Skepticism: Peter Klein

Question 1

What is Academic Skepticism?

Answer 1

It is the view that we cannot have knowledge of C-type propositions

Question 2

There are two arguments for Academic Skepticism. The first is the Cartestian style argument. State this argument.

Answer 2

U. My epistemic equipment is untrustworthy.

CS1. If I can know C-type propositions, then I can eliminate all genuine grounds for doubting them.
CS2. U is a genuine ground for doubt that I cannot eliminate
Therefore: I cannot know C-type propositions.

Question 3

The second argument for Academic Skepticism is an argument that employs the Closure Principle. State this argument.

Answer 3

CP1. If I am justified in believing h, then I am justified in believing that ~sk.
CP2. I am not justified in believing ~sk
Therefore: I am not justified in believing h.

Question 4

The first premise to the argument employing the Closure Principle is CP1. (p. 339). CP1 is mostly likely false. But CP1 can easily be repaired. What is the restricted version for CP1? (p. 342)

Answer 4

We can stipulate that the domain of the propositions in the generalization of CP includes only contingent propositions that are within S’s capacity to grasp and the entailment is “obvious” to S.

Question 5

State the argument for the repaired version of CP1.

Answer 5

1. If S is entitled to believe that p, then S has (nonoverridden) grounds that make p sufficiently likely to be true. (by the supposition)
   
   2. If S has (nonoverridden) grounds that make p sufficiently likely to be true, then S has (nonoverridden) grounds making q sufficiently likely to be true. (because p entails q)
   3. If S is entailed to believe that p, then S has (nonoverridden) grounds making q sufficiently likely to be true. [from 1,2]
   4. If S has (nonoverridden) grounds making q sufficiently likely to be true, then S is entitled to believe that q. [by the supposition]
   5. Therefore, if S is entitled to believe that p, S is entitled to believe that q. [from 2,3]

Question 6

Premise 2 of the argument for the repaired version of CP1 is this. If S has (non-overridden) grounds that make p sufficiently likely to be true, then S has (non-overridden) grounds making q sufficiently likely to be true. (because p entails q).

What is Dretske’s argument against premise 2?

Answer 6

One can have grounds that make it sufficiently likely that the animals at the zoo they are looking at are Zebras but not have grounds that make it sufficiently like that they are not cleverly disguised mules. This is so even though the animals being zebras entails that they are not cleverly disguised mules.

Question 7

What is Klein’s reason for doubting CP2? (p. 347 – 348)

Answer 7

One does not need to be able to completely rule out skeptical scenarios in order to be justified in believing that one is not in one of those scenarios.

For example, I do not have to be able to completely rule out an evil genius making it seems as if I have hands when in fact I do not in order for me to be justified in believing that I am not in such a scenario.

If I were required to completely rule it out, then, we would have to give up the Closure Principle.

Question 8

What is Contextualism?

Answer 8

Contextualism says that “know” is context sensitive.

It expresses different notions of knowledge in different contexts.

Question 9

How does Contextualism provide a basis for responding to the Academic Skeptic?

Answer 9

It provides a basis for responding to academic skeptic by showing that Academic Skeptic is gained by removing the skeptic factor.