SS and Disparate Impact - Sheet1 Flashcards
“‘Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’”
Hyrabayshi
“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect …. [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can . . . .”
Korematsu v. United States (1944)
“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability . . . .”
Griggs v. Duke Power (1971)
“[I]t is untenable that the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to communicate orally and in writing”
Washington v. Davis (1976)
“[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court’s opinion might assume.” Subjective discriminatory intent is a “common threat” in our cases. But it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a finding of unconstitutionality—it would be too high a burden to require plaintiffs to uncover the actual subjective intent, and an otherwise constitutional law also should not be struck down simply because one of the decision makers had an improper motive. “A law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for it.”
Washington v. Davis (1976)Stevens (concurring):
“[T]he validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless. . . . [W]ithin their sphere, military authorities are not more outside the bounds of obedience to the Constitution than are judges within theirs . . . .”
Korematsu v. United States (1944)Frankfurter (concurring):
“If Congress in peace-time legislation [rather than the military during war-time] should enact such a criminal law, I should suppose this court would refuse to enforce it.” I cannot subscribe to the reasonableness doctrine in this context. The Court is in no position to determine the “reasonableness” of military commanders—it will have no alternative to taking the military at its word. I cannot say whether these orders were reasonable or not, but even if they were, “I deny that it follows that they are constitutional.” Judicial recognition of a law like this is “a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself”—even an unconstitutional military order lasts only as long as the war, but judicial acceptance of the order “rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order . . . .”
Korematsu v. United States (1944)Jackson (dissenting):
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” and thus “may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”
Carolene Products footnote
(No compelling purpose): There is no legitimate purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination and maintaining White Supremacy.
Loving v. Virginia (1967)
But “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another”—especially if “the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds” (e.g. excluding blacks from juries).
Washington v. Davis (1976)
Congress did not intend to guarantee everyone a job. “What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”
Griggs v. Duke Power (1971)
Defendant cannot rely on studies demonstrating racism in the system overall—he “must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” He would also have to demonstrate that Georgia kept its capital sentencing system in place because of its disparate impact on blacks. The criminal justice system necessarily requires discretionary judgments—we must demand exceptionally clear proof that that discretion was abused here. A nationwide study is insufficient to address what happened in this particular case.
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
Disparate impact “[s]tanding alone,… does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.” Discriminatory purpose or intent has always been the constitutional starting point. See Keyes (requiring “a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action”); Strauder (excluding a black juror was unconstitutional, but there was no requirement that juries proportionally reflect the community).
Washington v. Davis (1976)
Distinguished Batson - in those cases, the State has an opportunity to put the decision maker on the stand to offer a non-discriminatory reason for the decision. Here, the State has no practical opportunity to challenge the study, and can’t put the jurors or prosecutors on the stand.
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
Held: UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The redrawing was clearly motivated by discriminatory purposes—no other conclusion was even possible. It was “irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislature is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.”
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)