Rwanda Flashcards
Melson (2003), origins of Rwandan genocide
no “age-old animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups,” as the front page of the October 1997 New York Times would have it.
Until 1959 when the Hutu revolution broke out, “there had never been systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis – anywhere
The Rwandan genocide was the product of a postcolonial state, a racialist ideology, a revolution claiming democratic legitimation, and war – all manifestations of the modern world
Melson (2003) colonial roots:
COLONIAL RESTRUCTURING OF TRADITIONAL POWER STRUCTURES
1) COLONIAL RESTRUCTURING OF TRADITIONAL POWER STRUCTURES
first the Germans and then the Belgians came to rely on the Mwami, the Tutsi ruler, and the Tutsi aristocracy to impose their domination. Moreover, the colonizers needed a conceptual framework to comprehend the complexities of African society. Central to it were the notions of “tribe” and “race.”
In the traditional system there had been three types of chiefs, with the chief of the land being a Hutu. However, the Belgians abolished this tripartite division, centralizing chiefly powers in one man, usually a Tutsi. By 1959 forty-three out of forty- five chiefs were Tutsi and only two were Hutu.
Belgians also initiated and made widespread a draconian system of forced labor, wherein mostly Hutu where drafted to work for the state without pay.
they refused to view the land as belonging to native lineages, allowing the state to dispose of Hutu land after paying out compensation to the owners.
The ubuhake system, a traditional social contract entailing subordination between Hutu and Tutsi, wherein some Hutu were able to rise to Tutsi rank, was undermined by the privatization of the land
As the Tutsi realized that Belgian “reforms” could in fact benefit them, they began to convert to Catholicism and to attend mission schools in order to improve their social position. In 1932, at the elite Astrida College (now Butare) out of 54 students 45 were of Tutsi origins
Melson (2003) colonial roots:
PHYSIOGNOMY
2) PHYSIOGNOMY
physiognomy of the aristocratic Tutsi cattle herders differed somewhat from the Hutu peasantry and the nonaristocratic Tutsi pastoralists: aristocrats in the king’s court tended to be taller and slimmer, and their facial features closer to the European ideal of beauty
apparent difference came to be generalized by the Europeans as indicating that all Tutsi were of a different and superior race from the Hutu
Melson (2003) colonial roots:
RACIAL THEORIES
3) RACIAL THEORIES
further elaborated by Belgian administrators and anthropologists who argued – in what came to be known as the “Hamitic Hypothesis” – that the Tutsi were conquerors who had originated in Ethiopia
Melson (2003) colonial roots:
Evidence that colonial ideas played a part in the genocide?
during the genocide: when genocidal killers were in doubt about the identity of their victims, they relied on colonial-era documents that had labeled people as Tutsi or Hutu.
Pierre Ryckmans, a Belgian administrator from the 1920s
“The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine [racial] presence is in itself enough
Melson (2003), Belgian attempts to ‘democratize’ colonial system
By 1957 there emerged Hutu-led political movements demanding an end to Hutu subordination and the overthrow of Tutsi hegemony. Significantly they referred to the Tutsi as an alien race, not as an indigenous upper class
1959, with the aid of Belgian administrators, political movements led by Hutu elites revolted against their Tutsi overlords
Commencing on November 1, 1959, Hutu violence spread throughout the country. Colonel Guy Logiest, commander of the Belgian troops, approved of the violence and actively encouraged it
Bahutu Manifesto, 1957
‘the problem is basically that of the political monopoly of one race, the Mututsi’
called for the replacement of one system of domination with another.
demanded that the racial categories be maintained in identity papers, thereby reifying such labels with deadly consequences for the 1994 genocide.
- most survivors (in 2002) dated the origins of the 1994 genocide to the 1959 revolution, when they were made second-class citizens in a racially polarized state
Habyarimana coup
EXPAND
July 1973
reaction to 1972 massacres against Hutu in Rwanda by Burundi army
Melson (2003), economic downturn 1980s
Habyarimana regime became increasingly vulnerable to liberalizing pressures from donors from abroad. In June 1990, following a meeting with French President Mitterand, Habyarimana announced that Rwanda would become a multiparty system
RPF, lead-up to invasion
October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a Tutsi-dominated force based in Uganda, commenced operations that would ultimately lead to the invasion of the country
Habyarimana’s plane shot down
April 6, 1994
Melson (2003), who orchestrated the genocidal campaign?
a radical Hutu elite at the center of government, calling itself “Hutu Power,” that had close ties to President Habyarimana
importance of propaganda (Melson 2003)
Hutu Power utilized the mass media to vilify the Tutsi minority as well as the Hutu opposition.
Rwandan Tutsis were demonized and accused of harboring murderous intentions against all Hutu
66 percent rate of literacy and a 29 percent rate of radio ownership (59 percent in the cities) - mass media proved very effective as tools of mobilization and propaganda.
Hutu Power fear-mongering prior to genocide (Melson 2003)
on October 4–5, 1990, it staged a phony attack on Kigali, which it blamed on the RPF. It initiated v real massacres of Tutsis as reprisals for RPF incursions and as a way of habituating ordinary people to violence.
means of mobilizing genocidaires in the villages (Melson 2003)
Hutu Power called people out to do communal work, umuganda (‘work’ here being mass murder)
Malkki’s work (Melson’s account)
Studying Hutu refugees from the Burundian massacres of 1972, she demonstrates how pervasive the “Hamitic Hypothesis” and racialist views of Tutsis had become.
In the popular Hutu mind, the Tutsis were demonized by an ideology (which she calls a “mythico-history”) that viewed them as foreign invaders from Ethiopia or Somalia who had arrived in Burundi (Rwanda) centuries before and were bent on subjugating or destroying the Hutu and stealing their land
Melson (2003), what links Rwanda, Holocaust and Cambodia?
the role of ideology and the circumstances of revolution and war
in any society, including liberal peaceful democracies, there are people who harbor murderous thoughts against national, ethnic, religious, racial, and other groups, but because they do not have the power to act on their intentions their murderous projects are mostly stillborn.
In all four instances, revolutionary regime was governed by an ideology that identified certain groups as the enemies of society. It was at war with foreign and domestic enemies that it sought to destroy what it called “the enemies of the revolution.”
Melson (2003), three ways in which revolutionary war closely linked to genocide
- gives rise to feelings of vulnerability and to paranoid fears that link supposed domestic “enemies” to external aggressors.
- war increases the autonomy of the state from internal social forces, including public opinion, public opposition, and its moral constraints.
- war closes off other policy options of dealing with “internal enemies.”
What type of genocide was Rwanda? (Melson 2003)
Rwandan genocide was a total domestic genocide, what the UN would call a “genocide-in-whole” as against a “genocide-in-part,” and as such it was the African version of the Holocaust
unique aspect of Rwandan genocide (Melson 2003)
Never before was a majority of a population mobilized by the state to become the “willing executioners” of a minority.
Braeckman (2007), importance of radio in Rwandan genocide
RTLM most pop station
Many apolitical listened to this extremist station bc of music it played
RTLM accused Belgian troops in Rwanda on UN peacekeeping mission of shooting down H’s plane
Next morn 10 Belgian soldiers brutally killed on not long afterward Belgium withdrew forces from the UN mission
RTLM gave signal to begin massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus
You have to kill [the Tutsis], they are cockroaches
Sept 1998, ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR):
- Sat in Arusha, Tanzania
- Sentenced former PM Jean Kambanda for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, in part for encouraging RTLM to continue its calls to massacre the Tutsis
- Same month, court convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu, leading civilian in Taba commune, on charges that included direct and public incitement to commit genocide
Ferdinand Nahimana, well-known historian who served as RTLM director, fled to Cameroon and the Belgian journalist George Ruggiu fled to Kenya
Both later arrested and delivered to the Arusha tribunal
First condemned N launched appeal but Ruggiu sentenced to 12 yrs of imprisonment after having been convicted of incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity
Li (2004), importance of social intimacy
Systematic identification and pursuit of Tutsi depended on the compilation of comprehensive lists at the local level; such surveillance, coupled with movement restrictions, made escape and anonymity extremely difficult.
killing involved widespread denunciation and betrayal of friends, neighbours, and loved ones
Li (2004), importance of RTLM’s everyday role
RTLM did not simply whip Hutu into a frenzy to channel fear and anger into sudden attacks. Rather, through the daily diet of informational updates, operational details (not to leave bodies on the road in view of Western journalists, for example), and encouraging monologues, it contributed to the framing of schedules and the routinization of “work.”
Mironko (2004), individuals’ initiatives
while state actions in Rwanda in 1994 may have speeded the process
of genocide, people themselves, thinking and acting in mobs, assumed a degree
of initiative in the violence, and killed with methods that far exceeded state
mandates.
Chretien et al. (1995) (Mironko’s account), how is it possible for ‘normal’ ppl to take part in mass violence?
reducing the human targets to non-human status generates broad social consent to mass murder
this consent was built through extensive ideological and political preparation that included dehumanizing Tutsi as “cockroaches” (inyenzi) and snakes (inzoka) and rewriting history to demonize an entire group, the Tutsi, as “foreign invaders.”
Mironko (2004), interviewees’ avoidance of the word ‘genocide’
in response to my question about what they had pleaded guilty to, all the avoues confirmed that they had pleaded guilty to the crime of “genocide” (using the French word). When I asked them what “genocide” was, the majority told me that it was ubwicanyi (“killings”). Very few of the prisoners used the term itsembatsemba or itsembabwoko (itsemba extermination, ubwoko tribe), which are common Kinyarwanda translations for “genocide,”
suggests that there is little if any understanding on the part of the perpetrators about the legal, moral, or political differences between committing genocide and murder
Mironko (2004), igitero’s two sets of meanings - meaning 1
The use of hunting metaphors in the genocide likens the killing of Tutsi to the process of environmental culling or sanitation in traditional Rwanda
Kuperman (2004), in most cases of mass killing since WWII
The Holocaust paradigm is so dominant, however, that the field of genocide studies has focused almost exclusively on explaining the actions of the perpetrators of genocide, leaving aside the actions, strategy, and potential responsibility of victim groups and third parties.
Kuperman (2004), RPF role in nutshell
1990s, RPF - with the support of the international community threatened Rwanda’s Hutu regime to such an extent that it retaliated with genocide
Rwanda’s 1994 genocide was a retaliation by the state’s Hutu regime to a violent challenge from the Tutsi rebels who invaded from Uganda in 1990 and fought for over three years to seize effective control of Rwanda.
origins of the RPF
June 1987, The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity abandoned its quasi-Marxist ideology and embraced secretly a last-resort “zed option”—the use of military force, if necessary, to return to Rwanda
To mark the change, in December 1987, the organization renamed itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
Although RANU’s original goal had been refugee return, the RPF had a broader political agenda, which included removal of Habyarimana and implementation of political reform in Rwanda to provide the returning Tutsi a significant share of political power.
Habyarimana compromising 1991-2
on democratization and refugees to satisfy international demands and undercut support for the rebels. For example, on February 19, 1991, he signed the Dar-Es-Salaam declaration on the right of refugee return. In March, his government negotiated a cease-fire with the rebels. In July, Habyarimana offered Rwandan passports to Tutsi refugees abroad, and he legalized opposition political parties.
- 1991, Habyarimana made a small gesture toward pluralization by adding an opposition member to his government. More significantly, in April 1992, he installed a multi-party government comprising 10 ministers of his own party and 9 from the opposition, though he still retained effective control
- July 1992, Habyarimana conceded in principle to the rebels’ demands on rule of law, democratization, power-sharing, and creation of a unified military, although without specifying the crucial details
RPF breaks ceasefire + consequences
On February 8, 1993, the rebels broke a seven-month cease-fire and rapidly captured a large swath of northern Rwanda, including portions of the hardline Hutu stronghold of Ruhengeri.
—> -retaliatory killing of Tutsi in Ruhengeri on March 5, 1993, and displaced an estimated one million Rwandans, or approximately one-eighth of the country’s entire population
-enabled Habyarimana to unite the Rwandan Hutu political class against the rebels and their domestic Tutsi “accomplices.”
RPF aware that retaliation likely
In February 1994, the RPF also started arming and training separate Tutsi “self-defense forces” within Rwanda to defend against the expected retaliatory massacres. When the genocide started, the program was a few months away from fruition, so that most Tutsi in Rwanda still were defenseless. In the first two months of 1994, some RPF officials also proposed publicly exhorting the “expected targets” of retaliation in Rwanda—that is, all Tutsi—to flee the country.
