Security & Threat Models Flashcards
Bell-LaPadula
Focus is on Data Confidentiality
state machine model = military
Data Access Controls
- MAC - mandatory access control
- ACM - access control matrix
- DAC - discretionary access control
- Non-discretionary access control
- MAC = permissions that are determined by org policy and need to know.
- ACM = rule based access control, is an example of non-discretionary. ACM is an ACL in the form of a table and columns.
- DAC = permissions set by the Data Owner (not org policy / need to know)
- Non-discretionary = permissions that are primarily set by the Administrator (not org policy / need to know).
SD3+C
Secure by Design
Secure by Default
Secure in Development & Communication
How to apply Threat Modeling
- Choose a threat modeling concept (STRIDE, VAST, etc.)
- Diagram potential attacks
Determine the potential attacks via a diagram of the elements involved: who each component + boundaries + data flow
How to apply Threat Modeling
- Choose a threat modeling concept (STRIDE, VAST, etc.)
- Diagram potential attacks
Determine the potential attacks via a diagram of the elements involved: who each component + boundaries + data flow
- Perform Reduction Analysis
AKA decomposing the app.
Reduction Analysis = IDENTIFY 5 key concepts:1. Trust Boundaries 2. Data flow paths 3. Input points 4. Privileged Operations = requires elevated permissions 5. Security stance / approach =
- Prioritize how to Respond = establish a threat prioritization chart
- Document the threats ascertained from the above
- Rank or rate each threat using:
- Probability X Damage Potential
- DREAD
- high/medium/low
Access Control Categories
Preventative = drug test, least privilege, IPS, firewalls, encryption
Detective = IDS, CCTV, alarms, anti-virus
Corrective = anti-virus, patches, IPS
Recovery = disaster recovery, backups, high availability
Deterrent = fences, dogs, lights, signs
Compensating = used when other controls (above) are too costly to implement
TCB / TCSEC
trusted computing base / trusted computer system evaluation criteria
US DoD standard
aka Orange Book
a combination of hardware, software and controls that work together to form a TCB for a security policy.
Components:
- Hardware & software elements
- Security Perimeter
- Reference Monitor & kernels
Composition theories
follows how data flows between systems rather than within an individual system.
Cascading = input for one system comes from another
Feedback = one system provides input to another, which reciprocates by reversing roles
Hookup = one system sends input to another but also sends to external
Protection Rings
oldie but a goodie, goes back to 1963
organizes code & components in an O/S into concentric rights within a runtime environment
0 = highest level of privilege, access anything = kernel / memory 1 = parts of O/S, apps that interact with kernel 2 = I/O drivers and system utilities - access peripheral devices 3 = user level programs / apps
Rings 0 - 2 == supervisory mode aka privilege mode aka system mode
Ring 3 == user mode
Accidental or intentional exploitations of vulnerabilities?
Threat Events
Biba Model
data integrity and lattice based
a common choice for commercial orgs (not military)
state machine model
Clark-Wilson Model
1987
data integrity
Subject - Program (or Interface) - Object
Brewer and Nash (aka Chinese Wall)
data isolation
prevents conflicts of interest.
State Machine Model
a system that is always secure no matter what state it’s in.
bela-lapadule
biba
Information Flow Model