Sequential Games Flashcards

1
Q

How does a Sequential game work?

A
Players do NOT choose Simultaneously
- Player 2 can Observe Player 1s move
Payoffs = u1(a1,a2) and u2(a1,a2)
- Payoffs are Common Knowledge
Dynamic games w/ Complete + Perfect Info
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2
Q

What is the main Issue with Dynamic Games?

A

Credibility

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3
Q

Why is Credibility an issue for Dynamic Games?

A

Player 2s Best Response may offer no incentive for Player 1 to adopt different Strategy

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4
Q

How do you find the Solution to a Sequential game?

A

Backwards Induction
- Work from End Result to first decision
- How does Stage n-1 react to Solution…
How does Stage 1 react to best decision in Stage 2

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5
Q

What is a Stackelberg Model of Duopoly?

A

Dominant Firm moves first- chooses Output

Follower firm moves second- chooses Output based on q1

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6
Q

How would Stackelberg be solved?

A

Backwards Induction
1 . Solve max π2 = q2 (a - q1 - q2 - c) Using Product Rule
=> Gives Firm 2 Reaction Function - q2* = (a - q1 - c)/2
2 . Sub. q2* into max π1 = q1 (a - q1 - q2* - c)
- Solves for q1*
3 . Sub. q1* into q2* => Outcome is q1* and q2*

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7
Q

What 3 things are always True for Stackelberg?

A
  1. Aggregate Quantities of Stackelberg > Aggregate Quantities in NE of Cournot
  2. Market Price in Stackelberg < Market Price in Cournot
  3. Firm 1 better off in Stackelberg than Cournot
    - Firm 2 worse off than in Cournot
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8
Q

What can Sequential Games with Simultaneous Moves cause?

A

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

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9
Q

What is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)?

A

List of Strategies for each player, which yield a NE in every Subgame of the game

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10
Q

If Players 1 + 2 make decision- then Players 3 + 4 Observe then make decision- how is SPE found?

A

Backwards Induction
1. Stage 2: Solve Simultaneous game between 3 + 4
2. Stage 1: Players 1 + 2 anticipate Stage 2 Solution + Simultaneously make decision based off Stage 2 result
SPE = decisions made by each player

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11
Q

When is a NE Subgame Perfect?

A

If Players Strategies constitute NE in every Subgame

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