Securities Flashcards
Duncan v McDonald
INDEFEASIBILITY
This case involved an underlying void contract due to forgery of a FIXED SUM MORTGAGE.
The court held that the security interest was nevertheless validated because the mortgage was registered.
Held registration of a fixed sum mortgage gives indefeasible title over the charge but does not impose any personal obligations on the defrauded person (true RO cannot be sued).
Held you get indefeasible title immediately upon registration (Frazer v Walker applies to mortgages because they are an interest in land).
Held that bank gets worthless rights where the mortgage is not registered.
Westpac Banking Corporation v Clark
2010, SC (NZ)
INDEFEASIBILITY
Solicitor forged a ALL OBLIGATIONS mortgage and westpac granted the loan.
Court held that the security interest is not validated because the mortgage referred to over “anything you owe” which did not apply to client because was forged (you is not them).
Recognised that bold drafting by bank may preclude this and allow their charge to be validated regardless of such circumstances.
Coltart
Holder of an option to purchase has a right to redeem.
Tart v Tart
Tenant has a right of redemption
Peace v Morris
Unconditional contract has a right of redemption (comes off purchase price).
Kreiglinger v New Patagonia Meat
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION / CLOGS
Wool brokers lent money with a condition that they get ROFR over all sheepskin sold by the company. The company paid off the loan.
Held that wool brokers still entitled to their right of first refusal because it formed no part of the mortgage transaction (it was in substance different). There is no principle that prevents the doctrine of clog because the collateral advantage was created at a different time than the equity of redemption.
Set out three categories where doctrine of clogs applies: where collateral condition is unconscionable, penal or repugnant.
It is essential, in any case to which the rule is said to apply, to consider whether or not the transaction is in substance a transaction of mortgage.
–> held that if the clause was part of a seperate transaction between the same parties, it would not be considered a clog.
Jones v Morgan
Morgan’s were unable to make payments for building contract to develop farmhouse in to nursing home. Jones, their neighbour gave them a loan in 1994 secured by a mortgage over the farm buildings. The loan was not enough to cover all expenses so in 1997 negotiated to sell some of farm land, needed approval of Jones, Jones gave consent conditional to extra condition that he gets purchase money and a half share/interest in the retained land.
Held that the 1997 condition made after he 1994 mortgage was not in substance and in fact independent to the original bargain and therefore SI can extent to the collateral.
Held that would be artificial to regard 1997 and 1994 agreements are independent because the 1997 agreement sought to give effect the intention of the 1994 mortgage.
Lockwood Buildings Limited v Trust Bank Canterbury
1995, COA (NZ)
MORTGAGEE TRESPASS
Showroom became fixture of land that Trust Bank had mortgage over. The Bank had security over land and then Lockwood trespassed and removed the showroom reducing value of land.
Held that Trust Bank can sue Lockwood for trespass.
Regards position of a mortgagee to be analogous to that of a reversioner. Therefore even though mortgagee does not have possession or immediate right to possession they can nevertheless sue in trespass for a loss suffered as the result of a permanent damage to the reversion.
Lockwood committed a trespass by removing the show home which permanently damage Trust Banks security in a manner causing it loss.
In light of this it is possible Cousins v Wilson may be decided differently because a purchaser similarly has economic interest like mortgagee.
JS Brooksbank
2009, COA (NZ)
INVALID SI
JS supplied wool to company which went into receivership. JS accidently supplied some wool to company before conditions of the supply agreement were met and receivers took control of it.
held cannot claim security over the wool because delivery was made prior to appellant receiving cleared funds it had occurred by error hence, respondent company had not obtained possession and appellant retained title to mistakenly delivered wool.
COA held that PPSA did not apply as it wasn’t a conditional sale and secured no performance of an obligation.
Conversion claim was unsuccessful.
ANZ security interest had not attached to the wool (not a valid colleterial advantage).
Mere possession does not give rise to a SI in the context of a mistaken delivery.
Bloodstock
2006, COA (NZ)
ATTACHMENT
NZB owned stallion called Generous. NZB entered into conditional sale agreement to lease Generous for 3 years and then at end of the period they can purchase (titled remained with NZB until the purchase). Leasee granted security over all its assets to Glen, defaulted on obligations and receivers claimed possession of Generous. A few years earlier leasees of Generous had granted Lock a security over all their present and after acquired property.
Held that Lock has security over Generous.
Glen had not registered security - so Lock held priority.
Held that the moment Glen got rights in new property the security attached to that property as well.
Portacom NZ
2004, HC (NZ)
Under section 16 leases are deemed to create security interests - therefore can attach to a perfected SI as after acquired property.
Polymers International Limited v Toon
2013, HC (NZ)
FINANCING STATEMENT
Test of “seriously misleading” is whether the error would prevent a registration being disclosed by a properly formatted search in the relevant searchable field - this is objective (does not take into account any subjective knowledge).
Confirms that a misspelt name is seriously misleading because it is a searchable field.
Service Foods
2006, HC (NZ)
FINANCING STATEMENT
Service Foods granted security over food supply and proceeds from sales. Westpac registered financing statement that they had security interest over all present and after acquired property.
Held not seriously misleading because the information on the type of security is not a searchable field. Therefore does not inhibit the ability to find the statement.
Held that was is misleading is the ability to find a statement, not the contents of the statement.
Statements that are over broad does not negate ability for the state to be searched and found.
Partners Finance v Richmond
2019, HC (NZ)
FINANCING STATEMENT
Financing statement over a Bulldozer was classified as a good: other, rather than a good: motor vehicle.
Held this is seriously misleading. Used Polymers test - held that was misleading because under the goods: other search field the identification number of the bulldozer was not found.
Held that having knowledge is irrelevant.
Gray v Royal Bank of Canada
1997, SC (UK)
NEMO DAT
Mr Smith owned van with perfected SI over it. He sold van to Gray and security remained. Gray then made arrangements with M who would pay off security and lease the van. M fraudulently grants another security over the van. M sells van to H, who then granted security interest to bank.
Held that Gary (who is still the owner) is not subject to the banks SI.
Accepted that nemo dat reasoning applies.
Held that H had a fair right of possession which is good against all the world except the rightful owner. Therefore the SI is valid but subject to Gary’s ownership. Therefore, Gray wins.
(if anyone else made claim against the van, the bank would win).