Secondary Parties Flashcards
The words in section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 should be given their ordinary meaning
Attorney General’s Reference (No1 of 1975)
There are some difficulties in application but as a rule of thumb, aiding and abetting implies participation at the time of the crime; and counselling and procuring implies participation prior to the crime
Mere encouragement is sufficient
Gianetto (1997)
“I’m going to kill your wife” “Oh goody”; it is for the jury to decide applying their common sense and fairness whether P#s acts where done with the aider or abettor’s encouragement
Unplanned presence can constitute evidence
Coney (1882)
D is a spectator at an illegal prize fight. It is up to the jury to decide whether guilty as a matter of fact. Unplanned presence CAN constitute evidence.
Wilcox v Jeffery (1951)
Went to watch saxophonist playing despite it being against terms of visa. The fact he met him at the airport and knew it was an illegal performance was important.
Clarkson (1971)
Entered a room where a rape was occurring, not sufficient for encouragement.
Mere abstention from preventing an offence can in appropriate circumstances result in accomplice liability
Tuck v Robson (1970)
Allowed the employee to sell drinks after hours, should have done something obvious to prevent conviction e.g. collecting up glasses and moving customers out of the building.
Du Cros v Lambourne (1907)
The owner of the car was liable where they could not prove who was driving the car dangerously. Suspect decision as is a creation of a new class of crime regarding the duty to act of property owners.
Not necessary to show a causal link between the counselling and the offence
Calhaem (1985)
It was sufficient that the crime took place within the scope of the advice given (to kill). There must be a) counselling, b) that a crime takes place and c) it occurs within the scope of the advice given
It is possible to be guilty of procuring even though principles don’t know that’s what you are doing
Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975)
Women’s drinks are laced and convicted of drinking driving. No need to show a consensus/meeting of minds. There just needs to be a causal link.
The accomplice must (1) intend a voluntary act of assistance (2) with knowledge of the circumstances
NCB v Gamble (1959)
Allowed lorry driver ticket certifying they could leave colliery even though overweight. This was intention to assist despite no criminal motive. The offence could not have taken place without the assistance.
The details of the crime do not need to be known, but knowledge of the type of crime is required
Bainbridge (1960)
Robbing a bank with drilling machinery is closely related to an offence cutting stolen goods
DPP v Maxwell (1979)
Drove a car for a protestant terrorist organisation. Claimed he did not known exactly what crimes would take place. Illegal bombing was on the “shopping list” of possible crimes which was not particularly extensive.
Not clear how far this doctrine will be stretched.
Defensive necessity in assistance
Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority (1986)
Controversial case regarding the supply of contraception to teenage girls. Ruled the doctor’s exercise of their clinical judgement was a complete negation of the criminal requirement. According to the principles this seems wrong.
Recklessness can be sufficient for intention to aid/abet
Bryce (2004)
Driven to spot to kill the victim but principle was undecided, didn’t kill until 13 hours later. Still guilty as an accomplice.
A person must intend to bring about the principle offence in order to be charged with procuring
Blakely, Sutton (1991)
Women laced drinks with the intention of spending the night with them. The men drove home before the women could tell them. Real intention is required and recklessness will not suffice. Obiter suggests other types of assistance may only require recklessness. Makes sense with Byrce.
Mendez (2010)
Ran up the street to attack after games went missing. Mendez couldn’t be liable if the direct cause of the victim’s death was something that was not foreseen by the defendant, or was likely to be more life threatening than the kinds of acts that are seen by the defendant. Only a broad judgement could be given in cases of spontaneous violence. Must conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant foresaw it could happen. Justified as causation which makes little sense as fundamental difference should be reason. Confusing area of law.
Objections to the Powell, English approach
(1) The relevant fault element should be sufficient for conviction irrespective of the method used by the principle
(2) Accomplices can be liable for subjective recklessness, whereas the perpetrator needs to have intention
Alternatives to Powell, English
(1) Woollin test for accomplices in all cases lacking fault element e.g. Gilmour (2000) didn’t know the bomb would be so big when drove people to set off, only guilty of manslaughter
(2) Abolish the mandatory life sentence
Unclear law on fundamental difference
Greatrex (1999)
Kick and hit with an iron bar not qualitatively difference
Rahman (2008)
Foreseeing a real possibility of death with intent to cause GBH when in fact principle had intention to kill is sufficient; Lord Brown suggests fundamentally different weapon argument which is potentially problematic
Yehmoh (2009)
Use of a long bladed knife was the same as knowledge of a Stanley knife; Court of Appeal feel intention to kill/caused GBH with one weapon is not different to foreseeing that injury with a different weapon