Soul Body Mind Flashcards

1
Q

Intro

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Dualism: the view that there are two different types of existence: mental and physical.

Substance dualism: Descartes’ version of dualism that the two different types of existence are two different substances, e.g. mental (characterised by thinking) and physical (characterised by extension). A substance is a type of existence which cannot be broken down into anything further.

Monism: the view that there is one kind of existence.

Materialism: the view that the one kind of existence is physical substance.

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2
Q

Plato dualism

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Plato believed the body was like a prison for the soul, trapping it in this world of appearances. He thought our souls came from the world of forms and had a vague memory of the forms.

Look up charioteer analogy

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3
Q

Recolection

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Plato’s argument from recollection supports existence of WOF + soul
- suggests we have knowledge of perfect, eternal, and unchanging concepts, such as perfect beauty, justice, and mathematical ideas like a perfect circle or perfectly equal lengths. Since we’ve never experienced these perfect concepts in the physical world, Plato argues that we must have acquired this knowledge a priori, meaning it was inherent rather than learned through experience.
In his dialogue The Meno, Plato illustrates this with a story about Socrates and an uneducated slave boy. Socrates, through a series of questions and drawings in the sand, leads the boy to solve a geometry problem on his own. This implies that the boy must have been born with an understanding of geometric concepts, supporting Plato’s belief that our souls possess innate knowledge of the forms.

Plato explains that we must have gained these perfect concepts before we were born. This implies that a part of us, our soul, existed in a realm of perfect forms before entering the physical world. In this realm, there are perfect mathematical forms and ideals like beauty and justice.

We are born with a faint memory of these forms because our soul encountered them before being confined to our current world of appearances. Anamnesis is the process of recalling these forms through our sensory experiences in the physical world.

Plato concluded that true knowledge comes from a priori understanding, making him a rationalist. He argued that there must be a realm of perfect and unchanging forms, which he called the World of Forms. This realm is not distant or separate but the true reality. What we perceive in the physical world is merely a shadow or imperfect version of these perfect forms. In essence, our experiences are reflections of the true, perfect reality that exists beyond our sensory perceptions.

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4
Q

Recollection

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P1. We have a concept of perfect justice and beauty and perfect mathematical concepts.
P2. We have never experienced perfect instances of such things.
C1. So, our knowledge of perfect concepts must be innate.
C2. Therefore there must be a world of forms and we must have a soul which gained perfect concepts from it before we were born.

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5
Q

Evualtion

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Justice and beauty are often seen as subjective. One could argue that these concepts are in the eye of the beholder, shaped by personal opinions rather than objective facts. Cultural influences heavily determine what individuals find beautiful or just, and these views can change over time and vary between cultures. Because everyone has a different idea of what perfect beauty or justice is, these concepts cannot be considered objectively perfect.

Maths is not subjective. Perfect Plato’s examples of perfect circles and the idea of lines that are perfect equal can get around this issue, however. It is much harder to argue that mathematics is subjective.

Hume responds that we can actually create the idea of perfection in our minds even if we have never experienced it. We have take our concept of ‘imperfect’ and simply concieve of its negation: ‘not imperfect’ to gain the concept of ‘perfect’.

Furthermore we could add to Hume’s point that mathematical knowledge could come from experience. The slave boy may not have had any mathematical training, but he had seen shapes of objects in his life – thereby gaining concepts of shape and geometry from experience. This gave him a basic conceptual understanding that Socrates’ questioning brought out and clarified.

Finally, even if Plato was correct that we were born with perfect concepts, it doesn’t mean a soul and world of forms is the only or even best explanation. Evolution could have programmed us to have a sense of morality, beauty and the evolution of intelligence could explain being born with mathematical ability.

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6
Q

Aristotle’s platos theory lacks empiricism

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Aristotle believed that his theory of the four causes demonstrated that Plato’s theory of forms was unnecessary because it didn’t help explain our experiences. Plato’s forms are unchanging and thus cannot account for the changes we observe in the world. This idea is similar to Ockham’s razor, which suggests that we shouldn’t believe in overly complicated explanations when simpler ones suffice. Aristotle argued that Plato’s forms are “nonsense, and even if they do exist, they are wholly irrelevant,” as they lack empirical validity.

However, Aristotle didn’t reject the idea of form itself, just the notion that forms exist separately from things. He believed that a thing’s form, or formal cause, is its essence—its defining quality. This perspective also led Aristotle to reject Plato’s mind-body dualism, as he saw rational thought (the form of a human) as inseparable from the body.

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7
Q

Arilotles material ism

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Aristotle rejected the idea of a world of forms because he believed it lacked empirical validity. Consequently, he also dismissed the notion of a non-physical soul originating from such a world. However, Aristotle still believed in the soul, viewing it as the form of the physical body.

By “form,” Aristotle meant essence—the defining characteristic of a thing. For example, the essence of a chair is its shape, which makes it suitable for sitting. The essence of a human, according to Aristotle, is the ability to reason. He argued that the soul is the formal cause of the body. He illustrated this with the analogy of a stamp imprint on wax: the imprint doesn’t exist separately from the wax, but it shapes the wax. Similarly, the soul gives form to the body, defining its essence without existing independently.

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8
Q

Evaluation

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Formal causation is considered unscientific. Francis Bacon, known as the father of empiricism for establishing the modern scientific method, argued that formal causation deals with metaphysical matters that lie beyond empirical study. He used the example of snow’s whiteness to illustrate his point. While science can explain how snow forms from air and water (its efficient cause), it can’t explain the form of its whiteness. Bacon believed that while form does exist, Aristotle was wrong to think that science could study it.

Modern science has gone even further than Bacon in rejecting formal causation, arguing that there’s no reason to think it exists at all. Today, we understand that an object’s color, once considered a “formal cause,” is actually the result of interactions between particles like atoms and photons. These interactions can be fully explained through efficient and material causation. Thus, what Aristotle referred to as “form” is now seen as reducible to material and efficient causes.

For Aristotle, the form of a human is the rational soul. However, most neuroscientists today argue that rationality is simply the result of the brain’s physical structure and processes. In this view, what Aristotle considered “form” is actually just material structure. Modern science seems to leave no place for formal or final causation.

Science cannot currently explain how consciousness or reason arises from material brain processes. The brain is incredibly complex, and while some aspects are understood, the processes behind reason and consciousness remain largely mysterious. Therefore, modern science cannot yet justifiably dismiss Aristotle’s ideas of the soul and form as explanations for reason.

However, there is scientific evidence linking the brain to reason, as damage to the brain can impair reasoning and other mental faculties. Given the vast gaps in our understanding of the brain, it is more reasonable to think that mental faculties like reason are reducible to material brain processes in ways we don’t yet comprehend, rather than requiring a different explanation like Aristotle’s concept of form, for which there is no evidence.

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9
Q

Descreates

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Descartes’ substance dualism posits that there are two distinct types of substances: mental and physical. A substance is a fundamental type of existence that cannot be broken down into anything else. The essence of mental substance is thinking, while the essence of physical substance is extension. A thing is extended if it occupies physical space, has a location, and can be described with coordinates.

Descartes’ indivisibility argument claims that the essential property of physical substance is extension, meaning anything that takes up space can be divided because there must be a point where it could be split. In contrast, the mind does not seem to be divisible because it is non-extended; it does not occupy space or have spatial coordinates along which it could be divided.

Leibniz’s law states that identical things must have the same properties. Since physical things are divisible and the mind is not, they cannot be identical. If the body and mind were the same, this single entity would have to be both divisible and indivisible, which is impossible. Therefore, the mind and body must be distinct.

P1. Physical substance is divisible (since it’s extended).
P2. The mind is indivisible (since it’s non-extended).
P3. Leibniz’ law is that identical things must have the same properties.
C1. The mind therefore cannot be identical with any physical substance, such as the body.

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10
Q

The issue that the mental is divisible

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The mind can be divided into different aspects such as perception, memory, and emotions. This means that the mind and body share the property of being divisible, and thus could be identical.

This challenges the idea that the mind is indivisible. If the mind can be divided into various components, it shares the same properties as the physical body. Therefore, the indivisibility argument falls apart.

Descartes responded that by the mind he means consciousness. Perception, memory and feeling are not divisions of consciousness, they are different modes of consciousness. It is the same undivided mind that perceives, remembers or feels emotions.

Modern scientific discoveries challenge Descartes’ idea of the mind as a single, unified consciousness. Studies in psychology suggest that the mind can indeed be divided, as seen in phenomena like blindsight and split-brain cases.

The brain is divided into two hemispheres connected by the corpus callosum, a thin strand of neurons. Sometimes, this connection is severed to treat severe epilepsy, leading to surprising results. In some cases, it appears that two separate “persons” exist within one body. For instance, the right hemisphere controls the left arm, and the left hemisphere controls the right arm. Patients have been observed picking up food with one arm while the other arm knocks it away. One patient even tried to hug his wife with one arm while pushing her away with the other. These observations suggest that the mind can be divided, challenging Descartes’ view of an indivisible consciousness.

This is at least good evidence for the possibility of consciousness being divisible and gives us reason to think P2 false and the indivisibility argument therefore fails.

It also casts doubt on Descartes’ method in assuming that we have the full picture of what our mind is merely from how it seems to be to itself, which is his justification for P2.

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11
Q

Conceiveability argument

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P1. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking non-extended thing.
P2. I have a clear and distinct idea of my body as a non-thinking extended thing.
C1. These opposing properties allow us to conceive of the mind separate to and without the body.
P3. What is conceivably separate is possibly separate.
P4. What is possibly separate is actually non-identical.
C2. Therefore, the mind and body are not identical.

Since the mind is non-extended, it is possible to imagine it existing independently of anything physical. For instance, you could picture yourself as an immaterial ghost walking through walls.

If two things are truly identical, they cannot be separated. For example, a triangle cannot exist without three sides; the idea of a triangle without three sides is inconceivable. Similarly, if the mind and body were identical, we wouldn’t be able to imagine one without the other.

Since we can conceive of the mind existing without the body, it suggests that it is possible for the mind to be separate from the body. Therefore, the mind and body are not identical.

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12
Q

Evaluation

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The masked man fallacy highlights a flaw in arguments that infer possibility from conceivability. Imagine someone hears about a masked man robbing a bank. They can conceive that the masked man is not their father. However, if it turns out that the masked man is indeed their father, it was impossible for him not to be their father, even though they conceived it that way. This shows that we can conceive of things that are actually impossible. Therefore, just because we can conceive of something does not mean it is truly possible.

This attacks P3, that what is conceivable is possible, by showing that we can conceive of the impossible.

The masked man fallacy shows that we can conceive of the impossible due to ignorance. In the example, the person doesn’t know who the masked man is, allowing them to imagine that it isn’t their father. However, Descartes would argue that this kind of ignorance doesn’t apply to our knowledge of our own mind. According to Descartes, once we understand our mind through clear and distinct intellectual perception, there is no ignorance that could lead us to conceive of something impossible, as happens in the masked bank robber scenario.

However, Descartes assumes that the way the mind appears to us is how the mind actually is. He believes that a clear and distinct intellectual perception of the mind reveals it as a mental substance with the essential property of thinking.

Yet, evidence from neuroscience and psychology shows that we are ignorant about many aspects of our minds. For example, most mental processing is unconscious, and we are unaware of how these processes influence us. This suggests that our perception of our own mind is neither perfectly accurate nor complete. Therefore, it is possible that we are ignorant about our minds and that, despite our self-perception, our mind could be extended and identical to our body.

This means that when we conceive of our minds as non-extended and separable from our bodies, we might be conceiving of the impossible due to our ignorance. Thus, the argument against the masked man fallacy assumes what it seeks to prove: that we know our mind is non-extended, which is the very point in question.

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13
Q

The interaction problem

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Let’s break this down into simpler terms.

This is a criticism of dualism. Dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two fundamentally different things. But if they are so different, how can they interact with each other? For example, when you want to move your hand, that mental desire results in your hand actually moving. Similarly, when you touch something hot, you feel the sensation of heat in your mind.

For this to happen, your non-physical mind would need to affect your physical body, but it’s not clear how that could work.

Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia pointed out that only physical things can interact with other physical things. She explained that interaction involves one thing pushing against another, which non-physical things can’t do. So, if the mind is non-physical, it shouldn’t be able to interact with the physical body. However, we see that our mental desires do cause physical actions, like wanting to touch a water bottle and then actually moving your arm to touch it.

Therefore, this suggests that dualism might not be correct.

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14
Q

Evualuation

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Descartes defence: Descartes tried to solve the interaction problem by suggesting that the mind and body interact at the pineal gland.

Counter-defence: There is no evidence or argument given in support of Descartes’ claim. He wrongly thought only humans had a pineal gland, but biologists later proved that false. More importantly, Descartes is saying where he thinks the mind and body interact, but the interaction problem doesn’t question where but how. Descartes is not providing an answer.

Furthermore, Physicists say that the universe is ‘causally closed’ because of the second law of thermodynamics that energy can be neither created nor destroyed – only transferred from one state to another. This means that energy cannot come from outside the physical universe and affect things within it. However that seems to be how substance dualism would have to work since the mental is supposedly outside the physical universe. Therefore substance dualism is false.

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15
Q

Evaluation

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Humanise this : Descartes defence: Descartes tried to solve the interaction problem by suggesting that the mind and body interact at the pineal gland.
Counter-defence: There is no evidence or argument given in support of Descartes’ claim. He wrongly thought only humans had a pineal gland, but biologists later proved that false. More importantly, Descartes is saying where he thinks the mind and body interact, but the interaction problem doesn’t question where but how. Descartes is not providing an answer.
Furthermore, Physicists say that the universe is ‘causally closed’ because of the second law of thermodynamics that energy can be neither created nor destroyed – only transferred from one state to another. This means that energy cannot come from outside the physical universe and affect things within it. However that seems to be how substance dualism would have to work since the mental is supposedly outside the physical universe. Therefore substance dualism is false.

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16
Q

Gilbert Ryle & the category mistake

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Ryle often referred to “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine” with deliberate abusiveness, aiming to show that it is completely false—not just in specific details but in principle. He argued that this idea isn’t just a collection of mistakes but one big fundamental error, which he described as a category mistake.

Ryle claimed that Descartes made a category mistake in his thinking. Descartes argued that physical things are extended, divisible, and non-thinking, while the mind is non-extended, indivisible, and thinking. From this, Descartes concluded that the mind must be a non-physical thing. Ryle contended that this conclusion is flawed. He argued that just because the mind is not a physical thing, it doesn’t necessarily mean it must be a non-physical thing. There could be another option: the mind might not be a “thing” at all, in any sense.

To illustrate his point, Ryle told a story about someone being shown around a university. After being shown various buildings, the person asked, “But where is the university?” They had mistakenly thought the university was a single building rather than a collection of buildings. This misunderstanding is akin to the category mistake Ryle believed Descartes was making.

Consider another example: imagine someone asked, “What is the taste of blue?” This question involves a category mistake, assuming that colors belong to the category of things that have a taste.

Ryle argues that the way we talk about the mind confuses us about its logical category. We use words like “state” and “process” for both physical things and mental phenomena. Since only physical things can be in physical states or undergo physical processes, we mistakenly think the mind must also be a “thing” because it can be in mental states or undergo mental processes. Descartes, caught in this confusion, can’t find a physical “thing” that could be the mind, so he concludes it must be a non-physical thing—a mental substance.

According to Ryle, Descartes wrongly assumes that the mind is a “thing.” When he realizes it’s not a physical thing, he concludes it must be a mental thing. Ryle suggests another option: the term “mind” doesn’t refer to a thing at all. Instead, it refers to a set of behavioral dispositions. This perspective aligns with Ryle’s philosophical behaviorism.

A disposition is a tendency for something to behave in a certain way under specific conditions. Ryle believes that when we talk about the mind, we’re really talking about behavioral dispositions. For example, if someone is described as scared, we’re actually describing their tendency to make scared facial expressions and run away.

Ryle illustrates this with the example of the “brittleness” of glass. Brittleness is the disposition of glass to shatter upon impact. Is brittleness a “thing”? Where is the brittleness in the glass? Can it be measured or divided? The answer to these questions is clearly no, similar to how Descartes answered questions about the mind. However, we wouldn’t conclude that the brittleness of glass is a non-physical thing.

Ryle argues that we shouldn’t be tempted to think of the mind as a non-physical thing based on Descartes’ reasoning, just as we wouldn’t think of the brittleness of glass as a non-physical entity.

17
Q

Evaluation

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Criticism of Ryle: Is the mind really just a set of dispositions? Doesn’t having a mind feel like something? Reducing the mind to a set of dispositions doesn’t seem to fully capture or explain the experience of conscious awareness, which at least feels like it exists in some sense. It’s hard to describe that sense, but it seems overly simplistic to see it merely as dispositions to behaviors. Ryle was a philosophical behaviorist, a controversial form of materialism.

Defense of Ryle: Even if Ryle is wrong in saying the mind is just a set of dispositions, he’s still correct in challenging Descartes’ assumption that because the mind isn’t a physical thing, it must be a non-physical thing. There could be other possibilities beyond just dispositions. At the very least, Descartes’ conclusion requires much more justification than he provides.

18
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Dawkins

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Dawkins’ Perspective: Dawkins, a scientist and materialist, argues that we are merely physical beings composed of DNA. Since this is all that scientific evidence supports, he believes we shouldn’t accept anything supernatural, like a soul.

Dawkins distinguishes between two types of soul: one he finds invalid and the other valid. Soul 1 is the idea that the soul is a separate, real entity apart from our body, which Dawkins rejects due to lack of evidence. Soul 2 is a metaphorical concept, representing the deep part of our mind and personality where the essence of our humanity lies. For instance, even someone who doesn’t believe in a literal soul might say, “I felt that in my soul” or “Hitler was a soulless person,” using “soul” metaphorically to express profound human feelings rather than referring to a non-physical entity (Soul 1).

Dawkins believes that everything about us, including our minds and consciousness, can be explained as biological processes within our body and brain.

19
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Wvauation

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David Chalmers provides a critique of Richard Dawkins’ view on consciousness by distinguishing between the “easy problem of consciousness” and the “hard problem of consciousness.” The easy problem involves identifying which brain processes correspond to mental processes like memory, perception, or emotion. The hard problem, however, is about understanding which brain processes give rise to consciousness itself. Chalmers acknowledges that neuroscience has made strides in addressing the easy problems but argues that it hasn’t made significant progress on the hard problem. He believes this lack of progress indicates that explaining consciousness might require discovering something radically new, which could be a dualist mental property or a yet-undiscovered materialist property. Essentially, our future understanding of the physical universe might be as revolutionary as our current knowledge is compared to Aristotle’s.

In defense of Dawkins, it’s noted that science has many current challenges, like dark matter, where progress is slow or non-existent. This doesn’t justify believing in non-physical entities, as there’s no evidence for their existence. Neuroscience is still in its infancy, and the brain’s complexity makes the lack of progress on the hard problem unsurprising. This does not imply that consciousness is non-physical. Instead, our limited understanding of the brain’s physical structure suggests that a scientific explanation for consciousness may emerge as we learn more about the brain.

20
Q

Plato cycle of opposites

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P1. Every change from one state to another must involve a cycle of opposites. E.g. something becoming ‘smaller’ must be cycling away from ‘bigger’. A quality which has an opposite comes into being from its opposite.
P2. This cycling involves two opposite processes; e.g. increasing and decreasing. If these processes were not equally balanced, everything would be eternally getting bigger and bigger or smaller and smaller.
P3. Something dying is cycling away from the process of coming into life. Therefore, something coming into life must be cycling away from the process of death.
P4. This process must be balanced otherwise there would be only dead things or no dead things.
C1. There must be a soul which is cycling between life and death

Cycle of opposites criticism: Arguably ‘life’ and ‘death’ are not objective qualities but just descriptions of different arrangements of atoms. Objectively they cannot be opposites, therefore.

Arguably the universe is getting bigger and bigger, and has been doing so since the big bang, not for eternity. So Plato’s argument fails because he could not have been aware of the discoveries of modern physics.