S1, C6 - ATC Surveillance Systems Flashcards
Surveillance services comprise:
1) Separation of arriving, departing and en route traffic
2) vectoring
3) position information to assist in the navigation of aircraft
4) monitoring traffic to provide information to the procedural controller
5) assistance to aircraft crossing CAS
Before a controller provides any surveillance services, he shall either:
1) identify the aircraft, using a method appropriate to the surveillance system in use
Or
2) have had the identity of the aircraft transferred from another controller.
The act of identifying an aircraft does not imply that a service is being given
Surveillance systems may also be used to provide the following, whether or not the aircraft has been identified:
1) information on the position of aircraft likely to constitute a hazard
2) avoiding action
3) information about observed weather for pilots and other controllers
And
4) assistance to aircraft in emergency
Surveillance services shall be provided to the…
…maximum extent practicable to cover the operational requirement subject only to workload, communications or equipment capability
Regardless of the type of airspace, or the ATS being provided…
…nothing shall prevent a controller from taking action he considers appropriate if he believes a risk of collision exists
The airspace within which the aircraft is flying determines the type of surveillance service available:
CAS - radar control service
OCAS - DS or TS
Pilots must be advised if a service commences, terminates or changes when:
1) OCAS
2) entering CAS (except when entering CAS in connection with in IFR flight holding in Class E)
3) changing from IFR to VFR or VFR to IFR within Class E
4) VFR flights entering/leaving Class B-D from/to Class E
5) Leaving CAS
A) unless pilots are provided with advance notice
Or
B) except when leaving CAS in connection with in IFR flight holding in Class E
For flights leaving CAS controllers should provide pilots with advance notice of:
1) the lateral or vertical point at which the aircraft will leave CAS. Such notice should be provided between 5-10nm or 3000-6000ft prior to the boundary of CAS
2) the type of ATS that will subsequently be provided, unless the aircraft is coordinated and transferred to another ATSU before crossing the boundary of CAS
A radar control service may be provided to aircraft operating:
1) IFR
2) SVFR
and
3) VFR in Class B-D
When providing a RCS controllers issue instructions to which:
1) Pilots of IFR are required to comply
And
2) pilots of SVFR or VFR will comply unless they advise the controller otherwise
Before an aircraft enter CAS the controller must establish…
…which flight rules the pilot will be operating under
Before a RCS to IFR flights is terminated…
…procedural separation must be applied, except at ACCs when an aircraft will be entering an adjacent sector and:
1) a radar handover has been given
Or
2) the conditions of any standing agreement have been met
Participating VFR flights in Class E shall not be provided with…
…an Air Traffic Control service, but one of the following UKFIS:
1) BS
OR
2) TS
Surveillance services provided within Class G…
…DS and TS are detailed in S1, Ch12 UKFIS
One of the following methods is to be employed when using PSR to identify aircraft:
Direction finding equipment should be used to assist the ID provided it has been approved for such use.
- Turn method
- Departing aircraft method
- Position report method
Turn Method:
An aircraft may be ID’d by ascertaining its heading and, following a period of track observation, correlating the observed movement of a particular position indication with:
1) the acknowledged execution of an instruction to alter heading by at least 30deg
2) one or more changes of heading by at least 30deg, as instructed by another controller
3) one or more changes of heading by at least 30deg, reported by the pilot
A turn for identification does not constitute the provision of a surveillance service. However, controllers should take into consideration terrain, other surveillance returns, RoA, PSR coverage before instructing an aircraft to alter heading.
In using the turn method a controller shall:
1) Verify that the movements of not more than 1 position indication correspond with those of the aircraft
2) exercise caution particularly when employing this method in areas where changes of heading are commonly made as part of a navigational routine
Departing Aircraft Method:
By observing and correlating the position indication of a departing aircraft to a known airborne time.
ID is to be achieved within 1nm of the end of the runway unless otherwise authorised by the CAA.
Particular care should be taken to avoid confusion with aircraft overflying the aerodrome, making a missed approach, departing from an adjacent runway or holding overhead the aerodrome.
Position Report Method:
By correlating a position indication with a report from the pilot that an aircraft is:
1) overhead an ERP which is displayed on the situation display
Or
2) at a particular distance not exceeding 30nm on a particular radial from a co-located VOR/DME or TACAN/DME. The source facility must be displayed on the situation display
Or
3) overhead a notified VRP or prominent geographical feature, in either case approved for the purpose and displayed on the situation display, provided that the flight is operating with visual reference to the surface and at a height of 3000ft or less above the surface.
The ID must follow a period of track observation sufficient to enable the controller to compare the movement of the position indication with the pilots reported route.
The reported position and level must indicate that the aircraft is within know PSR cover.
This method must be reinforced by an alternative method if there is any doubt about the ID because of:
1) the close proximity of other returns
Or
2) inaccurate reporting from an aircraft at high level or some distance from nav facilities.
When using Mode A to identify aircraft, one of the following methods is to be employed:
1) observing the pilots compliance with the instruction to select a discrete 4 digit code
2) recognising a validated 4 digit code previously assigned to an aircraft call sign. When code call sign conversion procedures are in use and the code call sign pairing can be confirmed, the call sign displayed in the data block may be used to establish identity.
3) observing an ident feature when it has been requested
Caution must be exercised when employing this method because simultaneous requests for SPI transmissions within the same area may result in misidentification.
Aircraft displaying 7000 are not to be identified using this method
When providing a surveillance service to an aircraft, controllers at SSR equipped units…
…should allocate that flight with a discrete code iaw the code assignment plan.
Unless otherwise directed by an ATC unit, Mode C will be selected in conjunction with Mode A.
Controllers must, therefore, verify the accuracy of the Mode C readout when assigning discrete codes to aircraft.
A controller assigning any Mode A code must…
…validate the code by checking ASAP, either by direct reference to his display or with the assistance of another ATC agency, that the data displayed corresponds with the code which has been assigned.
At units where code call sign conversion equipment is in use, procedures to ensure the correct correlation of the callsign with the assigned code are to be applied.
The Mode A code must be checked by one of the following methods:
1) instructing the aircraft to squawk the assigned code and observing that the correct numbers appear on the situation display
2) instructing the aircraft to ‘squawk ident’ and simultaneously checking the code numbers associated with the SSR response
3) matching an already identified position indication with the assigned code for that flight
If the Mode A code readout does not correspond to that assigned…
…the pilot is to be instructed to reset the assigned code.
Where this fails to achieve display of the assigned code, the pilot is to be instructed to select code 0000. If a corrupt code still exists the pilot should normally be instructed to switch off the transponder.
However, the corrupt code may be maintained to assist identification and tracking provided the Mode C has been verified.
Associated ATCUs are to be informed of the retention of corrupt data.
Controllers may deem Mode A codes to be validated when…
…it can be ascertained from the code assignment plan that an observed Mode A code has been assigned by a unit capable of validating the code, unless:
1) the code is promulgated as being invalidated
Or
2) the controller has been notified that the code is corrupt
The Mode A and associated Mode C of special purpose codes must be…
…considered unvalidated and unverified.
Controllers should be aware of the following special purpose codes:
1) emergency codes 7500, 7600, 7700
2) Code 1000 - aircraft conducting IFR as GAT, where the downlinked aircraft ID is validated as matching the aircraft ID entered in the flight plan
3) Code 2000 - aircraft entering U.K. Airspace from an adjacent FIR where the use of transponders is not required
4) Code 7007 - aircraft engaged on airborne observation flights under terms of open skies treaty. Flight Priority Cat B applies, details will be published by NOTAM
The Mode A and associated Mode C of conspicuity codes must be…
…considered unvalidated and unverified.
Pilots are required to squawk 7000 when operating at and above FL100 and are advised to do so when below FL100 unless:
1) they have been assigned a discrete code
2) they are transponding on one of the special purpose codes or one of the other specific conspicuity codes assigned iaw the code assignment plan
3) they are flying below 3000ft in the aerodrome traffic circuit and have been instructed to squawk 7010
Or
4) on grounds of safety the aircraft has been instructed to squawk standby.
In view of the associated reduction in protection from ACAS, such circumstances are to be regarded as exceptional. ATSUs shall log the circumstances and duration of any such occurrences.details are to be made available to the CAA on request.
Direct recognition of the aircraft ID feature on the situation display may be used to establish surveillance ID, subject to either:
1) correlation of the aircraft ID with the aircraft ID entered in the flight plan and displayed to controllers on FPS
Or
2) correlation of the aircraft ID feature with the aircraft call sign used in a directed RTF transmission to the controller.
However, controllers shall exercise particular caution when there are aircraft with similar call signs on frequency, and they shall utilise an alternative method if they have any doubt about the surveillance ID
Whenever it is observed that a downlinked aircraft ID feature is different from that expected from the aircraft…
…the pilot shall be requested to confirm and, if necessary, re-enter the aircraft ID.
If the discrepancy continues to exist following confirmation by the pilot that the correct call sign has been set in the aircraft ID feature, the controller shall take the following minimum actions:
1) inform the pilot of the persistent discrepancy
2) assign a discrete Mode A code
3) notify the erroneous aircraft ID feature transmitted by the aircraft to the next ATSU/position
Selected levels display…
…intent based information only and shall not be used for the purposes of separation.
Units equipped with enhanced Mode S surveillance systems that enable DAPs should…
…display selected levels on the situation display as a means of mitigating the risk of level busts.
The checking of selected levels shall not be used as a substitute for RT readback of level clearances.
Where selected level is seen to be at variance with an ATC clearance…
…controllers shall not state on RT the incorrect level as observed on the situation display.
However, controllers may query the discrepancy using the following phraseology:
“Callsign, check selected level, cleared level is xxxx”