical rack locations
• Device diagrams - Individual cabling

263
Q

2.1 - Configuration Management - Baseline configuration

A

• The security of an application environment
should be well defined
– All application instances must follow this baseline
– Firewall settings, patch levels, OS file versions
– May require constant updates
• Integrity measurements check for the
secure baseline
– These should be performed often
– Check against well-documented baselines
– Failure requires an immediate correction

264
Q

2.1 - Configuration Management - Standard naming conventions

A
• Create a standard
– Needs to be easily understood by everyone
• Devices
– Asset tag names and numbers
– Computer names - location or region
– Serial numbers
• Networks - Port labeling
• Domain configurations
– User account names
– Standard email addresses
265
Q

2.1 - Configuration Management - IP schema

A

• An IP address plan or model
– Consistent addressing for network devices
– Helps avoid duplicate IP addressing
• Locations
– Number of subnets, hosts per subnet
• IP ranges
– Different sites have a different subnet
– 10.1.x.x/24, 10.2.x.x/24, 10.3.x.x/24
• Reserved addresses
– Users, printers, routers/default gateways

266
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data -

A
• A primary job task
– An organization is out of business without data
• Data is everywhere
– On a storage drive, on the network, in a CPU
• Protecting the data
– Encryption, security policies
• Data permissions
– Not everyone has the same access
267
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data - Data sovereignty

A

• Data sovereignty
– Data that resides in a country is subject to
the laws of that country
– Legal monitoring, court orders, etc.
• Laws may prohibit where data is stored
– GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)
– Data collected on EU citizens must be stored
in the EU
– A complex mesh of technology and legalities
• Where is your data stored?
– Your compliance laws may prohibit
moving data out of the country

268
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data - Data masking

A
• Data obfuscation
– Hide some of the original data
• Protects PII
– And other sensitive data
• May only be hidden from view
– The data may still be intact in storage
– Control the view based on permissions
• Many different techniques
– Substituting, shuffling, encrypting, masking out, etc.
269
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data - Data encryption

A

• Encode information into unreadable data
– Original information is plaintext, encrypted
form is ciphertext
• This is a two-way street
– Convert between one and the other
– If you have the proper key• Confusion
– The encrypted data is drastically different
than the plaintext
• Diffusion
– Change one character of the input, and many
characters change of the output

270
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data - Data at-rest

A
• The data is on a storage device
– Hard drive, SSD, flash drive, etc.
• Encrypt the data
– Whole disk encryption
– Database encryption
– File- or folder-level encryption
• Apply permissions
– Access control lists
– Only authorized users can access the data
271
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data - Data in-transit

A
• Data transmitted over the network
– Also called data in-motion
• Not much protection as it travels
– Many different switches, routers, devices
• Network-based protection
– Firewall, IPS
• Provide transport encryption
– TLS (Transport Layer Security)
– IPsec (Internet Protocol Security)
272
Q

2.1 - Protecting Data - Data in-use

A

• Data is actively processing in memory
– System RAM, CPU registers and cache
• The data is almost always decrypted
– Otherwise, you couldn’t do anything with it
• The attackers can pick the decrypted information
out of RAM
– A very attractive option
• Target Corp. breach - November 2013
– 110 million credit cards
– Data in-transit encryption and data at-rest encryption
– Attackers picked the credit card numbers out of the
point-of-sale RAM

273
Q

2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Data Loss Prevention (DLP)

A

• Where’s your data?
– Social Security numbers, credit card numbers,
medical records
• Stop the data before the attackers get it
– Data “leakage”
• So many sources, so many destinations
– Often requires multiple solutions in different places

274
Q

2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems

A
• On your computer
– Data in use
– Endpoint DLP
• On your network
– Data in motion
• On your server
– Data at rest
275
Q

2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - USB blocking

A

• DLP on a workstation
– Allow or deny certain tasks
• November 2008 - U.S. Department of Defense
– Worm virus “agent.btz” replicates using USB storage
– Bans removable flash media and storage devices
• All devices had to be updated
– Local DLP agent handled USB blocking
• Ban was lifted in February 2010
– Replaced with strict guidelines

276
Q

2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Cloud-based DLP

A
• Located between users and the Internet
– Watch every byte of network traffic
– No hardware, no software
• Block custom defined data strings
– Unique data for your organization
• Manage access to URLs
– Prevent file transfers to cloud storage
• Block viruses and malware
– Anything traversing the network
277
Q

2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - DLP and email

A

• Email continues to be the most critical risk vector
– Inbound threats, outbound data loss
• Check every email inbound and outbound
– Internal system or cloud-based
• Inbound - Block keywords, identify impostors,
quarantine email messages
• Outbound - Fake wire transfers, W-2 transmissions,
employee information

278
Q

2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Emailing a spreadsheet template

A

• November 2016 - Boeing employee emails spouse a
spreadsheet to use as a template
• Contained the PII of 36,000 Boeing employees
– In hidden columns
– Social security numbers, date of birth, etc.
• Boeing sells its own DLP software
– But only uses it for classified work

279
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - Geographical considerations

A

• Legal implications
– Business regulations vary between states
– For a recovery site outside of the country, personnel
must have a passport and be able to clear immigration
– Refer to your legal team
• Offsite backup
– Organization-owned site or 3rd-party secure facility
• Offsite recovery
– Hosted in a different location, outside the scope of the
disaster
– Travel considerations for support staff and employees

280
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - Response and recovery controls

A
• Incident response and recovery has become
commonplace
– Attacks are frequent and complex
• Incident response plan should be established
– Documentation is critical
– Identify the attack
– Contain the attack
• Limit the impact of an attacker
– Limit data exfiltration
– Limit access to sensitive data
281
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - SSL/TLS inspection

A

• Commonly used to examine outgoing SSL/TLS
– Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security
– For example, from your computer to your bank
• Wait a second. Examine encrypted traffic?
– Is that possible?
• SSL/TLS relies on trust
– Without trust, none of this works

282
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - Trust me, I’m SSL

A

• Your browser contains a list of trusted CAs
– My browser contains about 170 trusted
CAs certificates
• Your browser doesn’t trust a web site unless a CA has
signed the web server’s encryption certificate
– The web site pays some money to the CA for this
• The CA has ostensibly performed some checks
– Validated against the DNS record, phone call, etc.
• Your browser checks the web server’s certificate
– If it’s signed by a trusted CA, the encryption
works seamlessly

283
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - Hashing

A

• Represent data as a short string of text
– A message digest
• One-way trip
– Impossible to recover the original message
from the digest
– Used to store passwords / confidentiality
• Verify a downloaded document is the same
as the original
– Integrity
• Can be a digital signature
– Authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity
• Will not have a collision (hopefully)
– Different messages will not have the same hash

284
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - API considerations

A

• API (Application Programming Interface)
– Control software or hardware programmatically
• Secure and harden the login page
– Don’t forget about the API
• On-path attack
– Intercept and modify API messages,
replay API commands
• API injection
– Inject data into an API message
• DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service)
– One bad API call can bring down a system

285
Q

2.1 - Managing Security - API security

A
• Authentication
– Limit API access to legitimate users
– Over secure protocols
• Authorization
– API should not allow extended access
– Each user has a limited role
– A read-only user should not be able to make
changes
• WAF (Web Application Firewall)
– Apply rules to API communication
286
Q

2.1 - Site Resiliency -

A
• Recovery site is prepped
– Data is synchronized
• A disaster is called
– Business processes failover to the alternate
processing site
• Problem is addressed
– This can take hours, weeks, or longer
• Revert back to the primary location
– The process must be documented for both directions
287
Q

2.1 - Site Resiliency - Hot site

A
• An exact replica
– Duplicate everything
• Stocked with hardware
– Constantly updated
– You buy two of everything
• Applications and software are constantly updated
– Automated replication
• Flip a switch and everything moves
– This may be quite a few switches
288
Q

2.1 - Site Resiliency - Cold Site

A
• No hardware
– Empty building
• No data
– Bring it with you
• No people
– Bus in your team
289
Q

2.1 - Site Resiliency - Warm site

A
• Somewhere between cold and hot
– Just enough to get going
• Big room with rack space
– You bring the hardware
• Hardware is ready and waiting
– You bring the software and data
290
Q

2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - Honeypots

A
• Attract the bad guys
– And trap them there
• The “attacker” is probably a machine
– Makes for interesting recon
• Honeypots
– Create a virtual world to explore
• Many different options
– Kippo, Google Hack Honeypot, Wordpot, etc.
• Constant battle to discern the real from the fake
291
Q

2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - Honeyfiles and honeynets

A
• Honeynets
– More than one honeypot on a network
– More than one source of information
– Stop spammers - https://projecthoneypot.org
• Honeyfiles
– Bait for the honeynet (passwords.txt)
– An alert is sent if the file is accessed
– A virtual bear trap
292
Q

2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - Fake telemetry

A

• Machine learning
– Interpret big data to identify the invisible
• Train the machine with actual data
– Learn how malware looks and acts
– Stop malware based on actions instead of signatures
• Send the machine learning model fake telemetry
– Make malicious malware look benign

293
Q

2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - DNS sinkhole

A

• A DNS that hands out incorrect IP addresses
– Blackhole DNS
• This can be bad
– An attacker can redirect users to a malicious site
• This can be good
– Redirect known malicious domains to a benign IP address
– Watch for any users hitting that IP address
– Those devices are infected
• Can be integrated with a firewall
– Identify infected devices not directly connected

294
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Infrastructure as a service (IaaS)

A

• Sometimes called Hardware as a Service (HaaS)
– Outsource your equipment
• You’re still responsible for the management
– And for the security
• Your data is out there, but more within your control
• Web server providers

295
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Platform as a service (PaaS)

A
• No servers, no software, no maintenance team,
no HVAC
– Someone else handles the platform,
you handle the development
• You don’t have direct control of the data,
people, or infrastructure
– Trained security professionals are
watching your stuff
– Choose carefully
• Put the building blocks together
– Develop your app from what’s
available on the platform
– SalesForce.com
296
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Software as a service (SaaS)

A
• On-demand software
– No local installation
– Why manage your own email distribution?
– Or payroll?
• Central management of data and applications
– Your data is out there
• A complete application offering
– No development work required
– Google Mail
297
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Anything as a Service (XaaS)

A

• A broad description of all cloud models
– Use any combination of the cloud
• Services delivered over the Internet
– Not locally hosted or managed
• Flexible consumption model
– No large upfront costs or ongoing licensing
• IT becomes more of an operating model
– And less of a cost-center model
– Any IT function can be changed into a service

298
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Cloud service providers

A
• Provide cloud services
– SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, etc.
• Charge a flat fee or based on use
– More data, more cost
• You still manage your processes
– Internal staff
– Development team
– Operational support
299
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Managed service providers

A
• Managed Service Provider (MSP)
– Also a cloud service provider
– Not all cloud service providers are MSPs
• MSP support
– Network connectivity management
– Backups and disaster recovery
– Growth management and planning
• Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP)
– Firewall management
– Patch management, security audits
– Emergency response
300
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - On-premises vs. off-premises

A

• On-premises
– Your applications are on local hardware
– Your servers are in your data center in your building
• Off-premises / hosted
– Your servers are not in your building
– They may not even be running on your hardware
– Usually a specialized computing environment

301
Q

2.2 - Cloud Models - Cloud deployment models

A
• Public
– Available to everyone over the Internet
• Community
– Several organizations share the same resources
• Private
– Your own virtualized local data center
• Hybrid
– A mix of public and private
302
Q

2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing - Cloud computing

A
• Computing on-demand
– Instantly available computing power
– Massive data storage capacity
• Fast implementation
– IT teams can adjust rapidly to change
– Smaller startup costs and pay-as-you-go
• Not always the best solution
– Latency - the cloud is far away
– Limited bandwidth
– Difficult to protect data
– Requires Internet/network connectivity
303
Q

2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing - Edge computing

A

• Over 30 billion IoT devices on the Internet
– Devices with very specific functions
– A huge amount of data
• Edge computing - “Edge”
– Process application data on an edge server
– Close to the user
• Often process data on the device itself
– No latency, no network requirement
– Increased speed and performance
– Process where the data is, instead of
processing in the cloud

304
Q

2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing - Fog computing

A

• Fog
– A cloud that’s close to your data
– Cloud + Internet of Things - Fog computing
• A distributed cloud architecture - Extends the cloud
• Distribute the data and processing
– Immediate data stays local - No latency
– Local decisions made from local data
– No bandwidth requirements
– Private data never leaves - Minimizes security concerns
– Long-term analysis can occur in the cloud - Internet
only when required

305
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud -

A
• On-demand computing power
– Click a button
• Elasticity
– Scale up or down as needed
• Applications also scale
– Access from anywhere
• How does it all happen?
– Planning and technology
306
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Thin client

A
• Basic application usage
– Applications actually run on a remote server
– Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI),
– Desktop as a Service (DaaS)
– Local device is a keyboard, mouse, and screen.
• Minimal operating system on the client
– No huge memory or CPU needs
• Network connectivity
– Big network requirement
– Everything happens across the wire
307
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Virtualization

A
• Virtualization
– Run many different operating systems on the
same hardware
• Each application instance has its
own operating system
– Adds overhead and complexity
– Virtualization is relatively expensive
308
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Application containerization

A
• Container
– Contains everything you need to run an application
– Code and dependencies
– A standardized unit of software
• An isolated process in a sandbox
– Self-contained
– Apps can’t interact with each other
• Container image
– A standard for portability
– Lightweight, uses the host kernel
– Secure separation between applications
309
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Microservices and APIs

A
• Monolithic applications
– One big application that does everything
• Application contains all decision making processes
– User interface
– Business logic
– Data input and output
• Code challenges
– Large codebase
– Change control challenges
• APIs
– Application Programming Interfaces
• API is the “glue” for the microservices
– Work together to act as the application
• Scalable
– Scale just the microservices you need
• Resilient
– Outages are contained
• Security and compliance
– Containment is built-in
310
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Serverless architecture

A

• Function as a Service (FaaS)
– Applications are separated into individual, autonomous
functions
– Remove the operating system from the equation
• Developer still creates the server-side logic
– Runs in a stateless compute container
• May be event triggered and ephemeral
– May only run for one event
• Managed by a third-party
– All OS security concerns are at the third-party

311
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Microservice Architecture

A

Client

                 API Gateway

Microservice Microservice Microservice
Database Database Database

312
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Transit gateway

A

• Virtual Private Cloud (VPC)
– A pool of resources created in a public cloud
• Common to create many VPCs
– Many different application clouds
• Connect VPCs with a transit gateway
– And users to VPCs
– A “cloud router”
• Now make it secure
– VPCs are commonly on different IP subnets
– Connecting to the cloud is often through a VPN

313
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Resource policies

A

• Assigning permissions to cloud resources
– Not the easiest task
– Everything is in constant motion
• Specify which resources can be provisioned (Azure)
– Create a service in a specific region,
deny all others
• Specify the resource and what actions are
permitted (Amazon)
– Allow access to an API gateway from an
IP address range
• Explicitly list the users who can access the
resource (Amazon)
– Userlist is associated with the resource

314
Q

2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Service integration

A
• Service Integration and Management (SIAM)
• Many different service providers
– The natural result of multisourcing
• Every provider works differently
– Different tools and processes
• SIAM is the integration of these
diverse providers
– Provide a single business-facing
IT organization
Database • An evolving set of processes and procedures
315
Q

2.2 - Infrastructure as Code - Infrastructure as code

A

• Describe an infrastructure
– Define servers, network, and applications as code
• Modify the infrastructure and create versions
– The same way you version application code
• Use the description (code) to build other application
instances
– Build it the same way every time based on the code
• An important concept for cloud computing
– Build a perfect version every time

316
Q

2.2 - Infrastructure as Code - 2.2 -SDN (Software Defined Networking)-

A

• Networking devices have two functional planes
of operation
– Control plane, data plane
• Directly programmable
– Configuration is different than forwarding
• Agile - Changes can be made dynamically
• Centrally managed - Global view, single pane of glass
• Programmatically configured
– No human intervention
• Open standards / vendor neutral
– A standard interface to the network

317
Q

2.2 - Infrastructure as Code - SDV (Software Defined Visibility)

A

• You must see the traffic to secure the data
– React and respond
• Dynamic deployments include security and network
visibility devices
– Next-generation firewalls, web application firewalls,
– Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
• Data is encapsulated and encrypted
– VXLAN and SSL/TLS
• New technologies change what you can see
– Infrastructure as code, microservices
• Security devices monitor application traffic
– SDV provides visibility to traffic flows
• Visibility expands as the application instances expand
– Real-time metrics across all traffic flows
• Application flows can be controlled via API
– Identify and react to threats

318
Q

2.2 - Virtualization Security - VM sprawl avoidance

A

• Click a button
– You’ve built a server
– Or multiple servers, networks, and firewalls
• It becomes almost too easy to build instances
– This can get out of hand very quickly
• The virtual machines are sprawled everywhere
– You aren’t sure which VMs are related to which applications
– It becomes extremely difficult to deprovision
• Formal process and detailed documentation
– You should have information on every virtual object

319
Q

2.2 - Virtualization Security - VM escape protection

A

• The virtual machine is self-contained
– There’s no way out - Or is there?
• Virtual machine escape
– Break out of the VM and interact with the host operating
system or hardware
• Once you escape the VM, you have great control
– Control the host and control other guest VMs
• This would be a huge exploit
– Full control of the virtual world

320
Q

2.2 - Virtualization Security - Escaping the VM

A
• March 2017 - Pwn2Own competition
– Hacking contest
– You pwn it, you own it - along with some cash
• JavaScript engine bug in Microsoft Edge
– Code execution in the Edge sandbox
• Windows 10 kernel bug
– Compromise the guest operating system
• Hardware simulation bug in VMware
– Escape to the host
• Patches were released soon afterwards
321
Q

2.3 - Secure Deployments - Development to production

A

• Your programming team has been working on a new application
– How will you deploy it safely and reliably?
• Patch Tuesday
– Test and deploy Wednesday? Thursday? Friday?
• Manage the process
– Safely move from a non-production phase to full production

322
Q

2.3 - Secure Deployments - Sandboxing

A

• Isolated testing environment
– No connection to the real world or production system
– A technological safe space
• Use during the development process
– Try some code, break some code, nobody gets hurt
• Incremental development
– Helps build the application

323
Q

2.3 - Secure Deployments - Building the application

A
• Development
– Secure environment
– Writing code
– Developers test in their sandboxes
• Test
– Still in the development stage
– All of the pieces are put together
– Does it all work?
– Functional tests
324
Q

2.3 - Secure Deployments - Verifying the application

A
• Quality Assurance (QA)
– Verifies features are working as expected
– Validates new functionality
– Verifies old errors don’t reappear
• Staging
– Almost ready to roll it out
– Works and feels exactly like the production
environment
– Working with a copy of production data
– Run performance tests
– Test usability and features
325
Q

2.3 - Secure Deployments - Using the application

A

• Production
– Application is live
– Rolled out to the user community
• A challenging step
– Impacts the users
• Logistical challenges
– New servers
– New software
– Restart or interrupt of service
Secure baselines
• The security of an application environment should
be well defined
– All application instances must follow this baseline
– Firewall settings, patch levels, OS file versions
– May require constant updates
• Integrity measurements check for the secure baseline
– These should be performed often
– Check against well-documented baselines
– Failure requires an immediate correction

326
Q

2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Provisioning

A

• Deploy an application
– Web server, database server, middleware server, user
workstation configurations, certificate updates, etc.
• Application software security
– Operating system, application
• Network security
– Secure VLAN, internal access, external access
• Software deployed to workstations
– Check executables for malicious code, verify security
posture of the workstation

327
Q

2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Scalability and elasticity

A

• Handle application workload
– Adapt to dynamic changes
• Scalability
– The ability to increase the workload in a
given infrastructure
– Build an application instance that can handle
– 100,000 transactions per second
• Elasticity
– Increase or decrease available resources as the
workload changes
– Deploy multiple application instances to handle
– 500,000 transactions per second

328
Q

2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Orchestration

A

• Automation is the key to cloud computing
– Services appear and disappear automatically,
or at the push of a button
• Entire application instances can be instantly provisioned
– All servers, networks, switches, firewalls, and policies
• Instances can move around the world as needed
– Follow the sun
• The security policies should be part of the orchestration
– As applications are provisioned, the proper security is
automatically included

329
Q

2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Deprovisioning

A

• Dismantling and removing an application instance
– All good things
• Security deprovisioning is important
– Don’t leave open holes, don’t close important ones
• Firewall policies must be reverted
– If the application is gone, so is the access
• What happens to the data?
– Don’t leave information out there

330
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques -

A

• A balance between time and quality
– Programming with security in mind is often secondary
• Testing, testing, testing
– The Quality Assurance (QA) process
• Vulnerabilities will eventually be found
– And exploited

331
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Stored procedures

A

• SQL databases
– Client sends detailed requests for data
– ‘SELECT * FROM wp_options WHERE option_id = 1’
• Client requests can be complex
– And sometimes modified by the user
– This would not be good•
Stored procedures limit the client interactions
– ‘CALL get_options’
– That’s it. No modifications to the query are possible.
• To be really secure, use only stored procedures
– The application doesn’t use any SQL queries

332
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Obfuscation/camouflage

A

• Obfuscate
– Make something normally understandable very
difficult to understand
• Take perfectly readable code and turn it into nonsense
– The developer keeps the readable code and gives you
the chicken scratch
– Both sets of code perform exactly the same way
• Helps prevent the search for security holes
– Makes it more difficult to figure out
what’s happening - But not impossible

333
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Code reuse/dead code

A

• Code reuse
– Use old code to build new applications
– Copy and paste
• If the old code has security vulnerabilities, reusing
the code spreads it to other applications
– You’re making this much more difficult for everyone
• Dead code
– Calculations are made, code is executed,
results are tallied
– The results aren’t used anywhere else in the
application
• All code is an opportunity for a security problem
– Make sure your code is as alive as possible

334
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Input validation

A
• What is the expected input?
– Validate actual vs. expected
• Document all input methods
– Forms, fields, type
• Check and correct all input (normalization)
– A zip code should be only X characters long with a
letter in the X column
– Fix any data with improper input
• The fuzzers will find what you missed
– Don’t give them an opening
335
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Validation points

A

• Server-side validation
– All checks occur on the server
– Helps protect against malicious users
– Attackers may not even be using your interface
• Client-side validation
– The end-user’s app makes the validation decisions
– Can filter legitimate input from genuine users
– May provide additional speed to the user
• Use both - But especially server-side validation

336
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Memory management

A

• As a developer, you must be mindful of how memory is used
– Many opportunities to build vulnerable code
• Never trust data input
– Malicious users can attempt to circumvent your code
• Buffer overflows are a huge security risk
– Make sure your data matches your buffer sizes
• Some built-in functions are insecure
– Use best practices when designing your code

337
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Third-party libraries and SDKs

A

• Your programming language does everything - Almost
• Third-party libraries and software development kits
– Extend the functionality of a programming language
• Security risk
– Application code written by someone else
– Might be secure. Might not be secure.
– Extensive testing is required
• Balancing act - Application features vs. unknown code base

338
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Data exposure

A

• So much sensitive data
– Credit card numbers, social security numbers, medical
information, address details, email information
• How is the application handling the data?
– No encryption when stored
– No encryption across the network
– Displaying information on the screen
• All input and output processes are important
– Check them all for data exposure

339
Q

2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Version control

A

• Create a file, make a change, make another change,
and another change
– Track those changes, revert back to a previous version
• Commonly used in software development
– But also in operating systems, wiki software, and
cloud-based file storage
• Useful for security
– Compare versions over time
– Identify modifications to important files
– A security challenge
– Historical information can be a security risk

340
Q

2.3 - Software Diversity - Exploiting an application

A

• Attackers often exploit application vulnerabilities
– They find the unlocked door and open it
• Once you exploit one binary, you can exploit them all
– The application works the same on all systems
– A Windows 10 exploit affects all Windows 10 users
• What if all of the computers were running different
software?
– Unique binaries
– Functionally identical

341
Q

2.3 - Software Diversity - Software diversity

A

• Alternative compiler paths would result in a different
binary each time
– Each compiled application would be a little bit
different
– But functionally the same
• An attack against different binaries would only be
successful on a fraction of the users
– An attacker wouldn’t know what exploit to use
– Make the game much harder to win