Social Preferences Flashcards

1
Q

What is game theory equilibrium?

A

set of best strategies players pick to maximise payoff.

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2
Q

What is Nash Equilibrium?

A

point where no player benefits from changing their action if others keep their decision constant.

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3
Q

What can be said about prisoners dilemma regarding Nash?

A

1 - Nash equ. = cheat, cheat
2- Nash does not mean pareto
3- In a repeated game backwards induction shows sublime perfect equilibrium is cheat, cheat

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4
Q

Who is Robert Axelrod?

A

economist that showed tit-for-tat tactic was better than cheat, cheat
- Got game theorists to come and submit a strategy and then competed the tactics

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5
Q

What is a tit-for-tat strategy?

A
  • Repeats the opponents action in the last round, starting with coop.
  • promotes cooperation and punishes cheat
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6
Q

What did Axelrods investigation discover regarding the tit-for-tat strategy?

A
  • Tit-for-tat strategy collected the most points overall

- In a head to head, cheat, cheat wins but two t4t players will coop every round

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7
Q

What’d Adreoni and Millar’s repeated PD experiment show?

A

-people cooperated initially
-coop collapsed towards the end, reasons:
1-Rational cooperation (building good rep for private gains)
2- Altruism (natural tendency to coop)

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8
Q

What are the altruism models?

A

1- Pure altruism: care directly about others (Ui = pi + apj)
2- Duty: cooperating brings you enjoyment (Ui = pi + a, a>0 if i coops)
3- Reciprocal Altruism - both need to coop to improve utility (Ui = pi + a, a>0 if i&j coop)

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9
Q

How did Adreoni and Millar test for cooperation reasoning?

A

3 conditions:
1- Strangers, play one round with a random person
2- Partners, play ten rounds with a random partner (opp. for rep building)
3- Computer 50s, play with either stranger or computer for 10 rounds, computer plays tit for tat

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10
Q

What did Adreoni and Millars test for reasoning find?

A
  • Findings are consistent with reputation building

- Coop still present with strangers so stable fraction are altruists.

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11
Q

What was the ultimatum game?

A
  • one person is given £10 and they have to propose how to split the £10, receiver can accept or reject the offer
  • If receiver rejects the offer, both get nothing
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12
Q

What is the nash equilibrium for the ultimatum game?

A

offer £0.01

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13
Q

What were the results of the ultimatum game?

A
  • mainly offer £4-5
  • almost no offers below £2
  • Lower offers higher chance of rejection
  • Reciprocal Altruism to foster cooperation
  • Reciprocal punishment against unkind behaviour.
  • Don’t know how much altruism is due to ‘rational irratinality’ - not wanting to get rejected so offering more
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14
Q

What is the dictator game?

A
  • Proposer given £10

- They choose the offer and it cannot be rejected

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15
Q

What are the findings for the dictator game?

A
  • Less offered than ultimatum game, shows some of altruism must have been reciprocal
  • Forsythe ‘94: 20% give half, 79% give >0
  • Hoffman ‘94: <6% give half, 33% positive
  • Hoffman’s study had double anonymity, this suggests people are intrinsically selfish but don’t want to appear so.
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16
Q

What is the public good game?

A
  • 80 subjects, each given 225 tokens
  • Can keep token or add it to the public pot
  • Payoff from public pot depends on contribution, more contributed, more paid out
  • if all pay public, payoff = £4.95 each
  • if one free rides, payoff = £4.40 + £2.25 = £6.65
  • Repeated 10 times
17
Q

What is the Nash equilibrium for the public good game?

A
  • All private pot
18
Q

What are the findings of the public good game?

A
  • first round ~1/2 public pot

- Public pot falls after each round, virtually no public pot by the end

19
Q

What are the Causes of decay in the Public good game?

A

1- Learning, Players learn free riding is optimal
2- Rational Coop, understand free riding is optimal but tries to coop
3- frustrated kindness - gives up when others are selfish

20
Q

What was the Isaac and Walker experiment and what did it show?

A
  • played two games consecutively
  • end of first game 80% free ride
  • start of second game public pot high again
  • rules out learning!
21
Q

What was Adreoni’s experiment in 1995?

A
  • investigation into whether Isaac and walker results were due to kindness or confusion
  • 2 game modes:
    1) Regular
    2) Rank - total payout fixed, private payout depends on if you beat others. No incentive to be kind
22
Q

What were the findings of Adreoni’s experiment in ‘95?

A
  • Lower Public contributions in rank, more free riding
  • 1/2 of cooperation moves are due to kindness
  • Decay is due to frustrated kindness
23
Q

How did Fehr/ Gachter suggest we can prevent the decay in public good games and how well did it work?

A

-punishmwnt mechanism
-standard game theory suggests costly to punish
Findings:
-More public contributions
-Cooperatino was sustained
-Heavy punishment for poor contributors

24
Q

What is the nash equilibrium for the dictator game?

A

£0