Rwanda Flashcards
Melson (2003), origins of Rwandan genocide
no “age-old animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups,” as the front page of the October 1997 New York Times would have it.
Until 1959 when the Hutu revolution broke out, “there had never been systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis – anywhere
The Rwandan genocide was the product of a postcolonial state, a racialist ideology, a revolution claiming democratic legitimation, and war – all manifestations of the modern world
Melson (2003) colonial roots
first the Germans and then the Belgians came to rely on the Mwami, the Tutsi ruler, and the Tutsi aristocracy to impose their domination. Moreover, the colonizers needed a conceptual framework to comprehend the complexities of African society. Central to it were the notions of “tribe” and “race.”
physiognomy of the aristocratic Tutsi cattle herders differed somewhat from the Hutu peasantry and the nonaristocratic Tutsi pastoralists
aristocrats in the king’s court tended to be taller and slimmer, and their facial features closer to the European ideal of beauty
apparent difference came to be generalized by the Europeans as indicating that all Tutsi were of a different and superior race from the Hutu
further elaborated by Belgian administrators and anthropologists who argued – in what came to be known as the “Hamitic Hypothesis” – that the Tutsi were conquerors who had originated in Ethiopia
In the traditional system there had been three types of chiefs, with the chief of the land being a Hutu. However, the Belgians abolished this tripartite division, centralizing chiefly powers in one man, usually a Tutsi. By 1959 forty-three out of forty- five chiefs were Tutsi and only two were Hutu.
Belgians also initiated and made widespread a draconian system of forced labor, wherein mostly Hutu where drafted to work for the state without pay.
they refused to view the land as belonging to native lineages, allowing the state to dispose of Hutu land after paying out compensation to the owners.
The ubuhake system, a traditional social contract entailing subordination between Hutu and Tutsi, wherein some Hutu were able to rise to Tutsi rank, was undermined by the privatization of the land
As the Tutsi realized that Belgian “reforms” could in fact benefit them, they began to convert to Catholicism and to attend mission schools in order to improve their social position. In 1932, at the elite Astrida College (now Butare) out of 54 students 45 were of Tutsi origins
during the genocide: when genocidal killers were in doubt about the identity of their victims, they relied on colonial-era documents that had labeled people as Tutsi or Hutu.
Pierre Ryckmans, a Belgian administrator from the 1920s
“The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine [racial] presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige vis-`a-vis the inferior races which surround [them]…. It is not surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting have let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt.
Melson (2003), Belgian attempts to ‘democratize’ colonial system
1950s
churchmen feared being replaced by Tutsi priests, while the administrators were increasingly open to egalitarian ideas that promoted the lowly Hutu over the Tutsi upper class and aristocracy.
By initiating policies favoring the Hutu after the war, the Belgians were bound to encourage a Hutu revolt and Tutsi reaction.
By 1957 there emerged Hutu-led political movements demanding an end to Hutu subordination and the overthrow of Tutsi hegemony. Significantly they referred to the Tutsi as an alien race, not as an indigenous upper class
1959, with the aid of Belgian administrators, political movements led by Hutu elites revolted against their Tutsi overlords
Commencing on November 1, 1959, Hutu violence spread throughout the country. Colonel Guy Logiest, commander of the Belgian troops, approved of the violence and actively encouraged it
Bahutu Manifesto, 1957
‘the problem is basically that of the political monopoly of one race, the Mututsi’
called for the replacement of one system of domination with another.
demanded that the racial categories be maintained in identity papers, thereby reifying such labels with deadly consequences for the 1994 genocide.
At Ibuka (Tutsi survivors’ assoc) conference, Nov 25-Dec 1, 2002
most survivors dated the origins of the 1994 genocide to the 1959 revolution, when they were made second-class citizens in a racially polarized state
Habyarimana coup
July 1973
reaction to 1972 massacres against Hutu in Rwanda by Burundi army
Melson (2003), economic downturn 1980s
Habyarimana regime became increasingly vulnerable to liberalizing pressures from donors from abroad. In June 1990, following a meeting with French President Mitterand, Habyarimana announced that Rwanda would become a multiparty system
RPF, lead-up to invasion
October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a Tutsi-dominated force based in Uganda, commenced operations that would ultimately lead to the invasion of the country
Habyarimana’s plane shot down
April 6, 1994
Melson (2003), who orchestrated the genocidal campaign?
a radical Hutu elite at the center of government, calling itself “Hutu Power,” that had close ties to President Habyarimana
importance of propaganda (Melson 2003)
Hutu Power utilized the mass media to vilify the Tutsi minority as well as the Hutu opposition.
Rwandan Tutsis were demonized and accused of harboring murderous intentions against all Hutu
66 percent rate of literacy and a 29 percent rate of radio ownership (59 percent in the cities) - mass media proved very effective as tools of mobilization and propaganda.
Hutu Power fear-mongering prior to genocide (Melson 2003)
on October 4–5, 1990, it staged a phony attack on Kigali, which it blamed on the RPF. It initiated v real massacres of Tutsis as reprisals for RPF incursions and as a way of habituating ordinary people to violence.
means of mobilizing genocidaires in the villages (Melson 2003)
Hutu Power called people out to do communal work, umuganda (‘work’ here being mass murder)
Malkki’s work (Melson’s account)
Studying Hutu refugees from the Burundian massacres of 1972, she demonstrates how pervasive the “Hamitic Hypothesis” and racialist views of Tutsis had become.
In the popular Hutu mind, the Tutsis were demonized by an ideology (which she calls a “mythico-history”) that viewed them as foreign invaders from Ethiopia or Somalia who had arrived in Burundi (Rwanda) centuries before and were bent on subjugating or destroying the Hutu and stealing their land
Melson (2003), what links Rwanda, Holocaust and Cambodia?
What links all of these instances and makes them “modern” are the role of ideology and the circumstances of revolution and war
in any society, including liberal peaceful democracies, there are people who harbor murderous thoughts against national, ethnic, religious, racial, and other groups, but because they do not have the power to act on their intentions their murderous projects are mostly stillborn.
In all four instances, revolutionary regime was governed by an ideology that identified certain groups as the enemies of society. It was at war with foreign and domestic enemies that it sought to destroy what it called “the enemies of the revolution.”
Under revolutionary circumstances they will redefine the identity of a subset of the political community as “the people,” “the nation,” “the race,” “the religion,” or “the class.”
Rev regime also aims to alter the state’s international situation
Melson (2003), three ways in which revolutionary war closely linked to genocide
- gives rise to feelings of vulnerability and to paranoid fears that link supposed domestic “enemies” to external aggressors.
- war increases the autonomy of the state from internal social forces, including public opinion, public opposition, and its moral constraints.
- war closes off other policy options of dealing with “internal enemies.”
What type of genocide was Rwanda? (Melson 2003)
Rwandan genocide was a total domestic genocide, what the UN would call a “genocide-in-whole” as against a “genocide-in-part,” and as such it was the African version of the Holocaust
unique aspect of Rwandan genocide (Melson 2003)
Never before was a majority of a population mobilized by the state to become the “willing executioners” of a minority.
PRIMARY SOURCE: International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda Cartoon Book 2011
Use of Tutsi and Hutu families which are friends as main protagonists. In it together bc Hutus are accused of being Tutsi-lovers
Use of innocent children as main characters/ only survivors - they know no ethnic community
Sanitized - images not too graphic. But still, depictions of mass murders and even one in a church
V positive portrayal of view and success of ICTR
Clear that white ppl abandoned, and white person on RTLM = the enemy, but doesn’t labour point of abandonment by internat community. Fairly balanced account
Extremists portrayed as ultimate enemies/ the worst. Unbalanced account of Arusha Accords - extremists portrayed as stubborn and unwilling to compromise. In fact, RPF also v unwilling to compromise and internat community forcing huge concessions from extremists
Braeckman (2007), importance of radio in Rwandan genocide
RTLM most pop station
Many apolitical listened to this extremist station bc of music it played
RTLM accused Belgian troops in Rwanda on UN peacekeeping mission of shooting down H’s plane
Next morn 10 Belgian soldiers brutally killed on not long afterward Belgium withdrew forces from the UN mission
RTLM gave signal to begin massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus
You have to kill [the Tutsis], they are cockroaches
Article 3 common to the 4 Geneva Conventions of 194
in an internal conflict, civilians shall in all circumstances be treated humanely w/o any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion, sex, birth or wealth
Rwanda and Genocide convention
Rwanda became party to it 1975
Article 3 - direct and public incitement to commit genocide = punishable
Sept 1998, ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR):
- Sat in Arusha, Tanzania
- Sentenced former PM Jean Kambanda for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, in part for encouraging RTLM to continue its calls to massacre the Tutsis
- Same month, court convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu, leading civilian in Taba commune, on charges that included direct and public incitement to commit genocide
Ferdinand Nahimana, well-known historian who served as RTLM director, fled to Cameroon and the Belgian journalist George Ruggiu fled to Kenya
Both later arrested and delivered to the Arusha tribunal
First condemned N launched appeal but Ruggiu sentenced to 12 yrs of imprisonment after having been convicted of incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity
Li (2004), course of genocide
in the vacuum left by the absence of much cultivation, business, and study, the genocide established its own rhythm; participation (construed broadly, not necessarily killing) was routinized.
Li (2004), importance of social intimacy
Systematic identification and pursuit of Tutsi depended on the compilation of comprehensive lists at the local level; such surveillance, coupled with movement restrictions, made escape and anonymity extremely difficult.
killing involved widespread denunciation and betrayal of friends, neighbours, and loved ones
Li (2004) Rwandans easily open to manipulation and control?
seems difficult to rely on existing explanations—ideas such as cultural norms of obedience, elite-driven manipulation, and socioeconomic pressures—without somehow speaking of Rwandans as easily open to manipulation and control.
However, the genocide came immediately after the period of multipartyism, which was marked by unprecedented political openness and opposition to the state, including intra-Hutu violence
importance of not considering Hutus as ‘automatons’, mindlessly responding to propaganda - as most accounts of radio’s role
Li (2004), importance of RTLM manipulation of historical discourse
“Hutu revolution” of 1959 that precipitated the end of elite Tutsi hegemony (many Tutsi were as poor as their Hutu neighbours) and Belgian rule represented a radical and emancipatory leap forward, the raison d’eˆtre of the post-colonial Rwandan state that had always implicitly legitimized itself in opposition to the past
RTLM portrayed the progress achieved since the revolution as under threat from the RPF, collapsing past into present and calling upon Rwandans to re-enact the do-or-die moment of 1959.
contribd to deep sense of crisis
Georges Ruggiu, RTLM’s Belgian animateur recalled station’s management’s explicit instructions to make such historical comparisons and that he said on the air that “the 1959 revolution ought to be completed in order to preserve its achievements”
Li (2004), import of RTLM manipulation of discourse of democracy
Rwandan state built on notion of ethnic majoritarianism.
Allowed state to demonize the Tutsi.
Collapsed economic, regional and ideological differences between Hutu in name of ethnic solidarity
RTLM - pressing ppl to forget about parties and think only of ethnicity
-Tutsi numerical weakness meant their attempts to seize control = suicide
Li (2004), RTLM use of language of development
RTLM’s invocation of work drew upon the existing discourses of development -
notion of umuganda, communal work - while simultaneously recasting communal labour as an exercise in national survival
“Mobilize yourselves,” animateur Georges Ruggiu told listeners during the killings. “Work you the youth, everywhere in the country, come to work with your army.
Li (2004), reasons for RTLM’s greater influence than Radio Rwanda
Radio Rwanda’s reticence about the progress of the war began to raise listeners’ suspicions that it was withholding the full extent of the truth
Domitille, 57, an accused genocidaire, listening to the radio morning after the plane crash: “While Radio Rwanda played classical music, RTLM gave news about the situation”
RTLM somehow struck a balance between continuity and change
Li (2004), RTLM generating impression of trustworthiness
corrected itself, especially in cases where it retracted denunciations (which were effectively death warrants)
allowed Tutsis to speak and criticise the MRND,e.g. Rutaremara, high official in the RPF, but reporter Kantano prefaced interview with jokes about him ‘that tall Tutsi’, and said after that R was ‘of course anwswering in the inkotanyi way’ - to discredit
Both Hutu detainees and Tutsi survivors I spoke to said that the presence of a muzuungu (white man - Ruggiu) at RTLM gave it the appearance of strength, perhaps even international sanction.
Li (2004), Importance of personalities of RTLM broadcasters
Kantano Habimana was by far the most popular
one of Hitimana’s trademarks was to call out to the furthest mountains in the country, issue personal greetings to specific regions of Rwanda, and salute named individuals with whom he had met or shared a drink the night before
Listening to Noheli Hitimana at dawn while heading out to the fields was itself a cultural practice
Hitimana’s work at RTLM continued in the vein of many of his old practices from Radio Rwanda. For example, in response to criticisms of RTLM broadcast over Radio Muhabura, he responded with a litany of areas that had experienced RPF attacks
Hitimana converts his everyday habit of naming, recognizing, and saluting individuals into a means of denouncing, targeting, and threatening them, all within the boundaries of the same style and the same medium
Li (2004) influence of RTLM beyond broadcasts themselves
Broadcasts were often reincarnated elsewhere as rumour, where the possibilities for exaggeration or reinterpretation could only expand.
According to one of his neighbours, a militia member named Hakiri used to spend mornings on the roof of his shop with a radio clutched to his ear, listening to RTLM. When he listened, “his mood changed” and he would climb down and gather people to tell them what he had heard
Li (2004), RTLM’s music
Bikindi’s anti-Tutsi lyrics
Many Hutu sang along with Bikindi’s songs on RTLM in bars and in streets, and even after “work” shifts
Li (2004), importance of RTLM’s everyday role
RTLM did not simply whip Hutu into a frenzy to channel fear and anger into sudden attacks. Rather, through the daily diet of informational updates, operational details (not to leave bodies on the road in view of Western journalists, for example), and encouraging monologues, it contributed to the framing of schedules and the routinization of “work.”
According to one survivor, many people would listen to RTLM at roadblocks, in homes, and in bars, during breaks. Sometimes they would listen outdoors in groups as large as 100, closely following the information relayed to plan the next day’s activities. When asked if this took place every day, he replied, “Of course. It was work. It was to know what to do”
Appropriation of the rhythms of everyday life by the proponents of the genocide was part of a dialogic process through which Rwandans actively sought to understand and confront a social world disrupted by four years of civil war, political instability, and economic crisis, now coming to a head with the assassination of Habyarimana and the eruption of widespread violence
while it is often noted that the road to genocide is paved with smaller massacres, it may be more appropriate in this case to say that rather than violence becoming normal, it was normality itself that was co-opted in the service of violence.
Mironko (2004), individuals’ initiatives
while state actions in Rwanda in 1994 may have speeded the process
of genocide, people themselves, thinking and acting in mobs, assumed a degree
of initiative in the violence, and killed with methods that far exceeded state
mandates.
Chretien et al. (1995) (Mironko’s account), how is it possible for ‘normal’ ppl to take part in mass violence?
reducing the human targets to non-human status generates broad social consent to mass murder
this consent was built through extensive ideological and political preparation that included dehumanizing Tutsi as “cockroaches” (inyenzi) and snakes (inzoka) and rewriting history to demonize an entire group, the Tutsi, as “foreign invaders.”
Mironko (2004), igitero
‘mob attack’
played a significant role in providing the discursive grounds for justifying the extermination of Tutsi, and also the logistical instrument for ensuring popular participation in the genocide.
Mironko (2004), interviewees’ avoidance of the word ‘genocide’
in response to my question about what they had pleaded guilty to, all the avoues confirmed that they had pleaded guilty to the crime of “genocide” (using the French word). When I asked them what “genocide” was, the majority told me that it was ubwicanyi (“killings”). Very few of the prisoners used the term itsembatsemba or itsembabwoko (itsemba extermination, ubwoko tribe), which are common Kinyarwanda translations for “genocide,”
suggests that there is little if any understanding on the part of the perpetrators about the legal, moral, or political differences between committing genocide and murder
many interviewees told me that they had taken part in ibitero or group attacks. Igitero (pl. ibitero) comes from the infinitive gutera (to) launch, assault, attack)
Mironko (2004), historical myths
use of historical myths and arguments elaborated by Hutu Power propagandists, many of whom are still at large, was evident in the avoues’ accounts.
RPF
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Mironko (2004), range of terms used to refer to, and demonize/ stereotype/ dehumanize, Tutsi
mwanzi (enemy), inyenzi (cockroaches), RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), and Inyeshyamba (forest dwellers/maquisards)
Mironko (2004), igitero’s two sets of meanings - meaning 1
igitero is related to a whole group of words associated with hunting.
Traditionally, the Rwandan monarch was in charge of regulating the natural environment through hunting. He opened the hunting season in which he himself participated, and delegated the power to hunt certain animals at certain times to the local authorities. Thus, the King morally sanctioned the hunters’ actions (Nkulikiyinka, 1993)
The use of hunting metaphors in the genocide likens the killing of Tutsi to the process of environmental culling or sanitation in traditional Rwanda
Using words like kuvuza induru (yell), kwihisha (to hide), kuvumbura (flush out of hiding), gushorera (to herd), guhiga (to hunt/chase), and kwichira ku gasi(kill in full view) the avoues I interviewed often seemed to be recounting hunting expeditions, rather than genocidal attacks.
Mironko (2004), dehumanization
Psychologically, those people called to participate in the genocide transformed themselves into hunters in pursuit of dangerous animals.
As for the victims (their prey), often they too felt dehumanized to the extent that it made sense on some level for them to be killed
Mironko (2004), igitero’s two sets of meanings - meaning 2
form of social and political organization that actually facilitated the attacks on Tutsi.
When a person is attacked, s/he shouts for help and those who live on the same hill or hamlet are socially and morally obligated to come to the person’s aid. But during the genocide, this practice was used not to help the victims, but rather to assemble the attackers
The whistles, instead of signaling that help is on the way, were transformed into a message of terror signifying impending destruction. Kugaba igitero (to give orders) was a term used to organize the attacking mobs.
This was mostly the job of the political party leaders known as Nyumba kumi (“10 houses” in Swahili) because they were in charge of 10 households, the lowest administrative level in the country
MRND
Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Développement
Mironko (2004), in what manner were the killings carried out?
casually
interviewees still regard their participation in them casually
Mironko (2004), ‘double genocide’
most radical among them even spoke of a “double genocide.” Nobody is innocent, they [the RPF] killed us and we killed them
Mironko (2004), reconciliation
By jumping straight to reconciliation without first addressing the deep wounds caused by the genocide, I argue that the groundwork for a future genocide is being laid.
Mironko (2004), culture of obedience?
I have tried to show here that it is considerably more complicated than that.
The ordinary Rwandans I spoke to in the prisons did not kill Tutsi only because they were Tutsi, but for a range of reasons that included safeguarding their wealth from the invading Tutsi, as per government propaganda.
Kuperman (2004), in most cases of mass killing since WWII
(unlike the Holocaust) the victim group has triggered its own demise by violently challenging the authority of the state
The Holocaust paradigm is so dominant, however, that the field of genocide studies has focused almost exclusively on explaining the actions of the perpetrators of genocide, leaving aside the actions, strategy, and potential responsibility of victim groups and third parties.
Kuperman (2004), RPF role in nutshell
1990s, RPF - with the support of the international community threatened Rwanda’s Hutu regime to such an extent that it retaliated with genocide
Rwanda’s 1994 genocide was a retaliation by the state’s Hutu regime to a violent challenge from the Tutsi rebels who invaded from Uganda in 1990 and fought for over three years to seize effective control of Rwanda.
First inyenzi invasion
1961
origins of the RPF
June 1987, The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity abandoned its quasi-Marxist ideology and embraced secretly a last-resort “zed option”—the use of military force, if necessary, to return to Rwanda
To mark the change, in December 1987, the organization renamed itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
Although RANU’s original goal had been refugee return, the RPF had a broader political agenda, which included removal of Habyarimana and implementation of political reform in Rwanda to provide the returning Tutsi a significant share of political power.
Habyarimana attempts to avert RPF invasion
- agreed jointly with Uganda to seek UN assistance on two initiatives to facilitate repatriation of Tutsi refugees—a survey of their wishes in the Ugandan camps, scheduled for October 1990, and a visit to Rwanda by refugee leaders to draw up lists of proposed returnees, scheduled for November 1990
- legalized opposition political activities in Rwanda
RPF undermining Habyarimana’s attempts at compromise
By invading in October 1990, the rebels preempted Habyarimana’s refugee initiatives before their sincerity could be tested.
Publicly, the RPF disparaged his initiatives as inadequate because they offered return only to refugees in Uganda, without addressing the needs of Tutsi refugees in other states whom the RPF also represented.
However, even if Habyarimana had agreed to take back all Tutsi refugees, RPF officials say privately in retrospect that they still would have launched the invasion—unless Habyarimana had also offered to give them a significant share of political power.
Kuperman (2004), RPF expectations of protracted struggle
Rwigyema and other senior rebel officials anticipated a protracted struggle against a more numerous and better equipped Rwandan army. The RPF expected to have about 1,000 rebels on foot with small weapons facing the 5,000-strong Rwandan army that was outfitted with armored vehicles and helicopters.
In addition, the rebels expected that foreign powers, including Belgium, France, and Zaire, probably would intervene to support the army
rebels’ preparations provide further evidence that they anticipated a protracted struggle, and help explain the three-year delay between the founding of the RPF and the invasion.
The RPF prepared food stores and follow-on invasion routes in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. This included planting crops in neighboring states and preparing dried beef for an extended campaign
Kuperman (2004), role of foreign powers
- France deployed troops that bolstered the resolve of the Rwandan army, helped organize its counter-attack, and assisted in operations such as targeting artillery. The French continued this military support for the next three years, deploying reinforcements whenever necessary
- France deployed 150 troops to reinforce the Rwandan army on February 9, 1993 and another 250 troops on February 20
- International pressure on H to make concessions - pressure mounted on Habyarimana to share power. Sanctions were applied or threatened by the international community, including French officials who warned the Rwandan president that they would soon withdraw their troops, which he correctly viewed as his only protection against the rebels. In August 1993, seeing little other choice, he finally caved in on the two powersharing provisions and signed the comprehensive Arusha accords. The RPF and its allied domestic opposition parties were to be given the majority of seats in the interim cabinet and legislature preceding elections. Moreover, the rebels were to be granted their requested 50% of the officer positions (and 40% of the enlisted ranks) in the combined army, rather than the 15% that Habyarimana originally proposed. In light of the superiority of the rebels on a man-for-man basis by this time, the military integration protocol was tantamount to a negotiated surrender of the Hutu army to the Tutsi rebels
- RPF communicated to certain groups of domestic Tutsi that they should flee Rwanda - most refused to leave on the grounds that they expected the UN peacekeepers to protect them if violence broke out.
the international community, by supporting the rebels’ intransigence, inadvertently helped trigger the genocidal backlash.
Habyarimana compromising 1991-2
on democratization and refugees to satisfy international demands and undercut support for the rebels. For example, on February 19, 1991, he signed the Dar-Es-Salaam declaration on the right of refugee return. In March, his government negotiated a cease-fire with the rebels. In July, Habyarimana offered Rwandan passports to Tutsi refugees abroad, and he legalized opposition political parties.
- 1991, Habyarimana made a small gesture toward pluralization by adding an opposition member to his government. More significantly, in April 1992, he installed a multi-party government comprising 10 ministers of his own party and 9 from the opposition, though he still retained effective control
- July 1992, Habyarimana conceded in principle to the rebels’ demands on rule of law, democratization, power-sharing, and creation of a unified military, although without specifying the crucial details
criticism of RPF by Hutu opposition party in Rwanda
On July 1, 1992, the leading opposition Hutu party, the MDR, criticized the rebel offensive, saying it “shows a duplicity within the RPF that calls into question its good faith and sincerity”
RPF breaks ceasefire
On February 8, 1993, the rebels broke a seven-month cease-fire and rapidly captured a large swath of northern Rwanda, including portions of the hardline Hutu stronghold of Ruhengeri.
Approached w/in 20 miles of Kigali.
Many Hutu civilians killed
RPF frustration at French deployments 1993
As one senior rebel puts it, “We could have won, but the international community wouldn’t let us. France would aid the army and the international community would criticize us.”
Consequences of Feb 1993 RPF offensive
- retaliatory killing of Tutsi in Ruhengeri on March 5, 1993, and displaced an estimated one million Rwandans, or approximately one-eighth of the country’s entire population
- enabled Habyarimana to unite the Rwandan Hutu political class against the rebels and their domestic Tutsi “accomplices.”
reaction to Habyarimana’s Arusha concessions
- profound distress within Rwanda’s army and government. Habyarimana’s cronies felt betrayed and terrified. They immediately set out to undermine the implementation of the accords, working in conjunction with the president.
- US assistant Secretary of State for Africa during most of the war says the “RPF demands concerning the future of the military were guaranteed to push the regime into a state of total paranoia”
- even the rebels admit that Habyarimana made the lion’s share of the concessions.
Habyarimana obstructing Arusha
In the fall of 1993, Habyarimana obstructed implementation of the Arusha accords by coopting virtually all of the Hutu opposition parties into his “Hutu Power” alliance against the Tutsi. He did so by spawning Hutu Power wings within each party that quickly became more popular than their moderate rivals (except in one case).
Once the opposition parties were dominated by their Hutu Power wings, he insisted to the rebels that these hardliners—rather than the minority moderate wings allied with the RPF— should appoint the parties’ representatives to the transitional government, which would enable him to retain effective control of the government.
Assassination of Burundi’s first elected Hutu president
October 1993
followed by massacre of thousands of Hutu civilians
Based on these killings, and the RPF’s military offensive earlier that year, Habyarimana could make a credible case that the Tutsi represented an existential threat to the survival of Rwanda’s Hutu.
Kuperman (2004), Hutu extremists preparing for massacres
the Rwandan media began to report, and the rebels became aware of, strong signs that extremist Hutu were preparing to greatly escalate their campaign of retaliation against civilian Tutsi
These Hutu extremists apparently believed that by preparing to kill all of the Tutsi civilians in Rwanda they could prevent the country from being conquered by the rebels. Accordingly, they imported thousands of guns and grenades and hundreds of thousands of machetes, and transformed political party youth wings into fully fledged armed militias
They apparently also established a clandestine network of extremists within the army to take charge when the time came
Wave of mutual political assassinations
Feb 1994
RPF aware that retaliation likely
In February 1994, the RPF also started arming and training separate Tutsi “self-defense forces” within Rwanda to defend against the expected retaliatory massacres. When the genocide started, the program was a few months away from fruition, so that most Tutsi in Rwanda still were defenseless. In the first two months of 1994, some RPF officials also proposed publicly exhorting the “expected targets” of retaliation in Rwanda—that is, all Tutsi—to flee the country.
However, the rebels worried this could cost them international support by suggesting they intended to violate the cease-fire. Moreover, it would stigmatize the Tutsi in Rwanda as fifth-columnists
Instead, the RPF decided to communicate discreetly to certain groups of domestic Tutsi that they should flee Rwanda.
Charles Murigande admits, “reprisals were expected.”
Rudasingwa concurs that, “we knew the mass killings would occur,” but were surprised by “the speed and the viciousness.”
