Rylands v Fletcher Flashcards
- C may have an action…
It is a strict liablity tort…
Here…
C may have an action in the tort of Rylands v Fletcher. It concerns the escape of a dangerous thing [say what it is eg. explosion of paint / leak of oil].
It is a strict liability tort, so the defendant could still be liable even if they tried to prevent the escape or did not know about it.
If Relevant: Here [eg. D could still be liable even though he tried to keep the chemicals safe in barrels / he did not know the chemicals had leaked].
- C has proprietary interest in the land affected because…
C has a proprietary interest in the land affected because [eg. C owns / rents the house that was damaged] as in Hunter v Canary Wharf.
- D is the occupier/ accumulator of the land that the dangerous thing accumulated on because…
D is the occupier (or accumulator) of the land that the dangerous thing accumulated on because [eg. D owns / rents the house where the oil accumulated] as in Read v Lyons.
- The Tort of Rylands v Fletcher was defined by…
a) anyone who brings…
The Tort of Rylands v Fletcher was defined by Blackburn J:
“anyone who brings onto his land and keeps there, something likely to do mischief if it escapes, is answerable for all damage which is a natural consequence of its escape”.
The 2004 case of Transco PLC v Stockport MBC has developed the tort further.
- C must show certain factors…
The thing must be…
Here…
C must show certain factors :
The thing must be brought and accumulated on D’s land, as in Giles v Walker.
Here, [eg. oil was brought and accumulated on D’s land as D brought the chemicals to the shed and they were stored in barrels].
- The thing that accumulates must be the thing that…
Here…
The thing that accumulates must be the thing that escapes, as in Stannard v Gore.
Here, [eg. it was the oil that accumulated and escaped OR the oil accumulated but caught fire which spread and so the oil itself did not escape].
- Although, the thing does not need to be inherently dangerous as in Rylands v Fletcher…
Here…
Although the thing need not be inherently dangerous, as in Rylands v Fletcher, the thing must be likely to do mischief (damage) if it escapes, as in Hale v Jennings.
Here, [eg. oil is inherently dangerous, and if it escapes, mischief (damage) is likely because oil is toxic OR although water is not inherently dangerous, it could cause still mischief (damage) if it escapes].
- Damage must be caused, and the damage must be…
Here…
Damage must be caused, and the damage must be reasonably foreseeable, as in Cambridge Water v EC Leather.
Here, [eg. the damage was that next door’s plants were destroyed, which was reasonably foreseeable damage because oil is toxic and could foreseeably damage next door’s garden if it escaped].
- The thing must escape from…
a)…
b)…
Here…
The thing must:
a)escape from the defendant’s land over which they have control, as in Read v Lyons,
or
b)escape from circumstances over which they have control, as in Hale v Jennings.
Here, [eg. the oil did escape from D’s land which D controlled because he owned / rented it].
- There must be a non-natural use of land, which means it is… (a, b, and c must all be satisfied)
Here…
There must be a non-natural use of land, which means it is (a)‘extraordinary and unusual considering time and place’, rather than a ‘truly domestic use’, as in Transco v Stockport .
It must be (b) potentially dangerous, as in Cambridge Water v EC Leather.
It is likely to involve (c) things stored in large quantities, as in Mason v Levy.
Here, [eg. storing several barrels of oil in a shed is a non-natural use as it is unusual in a residential area, oil is potentially dangerous and it was stored in fairly large quantities].
- Defence No.1: Act of God…
The defence of ACT OF GOD arises where the thing escaped due to unforeseeable extreme weather conditions, set out in Nichols v Marsland.
If Relevant: Here, [eg. the oil escaped because the barrel was knocked over in a violent storm].
- Defence No. 2: Common Benefit
The defence of COMMON BENEFIT where the dangerous thing has been accumulated by the defendant for either the common benefit of both the defendant and claimant, or just the benefit of the claimant, as in Dunne v North West Gas.
If Relevant: Here, [eg. the thing that escaped was rat poison, which was potentially being used for the benefit of both C and D].
13: Defence No. 3: Act of a Stranger
The defence of ACT OF A STRANGER arises where the thing escaped because of the actions of someone over which the defendant had no control, as in Perry v Kendricks.
If Relevant: Here, [eg. the oil escaped because it was knocked over by a trespasser who D had no control over].
14: Defence No. 4: Statutory Authority arises where the thing was brought onto the land…
The defence of STATUTORY AUTHORITY arises where the thing was brought onto the land and accumulated under the authority of a law/statute, set out in Charing Cross Electricity v Hydraulic Power.
If Relevant: Here, [eg. the oil was brought onto the land and accumulated under the authority of a statute which allowed the public works department to lay a new railway line].
- Defence No. 5: Volenti Non Fit Injuria (and possibly Contributory Negligence)
The defence of VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA arises where the claimant consents to the risk of damage when they fully understand the nature of the risk rather than just being aware of its existence, and exercised free choice, as in Peters v Prince of Wales Theatre.
If Relevant: Here, [eg. the thing that escaped was water from D’s sprinkler which C consented to as he fully understood the nature of the risk and exercised free choice].
NOTE: ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE MAY APPLY – USE THE NEGLIGENCE MODEL ANSWER.
