Session 9 Flashcards

1
Q

How is the European electricity market structured?

A

Geographically structured in bidding zones.

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2
Q

What are Interconnectors? What indicates the capacity utilization rate of an interconnector?

A

Interconnectors
* Bidding Zones are linked with “interconnectors”
* If interconnector capacity is not fully used, prices equalize across zones (price convergence)
* If interconnectors are congested, prices diverge between zones
* Reverse is also true: if prices diverge, interconnectors must be congested

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3
Q

Defining market splitting

A

Splitting an existing zone into two or more zones

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4
Q

Who has what opinion about splitting the German market?
What problems would come along with it?

A
  • The EU Commission is strongly in favor
  • The German government is strongly against

Problems
* Distributional consequences: Southern industry would pay more
* Subsidy payments for Northern wind would increase, setback for merchant wind
* Determining the split is difficult and to some degree arbitrary

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5
Q

Does splitting zones only make sense if average prices differ from potential zone to potential zone?

A

Splitting a zone could even make sense if average prices are the same
* If hourly prices differ
Static, annual price signals could be derived from other instruments (say, grid fees)
* Dynamic, hourly signals are much harder to approximate
* Depend on current situation (demand / supply / congestion)

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6
Q

Low-carbon system needs local price signals: which signals are there on what levels?

A

Locational price signals
* Dispatch: storage, electrolysis, EVs
* Investment: wind, solar, electrolysis, hydrogen

Transmission grid
* Bidding zone split

Distribution grid
* Granular grid fees → Network Charges session
* DSOs are a real problem for the transition

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7
Q

How to link zonal markets?
+ how is trade between market zones organised? (+Two crucial questions)

A

With Market Coupling!

How is the trade between bidding zones organized?
* “Cross-border (XB) trade”
* Two crucial questions: capacity calculation and capacity allocation

Cross-border capacity allocation
* Who should be allowed to trade?
* Which market segmentis allowed to use the capacity?
* How is the capacity priced?
* Explicit vs. implicit market coupling

Cross-border capacity calculation
* How much import/ export can and should be allowed? (NTC vs. flow-based)

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8
Q

Cross-border capacity allocation
+2 forms of market coupling

A

Cross-border capacity allocation:
* Who should be allowed to trade?
* Which market segmentis allowed to use the capacity?
* How is the capacity priced?
* Explicit vs. implicit market coupling

1. Explicit market coupling
* Capacity is sold to market parties in dedicated (“explicit”) auctions – “book a slice of capacity”
* Compatible with OTC and PX, auctions and continuous trading
→ Inefficient trade (low-price to high-price zone), if parties have wrong expectations

2. Implicit market coupling
* Market parties do not explicitly trade internationally, but simply bid locally
* Exports / imports are determined by power exchanges simultaneously with matching demand and supply within a zone → Avoids inefficient trade

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9
Q

Cross-border capacity calculation

A

Cross-border capacity calculation:
* How much trade can and should be allowed? (NTC vs. flow-based)

1. Net transfer capacity (NTC)
* TSO pre-determine import/export capacity
* “Tomorrow’s DE-FR capacity: 5GW”
* Not trivial because of pre-loading of IC

2. Flow-based market coupling (FBMC)
* Import/export capacity is determined while accounting for the impact of trade on loading of all “critical network elements”
* These include, but are not limited to interconnectors
→ Increased trade opportunities

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10
Q

NTC-based market coupling (capacity calculation) -> How is the capacity assessed in practice?

NTC = net transfer capacity

A

Market clearing algorithm maximizes international welfare
* For given demand and supply curves
* Subject to fixed constraints (MW) on each zonal border

Terminology
* Available transfer capacity (ATC) for the day-ahead auction
* Net transfer capacity (NTC) available to all market stages (including financial markets)

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11
Q

(If) NTCs are determined by TSOs ahead of time: 2 Problems

A
  • Problem 1: pre-loading of interconnectors (“loop flows” and other unscheduled flows)
  • Problem 2: reducing load flow on internal lines by reducing NTC (“move congestion to the border”)
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12
Q

FBMC / Flow-based market coupling (3)

A

1. effects on other borders
“Merging zonal with nodal pricing”
* Represent grid constraints more realistically in the market clearing
- Allow more trade than NTC

Accounting for the effects on other ICs
* Exports from Germany to France impact not only the FR-DE interconnectors, but others, too
* Market-clearing algorithms accounts for these impacts

  1. Critical network elements:
    * Not only interconnectors are considered as constraints
    * But all critical network elements – those that are both heavily loaded and strongly affected by international trade
  2. Generation shift keys (GSK):
    * Where is a marginal generator (and load) located within the bidding zone?
    * In practice, rough approximations may be used (e.g., even distribution across the bidding zone)
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13
Q

The Clean Energy Package 70% rule

A

Rule: Every lines needs to keep 70% of capacity available for international trade

Cross-border capacity can be adjusted to relief within-zone congestion, e.g.
* Strong wind generation in Norther Germany → internal grid congestion
* Strong wind generation in Denmark→low spot price in Denmark→exports to Germany
* → Reducing the import capacity at the DK-DE border reduces line overload inside Germany

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14
Q

What are drivers of network congestion today? (4)

A
  1. Expansion of wind power (huge capacity installed because of low number of FLH)
  2. Fading effects of regional monopolies (integrated utilities invested in local supply)
  3. International market integration (increase in imports and exports)
  4. Yet to come: new consumers (E-mobility, heat pumps)
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15
Q

Redispatch:
- definition
- how it works

A

Definition of redispatch
“The rescheduling of generation and controllable demand by TSO(s) within a bidding zone, in order to relieve congestion on certain network elements.”

How redispatch works
* Reduce generation in oversupplied region (“before/upstream the constraint”)
* Increase generation in undersupplied region (“behind/downstream the constraint”)
* Hence, redispatch is locational in nature → load flow sensitivities

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16
Q

Redispatch vs. balancing

A
  • Redispatch does not affect the system-wide demand-supply balance – this is done through balancing services
  • In fact, most European TSOs handle redispatch and balancing as an integrated process and use the same resources for both
17
Q

To whom and through what law is redispatch in GER applicable?

A
  • Redispatch for conventional plants
  • Einspeisemanagement (EinsMan) for plants under support scheme (RE curtailment)
18
Q

Mandatory redispatch with cost-based compensation
How does it work? (4)

A
  • Congestion management is ordered by TSO or DSO
  • Power plants are legally obliged participate (mandatory)
  • Plant owners are compensated for costs and forgone profits (economically indifferent)
  • We want to avoid any incentives to provoke or prevent being redispatch
19
Q

network reserve
- (comprehensive) definition
- what is needed

A
  • TSOs can contract power stations scheduled for mothballing or decommission, already mothballed plants, or plants
    outside Germany for a grid reserve to be used as capacity available for upward redispatch
  • German plants are compensated for the costs of reactivating plants and keeping them operational
  • Power plants outside Germany are contracted on a voluntary basis and are compensated according to bilateral agreements
  • Downward redispatch is not a problem (there is always sufficient capacity to turn down)
  • Upward redispatch is a problem (Lack of capacity to ramp up)
20
Q

Effect of splitting zones on redispatch costs

A

Splitting zones reduces redispatch costs
* Smaller zone mean less congestion …
* … hence less redispatch

Splitting zones creates congestion income for TSOs
* Trade volumes x price spread
* This income can be used to reduce grid fees further

21
Q

Voluntary markets for redispatch
- the idea
- desired effect

A

The idea:
* System operators buy upward / downward redispatch
* Generators, consumers, storage owners can participate – voluntarily
* They are compensated based on bids for activation
* These markets must be (near) nodal in spatial granularity

Desired effect: Redispatch markets…
* … incentivize consumers and decentralized assets to participate
* … turn networks into smart grids – coordinate everything from heating to batteries
* ..help avoiding expensive and complicated grid expansion
* … save zonal European wholesale markets

22
Q

Redispatch markets: A mechanism … (5)

A

… to avoid/relief congestion in the distribution and/or transmission grid
… through redispatching generation / loads / storage
… with voluntary participation
… with compensation based on bids
… for delivery of energy (rather than availability or capacity)

23
Q

Problems of market-based redispatch (2)

A

Locational market power
* Some generators/loads are much more effective at solving any given congestion than all others
* Usual problems of market power: inflated prices at cost of rate payers

Strategic bidding
* Repercussions (=Auswirkungens) on the zonal electricity market
* This is different from market power! (but mutually enforcing)

24
Q

Strategic bidding with market-based redispatch

A

Two-stage market
* First stage: zonal spot market
* Second stage: locational redispatch market

Generators in the oversupplied region
* Anticipate they will be paid for ramping down – if they are available (i.e., producing)
* Bid below variable cost in spot to be eligible for downward redispatch

Generators in the scarcity region
* Anticipate they will be paid for ramping up – if they are available (i.e., not producing)
* Bid above variable cost (“withhold capacity”)

Generators have an incentive for strategic bidding
* This has a number of problematic consequence, e.g. it aggravates congestion

25
Q

Consequences from inc-dec gaming / strategic bidding (5)

A

Congestion is aggravated
* Higher redispatch volume
* Volumes (supply and demand) is shifted from spot market to redispatch – but redispatch does not reach all market parties, in
particular outside Germany

Windfall profits
* Profits of generators increase, consumers pay more (mostly through grid charge)

Problematic for financial markets
* Hedging based on spot markets no longer possible (RDM will become “lead” market)

Perverse investment incentives
* “Ghost” plants which are built but never produce

Two market stages with differing locational resolution: Inconsistent
* Feedback effects: spot is not independent from redispatch market

26
Q

Inc-dec gaming as arbitrage trading

A

Market parties exploit arbitrage between two markets
* Zonal electricity market vs. locational redispatch market
* “Buy cheap, sell expensive”

In this case, arbitrage trade does not make prices converged
* Gaming creates the demand for redispatch itself

27
Q

Requirements for inc-dec gaming / strategic bidding (3)

A

No market power needed
* No market power, no collision required for inc-dec gaming
* Fostering competition will not make inc-dec gaming go away
* Not a violation of competition law or balancing responsibilities

Some foresight of congestion required
* Currently in Germany: structural congestion can be quite easily predicted
* Each call-up is an opportunity to learn and calibrate: 8760 opportunities a year

All forms of local “extra” markets are concerned
* Pay-asbidisnosolution
* Loadscanalsobidstrategically
* Distribution grids: potentially even worse than transmission grid

28
Q

Mitigating inc-dec gaming will always be difficult because … ?

A

Regulation will always diminish the benefits of market-based redispatch
* Regulating bids will decrease the incentives

Various strategies for regulatory mitigation have been proposed
* Decrease transparency → would be harmful, roll back transparency legislation
* Increase competition → does not avoid inc-dec gaming
* Regulate bids → severe information asymmetry – same as for cost-based redispatch

29
Q

How about forbidding inc-dec?

A

It’s economically questionable:
- Inc-dec is the strategy of profit maximizing firms (they simply price in opportunity costs)
- Forbidding inc-dec means discriminating between generators:
* Low-cost plants (“in the money”) would be denied the locational rent
* Expensive plants (“out of the money”) would reap locational rent
- Distorted investment incentives: Incentive to build less efficient plants

30
Q

How locational signals work (in the grid)

A
  • Locational incentives relieve networks by changing how grid users behave (where they build assets and how they run them)

Impact on dispatch:
* Increase generation / reduce consumption where electricity is scarce
* Decrease generation / increase consumption where electricity is abundant
* Scarcity and abundance are highly dynamic and depend on current (weather / consumption) pattern
- Impact on investment
* Additional generation investments in scarcity regions
* Additional consumption investments in abundance regions

31
Q

Do batteries (help) relieve the network?

A

Depends on the correlation of price and congestion

32
Q

When do pure investment incentives make sense? (2)

A

They make sense if these conditions are fulfilled:
* Assets are flexible with respect to location decision (electrolysis, solar power) – otherwise it has no effect (residential flexibility)
* Assets are little price responsive (base load, solar) – otherwise dispatch might run counter grid constraints (batteries)

33
Q

per kW vs. per kWh instruments: Impact on different technologies

A

Some extra instruments are specified per kW installed capacity (e.g., connection charges, capacity mechanisms)

Others are specified in per kWh terms (e.g., renewables support schemes, grid usage fees)

This has different implications for different technologies
* Capacity payments have a stronger impact on assets with fewer running hours
* Energy payments have a stronger impact on assets with more running hours