Rest of con law Flashcards
City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center
i. Facts: The city denied a permit to a group home of mentally challenged individuals
ii. Issue: Are regulatory classifications based on mental retardation quasi-suspect such that they should receive intermediate scrutiny?
iii. Holding: The requirement that this group gets a special permit does not pass the rational basis test thus this law is law is invalid
iv. Takeaway: Mental retardation is not a suspect class, so their validity is subject to rational basis review, however, rational basis review does not mean that a court will automatically uphold a law
1. The law here was struck down
2. The motives behind the city’s denial of the permit were irrational
3. This is a higher version of rational basis – shows that the levels of review are more of a sliding scale
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
i. Facts: Dred Scott was a slave that claimed because his master took him to a place where slavery was not allowed and then took him back to Missouri he should be a free man
ii. Issue: Can an African American slave become a member of the political community entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities appertaining thereto?
iii. Holding: Declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional (first time the Supreme Court determined a law passed by Congress was unconstitutional), held that slaves were not proper citizens
iv. Takeaway: The word citizen as used in the Constitution does not include slaves
1. This decision indirectly led to the freeing of slaves because it became central to the issues that led to the Civil War
2. This decision was overturned by the 14th Amendment which granted citizenship to all persons born in the US
Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)
i. Facts: West Virginia law declared that only whites may serve on juries
ii. Issue: Does the West Virginia law that declared only white males could serve on juries violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment?
iii. Holding: Yes
iv. Takeaway: Denying a citizen participation in the administration of justice solely on racial grounds violates equal protection
Which case established strict scrutiny for race & national origin
Korematsu v. United States (1944)
Korematsu v. United States
i. Facts: Korematsu was a Japanese-American that appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a federal military order excluding Japanese-Americans from certain parts in the western half of the US
ii. Issue: May a racial classification survive strict scrutiny on the basis of military need or national security?
iii. Holding: Yes – military necessity and national security may justify placing legal restrictions on a single racial group, the law that excluded Japanese from West Coast is upheld
iv. Takeaway: Military necessity and national security may justify placing legal restrictions on a single racial group
Loving v. Virginia (1967)
i. Facts: White man and black woman were married in DC and then moved back to Virginia – they were convicted of violating the interracial marriage ban and sentenced to a year in jail
1. Virginia argues because the statute treats blacks and whites equally it is not discriminatory
ii. Issue: Do statutes that ban interracial marriages violate the EPC of 14th Amendment?
iii. Holding: The statute is unconstitutional – no legitimate purpose to the law except racial discrimination
iv. Takeaway: Legislation that restricts the freedom to marry solely on the basis of racial classification violates the EPC of the 14th Amendment
h. Palmore v. Sidoti (1984)
i. Facts: A mother was awarded custody of her 3-year-old daughter after her and her husband obtained a divorce, the father filed for custody a year later after the mother moved in with a black man
ii. Issue: Can a court consider private racial bias and the possible injury caused by them when determining the custodial placement of a child?
iii. Holding: No – although domestic relations are usually left up to the states, the Constitution cannot permit a state court to give way to such discrimination
iv. Takeaway: Courts cannot use private racial bias as a justification for official court action
i. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
i. Facts: A man asserted an equal protection challenged against his conviction for violating a Louisiana statute which required railway companies to maintain separate accommodations for whites and blacks after he was forcibly removed by from police from a coach car
ii. Issue: Does the EPC of 14th Amendment restrict states from segregating citizens based on race?
iii. Holding: No – the 14th Amendment does not restrict states from requiring the separation of the races
iv. Takeaway: The 14th Amendment does not withhold from states the power to permit or require the separation of races.
1. The was not overturned until Brown v. Board of Education
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
i. Facts: Black children in four states challenged the denial of their admission to public schools reserved solely for whites pursuant to laws permitting or requiring segregation
ii. Issue: May states require or permit that public schools be segregated on the basis of race?
iii. Holding: No – states cannot segregate public schools on the basis of race
1. Overruled Plessy v. Ferguson
iv. Takeaway: States cannot segregate schools on the basis of race
1. Courts have expanded this principle that “separate but equal” is a violation of equal protection in virtually every area of civic life
Washington v. Davis (1976)
i. Facts: Two black police officers and two black applicants to the District of Columbia’s police department sought to challenge the department’s application process as discriminatory on the basis of race on several grounds, including that certain written tests had a discriminatory impact on blacks
ii. Issue: Does a facially neutral law or official act violate equal protection merely because it has a discriminatory impact?
iii. Holding: No – a facially neutral law or official act will be declared unconstitutional only if there is proof that the law or act has a discriminatory purpose
iv. Takeaway: A facially neutral law will only be overturned if it has a discriminatory purpose
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
i. Facts: Black man in Georgia convicted of murdering a police officer and sentenced to death – there was data that the death penalty was applied more often to African Americans than other minorities, he argued it violated equal protection
ii. Issue: Does statistical evidence indicating a risk that race plays a role in capital sentencing determinations prove a violation of equal protection?
iii. Holding: No – this alone does not prove a violation of equal protection
iv. Takeaway: Statistical evidence indicating a risk that race plays a role in capital sentencing determinations does not alone prove a violation of equal protection.
City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
i. Facts: A group of black citizens of Mobile Alabama filed suit in federal court claiming that the city’s commission form of government was maintained in violation of the 15th Amendment’s prohibition against race-based interference with the right to vote
ii. Issue: Where it is found that minorities vote without hindrance, can a 15th Amendment violation be inferred from the fact that a proportionate number of minority candidates have failed to hold office?
iii. Holding/takeaway: No – the 15th amendment does not entail the right to have black candidates elected but prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote
1. Establishes a stringent standard for proving purposeful discrimination under the 15th Amendment
Personnel Adminstrator of Mass. v. Reeny (1979)
i. Facts: A female state employee was passed over for promotion by several less qualified male applicants that had served in the armed forces – she sued based on equal protection challenging the state personnel office’s stated preference for veterans
ii. Issue: Does the government’s awareness of the discriminatory impact of certain legislation suggest that such legislation was enacted for a discriminatory purpose?
iii. Holding:
iv. Takeaway: To be deemed purposefully discriminatory, a government act must have been taken because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Brown 2
i. Facts: In 1952 the court decided (Brown 1) that racial discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional – 1955 is the trial that determined the remedies for the discrimination
ii. Issue: What is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the constitutional principles invalidating public school segregation?
iii. Holding: The district courts are to determine the remedies based on their specific districts – the schools need to make a prompt and reasonable start towards compliance with the original ruling – the local school authorities should be responsible for implementing anti-discrimination remedies
iv. Takeaway: The Federal District Courts which first heard the cases involved in Brown I are to employ their full equitable power to ensure and oversee the full implementation of the constitutional principles announced therein.
Green v. Country School Board (1968)
Declared the “freedom if choice” plan is unconstitutional - gave students the ability to choose which school they attended
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)
i. Facts: A black student and others filed a petition in federal District Court seeking relief from the failure of the Charlotte School to desegregate in an expedient manner consistent with Brown I
ii. Issue: May federal district courts employ broad equitable powers to fashion a plan for desegregation once it has been shown that school officials have failed to do so?
iii. Holding: Yes – this is within the court’s broad equitable powers
1. Mathematic ratios are a useful starting point but not an inflexible requirement
2. One race schools – the court should scrutinize these schools and the burden is on the school authorities to satisfy their racial comp is not discrimination
3. Altering of attendance zones may be inconvenient but is necessary during interim remedial period
4. Transferring students is within the jurisdiction of the courts to decide
iv. Takeaway: This court defined the remedial powers of federal courts – courts have authority until they have dismantled the dual school system and complied with the decision in Brown
Milliken v. Bradley (1974)
i. Facts: A federal district court in Michigan ordered a multidistrict, area-wide remedy to address the racial segregation in only one of the 53 school districts in the metropolitan Detroit area
ii. Issue: Can a federal court impose a multi-district, area-wide remedy to a single-district segregation problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary school systems in their districts?
iii. Holding: The multi-district remedy is not applicable in this case – in order for the remedy to be placed on an entire school system the school had to have been found to violate the 14th amendment, Detroit was the only school district that had violated this and thus is the only school that can be forced into a remedy
iv. Takeaway: Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.
Parents involved in community schools v. Seattle School district (2007)
i. Facts: A Seattle School District used race as a factor when assigning children to schools – Seattle had never operated segregated schools, Louisville district had racial discriminatory past and were under a court order for almost 20 years until they were found to operate a unitary school
ii. Issue: Can a public school that had never operated legally segregated schools choose to classify students by race and rely upon that to make school assignments?
iii. Holding: These schools cannot use racial assignments
iv. Takeaway: Use of race as a factor in school assignments, unless it is to remedy past segregation or used as one factor in a range, violates the equal protection clause
What goals must affirmative actions accomplish?
- remedy past proven discrimination in particular establishment
- diversity as a benefit for the educational experience
Regents of the University of Cali v. Bakke (1978)
Medical school set aside 16 slots for minorities
Takeaway: cannot use a set number of seats for minorities or a quota
Richmond v. JA Croson Co (1989)
i. Facts: After losing its bid on a public project due to its inability to procure satisfactory bids from minority subcontractors, a construction company filed suit against Richmond, VA to challenge the city ordinance that required 30% of subcontractors on public projects to be owned by minorities
ii. Issue: Can a local government justify maintenance of a policy of affirmative action in awarding public project contracts in an effort to remedy prior discrimination where there is no precise evidence of prior purposeful discrimination?
iii. Holding: No – in order for a local government to remedy discrimination with the use of affirmative action they must prove that such plans are necessary and that they are addressing actual past discrimination
1. There was no consideration of non-race measures to combat the perceived discrimination and the quota used was not narrowly tailored to any goal
2. Takeaway: A city may use its spending powers to remedy private discrimination if it identifies that discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Metro Broadcasting inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (1990)
i. Facts: Minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other factors were basically equal and the distress sale was challenged as it allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of their stations
ii. Issue: Did the FCC’s minority preference policies violate the EPC component of 5th amendment?
iii. Holding: No – these policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity
iv. Takeaway: Intermediate scrutiny used for affirmative action programs
Adornad Constructors v. Pena
Overruled Metro and said affirmative action needs strict scrutiny
i. Facts: United States Department of Transportation gave additional compensation to contractors that hired small businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals (based on race) to be their subcontractors
ii. Issue: Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
iii. Holding: Yes – even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury
iv. Takeaway: All racial classifications (whether imposed by federal, state or local authorities) must pass strict scrutiny review
Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)
i. Facts: Gratz was denied admission to the undergraduate University of Mich in favor of minority candidates
1. U of Mich used the many factors when granting candidates admission, one of which is race
2. School used point system based on different points for characteristics, 20 points automatically for being a minority
ii. Issue: Does the University of Michigan’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the EPC and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
iii. Holding: Yes – violate equal protection – do not survive strict scrutiny
iv. Takeaway: University admissions policies must take race into account, if at all, only on a case-by-case individualized basis
1. The fatal blow to the admissions policy was the quantification of each student’s admissibility and giving a value to a specific race
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
i. Facts: Grutter was a white law school applicant that was denied admission at U of Mich based on their policy for relying on applicant’s race in admissions decisions
1. The school had an admissions policy that required the school to consider all factors but emphasized the inclusion of candidates from racial or ethnic groups fostered racial and ethnic diversity in the student body
ii. Issue: Can a law school use race as a factor in student admissions?
iii. Holding: Yes – using the holding in Bakke – student body diversity serves a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in the admissions process
iv. Takeaway: To withstand a constitutional challenge, a race-based admissions policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest
1. Compelling purpose: Diverse student body to fulfill the good faith mission
2. Narrowly tailored: Considered race/ethnicity as a plus, used it in a flexible, nonmechanical way, school gave weight to other diversity factors besides race
Reasons for intermediate scrutiny for gender
i. Biological differences between men and women make it more likely that gender classifications will be upheld / justified
ii. Women are a political majority with voting power
iii. Strict scrutiny might prohibit the government from engaging in affirmative action to benefit women’s equality
Reed v. Reed (1971)
Invalidated a gender classification for the first time (used rational basis)
i. Holding: Invalidated a law that said if two people were competing applicants in the same category to receive an inheritance the man was preferred over the woman
1. Can’t pick a person to handle the estate because they are a man versus a woman if they are the exact same relationship to the deceased – this violates the EPC
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)
i. Facts: Female lieutenant in US Air Force filed suit against the Armed Forces regarding the statute that created the assumption that wives of men in the service were dependent for purposes of obtaining living allowances but the same was not available for dependent men
ii. Issue: Are gender classifications subject to strict scrutiny?
iii. Holding: Strict scrutiny should be used and the law is unconstitutional as it violates EPC of the 5th amendment
iv. Takeaway: Gender based classifications are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict scrutiny – not a majority opinion on the level of scrutiny