Shareholders rights Flashcards

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1
Q

Board of directors decisions made by?

A

Ordinary majority

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2
Q

board powers come from?

A

Articles

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3
Q

who are the members in general meeting + stat

A

112 CA 2006
1 subscribers of first memorandum (basically first shreholders).
2. every other person in members register

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4
Q

How do members make decisions

A
  1. resolutions at general meetings (all reg. comp.)
  2. OR written resolutions (private reg. comp.)
  3. OR Unanimous assent (common law)
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5
Q

Ordinary resolutions require + stat

A

simple majority of votes (above 50%) s 282 (1) CA 2006

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6
Q

Special resolutions require special majority of + stat

A

75% at gen. meeting s 283 (1)

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7
Q

How come shareholders hold ultimate power + stat

A

they may dismiss directors by ordinary resolution s.168

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8
Q

Certain matters can only be determined by special resolution like what?

A

Altering articles s21

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9
Q

Art 4 of model articles:

A

Shareholders can instruct directors (not)to take certain action

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10
Q

Overview general meeting + stat

A
  • All members=right to attend GM
  • Members attend&vote personally, audio-vis, thru proxies
  • Right to appoint proxy s325
  • PLCs must hold annual meetings s336(1)
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11
Q

members with full paid shares of at least 5% or at least 100 members with shares paid up to £100 each on average may: +stat

A
  • require company to give notice of a resolution that they want tabled at next AGM s338
  • Require that a matter be included on AGM agenda
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12
Q

Rules regarding notice for GMs + stat

A

s307

  • at least 14 days notice gen. required
  • for PLCs 21
  • for ‘traded comps.’ 21 days
  • GMs that aren’t Annual GMs can be called by directors (if its 8months till next AGM) s302
  • directors can be instructed to do so by members representing 5% of paid up shares (at least) s303
  • courts have discretionary power to order GM s306
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13
Q

Effectiveness of GMs

A
  • do little to empower because
  • attendance impractical as members are round globe
  • large %age of shares held by institutional shareholders (organisations)
  • proxies=matters decided before meeting
  • important matters, usually rubber stamped
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14
Q

Can shareholders effectively hold board accountable?

A

1- in reality, board of PLC holds much power
2- issues e.g. distance mean that shareholders dont interfere with board
3- argument: director=not accountable. esp. in big businesses where short term finance performance satisfies shareholders
4- inadequate supervision of directors can lead to comp. collapse and finance scandals

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15
Q

Duty in s172(1) (effort to remedy lack of director supervision)

A

director must act in a way, in a good faith, that he believes will promote the success of company for members as a whole. In doing so they must HAVE REGARD TO (list of 6 in stat book)

is ‘have regard’ too vague to have effect on director conduct?

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16
Q

Company const.: what stat say all companies must have own articles or prepare own (to submit to registrar)

A

s.18

17
Q

If own articles aren’t submitted…
also if own articles are silent on an area…
+stat

A

model articles will be used s20.

18
Q

Nature and effect of AoA + stat and case

A
  • if it conflicts with stat., stat. wins

- AoA can circumvent this (bushell v Faith [director in question votes worth more])

19
Q

articles are given contractual effect as between member and company by virtue of

A

S33(1) aka stat contract

20
Q

Strange characteristics of stat. contract

A
  • can’t be set aside for mistake, misrep duress or undue influence
  • implied terms can’t be added
  • can only be altered by special resolution (s.21)
21
Q

Enforcement of articles by COMP. AGAINST MEMBERS + case

A
  1. company may enforce any provision
  2. If member inconsistent with articles he may be sued
  3. Hickman AoA contained arbitration clause [must arb before taking comp. to court]. Hence, he couldn’t effectively sue when he didn’t adhere
  4. Articles can’t remove member stat. rights
22
Q

Enforcement of art. by MEMBERS AGAINST OTHER MEMBERS + cases

A
  1. unclear if this is possible
  2. Welton v Safferey: member incositent with AoA-wrong against company. other member is improper claimant.
  3. Rayfield v Hands: member able to invoke stat contract to enforce pre-emption (sell share? must offer)rights against other members
  4. Gerrie: court assumed s33(1) created rights between members (though this wasn’t the issue.
    - perhaps, if breach is against comp&members, then impossible BUT
    - If against memebers alone? Possible
23
Q

Enforcement of art by MEMBERS AGAINST COMP. + stat

A
  • not clear to which company is a party to contract
  • controversy due to predecessor sections
    though s33(1) says ‘covenant on part of company and each member’
  • s14 CA 1985 says ‘as if it had been signed and sealed by each member’ company left out
  • Suggests company is not deemed to have covenanted
24
Q

Insider rights + cases

A
  • member can sue company for breach of any insider rights contained in const.
  • insider rights: rights conferred by articles on members IN THEIR CAPACITY AS members
  • e.g. Wood v Odessa Waterworks (right for memeber to insist declared dividend be paid in accordance with articles)
  • Pender v Lushington: right of member to vote at general meeting in any way he chooses
  • Gerrie: right to compel comp. to arrange fair valuation of shares which one wishes to sell (here, shares had to be offered 1st to existing members&comp. would arrange fair valuation)HELD: shareholder could enforce this against comp. under s33(1)
25
Q

Insider rights difficulty + case

A

difficult to differentiate:

  1. act by officer of company amounting to breach of members personal rights by company
  2. One which amounts to wrong against company (foss v Harbottle-company is proper claimant here)
26
Q

Irregularities in internal management are… +case

A

wrongs against company:

  • Macdougall v Gardiner: GM: dismissal of chairman dep. chair allowed delay to another meeting. AoA said adjournment could be challenged by poll (show hands). Claimant demanded poll, dep chair refused it (similar to Pender v Lushington-wrong against MEMBER)
  • Here it was wrong against comp as chair didn’t follow rules (like in pender)
  • Difficulties as above usually seen involving GMs
27
Q

Enforcement of articles by member against company: outsider rights + case

A
  • rights conferred on members by articles. NOT concerned with membership
  • concerned with capacity as an outsider (director, solicitor, etc)
  • Hickman: outsider rights not enforceable against company (general rule)
  • e.g. Eley: right of a member to be a comp. solicitor.(was dismiessed early as solicitor. couldn’t invoke stat contract as it is outsider right. an acc contract would’ve been better)
28
Q

Outsider rights enforced by member qua member +case

A
  • member can compel company in capacity as member to act in accordance with articles
  • Quin&axten v Salmon: right to vote=ignored. Enforced qua member.
  • HOWEVER: Beattie v E&F Beattie ltd: BEING sued in capacity as director, in no position to invoke AoA via sat. contract
  • being sued in capacity as director locked him in, so he couldn’t act in capacity as member
29
Q

Foss v Harbottle

A

Every shareholder has right under stat. contract to compel company to act in accordance with all its articles

30
Q

Shareholder agreements

A
  • uncertainties concerning stat. contracts mean members get into shareholder/membership agreements
  • these can cover, voting rules, share transfers & appointment if directors
  • common in smaller private comps
  • conventional contracts: normal remedies for breach
  • no need for qua member, insider or outsider rights
  • cant be varied by special majority, not a public document