Strict and Absolute Liability Flashcards
essentials for application of Strict liability rule
- Some dangerous thing must have been brought by a person on his land.
- The thing thus brought or kept by a person on his land must escape.
- It must be non-natural use of land.
Rylands vs. Fletcher (1868)
Facts: The defendant got a reservoir constructed through an independent contractor over his land for providing water to his mill. There were old disused shafts under the site of the reservoir, which the contractor failed to observe and so, did not block them.
When the water was filled in the reservoir, it burst through the shafts and flooded the plaintiff’s coal mines on huge adjoining land. The defendant did not know of the shafts and had not been negligent although the independent contractors had been.
Held: The rule of “STRICT LIABILITY” was propounded by BLACKBURN J. as follows;
The rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs’ default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of god.
The liability arises not because there was any fault or negligence on the part of a person, but because he kept some dangerous thing on his land and the same has escaped from there and caused damage.
To the above rule, another important qualification was made by house of chambers; it was held that for liability under the rule, the use of land should be non-natural as was the position in Rylands case.
DANGEROUS THING:
A thing likely to do mischief if it escapes.
In Rylands case it was a large body of water.
The rule has also been applied to gas, electricity, vibrations, yew trees, sewage, flag-pole, explosives, noxious fumes, and rusty wire.
ESCAPE
For this rule to apply it is also necessary that the thing causing the damage must escape to the area outside the occupation and control of the defendant.
Read vs. Lyons and Co. (1947)
Facts: The plaintiff was an employee in the defendant’s ammunition factory. While she was performing her duties inside the defendant’s premises, a shell which was being manufactured there, exploded whereby she was injured. There was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants.
Held: even though the shell was a dangerous thing, the defendants were not liable because there was no escape of the thing outside the defendants premises and therefore, the rule of strict liability did not apply.
NON-NATURAL USE OF LAND:
In Rylands case, the water Collected in the reservoir in such large quantity was held to be non natural use of land. Keeping water for ordinary domestic purposes is natural use.
For the use to be non-natural, it must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of community.
SOCHACKI VS. SAS (1947)
Fire in a grate is an ordinary, natural, proper, everyday use of fire place in a room. If this fire spreads to the adjoining premises, the liability under the he Rylands vs. Fletcher rule does not arise.
NOBLE VS. HARRISON (1926)
Facts: The branch of a non-poisonous tree growing on the defendant’s land, which overhung on the highway, suddenly broke and fell on the plaintiff’s vehicle passing along the highway. The branch had broken off due to some latent defect.
Held: Growing of non poisonous trees is not non natural use of land. Therefore the plaintiff is not liable.
CROWHURST VS. AMERSHAM BURIAL BOARD (1878)
Growing of a poisonous tree is non natural use land and if the animal on the neighbour’s land nibbles the leaves of such a tree and dies the defendant will be liable under the rule.
ACT DONE BY AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Generally, an employer is not liable for the wrongful act done by an independent contractor. However, it is no defence to the application of this rule that the act causing the damage had been done by an independent contractor.
T.C. Balakrishnan Menon vs. T.R. Subramanian (1968)
Facts: an explosive made out of a coconut shell filled with explosive substance, instead of rising into the sky and exploding there, ran at a tangent, fell amidst the crowd and exploded, causing serious injuries to the respondent.
Issue: Whether the appellants who had hired an independent contractor to attend to the exhibition of fireworks, would be liable.
Held: “ The minnal gundu is an explosive and is therefore an “extra hazardous” object, and persons who use such an object, which in its very nature, involves special danger to others, must be liable for the negligence of the heir independent contractor. The duty to keep such a substance without causing injury to others is non dele gable duty: the appellants could not have escaped liability fro the breach of such a duty by engaging an independent contractor.”
Exceptions to strict liability rule.
- Plaintiff’s own default.
- Act of god.
- Consent of the plaintiff.
- Act of third party.
- Statutory authority.
PLAINTIFF’s OWN DEFAULT
Accepted as a defence in Rylands case itself.
If the plaintiff suffers damage by his own intrusion into the defendant’s own property, he cannot complain for the damage so caused.
PONTING VS. NOAKES (1849)
The plaintiffs horse intruded into the defendants land and died after having nibbled the leaves of a poisonous tree there.
The defendant was held not liable because damage would not have occurred but for the horse’s own intrusion into the defendant’s land.
The strict rule did not apply for another reason also; that there was no escape.
EASTERN AND SOUTH AFRICAN TELEGRAPH CO. LTD. VS. CAPETOWN TRAMWAYS CO. (1902)
Facts: the plaintiff’s submarine cables were disturbed by escape of electric current from the defendants tramways. It was found that the damage was due to the unusual sensitiveness of the he plaintiffs apparatus and such damage won’t occur to a person carrying on ordinary business.
Held: When the damage to the plaintiffs property is caused not so much by the escape of the things collected by the defendant as by the unusual sensitiveness of the plaintiffs property itself, the plaintiff cannot recover anything.
A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own property to special use, whether for business or for pleasure.
ACT OF GOD / VIS MAJOR
Considered to be good defence in Rylands vs. Fletcher case.
Act of god has been defined as;
Circumstances which no human foresight can provide against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility.
NICHOLS VS. MARSLAND (1876)
Facts: the defendant created artificial lakes on his land by damming up a natural stream. That year there was an extraordinary rainfall, heaviest in the human memory, by which the streams and the lakes swelled so much that the embankments constructed for the artificial lakes, which were sufficiently strong for an ordinary rainfall, gave way and the rush of water down stream washed away the plaintiff’s four bridges.
There was found to be no negligence on the part of the defendants. It was held that the defendants were not liable under the rule of strict liability because the accident in this case had been caused by act of god.
S.K. Shangrung Lamkang vs. State of Manipur (2008)
Facts: Two persons died due to electrocution causes by a falling of a high tension electric wire from its pole while they were proceeding riding on a scooter.
The respondents contended that the fall of the electric wire was due to the lightening storm resulting in breaking of a tension disc insulator and not due to their negligence.
Held: since the management of supply of electricity was a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, when harm was caused to anyone on account of any cause in the operation of the activity, the respondents, who were responsible in respect to the said activity would be strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who were harmed in the course of operation of the said activity.
The risk involved in the management of supply of electricity was surely great and a high degree of care as expected of hath respondents, inasmuch as they ought to have appreciated the possibility of falling of the electric wire from its pole as a result of storm or lightening.
M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD VS. SHAIL KUMAR ( 2002 )
One Joginder Singh was riding on his bicycle while returning from his factory. A snapped live elope citric wire was lying on the road. There was rain and the road was inundated with water. The cyclist could not notice the electric wire and as he came in contact with the same, he died instantaneously due to electrocution.
Held: The rule of strict liability was applied and it was held that the Board had statutory duty to supply electricity on the area. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the electric supplier shall be liable for the same.
Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out such measures to prevent such mishaps.
The defence that the snapping of wire was due to the act of the go stranger who might have tried to pilfer the electricity was rejected. Such act should have been foreseen by the board and prevented.
If the accident was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule of strict liability did not apply.
The court also explained the nature of strict liability and said; “ it differs from the liability which arises on account of negligence or fault in this way, i.e., the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defence did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm, he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed but such consideration is not relevant in aliases of strict liability when the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.
CONSENT OF THE PLAINTIFF
In case of volenti non fit injuria, i.e., where that plaintiff has consented to the accumulation of the dangerous thing on the defendant’s land, the liability under the Rylands vs Fletcher rule does not arise.
Such a consent is implied where the source of danger is for the common benefit of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
CARSTAIR VS. TAYLOR (1871)
The plaintiff hired the ground floor of the building from the defendant. The upper floor of the building was occupied by the defendant himself. Water stored on the upper floor leaked without any negligence on the part of the defendant and injured the plaintiffs goods on the ground floor. As the water had been stored for the benefit of both the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant was held not liable.
ACT OF THIRD PARTY
If the harm has been caused due to the act of the stranger, who is neither the defendant’s servant nor the defendant has any control over him, the defendant will not be liable under this rule.
BOX VS. JABB (1879)
The overflow of the defendants reservoir was caused by the blocking of a drain by strangers, the defendant was held not liable for that.
NORTHWESTERN UTILITIES VS. LONDON GUARANTEE AND ACCIDENT CO. (1936)
The appellants were a public utility company carrying gas at a high pressure. During the construction of sewer by the city authorities, a gad pipe leaked, resulting in fire which destroyed the hotel insured by the respondents. Since the operations of the he city authorities were conspicuous and the danger to the gas pipelines could have been reasonably foreseen and guarded against, the failure to do that was considered to be a negligence on the go part of the appellants and they were held liable.
