Rules of Interpretation Flashcards
Literal Construction (1st Case)
- The words, phrases and sentences of a statute are to be understood in their odinary meaning in their natural, ordinary and grammatical meaning. Unless such a construction leads to an absurd meaning.
- Case: When the language is clear and unambigious there is no need to apply the tools of interpretation.
Two basic rules of literal interpretation
Every word should be given meaning
The court cannot read into anything that is unambigious, unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it hasn’t expressed
What are the presumptions in literal construction
No word is unnecessarily used. One should not presume any omissions, and if any word is not there in the statute, it is not to be given any meaning.
Mischief Rule
In Heydon’s case, in 1584, it was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes, these four things are to be considered:
1. What was the law before the making of the act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the law did not provide
3. What remedy the parliament had appointed to cure the disease
4. The true reason of the remedy
The mischief rule requires courts to adopt the construction that supresses the mischief and advances the remedy
When is hayden’s rule applicable? [Case]
Only when the words in question are ambiguous and reasonably capable of more than one meaning
When does the court have to ignore the mischief rule?
When a construction’s adoption is such that it ignores the plain meaning of the words or disregards the context (Umed Singh)
Rule of harmonious construction
Rule is that a statute must be read as a whole and that one provision must be read in relation to others such that they are harmonious. Goal is to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy.
What is the duty of courts in harmonious construction?
To avoid a head on clash between two sections of the same act and whenever it is possible, to construct provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.
How can a court harmoniously construct?
- Holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate situations
- Making a provision the exception to the otherwise general provision
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay
Seeming conflict between Article 161 (Pardoning Power) and Article 142 (natural justice). Governor has power to pardon, and there are no limitations in Article 161. Article 142 allows the SC to suspend the sentence or grant bail during pendency of application for special leave.
Court uses harmonious construction
Article 161 does not include the power to suspend the sentence when the matter is subjudice in the Supreme Court under 142.
But it is open to the governor to grant full pardon under Section 161 at any time even during the pendency of the case in supreme court.
Therefore there is no conflict.
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore
- Appeal preferred by the trustees of the temple who were managing the temple on behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins.
- To remove the disabilities of Harijans from entering Hindu Public Temples the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act was enacted.
- Appellants argud that the temple is a private one and outside operation of act. Act violates 26(b) freedom to manage religious affairs by denominations. Since age-old practice of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to conduct religions, they are a denomination.
Question of law
Whether 26(b) can be overriden by Right to freedom of religion under A25
Harmonious Construction
Entry to all, but for special ritualistic occasions, the entry may be restricted to Gowda Saraswath Brahmins
Rule of Reasonable Construction
ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
- The words of a statute must be construed so as to give a sensible meaning to them
- A provision cannot be so interpreted so as to divorce it from comon sense
- Example: By the 1st amendment to the US consti, the freedom of speech and expression is absolute. In india it is reasonable. There are reasonable restrictions such as
- Security of state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency etc.
Ejusdum Generis
When a general word follows particular and specific words, then the scope of the general word must be construed such that it agrees with the scope of the specific words.
SEBI Case
Facts of the Case:
In March 2002, the Promoters of Shree Ram Multi Tech Limited (“SRMTL”) borrowed Rs. 48,94,00,000 from Nirma Industries and pledged shares of SRMTL worth Rs. 1,42,88,700.
In June 2005, Nirma Industries enforced the pledge due to the Promoters’ failure to repay the debt, triggering Regulation 10 of the Takeover Regulations.
Nirma Industries made a public announcement for an open offer to acquire up to 20% of SRMTL’s shares at Rs. 18.40 per share.
A Special Audit Report revealed that directors had siphoned off 350 crores, leading Nirma Industries to seek withdrawal of the offer.
SEBI rejected the withdrawal application without a personal hearing, stating reasons were not justified. SAT upheld SEBI’s decision.
Issues:
Did SEBI violate principles of natural justice by not granting a personal hearing?
Does the act of fraud by SRMTL’s promoters justify withdrawal of the offer by Nirma Industries?
Should the principle of Ejusdem Generis apply in interpreting Regulation 27(d)?
Decision:
SEBI was not obligated to grant a personal hearing as per the Regulations, and no request for a hearing was made by the appellant.
The term “such circumstances” in Regulation 27(1) (now 23) must be construed strictly to pertain to situations making completion of the offer impossible, not economically undesirable.
Ejusdem Generis does not apply to Regulation 27(d) as interpreted by SAT, as the conditions in sub-clauses (b) and (c) do not align with the broader context of impossibility outlined in sub-clause (d).
When can you apply ejusdum generis?
- The statute contains an enumeration by specific words
- The members of the enumeration constitute a class
- The class is not exhausted by the enumeration
- A general term follows the enumeration
- There is no clearly manigested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires