Searches and Seizures Flashcards
Katz v. United States - test for determining a search under Katz
Reasonable expectation of privacy test
A search occurs if there is a governmental intrusion upon a person who has
(1) a subjective expectation of privacy AND
(2) that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
Oliver v. United States - Open fields
No reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields
Four factor test in curtilage - United States v. Dunn
(1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home;
(2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; AND
(4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by
Factors are not to be applied mechanically. The central question is “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s umbrella”
Aerial observation of curtilage - California v. Ciraolo
“[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”
[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible”
Court noted the officers were operating within publicly navigable airspace – the Court added that any member of the general public could have glanced down and seen what the officers observed.
Aerial observation of the curtilage at 400 ft - Florida v. Riley (White’s Plurality view and O’connor’s concurring view)
J. White Plurality - the helicopter was at a height not prohibited by law, any member of the public could have done this - one limitation: nothing in the record indicated flying at 400 ft was rare, the flight interfered with normal use, that intimate details were revealed, or any undue noise, wind, threat of injury
O’Connor concurrence - would ask the question whether the helicopter was at an altitude that members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that the D’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not one that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable
Katz and Business and Commercial Premises
As a general rule, law enforcement officers may stand in the shoes of a member of a general public, entering business or commercial premises and observing in areas and in a manner consistent with the invitation given to members of the public, even though law enforcement’s purposes are investigatory without the officer’s actions constituting a search under the Fourth Amendment
Kyllo v. United States - Thermo vision/sensory enhancing technology
“Obtaining by sense enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion ‘into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use”
“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore the details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”
California v. Greenwood - cops digging through trash like the raccoons they truly are
Having deposited his garbage, in an area particularly suited for public inspection and for the express purpose of having strangers take it, Greenwood had no reasonable expectation of privacy
United States v. Knotts - beeper tracking in the car
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When the defendant travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.
United States v. Karo - beeper tracking in the home
The government engages in a search where the government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house
A search occurs even if visual observation initially revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached entered the home if subsequent use of the beeper verifies that the article remains on the premises
United States v. White - wiretapping
(subsequently adopted by later majority opinions)
Reaffirmation post-Katz of Hoffa v. United States, Lewis v. United States, and Lopez v. United States
False Friend cases – no fourth amendment safeguard for an individual’s “misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it”
Lack of Fourth Amendment protection extends to circumstances in which the false friend is an undercover agent, that undercover agent is using electronic equipment to record the conversation, or the false friend is carrying recording equipment or a device that transmits the communications to be recorded elsewhere
Smith v. Maryland - third party doctrine and pen registers
A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties
When Smith used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed” that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.
United States v. Miller - third party doctrine and bank documents
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the Bank Security Act that records of depositors’ transactions be maintained by banks. Even if the banks could be said to have been acting solely as Government agents in transcribing the necessary information and complying without protest with the requirements of the subpoenas, there would be no intrusion upon the depositors’ Fourth Amendment rights
Bond v. U.S. - feeling passenger bags on a bus
If cops do anything more than what any normal other passenger might do on the bus (i.e., squeeze the bag in an “exploratory manner” looking for contraband) it violates the passenger’s reasonable expectation of privacy and is thus a search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment
dog sniffs and searches
A dog sniff alone is not a search - U.S. v. Place, Illinois v. Caballes
Dog sniff is not particularly intrusive, only tells whether there is contraband - this is not something society is willing to recognize as protected
Distinguishing from Kyllo (thermo vision): the dog sniff does not detect legal behavior, the thermo vision does
Test from U.S. v. Jones determining whether there is a search
Physical intrusion test:
(1) a “trespass”/physical intrusion occurs
(2) the trespass/physical intrusion is upon an area enumerated in the Fourth Amendment (“persons, houses, papers, or effects”), AND
(3) it occurs with the intent “to find something or to obtain information
Black letter law on whether a search occurs (both tests)
A search occurs if either
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test is satisfied - If there is a government intrusion upon a person who has (1) a subjective expectation of privacy AND (2) that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
OR the Jones trespassory/physical intrusion search test is satisfied
(1) a “trespass”/physical intrusion occurs
(2) the trespass/physical intrusion is upon an area enumerated in the Fourth Amendment (“persons, houses, papers, or effects”), AND
(3) it occurs with the intent “to find something or to obtain information
When a traffic stop becomes an unreasonable seizure
The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission
May last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose – ends when tasks tied to violation are or reasonably should be over
The trespass/physical intrusion prong of the Jones test - notes about consent and social norms
The government trespasses or engages in a physical intrusion that is unlicensed
A physical intrusion can be licensed either through permission or implicitly via being implied from background social norms (“the habits of the country”)
Even where social norms would allow for some degree of physical intrusion, government cannot exceed the scope of the authorization (ex: walking to a person’s front door is licensed by social custom, bringing your drug detecting dog with you is not)
Extent of what officers can do on the front porch of a home (without a warrant)
The same as anyone else (ex. knock on the door)
Bringing a drug-sniffing dog is too much; this is more than any other visitor would do
Period of time in which obtaining Cell Site Location Data without a warrant is problematic
“We need not decide whether there is a limited period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”) free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”
Why do we care about probable cause? No, really. Why do we?
(1) law enforcement needs probable cause to get a search warrant (if one is needed),
(2) law enforcement needs probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant,
(3) law enforcement needs probable cause to arrest in the absence of a warrant, AND
(4) there are important exceptions to the warrant requirement for which probable cause is required for the police to search and/or seize
Probable Cause - Gates Standard
Question Posed – For issuance of a search warrant, the determination of probable cause hinges upon whether under the totality of circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.
In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of acts.
Comparing standards of proof (ranking them from most strict to least strict)
Most strict: Beyond a reasonable Doubt
Then, Clear and Convincing Evidence
Then, Preponderance of the Evidence
Then, Probable Cause,
Least strict: Reasonable Suspicion
Percentage requirement sufficient to reach probable cause
“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages” - Maryland v. Pringle
In that case, 1/3 chance of the drugs belonging to each suspect was good enough, but the Court declined to attach a set percentage for probable cause.
Challenging the probable cause of alerts from drug dogs
In short, a probable-cause hearing focusing on a dog’s alert should proceed much like any other. The court should allow the parties to make their best case, consistent with the usual rules of criminal procedure. And the court should then evaluate the proffered evidence to decide what all the circumstances demonstrate. If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then the court should find probable cause.
If, in contrast, the defendant has challenged the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog overall or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the competing evidence. In all events, the court should not prescribe, as the Florida Supreme Court did, an inflexible set of evidentiary requirements. The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime
Probable cause and subjectivity
An officer’s subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable cause determinations
The question of whether under the totality of circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched is answered based on objective rather than subjective considerations
Five things needed for a valid warrant
For a warrant to be valid:
(1) there must be probable cause to issue the warrant,
(2) the warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate
(3) the warrant must be supported by an oath or affirmation
(4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, AND
(5) the warrant must particularly describe the person or things to be seized
13 (!!!) general principles with regard to the particularity requirement of the warrant clause GOOD FUCKIN LUCK MEMORIZING THAT LMAO just hit 1 and move on with your life you know it’s happening JUST DO IT coward
(1) GOOD TRY GUYS
A greater degree of ambiguity will be tolerated when the police have done the best that could be expected under the circumstances, by acquiring all the descriptive facts which reasonable investigation of this type of crime could be expected to uncover and by ensuring that all of those facts were included in the warrant.
(2) VAGUE THINGS ARE HARD
A more general type of description will be sufficient when the nature of the objects to be seized are such that they could not be expected to have more specific characteristics.
(3) VAGUE, ILLEGAL THINGS ARE HARD
A less precise description is required of property which is, because of its particular character, contraband.
(4) TMI
Failure to provide all of the available descriptive facts is not a basis for questioning the adequacy of the description when the omitted facts could not have been expected to be of assistance to the executing officer.
(5) GLITCH IN PIC
An error in the statement of certain descriptive facts is not a basis for questioning the adequacy of the description if the executing officer was nonetheless able to determine, from the other facts provided, that the object seized was that intended by the description.
(6) DR.’S ORDERS
Greater care in description is ordinarily called for when the type of property sought is generally in lawful use in substantial quantities.
(7) TICKETS 2 GUN SHOW
A more particular description than otherwise might be necessary is required when other objects of the same general classification are likely to be found at the particular place to be searched.
(8) FOX DIDN’T DO IT
The greatest care in description is required when the consequences of a seizure of innocent articles by mistake is most substantial, as when the objects to be seized are books or films or the papers of a newsgathering organization.
(9) SAVE BB, LEAVE BATHWATER
The mere fact that some items were admittedly improperly seized in execution of the warrant “does not mean that the warrant was not sufficiently particular.”
(10) WHAT’S A CRIME
The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement does not “require particularity with respect to the criminal activity suspected.”
(11) FINAL COUNTDOWN
Some leeway will be tolerated where it appears additional time could have resulted in a more particularized description, where there was “some urgency to conduct a search … before the defendant had the opportunity to remove or destroy the evidence.”
(12) CONTXT CLUES
A description which alone might be insufficient may become particular enough given the context within which it is used.
(13) NOTHING PROBABLE CAN STAY
A search warrant that does contain a sufficient description of the items to be seized, even in the probable cause sense, can be “undone” by later events occurring either prior to or subsequent to the commencement of the warrant’s execution.
Anticipatory search warrants
“for a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,’ but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur.”
Officer’s affidavit supporting the anticipatory search warrant must provide sufficient information to support both requirements
reasoning behind the warrant requirement - not really a thing we need to know, but hey, fun facts amirite
The warrant requirement was in response to general warrants from the British crown – they would issue a warrant because of tax reasons but actually search for seditious literature in the home