SG Admin Law Flashcards
Overview
- Chng Suan Tze: CA held that all power given by law has legal limits and that the rule of law demands that Courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power.
JR aimed at determining compliance with the law, fair hearing and rationality in decision-making. - Yong Vui Kong v AG [2010]: Steven Chong J ID’d 3 factors courts have considered themselves unable to review-
(1) Where the matters are one of political or subjective preference: absence of objective legal standards;
(2) Where Courts lack specialist knowledge; and
(3) Where matters are polycentric (involves multiple concerns and perspectives) which are ill-suited to an adversarial adjudicatory method which involves only 2 parties.
Procedural aspects of judicial review
- Powers rooted in inherent jurisdiction of Court. Aims to:
A. Delimit the competence and responsibilities of different state actors;
B. Protect constitutional rights and values; and
C. Ensure that Govt actions conform to legal stds. - Art 93 Constitution: Judicial power of SG shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force.
SC can grant constitutional remedies (State courts have no jurisdiction).
Preliminary Matters:
Remedies
- O 53 RoC and S 27 Supreme Court Judicature Act provide the procedural backbone for JR.
- 2 groups of remedies:
(1) Prerogative public law remedies (remedies specific to public law have no power in private law like contract or tort)
a. Quashing order: Quash OG decision should Court find some illegality or ultra vires with ref to the decision.
b. Mandatory order: Mandate the making of a fresh decision and suggest some parameters in the admin of making that fresh decision.
c. Prohibiting order: Prohibits implementation of OG decision that is being challenged in JR proceedings.
(2) Private law remedies (has parallels in private law; declaratory relief may be applied for under O53):
a. Injunction
b. Declaration
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review
Case must have sufficient merit (to weed out frivolous cases or cases which would unduly impose burden on Courts and admin).
3 requirements to be satisfied [KA Jeyaretnam v AG [2014]]:
A. Leave: Material before the Court discloses an arguable case or a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of getting the remedies sought by A;
B. Susceptibility to JR: the subj matter of the complaint is susceptible to JR; and
C. Locus Standi: A has sufficient interest in the matter.
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review -
Leave
- Courts aim to strike balance b/w not allowing frivolous cases to go forward but at the same time, recognising the early stages of the proceedings (i.e. not wanting to go into a full hearing straight away).
- Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294
A must establish prima facie case of reasonable suspicion. Courts will examine materials quickly and decide if threshold is satisfied. - Public Service Commission v Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133: Leave will be granted if there appears to be a point which might, on further consideration, turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to A the relief claimed.
- Teng Fuh Holdings Pte Ltd v Collector of Land Revenue [2006] 3 SLR(R) 507: T owned land which SLA acquired for public purpose in 1983. 22 years later, T (licensee) applied for a quashing order of SLA’s declaration of acquisition as done in bad faith since the land acquired by SLA was subsequently rezoned for residential purposes after 22 years of inaction.
Held: Leave can only be granted if T can establish an arguable case or a prima facie case of “reasonable suspicion” of bad faith. On the facts, T just wanted to take advantage of land value if it was used for residential purposes rather than for public purposes.
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review -
Susceptibility to JR (General)
- Issue of whether the case is appropriate for O53 as a matter of procedure.
- Creates specifics to the procedure to prevent frivolous and vexatious claims to promote an element of finality of decision-making by administration and a level of legal certainty. - Action must be brought under O53 for public law cases, and cannot use civil procedures to evade procedural protections (O’Reilly v Mackman [1992]), e.g. avoiding the time limit of 3 months by attempting to sue in contract.
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review -
Susceptibility to JR -
Is it a public law case?
[UDL Marine v Jurong Town Corporation [2011] 3 SLR 94]
[UDL leased land from JTC, applied to renew its lease. JTC informed UDL that it would not be renewing the lease. UDL applied for a quashing order, claiming that JTC exercised its discretionary power irrationally, and that JTC had breached rules of natural justice or had failed to give effect to UDL’s legitimate expectations.]
A. Source of Power test:
1. Is the public body that is making the decision, making the decision under some form of statutory framework or statutory power? Or, are they making the decision under contract?
a. UDL Marine v Jurong Town Corporation [2011]:
Held: When JTC decided not to renew UDL’s renewal applications, it was exercising its private contractual rights under the lease. The source of JTC’s powers to stipulate the factors, and its application of those factors to reach its decisions lay in the lease.
b. Public Service Commission v Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001]: Lai was on 1 year’s probation as Sr Officer in Land Office in MinLaw in Nov 1996. She received a good appraisal after the first year; and cfm’n of permanent tenure due by Nov 1997. Lai told that cfm’n would be a formality. She then alleged to her immediate superior shortcomings in 2 sr officers. Lai received adverse reports and her probationary period extended by a year. After probation, employment terminated. Applied for leave to apply for quashing order and mandatory order under O53. Rubin J granted leave bc there was a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion and matters fell within public law. PSC argued that the case was not susceptible to JR, on the basis that the case was a matter of private law as it involved contractual rights.
Held: Court found that the case was not amenable for JR as parties were essentially dealing with employment dispute under the employment contractual documents that parties had entered into.
c. Tey Tsun Hang v NUS [2015] SGHC 7: Simply establishing that NUS is a public body in one particular context does not make all its decisions susceptible to JR. On the facts, the r/s b/w NUS and Tey was purely contractual.
B. Nature of Decision-making Power:
a. UDL Marine v Jurong Town Corporation [2011]: Nature of decision-making power test requires Court to consider whether R’s decision involved an exercise of public law functions.
Held: Power exercised by JTC to lease land was a private act, not a public law function, since granting leases was “not something a private individual would not be capable of doing”.
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review -
Locus Standi -
Need for a ‘real’ interest - must establish a particular connection with the case
- Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v AG [2013] 4 SLR 1: Law on locus standi is as follows:
a. Must be a public duty which has been breached, w/o such a breach there can be no qn of whether A has standing or not.
b. Where this public duty generates correlative private rights or public rights, A would have locus standi.
c. BUT, in the rare case where a non-correlative rights-generating public duty is breached, and the breach is of sufficient gravity such that it would be in the public interest for Courts to hear the case, A without rights may have locus standi as well, at the discretion of Courts. - Eng Foong Ho v AG (SG CA): Locus standi requirements are to be the same across the different remedies sought, regardless of their historical roots.
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review -
Locus Standi -
Challenge in relation to personal right
- Tan Eng Hong v AG [2012] 4 SLR 476: Not enough for A to show that he had possessed a personal right; he also had to show a violation of that personal right.
- Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v AG [2013]: Appropriate test for determining standing turns on the nature of the rights at stake. Although, regardless of whether it is public or private right, it can be a personal right that can be prosecuted by private citizens, even if the rights are shared with other people.
Preliminary Matters:
Leave for Judicial Review -
Locus Standi -
Public right and special damage
- Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG [2014] 1 SLR 345: J challenged a discharge of public duty under the constitution where there was no corresponding violation of a consti right.
Held: Must show some form of special dmg to demo his particular standing to commence JR proceedings.
Court also recognised and emphasised that there is no freestanding public interest type of standing applicable (unless there is egregious or serious illegality). - Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v AG [2013]: Possible to find locus standi where A asserts no more than a public right which is shared in common with other citizens, however, standing accrues only if there is a nexus b/w A and the desired remedy that has been established by demo-ing ‘special dmg’.
a. “Special Damage”: A who asserts public right must demo that his personal interests are directly and practically affected over and above the general class of persons who hold that right, but need not go so far as to show that he is the only person affected. - Tey Tsun Hang v NUS [2015] SGHC 7: Impugned Decisions were not susceptible to JR as they were purely contractual in nature, as b/w employer and employee. Further, they did not involve an exercise of any public law function.
Preliminary Matters:
Exhaustion of Internal Remedies
JR should be seen only as a last-resort remedy (exhaust all means before going to Court).
a. Borissik Svetlana v URA [2009] 4 SLR (R) 92: BS and H dissatisfied with URA’s decision to reject her app for redev of a semi-detached house and for its replacement with a detached bungalow. BS had obtained leave for a mandatory order to quash decision.
Held: App dismissed as BS failed to exhaust remedies before coming to Court.
b. Chiam See Tong v SDP [1993] 3 SLR (R) 774: Chiam convicted in a CEC disciplinary hearing and expelled from the party. Party consti provided for appeal to ordinary party conference. Chiam applied for a declaration and injunction against Ds who argued that Chiam had not exhausted internal remedies.
Held: Exceptional circumstances are needed for Court to allow app for JR without exhausting all the remedies.
** A is obliged to pursue alternative remedies if they are effective in dealing with specific issues (subject to Courts’ discretion).
Grounds of Review:
5 Grounds for JR
[GCHQ [1985] (UK HL)]
- Illegality
a. Relevant/irrelevant Considerations;
b. Propriety of purpose;
c. Not exceeding powers;
d. Preventing fetters on discretion; and
e. Non-abrogation of power. - Irrationality
a. Reasonableness - Wednesbury Test;
b. No duty to disclose reasons;
c. Conditions to adopt gen policy into guidelines; and
d. JR limited to procedure. - Proportionality (not applicable in SG)
- Bad Faith
- Procedural Impropriety
a. Fair Hearing;
b. Actual Bias; and
c. Apparent Bias.
Grounds of Review:
5 Grounds for JR -
Illegality -
Relevant Considerations
- Courts will ensure that the Exec has properly understood the stat parameters in which they are operating (cannot operate beyond its powers).
- Relevant/irrelevant Considerations: In exercising stat powers, Exec has only taken into acc relevant considerations and not irrelevant considerations. Cannot under consider or over consider.
a. Ramalingan Ravinthran v AG [2012] 2 SLR 49: Issue was related to exercise of PP discretion.
Held (CA): AG is entitled to take into acc myriad factors in determining whether to charge an offender, and for what offence to charge.
b. Tan Seet Eng v AG [2015] SGCA 59: Illegality serves the purpose of examining whether decision-maker has exercised his discretion within the scope of his authority. Inquiry is into whether he has exercised his discretion in good faith according to the stat purpose for which the power was granted, and whether he has taken into acc irrelevant considerations or failed to take acc of relevant considerations.
Grounds of Review:
5 Grounds for JR -
Illegality -
Propriety of Purpose
- When Parliament is delegating powers to an admin, it is doing so for a particular purpose and in pursuit of a proper purpose (i.e. can only use stat powers for which it is created).
- Admin measure just needs to be incidental to statute’s purpose: PP v MM Pillay [1977 – 1978] SLR(R) 45: S90 Road Traffic Act provides that Minister may make any rules “generally for the purpose of carrying this Act into effect” and the long title reads “for the regulation of traffic”. D drove into restricted zone during restricted hours w/o obtaining area licence. D was charged, argued that the rules were ultra vires to s90 RTA, claiming that the Minister did not have power under s90 RTA to make rules that prohibit vehicles from using any road except upon obtaining the area licence through payment of fees
Held: Such rules within the Minister’s powers as were conferred by s90 RTA. The imposition of a fee for entering the area was the means adopted to achieve the desired purpose and was merely incidental thereto (of preventing motor congestion).
Grounds of Review:
5 Grounds for JR -
Illegality -
Not exceeding powers
Cannot act ultra vires (as per PP v MM Pillay [1977 – 1978]).