Section 5. Freedom of Religion Flashcards

1
Q

What is the Supreme Court’s opinion on divorce? (Republic v Manalo, 2018)

A
  • To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated
  • The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
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2
Q

What is Article 3 Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution

A

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

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3
Q

What is the non-establishment clause?

A

The non-establishment clause prohibits legislation [and all governmental act]
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefers one over another

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4
Q

What is the free exercise clause?

A

Freedom to believe and to act in accordance with such belief.

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5
Q

Distinguish fully between the “free exercise of religion clause” and the
“non-establishment of religion clause”

A

The non-establishment of religion clause prohibits legislation which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefers one over another. While the freedom of exercise of religion entails the right to believe, which is absolute, and the right to act on one’s belief, which is subject to
regulation. As a rule, the freedom of exercise of religion can be restricted
only if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the
state has the right to prevent. (Iglesia ni cristo v. CA, 259 SCRA 529.)

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6
Q

What is prohibited by the non-establishment clause?

A
  1. The State cannot organize a religion [no state religion].
  2. It cannot promote one religion or all religions.
  3. It cannot support a religious activity with public funds.
  4. It cannot participate in the affairs of a religious organization
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7
Q

What are the Constitutional exceptions? (or those acts allowed by the
Constitution which apparently favor religion)

A

a. Art. VI., Sec. 28 (3) exemption from taxes (real property)
b. Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2) payment of tax money to ecclesiastics in the
armed forces – not only in armed forces but also in penal [?]
institutions (leprosarium, orphanage)
c. Art. XIV, Sec. 3 (3) – allows religious instructions in public
schools (subject to certain restrictions)

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8
Q

Tests for Allowable Aid to Religion (LEMON TEST)

A

ts for Allowable Aid to Religion (LEMON TEST)
1. The statute (or it may be any governmental act) must have a
secular legislative purpose;
Secular means worldly legislative purpose, not religious in nature.
2. The principal or primary effect is neither one that advances or
inhibits religion;
3. It must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman)

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9
Q

Facts: In 2014, the Philippine Postal Corporation issued a stamp
commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo’s (INC’s) Centennial Celebration. The design
of the stamp showed a photo of INC founder, the late Felix Y. Manalo with
the designation on the left side containing the words “Felix Y. Manalo, 1886-
1963 First Executive Minister of Iglesia ni Cristo”, with the Central Temple of
the religious group at the background. At the right side of Manalo’s photo is
the INC’s centennial logo which contained a torch enclosed by a two
concentric circles containing the words “IGLESIA Nl CRISTO CENTENNIAL
1914-2014”. Based on the MOA entered between the PHILPOST
(governmental entity) and INC, the latter will shoulder the expenses for the
printing 50,000 pieces of the stamps, while the 1,250,000 will be paid by
PHILPOST.
Issue: Does this violate the “non-establishment clause?”

A

Held: No. The “Lemon Test” is used to adjudge whether the assailed
governmental act violated the “non-establishment clause” as follows: (1) The
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) Its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) The
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
In this case the printing of the stamps, has a secular purpose, which is to
acknowledge the INC’s existence for a hundred years, and its founder’s
contribution to Philippine history and culture. It does not equate to the State
sponsoring the INC. It is no different from other stamps issued by PHILPOST
acknowledging persons and events of significance to the country. We note
that the PHILPOST has also issued stamps for the Catholic Church such as
those featuring Heritage Churches, 15th International Eucharistic Congress,
and Pope Francis. In the past, the Bureau of Posts also printed stamps celebrating 300 years of Islam in the 1980s. Finally, other than this single
transaction with INC, this Court did not find PHILPOST to have been
unnecessarily involved in INC’s affairs

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10
Q

Facts: One aspect of the case is that the COMELEC refused to register under
the Party List system this organization of gays, lesbians, transexuals and
bisexuals on the ground that this is immoral.
And Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbian, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). In 2006, Ang Ladlad applied for accreditation with the COMELEC as
a sectoral party. COMELEC denied it. Part of the COMELEC Order stated:
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul
wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women
did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise
also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving
in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
Issue: Is the denial valid?

A

Held: NO. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion,”
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.

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11
Q

Facts: The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since the use of contraceptives contravenes their religious beliefs.
Is the RH law valid?

A

Held: Yes. In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the
State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.

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12
Q

2000, No. 8. Madlangbayan is the owner of a 500 square meter lot which
was the birthplace of a religious sect who admittedly played an important
role in Philippine history and culture. The National Historical Commission
passed a resolution declaring it a national landmark and on its recommendation the lot was subjected to expropriation proceedings [the
NHC purchased it with public money]. This was opposed by Madlangbayan
on the following grounds …(b) that those to be benefited by the expropriation would only be the members of the religious sect of its founder. Resolve the opposition. [Does this violate the non-establishment clause?]

A

The arguments of Madlangbayan are not meritorious.
According to Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996), the power
of eminent domain is not confined to expropriation of vast tracts of the land.
The expropriation of the lot to preserve it as the birthplace of the founder of
the religious sect because of his role in Philippine history and culture is for a
public purpose, because public use is no longer restricted to the traditional
concept. The fact that the expropriation will benefit the members of the
religious sect is merely incidental. The fact that other birthplaces have not
been expropriated is likewise not a valid basis for opposing the expropriation.
As held in J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31
SCRA 413 (1970), the expropriating authority is not required to adhere to the policy of “all or none”.

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13
Q

: Recognizing the value of education in making the Philippine
labor market attractive to foreign investment, the DECS offers subsidies to
accredited colleges and universities in order to promote quality education.
The DECS grants subsidy to a Catholic school which requires its students to
take at least 3 hours a week of religious instruction.
1. Is the subsidy permissible?
2. Presuming that you answer in the negative, would it make a difference
if the subsidy were given solely in the form of laboratory equipment in
chemistry and physics?
3. Presume, on the other hand, that the subsidy is given in the form of
scholarship vouchers given directly to the student and which the
student can use for paying tuition in any accredited school of his choice,
whether religious or non-sectarian. Will your answer be different?

A

1) No, the subsidy is not permissible. It will foster religion, since the school
gives religious instructions to its students. Besides, it will violate the
prohibition in Section 29[2J, Article VI of the Constitution against the use of
public funds to aid religion. In Lemon vs Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, it was held
that financial assistance to a sectarian school violates the prohibition against
the establishment of religion if it fosters an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Since the school requires its students to take at
least three hours a week of religious instructions, to ensure that the financial
assistance will not be used for religious purposes, the government will have
to conduct a continuing surveillance. This involves excessive entanglement
with religion.
2) If the assistance would be in the form of laboratory equipment in chemistry
and physics, it will be valid. The purpose of the assistance is secular, i.e., the
improvement of the quality of tertiary education. Any benefit to religion is
merely incidental. Since the equipment can only be used for a secular
purpose, it is religiously neutral. As held in Tilton vs. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, it will not involve excessive government entanglement with religion, for the use of the equipment will not require surveillance.
3) In general, the giving of scholarship vouchers to students is valid. Section
2(3), Article XIV of the Constitution requires the State to establish a system
of subsidies to deserving students in both public and private schools.
However, the law is vague and over-broad. Under it, a student who wants to
study for the priesthood can apply for the subsidy and use it for his studies.
This will involve using public funds to aid religion

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14
Q

Two (2) aspects: Free exercise of religion is

A
  1. the freedom to believe, which is absolute; and
  2. the freedom to act, which may be restricted, in accordance with
    one’s beliefs.
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15
Q

Section 28. Title
VI, Chapter 9, of the Administrative Code of 1987 requires all educational
institutions to observe a simple and dignified flag ceremony, including the
playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem, pursuant to rules to be promulgated by the Secretary of Education. Culture and Sports. The refusal of a teacher, student or pupil to attend or participate in the flag ceremony is a ground for dismissal after due investigation. The Secretary of Education Culture and Sports issued a memorandum implementing said provision of law. As ordered, the flag ceremony would be held on Mondays at 7:30 a.m. during class days. A group of teachers, students and pupils requested the Secretary that they be exempted from attending the flag ceremony on the ground that attendance thereto was against their religious belief. The Secretary denied the request. The teachers, students and pupils concerned went to Court to have the memorandum circular declared null and void.
Decide the case.

A

The teachers and the students should be exempted from the flag ceremony. As held in Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 251 SCRA 569, to compel them to participate in the flag ceremony will violate their freedom of religion. Freedom of religion cannot be impaired except upon the showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a right to prevent. The refusal of the
teachers and the students to participate in the flag ceremony does not pose
a clear and present danger

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16
Q

Facts: This guy wanted to be excluded because his religion forbids him to
be a union member. If there is a close-shop agreement in a union of the
management, all employees can be forced to become a member of the union.
Issue: Can you force someone to join an organization under a “close-shop”
agreement?

A

Held: The SC stated that you can be given an exception for the reason that
freedom of religion is a fundamental right. What about a close-shop
agreement? It is only an aspect of property right, a contractual right. We
have learned before that there is such thing as hierarchy of rights.
So in case of conflict, since freedom of religion is a cherished right, a
fundamental right, it will be superior to the close-shop agreement. You
cannot be forced to become a member of the union despite the close-shop
agreement.

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17
Q
  1. What should be the state’s attitude towards religion?
A

A: The state’s attitude towards religion should be benevolent neutrality. The
non-establishing clause requires it to be neutral; but there is a qualification
that it has to be benevolent- which is one of accommodation.

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18
Q
  1. What test should be applied to justify the curtailment of freedom to act in
    accordance with one’s religion?
A

A: We apply the “Compelling interest test” meaning the court is applying the
strict scrutiny test because you apply “paramount and compelling”

19
Q
  1. Has it discharged the burden that it has a compelling interest to stop
    Escritor or to dismiss her from employment on the ground of immorality?
    Prejudice?
A

Held: The State’s attitude towards the church or religious matters should be
one of benevolent neutrality. This means that while separation is maintained,
it must not be hostile. But it must be benevolent, or one of accommodation,
since the Constitution considers religion as a cherished right.

Under the compelling interest test, the State is permitted to interfere in
religious practice, if it is able to show that it has an interest to protect which
is paramount and compelling. In this case, the State interest is in
protecting marriage as a social institution. But the bare claim that the couple’s
arrangement is destructive of this interest is not enough. The State must
articulate in specific terms the State’s interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious
freedom.

20
Q

Q: To prevent the spread of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the IATF
prohibited all religious activities in areas under Enhanced
Community Quarantine. Is that valid?

A

First issue: The freedom to act in accordance with your belief- freedom to
go to church during Covid.
Note that freedom to act is not absolute. The State can limit it if it has a
compelling interest, which in this case is health to prevent the spread of
disease, hence the State has a paramount interest in ensuring that Covid will
not spread.
Second issue: Is the rule narrowly tailored to protect the interest.
Judge believes it will fail. If the compelling interest of the State is health, the
rule should be narrowly tailored to protect that interest only and no rights
should be burdened.
If it prohibits it totally as in “No Movement Sunday” Judge believes it is too
burdensome. You can restrict the activity without endangering health; for
instance, observe social distancing, 30% capacity only since church buildings
are big and the ceilings too high the spread of the virus- danger is only
minimal.
This rule now is not narrowly tailored as it totally prohibits religious activitiesmeaning it does not really promote health at all. They can do something
about it to promote health without restricting other rights. Because again
Freedom of Religion is a cherished right according to this case of Escritor

21
Q

Q: Supposed I do not want to be vaccinated because it is against
my religion.

A

A: Judge believes it is possible to invoke the Freedom of Religion when one
does not want to be vaccinated because of his religion. Although the State
has a compelling interest in health, the right to Freedom of Religion is
superior.
Moreover, assuming that this religion is only 10% of the population and to
achieve herd immunity we need to inoculate 70%, this religion then now can say that the government should first inoculate the greater majority as theirs is relatively small. Hence, the rule should be narrowly tailored so as not to
sacrifice Freedom of Religion.
This next case should have been discussed under the non-establishment
clause, but the Supreme Court answered the question using the free exercise
clause.

22
Q

Does the holding of religious masses during noon breaks in the basement of
the Hall of Justice violate separation of church and state?

A

Held: No. The State’s policy towards religion is one of benevolent neutrality,
which allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is
not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive
authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic
masses at the basement.
Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith,
it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition,
without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers.
Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals
there.
Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic
chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its
faithful.
Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions

23
Q

Facts: Muslim employees in different courts of Iligan City made the following
request:
1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or
coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan;
2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.
Should the request be granted?

A

Held: The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday
Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the
observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary
to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break
during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291,
as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from
work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day,
during the entire calendar year. To allow the Muslim employees in the
Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution
of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be
rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service
rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other religious
denominations to request for similar treatment.

24
Q

Facts: The RH Law which promotes the use of contraceptives to control population growth exempts medical practitioners from providing advice or
services to patients if it runs contrary to their religious convictions. However,
the law requires the conscientious objector to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be
able to provide for the patient’s needs.
Does the provision violate the free exercise clause?

A

Held: Yes. The Court holds that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH
Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modern reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. Though it has been said that
the act of referral is an opt–out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro–life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

25
Q

Valmores was a first year student of the MSU College of Medicine and a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, whose fundamental beliefs goes into the strict observance if the Sabbath as sacred day. Between the
months of June to August 2014, some of petitioner Valmores’ classes and
examinations were moved from weekdays to Saturdays.[10] In one instance,
petitioner Valmores was unable to take his Histo-Pathology laboratory
examination held on September 13, 2015, a Saturday. Despite his request
for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of the respondents. As
a result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular
module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.
Respondents’ refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from Saturday classes and examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other Seventh-day Adventists who had successfully completed their studies at the
MSU-College of Medicine.
Hence, aggrieved by respondents’ lack of consideration, petitioner Valmores
elevated the matter before the CHED.[19] In an Indorsement dated January
6, 2015, the CHED Regional Office, referred the matter directly to the
President of MSU as well as respondent professor and requested that the
office be advised of the action thus taken.[20] In response, Dr. Macapado
Abaton Muslim (Dr. Muslim), President of MSU, instructed respondent
professor Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum

A

Ruling: There was a violation of freedom of religion. While in some cases
the Court has sustained government regulation of religious rights, the Court
fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by
the denial of petitioner Valmores’ request for exemption. Neither is there any showing that petitioner Valmores’ absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights of others. Precisely, the 2010 CHED Memorandum was issued to address such conflicts and prescribes the action to be taken by HEIs should such circumstance arise.
Respondents’ concerted refusal to accommodate petitioner Valmores rests
mainly on extra-legal grounds, which cannot, by no stretch of legal verbiage,
defeat the latter’s constitutionally-enshrined rights. That petitioner Valmores is being made by respondents to choose between honoring his religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such violation to perpetuate any further

26
Q

In an episode of Ang Dating Daan, Eliseo Soriano uttered the following
statement Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol
ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang
doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitcomplaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),2 against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
A Decision was rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, “Ang Dating Daan”.
Before the SC, Petitioner injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting
that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words like “putang babae” were said in exercise of his religious freedom

A

Ruling: The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in
question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987
Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints
expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed
evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger
and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements
respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert
the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept
that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion,
as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being
spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had
descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse.
Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.

27
Q

Religious disputes can either be inter-religious or intra-religious, what
should be the attitude of the State towards this?

A
  1. Between religious groups – It should be one of neutrality – In re Iglesia Ni Cristo (MTRCB giving an X rating programs of the Church which attacks other religions)
  2. Among members of same group (Taruc) If it involves
    ecclesiastical matters, the State or the court should not
    interfere. If non-ecclesiastical, then they can interfere.
    An ecclesiastical matter or religious affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement of
    regulation within the religious organization for the government of the
    membership and the power of excluding from such associations those
    deemed unworthy of membership
28
Q

Facts: Taruc and other members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC)
in Socorro, Surigao del Norte, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to
another parish because the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged to a political
party opposed to Taruc’s. Bishop de la Cruz found this too flimsy a reason
and denied the request.
During the town fiesta, Taruc arranged an open mass to be celebrated by a
certain Fr. Ambong, who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of
Surigao and whose credentials as a parish priest were in doubt. This was
done despite the numerous pleas and disapproval of Bishop Dela Cruz.
In 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared Taruc et al expelled/excommunicated
from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, Taruc et al filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC of Surigao
City, contending that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without
trial thus violating their right to due process of law.
Issue: W/N courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

A

Ruling: No. [CA decision] Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs
of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
possession of church property. Obviously, there was no violation of a civil
right in the present case.
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials,
and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
In Fonancier v CA, the court held: The amendments of the constitution,
restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration
alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having
reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly
unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.

29
Q

Facts: Ricardo R. Villaflor, Jr. was removed as a missionary of the Abiko
Baptist Church, his recommendation as a national missionary of the American
Baptist Association (ABA) was cancelled and he was excluded from
membership in the Abiko Baptist Church in Japan. As a consequence of his exclusion from the church, his appointment as instructor of the Missionary Baptist Institute and Seminary was terminated, and his salary was cut-off.
Claiming that he was dismissed from his employment without the benefit of
due process and valid cause, filed a complaint before the NLRC.
Issue: Does the NLRC have jurisdiction?

A

Held: No. The exclusion of membership from Abiko Baptist Church in Japan
and the cancellation of ABA recommendation as a national missionary are
ecclesiastical matters which this jurisdiction will not touch upon. These
matters are exclusively determined by the church in accordance with the
standards they have set. The Court cannot meddle in these affairs since the
church has the discretion to choose members who live up to their religious
standards. The same is true with his appointment as instructor of the
educational institution since it was by virtue of his membership with Abiko
Baptist Church. It is one of his duties as a missionary. He himself admitted
that he was teaching “bible history, philosophy, Christian doctrine, public
speaking, English and other religious subjects to seminarians in [MBIS
intending] to be [a] pastor/minister[.]” These subject matters and how they
prepare or educate their ministers are ecclesiastical in nature which the State
cannot regulate unless there is clear violation of secular laws. It follows,
therefore, that even his alleged exclusion as instructor is beyond the power of review by the State considering that this is purely an ecclesiastical affair.

30
Q

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It
is a national confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self-governing
Evangelical churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship,
mutual counsel and cooperation. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.
(BUCCI), is likewise a religious corporation with a personality separate and
distinct from UCCP.
UCCP has 3 governing bodies: the General Assembly, the Conference and the
Local Churches. BUCCI belonged to the Cebu Conference Inc. and enjoyed a
peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when the BUCCI constructed a fence
that encroached upon the right of way allocated by the UCCP for CCI.
The General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute and rendered a
decision in favor of CCI. This triggered a series of events, which further
increased enmity and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.
Consequently, BUCCI filed its amended Articles of Incorporation and ByLaws, which provided for and affected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC
approved the same.
UCCP filed a complaint before SEC a complaint/protest for
rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and Incorporation and Injunction.
UCCP also prayed for the disallowance of the continued use of BUCCI as
corporate name.
SEC dismissed UCCP’s petition and upheld the right of BUCCI to continue
using its corporate name.. UCCP now comes before the Court posing
ostensibly a question of law, that the determination of membership in UCCP
is a purely ecclesiastical affair, which theory strips SEC and the Court of
Appeals of any authority to rule on the issues voluntarily submitted to them
by UCCP itself for resolution.

A

RULING: The matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair.
The Court owes but recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal
right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious
corporation via legitimate means a secular matter well within the civil courts’
purview.
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary
franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all corporations. Even with their religious nature,
SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and
corporate.
UCCP cannot rely on the Court’s ruling as restated in Long v. Basa,
[36] that
“in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decisions of the proper church tribunals
are conclusive upon the civil tribunals.”[37] If in the case at bar, even with its
highest executive official’s pronouncement that BUCCI is still recognized as
its member-church,[38] UCCP could not compel BUCCI to go back to its fold,
then the alleged absolute ecclesiastical authority must not be there to begin
with.
In fact, Long may be viewed as supportive of respondents’ case. Said case
involved a church’s sole prerogative and power to expel its individual
members. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCI’s sole prerogative and
power as a church to disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions,
that may have religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the
Court must respect and cannot review. It is worth mentioning that
in Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,[39] the Court held that the amendments of
the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith
or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the
power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership,
are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of
the civil courts.

31
Q

Can courts review the decision of a church body?

A

GR: No.
* Exception:
a. It acted outside the scope of its authority or contrary to its
internal rules, and
b. It affects question of property ownership (violation of due
process, rules on quorum, or has no authority as provided in
its constitution)

32
Q

What is the rule on RELIGIOUS TEST

A

The Constitution requires that there shall be no religious test, meaning that
certain offices shall not be reserved for certain religions, or that certain offices
cannot be reserved for people who believe in God only, and atheists cannot
be denied opportunity to public service.
The purpose is to preserve the separation of the church and the State, for the reason that the State is not allowed to lay some standards as a
qualification for employment

33
Q

XVI, 2009. A. Angelina, a married woman, is a Division Chief in the
Department of Science and Technology. She had been living with a married
man, not her husband, for the last fifteen (15) years. Administratively
charged with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, she admits her live-in arrangement, but maintains that this conjugal understanding is in conformity with their religious beliefs. As members of the religious sect, Yahweh’s Observers, they had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which has been confirmed and blessed by their Council of Elders. At the formal investigation of the administrative case, the Grand Elder of the sect affirmed Angelina’s testimony and attested to the sincerity of Angelina and her partner in the profession of their faith. If you were to judge this case, will you exonerate Angelina? Reasons. (3%)

A

A: The State’s attitude should be one of accommodation. Following Escritor,
she can be exonerated because there is no compelling State interest that is
sought to be protected here why it should interfere with the arrangement. If
we allow the arrangement to go on because it was sanctioned by their elders,
it is so constrained in such a way that it will not be abused.

34
Q

B. Meanwhile, Jenny, also a member of Yahweh’s Observers, was severely
disappointed at the manner the Grand Elder validated what she considered
was an obviously immoral conjugal arrangement between Angelina and her
partner. Jenny filed suit in court, seeking the removal of the Grand Elder from
the religious sect on the ground that his act in supporting Angelina not only
ruined the reputation of their religion, but also violated the constitutional
policy upholding the sanctity of marriage and the solidarity of the family. Will
Jenny’s case prosper? Explain your answer. (2%)

A

A: Take note that this involves a religious matter. If the Church allows it as
part of their discipline, the State cannot interfere. This is an intra-religious
dispute between an elder and a member. Matters about membership are
ecclesiastical.
In fact they are quarreling about their doctrine now, whether the
arrangement is immoral or not. She was simply dissatisfied with the decision
of the elders. There are no. standards which the court can apply. She cannot
challenge this before the courts because there is no grounds to base the
decision if based on Church rules. The court should dismiss this for lack of
jurisdiction.

35
Q

2016, -XIX-. Fernando filed an administrative complaint against his coteacher, Amelia, claiming that the latter is living with a married man who is
not her husband. Fernando charged Amelia with committing “disgraceful and
immoral conduct” in violation of the Revised Administrative Code and, thus,
should not be allowed to remain employed in the government. Amelia, on
the other hand, claims that she and her partner are members of a religious
sect that allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by
their respective spouses to enter marital relations under a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness.” Having made such Declaration, she argues that she
cannot be charged with committing immoral conduct for she is entitled to
free exercise of religion under the Constitution.
[a] Is Amelia administratively liable? State your reasons briefly. (2.5%)

A

A: In actual practice, the State might have a compelling interest here.
Teachers should serve as examples to their students. They should be held on
to higher standards. This may also be answered by citing Escritor.
Amelia is not administratively liable. There is no compelling state interest that
justifies inhibiting the free exercise of religious beliefs. The means used by
the government to achieve its legitimate objective is not the least intrusive
means (Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 [2006]).

36
Q

[b] Briefly explain the concept of “benevolent neutrality.” (2.5%)

A

A: Benevolent neutrality means that with respect to governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be permitted to allow individual and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. That is sought is not a declaration unconstitutionality of the law but an exemption from its application. (Estrada
v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 [2006])

37
Q

No. 5: “X” is serving his prison sentence in
Muntinlupa. He belongs to a religious sect that
prohibits the eating of meat. He asked the
Director of Prisons that he be served with
meatless diet. The Director refused and “X”
sued the Director for damages for violating his
religious freedom. Decide.

A

Yes, the Director of Prison is liable under Article
32 of the Civil Code for violating the religious
freedom of “X”. According to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of O’Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400,
convicted prisoners retain their right to free
exercise of religion. At the same time, lawful
incarceration brings about necessary limitations
of many privileges and rights justified by the
considerations underlying the penal system. In
considering the appropriate balance between
these two factors, reasonableness should be
the test. Accommodation to religious freedom
can be made if it will not involve sacrificing the
interests of security and it will have no impact
on the allocation of the resources of the
penitentiary. In this case, providing “X” with a
meatless diet will not create a security problem
or unduly increase the cost of food being
served to the prisoners. In fact, in the case of O’
Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, it was noted that
the Moslem prisoners were being given a
different meal whenever pork would be served.

38
Q

No XV. - A religious organization has a weekly
television program. The program presents and
propagates its religious, doctrines, and
compares their practices with those of other
religions.
As the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) found as
offensive several episodes of the program
which attacked other religions, the MTRCB
required the organization to submit its tapes for
review prior to airing.
The religious organization brought the case to
court on the ground that the action of the
MTRCB suppresses its freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. Decide. [5%]

A

The religious organization cannot invoke
freedom of speech and freedom of religion as
grounds for refusing to submit the tapes to the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board for review prior to airing. When the
religious organization started presenting its
program over television, it went into the realm of action. The right to act on one’s religious
belief is not absolute and is subject to police
power for the protection of the general welfare.
Hence the tapes may be required to be
reviewed prior to airing.
In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA 529, 544, the Supreme Court held:
“We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that Its
religious program is per se beyond review by
the respondent Board. Its public broadcast
on TV of its religious program brings it out of
the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears
of children. The Court reiterates the rule that
the exercise of religions freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring
about the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
of some substantive evil which the State is
duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the mere overriding Interest of public
health, public morals, or public welfare.”
However, the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board cannot ban the tapes on
the ground that they attacked other religions. In
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals,. 259
SCRA 529, 547, the Supreme Court held:
“Even a side glance at Section 3 of PD No.
1986 will reveal that it is not among the
grounds to justify an order prohibiting the
broadcast of petitioner’s television program.”
Moreover, the broadcasts do not give rise to
a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil. In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court
of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, 549:
“Prior restraint on speech, including the
religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of
a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the reality already on the ground.

39
Q

No. 12: Section 28. Title VI, Chapter 9, of the
Administrative Code of 1987 requires all
educational institutions to observe a simple and
dignified flag ceremony, including the playing or
singing of the Philippine National Anthem,
pursuant to rules to be promulgated by the
Secretary of Education. Culture and Sports,
The refusal of a teacher, student or pupil to
attend or participate in the flag ceremony is a
ground for dismissal after due investigation.
The Secretary of Education Culture and Sports
issued a memorandum implementing said
provision of law. As ordered, the flag ceremony would be held on Mondays at 7:30 a.m. during
class days. A group of teachers, students and
pupils requested the Secretary that they be
exempted from attending the flag ceremony on
the ground that attendance thereto was against
their religious belief. The Secretary denied the
request. The teachers, students and pupils
concerned went to Court to have the
memorandum circular declared null and void.
Decide the case.

A

The teachers and the students should be
exempted from the flag ceremony. As held in
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu, 251 SCRA 569. to compel
them to participate in the flag ceremony will
violate their freedom of religion. Freedom of
religion cannot be impaired except upon the
showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil which the State has a right to
prevent. The refusal of the teachers and the
students to participate in the flag ceremony
does not pose a clear and present danger.

40
Q

No III - Children who are members of a religious
sect have been expelled from their respective
public schools for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing by a band or
singing the national anthem, saluting the
Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
The students and their parents assail the
expulsion on the ground that the school
authorities have acted in violation of their right
to free public education, freedom of speech,
and religious freedom and worship. Decide the
case.

A

The students cannot be expelled from school.
As held in Ebralinag v. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. 219 SCRA
256 [1993], to compel students to take part in
the flag ceremony when it is against their
religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom. Their expulsion also violates the duty
of the State under Article XIV, Section 1 of the
Constitution to protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education and make such
education accessible to all.

41
Q

No. 7: - Tawi-Tawi is a predominantly Moslem province. The Governor, the Vice-Governor, and members of its Sang-guniang Panlalawigan are all Moslems. Its budget provides the
Governor with a certain amount as his discretionary funds. Recently, however, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed a resolution appropriating P100,000 as a special discretionary fund of the Governor to be spent by him in leading a pilgrimage of his provincemates to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Islam’s holiest city.
Philconsa, on constitutional grounds, has filed suit to nullify the resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan giving the special discretionary fund to the Governor for the stated purpose.
How would you decide the case? Give your reasons.

A

The resolution is unconstitutional First, it violates art. VI, sec. 29(2) of the Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public money or property, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit or support of any system of
religion, and, second, it contravenes art. VI, sec, 25(6) which limits the appropriation of discretionary funds only for public purposes.
The use of discretionary funds for purely religious purpose is thus unconstitutional, and the fact that the disbursement is made by resolution of a local legislative body and not by
Congress does not make it any less offensive to the Constitution. Above all, the resolution constitutes a clear violation of the nonestablishment Clause (art. III, sec. 5) of the
Constitution.

42
Q

No. 4: Upon request of a group of overseas
contract workers in Brunei, Rev. Father Juan de
la Cruz, a Roman Catholic priest, was sent to
that country by the President of the Philippines
to minister to their spiritual needs. The travel
expenses, per diems, clothing allowance and
monthly stipend of P5,000 were ordered
charged against the President’s discretionary
fund. Upon post audit of the vouchers therefor,
the Commission on Audit refused approval
thereof claiming that the expenditures were in
violation of the Constitution.

A

Yes, the Commission on Audit was correct in
disallowing the expenditures. Section 29(2),
Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the
expenditure of public funds for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest. The only exception is
when the priest is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution or government
orphanage or leprosarium. The sending of a
priest to minister to the spiritual needs of
overseas contract workers does not fall within
the scope of any of the exceptions.

43
Q

What is the effect if the court applies the strict scrutiny test?

A

In this instance, the court starts with the heavy presumption that the law is unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the restriction
(i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and
(ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
(compelling state interest=clear and present danger)