Ryland V Flecther

Question 1

When did the rule in Ryan v Flechter come about

Answer 1

In the 18 and 19 centuries during the Industrial Revolution that more technology factories and industrial plants came about bring fire fumes and damage to people land through flooding the court had to creat another rule

Question 2

Give the facts for Ryan v Flecther1868

Answer 2

In Rylands v Fletcher (1868), the defendant, a mill owner, had paid independent contractors to make a reservoir on his land, which was intended to supply water to the mill. During construction, the con- tractors discovered the shafts and passages of an old coal mine on the land, some of which joined up with a mine situated on neighbouring land, belonging to the claimant. The contractors could have blocked up these shafts but did not and, as a result, when the reservoir was filled, the water from it burst through the shafts and flooded the claimant’s mine, causing damage estimated at £937.
The defendant himself had not been negligent, since there was no way he could have known about the shafts, and nor could he be held vicariously liable for the contractors, who were clearly not his employees for that purpose. An action for trespass (discussed in the next chapter) was unavailable because the damage was not direct and immediate, and at the time of the case the tort of nuisance could not be applied to an isolated escape. Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that the defendant was liable in tort, upholding the judgment delivered in the lower court by Blackburn J, which defined the rule: ‘A person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must do so at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its escape’.
The justification for this rule, he explained, was that ‘the person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own . . .’.
Despite the fact that the courts claimed a clear foundation for the rule in previous cases, these authorities did not go nearly as far as the decision in the case, and it is generally regarded as establish- ing a completely new principle at the time.
In order to succeed in a claim under Rylands v Fletcher, the claimant must therefore prove the following:
● The defendant must control the land from which the problem has come.
● The defendant must have brought or accumulated something in the course of some ‘unnatural use’
of the land.
● The thing brought or accumulated must be ‘dangerous’, meaning likely to do damage if it escapes
from the land.

              There must be an escape of the dangerous thing. There must be damage as a result of the escape.

Question 3

Name the cases and explain the rule that the defendant must be in control of the Land

Answer 3

The defendant must control the land
The tort will only apply where the land onto which the dangerous thing is brought is in the control of the defendant. In Smith v Scott (1973), a local authority let a house to a homeless family, on condition that they promised not to make any trouble. This promise was disregarded by the family once they moved in, and their behaviour was so intolerable that their next-door neighbour tried to sue the local authority on the basis of Rylands v Fletcher. However, it was held that the rule could not be applied to the landlord of tenants, as control of the land would lie with the tenants

Question 4

The defendants must have control over the land does that apply to highways?

Answer 4

A defendant can also incur liability for bringing a dangerous thing onto the highway, if it then escapes onto someone’s land. In Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire (1985), police attempting to capture a dangerous psychopath fired CS gas into the shop where he was, which was set on fire by the gas. It was decided that the rule did apply to the escape of things from the highway.

Question 5

What do you understand by bringing or accumulating for unnatural use

Answer 5

Bringing or accumulating for unnatural use
The dangerous thing must have been accumulated or brought onto the defendant’s land in the course of some ‘unnatural’ use of the land; the rule does not apply to damage caused by anything which naturally occurs there (for such problems there will often be an action in nuisance or negligence). There has been much debate over what amounts to natural and non-natural use of land. It is clear that a defendant will not be liable for damage caused by trees or plants which grow naturally, nor for the escape of water which is naturally present on the land.

Question 6

State the facts of Giles v walker

Answer 6

Bringing or accumulating for unnatural use
Giles v walker 1890

. The seeds from these blew onto neighbouring land, causing the same problem on that land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher because thistles grew naturally, and had not been introduced by him.

Question 7

What case define unnatural use of the Land

Answer 7

In Rickards v Lothian (1913), the defendant leased the upper part of a building. A tap there was turned on by an unknown person and caused a flood, which damaged stock kept by the claim- ant on the floor below. The defendant was held not liable, since he was making an ordinary and proper use of the building. The Court of Appeal defined non-natural use as: ‘some special use bringing with it increased danger to others. [It] must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community’.

Question 8

What was the important statement made in Cambridge water v Eastern Counties Leather

Answer 8

Lord Goff had to say on the issue of unnatural use. He stated that the storage of chemicals on industrial premises was a ‘classic case of non-natural use’. Just because the activity benefited the community in that it created employment did not render such use of the land natural.

Question 9

Transco Plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council (2004)

Answer 9

Transco Plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council (2004)
The latest House of Lords view on the issue of non-natural uses of land was delivered in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council (2004). Here the defendant owned a water pipe, which carried water from the mains to a large block of flats. The pipe fractured, and huge amounts of water ran along an embankment, which contained the claimant’s gas pipeline. The embankment collapsed, leaving the gas pipeline unsupported. The claimant repaired the damage, and claimed the costs of the repairs under Rylands v Fletcher. Their claim failed, because the House of Lords held that a water pipe was not an unnatural use of land. This in itself was no surprise, but their Lordships went on to talk about how they would decide that a use of land was unnatural.
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              Elements of the tort  Lord Bingham stated that the phrase ‘unnatural user’ was not very helpful, and that a better ques- tion might be whether the defendant was an ‘ordinary user’. Rylands v Fletcher should only offer a cause of action where the defendant’s use of the land was ‘extraordinary and unusual’. However, said Lord Bingham, this test should not be applied inflexibly: ‘a use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place, but not so at another time or in another place’. The question to be asked was whether the defendant had done something out of the ordinary, considering the time and place in which he did so. Lord Bingham also stated that the question of whether the defendant’s use of land was of benefit to the community was not relevant, which suggests that the approach used in Rickards and British Celanese is definitely no longer in favour.

Question 10

Explain a dangerous thing

Answer 10

The thing the defendant bring to his land must be likely to damage if it escape but may be safe if it doesn’t escape

Question 11

What did Lord Bingham say concer dangerous things

Answer 11

. In Transco (see above), Lord Bingham explained that this test was quite a strict one, which would not easily be satisfied; essentially, it had to be shown that the defendant had brought or accumulated on the land something which he or she recognised, or ought to have recognised, would give rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger or ‘mischief’ if it escaped. If this requirement was fulfilled, it did not matter that the risk of an escape happening was low.

Question 12

Give examples of dangers things with a case

Answer 12

Gas
Electricity
Flagpoles
Tree branch
Poisonous fumes West v Bristol trampways

Question 13

In Read v Lyon how did the judge present describe escape

Answer 13

The tort only covers damage caused when a dangerous thing escapes from the defendant’s land; damage caused to someone else while they are on the defendant’s land is not applicable. In Read v Lyons (1946), the claimant was a factory inspector of munitions, visiting the premises where the defendants made explosive shells. One exploded, injuring her, and, because there was no sugges- tion that the defendants had been negligent, she claimed under Rylands v Fletcher. The defend- ants were held not liable, on the grounds that, although high-explosive shells clearly were ‘dangerous things’, the strict liability imposed by Rylands v Fletcher requires an escape of the thing that caused the injury. The court defined an escape as occurring when something escapes to outside a place where the defendant has occupation and control.

Question 14

Does escape have to be incidental for it to fall under Ryland v Flechter. Add a case to prove so

Answer 14

It was traditionally thought the term ‘escape’ meant that the release of the dangerous thing had to be accidental. In Crown River Cruises Ltd v Kimbolton Fireworks Ltd (1996), however, it was suggested that Rylands could be extended to cover intentional releases of dangerous things (in that case letting off fireworks as part of a display), although the defendants in the case were held not liable under Rylands.

Question 15

Explain Damages as an element that must be proved to succeed in a action of Ryland v Flechter

Answer 15

The tort is not actionable per se, so the escape of the dangerous thing must be proved to have caused damage. Clearly, this will usually be damage to land or other property, but until Transco (see above), it was unclear whether, if an escape did cause death or personal injury, Rylands would allow a claim. Transco now makes it clear that it will not. The House of Lords made it plain that Rylands v Fletcher was to be seen as a ‘sub-species’ of nuisance, and for this reason it could only protect rights to and enjoyment of land.

Question 16

Who can be sued

Answer 16

Basically anyone with an interest in land that has been affected by the escape from the defendants property

Question 17

Is Law of tort a strict liability

Answer 17

Most importantly, the case of Cambridge Water (see above) not only gave new life to the tort in Rylands, but also brought in a new element of fault. It established that a defendant could only be liable for a type of damage which was reasonably foreseeable, which means that liability can no longer properly be seen as strict.
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             f f e e n n c ce es s Defences   D D e e The general defences of volenti, contributory negligence, and statutory authority are applicable to Rylands v Fletcher, along with the related defences of common benefit and default of the claim- ant, and other specific defences discussed below.

Question 18

Volenti explain this as a defence

Answer 18

When the defendant has express or implied consent to be on the land and especially when such act is benefiting the the plaintiff. Eg pipeline and water tanks

Question 19

Con-tributary negligence and fault of the claimant

Answer 19

Contributory negligence and default of the claimant
Where a claimant contributes to causing the escape of the dangerous thing, their damages can be reduced under the normal rules of contributory negligence. A further defence, known as default of the claimant, applies if the escape of the dangerous thing is completely the fault of the claimant, or, more commonly, if the escape only causes damage because of some abnormal sensitivity on the part of the claimant’s property. This was the case in Eastern and South Africa Telegraph Co v Cape Town Tramways Co (1902), where the defendants were held not liable when a very minor escape of electricity caused by them affected the claimants’ extremely sensitive power cables

Question 20

Will a defendant be liable for an act when a relevant statue clearly authorities there action

Answer 20

Statutory authority
Defendants may escape liability under Rylands v Fletcher if the terms of a relevant statute clearly authorise their actions. However, many Acts which permit the performance of dangerous activities do not specify whether the rule should apply, and the question then becomes one of interpretation of the particular statute. In Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co (1894), a water main laid by the defendant burst, flooding the claimant’s premises. The Court of Appeal held that the company was not liable because they were not only permitted but obliged by statute to maintain a water supply, and occasional bursts were an inevitable result of such a duty. By contrast, in Charing Cross Elec- tricity Co v Hydraulic Co (1914), which featured similar facts, the defendants were found not to have a defence of statutory authority because the relevant statute did not oblige them to provide a water supply but only gave them the power to do so.

Question 21

Explain the act of a stranger

Answer 21

A defendant will not be liable where the damage is done by a third party who is not acting under the defendant’s instructions (note that that person need not literally be a stranger; the fact that the defendant knows them does not prevent the defence applying). This defence was applied in Box v Jubb (1879), where defendants were held not liable for damage done when their reservoir over- flowed because the flooding was caused by a third person who had emptied his own reservoir into the stream which fed the defendants’ reservoir.
Where a defendant avoids liability under Rylands because the harm was caused by the act of a stranger, there may nevertheless be liability for negligence if the act of the stranger was such that the defendant should have foreseen it and taken precautions against it.

Question 22

Act of God with a case

Answer 22

This defence is available when the escape is caused purely by natural forces, in circumstances which the defendant could not have been expected to foresee or guard against. In Nichols v Marsland (1876), the defendant dammed a natural stream on his land, in order to create three artificial lakes. The whole thing was well built, and precautions against flooding were quite adequate for all normal circumstances. However, an exceptionally heavy thunderstorm – described by witnesses as the heaviest in living memory – burst the banks of the lakes, and the resulting rush of water down the stream swept away four bridges on the claimant’s land. The defendant was held not liable because the thunderstorm was an ‘act of God’ which he could not reasonably be expected to predict, and without it the lakes would have been secure.