Stuart Britain- Civil Wars and Execution Flashcards
‘The Royalist failure to capture London was the main reason for their failure to win the First Civil War.’ How far do you agree? [20]
Introduction:
1) London
2) Geography
3) Resources
4) Leadership
‘The most important reason for the Parliamentarian victory in the First Civil War was the creation of the New Model Army in 1644.’ How far do you agree? [20]
Introduction:
1) NMA
2) Royalist failures in Army organisation and funding
3) Parliamentarian tactical and strategic approach before 1644
4) Parliamentarian failures before the NMA and successes after NMA
‘There was no hope of a peaceful resolution to the crisis between King and Parliament in 1642.’ How far do you agree? [20]
Introduction:
1) Short Parliament brought up grievances from 1629 which Charles was unwilling to deal with, especially with the Second Bishop’s War underway in the North
2) Charles clearly did not respect Parliamentary privileges with the Five Knights Case of January 1642
‘The Second Civil War was inevitable as the search for settlement obviously did not resolve any of the grievances between king and Parliament.’ How far do you agree? [20]
Introduction:
‘The King’s execution was the only way to prevent a third civil war from erupting in the Three Kingdoms.’ How far do you agree? [20]
Introduction:
(Using these four sources in their historical context,) assess how far they support the view that the attitude of Charles I was the main reason for the failure to achieve a settlement in the period 1646-1649. [30]
(Using these four sources in their historical context,) assess how far they support the view that the attitude of Charles I was the main reason for the failure to achieve a settlement in the period 1646-1649. [30]
Introduction:
Both sources A and D support the view that Charles I’s attitude was a significant reason for the failure to achieve a settlement, while source B blames the power struggle between the Army and Parliament for the failure to reach a settlement. Source C suggests Charles I’s attitude did play a role in the the failure to reach a settlement, though only because he was argued to be upholding freedom and people’s principle rights.
1) Source A supports the view. Charles clearly shows he intended to play Parliament and the Army against each other by exploiting their differences and to gather support from foreign allies to use force again to win back his throne. Charles refused the Newcastle Propositions immediately, waiting for the Independent majority in Parliament to push away the Scots. Private letter to his closest ‘adviser’, the queen, Henrietta Maria, who was in France gathering Catholic allies.
2) Source D also supports view, as ‘the king was convinced that they could do nothing without his consent’. His belief in the Divine Right of Kings meant he saw settlement propositions from Parliament, indebted to the Scots for their aid int he Civil War, as an attack on his rights as Head of the Church of England due to demands of a Presbyterian Church. Critical of the king even though it was written during the reign of his son, Charles II, so seems to give an honest account. Also shows the king’s not consenting to the Newcastle Propositions gave the Independent MPs the majority in Par., so gave the army a voice in Par. and so complicated the settlement.
3) However, Source B blames the army and its radical action to seize the king in June 1647. Baillie writes how the king was “much pitied and supported”, and it is true that after Ireton produced the Army Declaration, some people saw the army as the main obstruction to a settlement as it deeply complicated the s by settlement joining as a third political force. However, Baillie also suggests the king’s character as a stubborn man and his “unmatched folly” had slowed the negotiations down. In this letter, Baillie shares his opinion to a probably like-minded Presbyterian friend, showing the growing willingness for the Scots to help the king in a second civil war.
4) Source C, written shortly after the defeat of the Scottish army at the Battle of Preston by Cromwell’s forces has a desperate tone which argues the king cannot be to blame as his principles are to defend his subjects. This piece of propaganda was tapping into the anti-Army militias in London to blame the Army’s entry into the negotiations for slowing a settlement down and leading to a renewed conflict. Many people were indeed shocked by the Independent majority’s decision to pass the Bill of ‘No Further Addresses’ in January 1648.
Conclusion: Although sources B and C do suggest that the Army’s decision to conduct separate negotiations with the king by June 1647 did complicate the settlement. However, Source A and D clearly show that the king’s attitude from the very beginning led to the failure to achieve a settlement. Source D especially shows how the consequences of the king’s refusal to accept the NP led to the strengthening of the Army’s representatives’ hand in Par, so complicating the settlement in a three-way power struggle for the king, which Charles I then exploited.
