Spec Ops (Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare) Flashcards
What is the phenomena of Special Operations
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
A small force defeating a larger or better entrenched enemy
What is relative superiority?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
A condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well defended enemy
What are the three basic principles of relative superiority?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
- RS is acheived at the pivotal in an engagment
- Once RS is achieved, it must be sustained to achieve victory
- If RS is lost, it is difficult to regain
Why is it hard to regain RS when it is lost?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
- A weakness of SF is their lack of firepower compared to a large conventional force
- When they lose RS the stronger form of force usually prevails
The longer the engagment continues….
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
The more likely the outcome will be affected by:
- The will of the enemy
- Chance
- Uncertainty
What are the factors that comporise the frictions of war
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
- The will of the enemy
- Chance
- Uncertainty
What are the six principles of special operations
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
- Simplicity
- Security
3.Repitition - Suprise
- Speed
- Purpose
What are the phases of an opeartion?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
- Planning
- Prep
- Execution
These are all interconnected to one another
What is the relationship between complexity, security, and repetition in military planning?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Complex plans require extraordinary security, but excessive security can hinder effective preparation
What are the three elements of simplicity? critical to the success of a plan?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation.
With regards to simplicity, why is it important to limit the number of tactical objectives?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
4 points
- It focuses training
- Reduces personnel required
- Shortens time on target
- decreases the number of “moving parts.”
With regards to simplicity, how does good intelligence simplify a plan?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
It reduces unknown factors and variables that must be considered.
What did Clausewitz say about intelligence reports in war?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
“Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false and most are uncertain.”
This could be due to the time period he operated in
What role does innovation play in simplifying a plan?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
It helps avoid or eliminate obstacles that could compromise surprise or complicate mission execution.
Eg Commercially available low-light scopes increased accuracy during the Son Tay raid from 35% to 95%.
At what phase do the three elements of simplicity have the greatest impact?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
During the execution phase of the mission.
What is the primary purpose of tight security in special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
To prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage through foreknowledge of the impending attack.
Despite the enemy being prepared for an attack, why are special operations often successful?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Security prevents the enemy from knowing the exact time and, in some cases, the method of attack.
How should security measures be balanced during special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
They should be as tight as possible without unduly impeding the preparation or execution of operations.
Why is it not enough to conceal the mission itself in special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Because the enemy is often already prepared for an attack; timing and method must also be concealed.
Why is repetition important in the preparation phase of special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Repetition eliminates barriers to success by honing tactical skills and enabling quick reactions to threats within standard scenarios.
Despite the enemy being prepared, how do special operations forces still achieve surprise?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
3 points
Through:
1. deception
2. Timing
3. Exploiting the enemy’s vulnerabilities.
What role does deception play in achieving surprise during special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
2 points
Deception either:
1. Directs the enemy’s attention away from the attacking force
2. Delays their response long enough to gain surprise.
What risk is associated with using deception in special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
If deception fails to gain the intended response, it can heighten the enemy’s alertness and make surprise unattainable.
What is the main lesson about surprise in special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Surprise alone is insufficient; it must be combined with proper equipment and execution to achieve relative superiority.
Why is speed critical in special operations missions?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
- Reduces vulnerability
- Increases the opportunity to achieve relative superiority.
What lesson does Clausewitz provide regarding force size and mission goals?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
The smaller the force, the more limited its goals and duration should be.
Why are special forces typically small and lightly armed?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
To maximize speed and surprise, as they cannot sustain prolonged engagements against conventional forces.
What is the principle of “Purpose” in special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
Purpose is understanding and executing the prime objective of a mission, regardless of emerging obstacles or opportunities.
What are the two aspects of the principle of “Purpose”?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
(1) Clearly defined mission statements to guide actions in the heat of battle
(2) personal commitment to the mission.
Why is a clearly defined mission statement crucial in special operations?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
It ensures that individual soldiers understand the primary objective, even under stress or changing conditions.
What warning did Clausewitz give about the emotional aspect of warfare?
Chapter 1 - Theory of Special Operations
He cautioned that theorists often overlook the emotional dimension of combat, which is a critical error.
Context: Why was the Cabanatuan Raid necessary?
To rescue ~500 surviving Allied POWs (mainly from Bataan) facing brutal conditions and likely execution by retreating Japanese forces as the U.S. Sixth Army advanced on Luzon in January 1945.
Objective: What was the core mission goal?
A politically and militarily imperative rescue of Allied prisoners held at Camp Pangatian (Cabanatuan), requiring infiltration deep behind enemy lines and extraction.
Forces - US Lead Element: Who were the primary assaulters?
US 6th Ranger Battalion (Co C & 2nd Plt, Co F), commanded by Lt. Col. Henry Mucci. Formed from an artillery unit, intensely trained but not specifically for this type of rescue.
Forces - Critical Support: What non-Ranger units were essential?
Alamo Scouts (Sixth Army reconnaissance teams for vital pre-raid intel) and Filipino Guerrillas (led by Capts. Pajota & Joson for intel, guides, blocking forces, and transport).
Enemy Situation: What made the raid exceptionally risky?
Significant Japanese forces nearby: Camp guards & transients (~225), Dokuho Battalion at Cabu (~800 + tanks), and Naotake Command in Cabanatuan City (~7000). Outnumbered Rangers significantly.
McRaven Principle - Simplicity (Planning): How was the plan kept simple?
Basic infantry tactics, clear single objectives for assault elements, reliance on direct action rather than complex maneuvers or technology. Mucci delegated detailed planning to Capt. Prince.
McRaven Principle - Simplicity (Intelligence): How did intelligence simplify the plan?
Detailed intel from Alamo Scouts & guerrillas (camp layout, enemy positions, routines) allowed precise targeting, minimal necessary equipment, and identification of key routes (like the creek bed).
McRaven Principle - Security: How was operational security maintained?
Achieved through speed of planning/deployment (no-notice mission), limited briefing circle, no rehearsals, reliance on trusted Filipino allies, and the short timeframe before execution.
McRaven Principle - Repetition (Lack thereof): How did this raid challenge the principle of Repetition?
The 6th Rangers had not rehearsed this specific type of mission, a deviation from McRaven’s model. Success relied heavily on other principles and basic soldier skills.
McRaven Principle - Surprise: How was tactical surprise achieved?
Boldness of the raid, Japanese complacency, effective use of darkness/terrain (ditches, creek bed), P-61 fighter diversion drawing attention away during final approach.
McRaven Principle - Speed: How was speed utilized effectively?
Rapid movement into position, swift neutralization of guards (<30 secs) and key targets (tank shed), and a short time on target (approx. 20-30 mins) to minimize exposure before withdrawal.
McRaven Principle - Purpose: What drove the Rangers’ commitment?
Strong sense of purpose: rescuing fellow Americans from horrific conditions. Mucci emphasized this moral/emotional imperative, fostering dedication beyond normal duty (“We swore we’d die or do it”).
Critical Action - Blocking Force: What prevented immediate reinforcement?
Capt. Pajota’s guerrilla force successfully ambushed and held off the Japanese Dokuho Battalion at the Cabu Bridge, inflicting heavy casualties and destroying the bridge to stop tanks.
Innovation - Extraction Solution: How were weak POWs transported?
An innovative, low-tech solution organized by Capt. Pajota: mobilizing dozens of local carabao (water buffalo) carts to carry POWs unable to walk the long distance back to Allied lines.
Key Decision - The Delay: Why did Mucci postpone the raid by 24 hours?
Based on updated Alamo Scout/guerrilla intel about increased Japanese presence, Mucci delayed to allow for better reconnaissance, planning, and a more advantageous enemy disposition.
McRaven Analysis - Relative Superiority (Vulnerability): When were the Rangers most vulnerable?
During the final, exposed crawl to the objective and, critically, during the withdrawal, especially when crossing the open Rizal Highway with the slow, large column of POWs and carts.
McRaven Analysis - Relative Superiority (Dominance): When did the Rangers achieve dominance?
Relative superiority peaked rapidly upon initiating the assault, overwhelming the surprised camp guards and transient troops quickly due to surprise, speed, and focused firepower.
McRaven Analysis - Compensating Principles: How was success achieved despite lacking specific training/rehearsal?
McRaven suggests the strength of other principles (Simplicity, Security, Surprise, Speed, Purpose) combined with good intelligence and leadership compensated for the lack of repetition. Luck (“benevolent friction”) also played a role.
Outcome - Success Metrics: What were the raid’s results?
Highly successful: 511 POWs rescued (plus 1 later). Minimal friendly casualties (2 Rangers KIA, 1 POW died). Significant enemy losses (~500-800 killed by Rangers & guerrillas).
Core Lesson: What does the Cabanatuan raid illustrate about Special Operations?
Demonstrates that while specific training/rehearsals are ideal (Repetition), a combination of audacity, meticulous planning based on good intel, speed, surprise, strong purpose, and effective use of local allies can achieve success against seemingly overwhelming odds, even when deviating slightly from the theoretical model.
