Remoteness, Defences and Remedies Flashcards
Remoteness - the test of reasonable foreseeability
A claimant can only recover if the type of damage suffered was reasonably foreseeable at the time the defendant breached their duty of care.
This is an objective test: what was reasonably foreseeable.
This legal test was established by the Privy Council in The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] AC 388.
Remoteness - the same type of harm
The claimant can only recover if the defendant ought to have foreseen the ‘type’ of damage suffered (hence in Wagon Mound, despite pollution damage being foreseeable, fire damage was not, and so the type of harm suffered was not foreseeable). The courts have varied their approach to the type of damage that has to be foreseeable, with some cases taking a broad approach, whereas others have taken a narrow view as to the type of harm that is foreseeable.
the case law does indicate a prevailing attitude of the judiciary to take a broad approach to the type of damage that must be foreseeable, particularly in relation to personal injury. In Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 the claimant suffered psychiatric harm following a road traffic accident. The court held that the type of harm that had to be foreseeable was personal injury, physical or psychiatric (ie the type of harm was defined very broadly). The claimant’s psychological symptoms were therefore foreseeable and recoverable.
Remoteness - No need to foresee the exact way damage occurs
Once it is established that the type of damage was reasonably foreseeable, there is no need for the defendant to foresee the exact way in which the damage occurred.
Key case: Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837
Workmen negligently left oil lamps surrounding a hole in the road. The claimant, aged 8, picked up one of the lamps and dropped it into the manhole, where it exploded, causing the claimant to fall into the manhole and suffer severe burns. The type of damage, being damaged from burns, was foreseeable – for example, it was foreseeable that the claimant might knock over and break the lamp, causing a burn. However, the events as they unfolded were probably not foreseeable.
HELD: the harm was not too remote. As long as the type of damage is reasonably foreseeable, there is no need to foresee the exact way in which the burns occurred.
Remoteness - No need to foresee the extent of damage
Once it is established that the type of damage was reasonably foreseeable, the defendant is liable for the full extent of those damages, even if the extent is greater than that which would normally be expected.
Key case: Vacwell Engineering v BDH Chemicals [1971] 1 QB 88
The claimant suffered extensive property damage following the defendant’s negligence in causing a chemical explosion. A minor explosion was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s breach. However, the explosion that did occur was of a magnitude which was not reasonably foreseeable.
HELD: the damage was not too remote for the claimant to recover the full extent of the loss. The type of damage that was foreseeable was property damage caused by an explosion. It was irrelevant that the defendant could not foresee the magnitude of such an explosion and so they were liable for the full extent of the property damage.
‘Thin skull’ rule
The ‘no need to foresee the extent’ principle applies even if the damage or extent of injury has been aggravated by the claimant’s own weakness. This is the ‘thin skull’ or ‘egg shell skull’ rule; the defendant must take their victim as they find them.
Key case: Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405
The defendants negligently burned the claimant. The burn provoked the onset of a pre-existing malignant cancer from which the claimant subsequently died.
Held: if the defendant can foresee the original injury ie the type of harm (here, burns), they are responsible for anything that flows from that injury even if the claimant suffers to a greater extent because of a pre-existing condition. The defendant was liable for all physical damage to the claimant (the type of damage) and this included the cancer and death (the extent of the damage).
consent
Defences do not become relevant until a tort has been established. Only at that point is it necessary to see if any defences are available that might completely remove liability, or at least partially reduce it. It is for the defendant to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities.
There are several defences, but the one considered in this element is consent (also known as volenti non fit injuria).
Translated this means ‘that to which a man consents cannot be considered an injury’. It is usually shortened to volenti or ‘consent’.
The defence of consent is applicable in cases where the claimant has consented to the risk(s) involved and cannot, therefore, complain of the consequential damage.
In order to succeed in this defence the defendant must show that the claimant:
· Had capacity to give valid consent to the risks
· Had full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risks
· Agreed to the risk of injury
· Agreed voluntarily
If successful, consent acts as a complete defence. The claimant gets no damages.
consent - Had capacity to give valid consent to the risks
The first requirement for the defence of consent that the defendant must prove is that the claimant had the mental capacity to consent to the risk/s. This is normally straight forward, unless the claimant is say, a young child.
Also, in the case of Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 a prisoner took his own life whilst in police custody. It was alleged that the police were responsible for his death. The police were aware that he was at risk of taking his own life. Having confirmed that the police owed a duty of care to the prisoner to prevent him from taking his own life, the House of Lords stated that the defendants could not use an argument of consent in relation to the deceased’s action as this was the very action that they were required by their duty of care to prevent. The claimant did not have the requisite capacity to consent to the risk associated with taking his life. However, damages were reduced by 50% for contributory negligence.
consent - Had full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risks
The second requirement for the defence of consent, is that the claimant must have had full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk/s that materialised. General knowledge will not suffice.
This is subjective ie the question is whether the particular claimant knew the risk.
For example, in the case of Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6 the claimant accepted a lift with a drunken pilot. The claimant was also drunk, and this had to be taken account of by the court in determining whether he appreciated the danger involved. The court held that the claimant was not so drunk as to be incapable of understanding the nature and extent of the risk, and he willingly embarked on the flight knowing the defendant was drunk and likely to be negligent.
consent - Agreed to the risk of injury
The third requirement for the defence of consent, is that the claimant agreed to run the risk of injury due to the defendant’s negligence. This agreement can be express or implied. Like the previous requirement, this is also subjective.
Knowledge of the risk alone is not the same as consenting to it. In Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 the claimant was a passenger who knew the driver was under the influence of drink, but the defence of consent failed when the driver negligently caused an accident: knowing the risk did not mean that she (the claimant) had impliedly consented to the risk (ie agreed to waive any liability for negligence on the driver’s part).
In sport, the courts have held that by willingly engaging in the sport, the claimant voluntarily agrees to the risks inherent in that sport but not to risks which are not inherent in that sport eg serious foul play in football.
consent - Agreed voluntarily
The fourth requirement for the defence of consent, is that the claimant agreed to run the risk of injury due to the defendant’s negligence voluntarily. The defence cannot succeed unless the claimant acted voluntarily ie the claimant decided to subject themselves to the risk free of any constraint.
In Smith v Charles Baker & Sons [1891] AC 325 (in which the claimant was hit by a rock from a crane whilst at work) it was stressed that the requirement of voluntary consent was in addition to knowledge of the risk. Employees who know of the risks of their jobs are not necessarily voluntarily running those risks, since they may have little real option if they wish to keep their job. It is therefore very difficult (although not impossible) to succeed with the defence of consent where the claimant is an employee.
Consent may be negated by statute
S 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 prevents the use of consent by motorists facing claims from their passengers. For example, a drunk driver cannot rely on consent to defeat the claim of a passenger who voluntarily accepts a lift and is injured as a result.
S 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies to defendants acting in the course of business (but does not apply where the claimant is a consumer). Section 2(1) prohibits defendants excluding or restricting liability for death or personal injuries resulting from negligence. Under s 2(2) other types of loss may be excluded, subject to a test of reasonableness. Section 2(3) makes it clear that a person’s agreement to or awareness of a contract term or notice purporting to exclude or restrict liability for negligence will not of itself be taken as indicating voluntary acceptance of any risk.
Section 65(1) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 prohibits traders, when dealing with consumers, from using contract terms/notices limiting or excluding liability for death or personal injury through negligence. Other damage is subject to s 62 - an exclusion clause is only binding if it is fair. Section 65(2) states that voluntary acceptance of risk cannot be assumed merely because the consumer agreed or knew about the term.
The legal test for contributory negligence
for a finding of contributory negligence the defendant must establish:
(a) That the claimant failed to take reasonable steps for their own safety; and
(b) That this failure contributed to the claimant’s damage.
Effect of contributory negligence
A finding of contributory negligence reduces the liability of a defendant in relation to the harm their breach of duty has caused the claimant to reflect the claimant’s role in the harm they suffer. In practice, this means the claimant’s damages are reduced by a percentage the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage. Contributory negligence is therefore a partial defence.
As a result, it is the most commonly raised and successful defence given it produces a ‘fair’ result ie the claimant still receives damages, but the damages are reduced to reflect their part in any loss suffered.
The defence is available to other torts in addition to negligence, and possibly to breach of contract claims.
Failure to take reasonable steps for safety
The first stage of the legal test for contributory negligence, is that the claimant failed to take reasonable steps for their safety. The claimant is required to take the same degree of care that a reasonable and prudent person would take. The standard is objective.
Allowances are made for claimants who have been placed in an emergency or difficult dilemma ie claimants who are injured whilst trying to save themselves.
In Jones v Boyce (1816) 1 Stark 493 the claimant was a passenger on the defendant’s coach. When a horse started to run away with the carriage due to the defendant’s negligence, the claimant reasonably believed that the coach was about to overturn and so jumped off and broke his leg.
There was no contributory negligence. The claimant had acted reasonably in the situation. The defendant could not criticise the claimant’s attempts to avoid the danger created by the defendant.
Rescuers are generally protected from contributory negligence.
The nature of the duty must also be considered. In St George v Home Office [2008] EWCA Civ 1068 the claimant was a prisoner who fell out of a top bunk bed during a seizure caused by withdrawal from drugs. Prison staff had failed to adequately look after him, despite knowing of the risk of withdrawal seizures.
It was held that it was inappropriate to reduce the claimant’s damages on the basis that his own role in creating the addiction amounted to contributory negligence, because having told the prison officers about the risk of seizures, it would not be equitable to reduce his damages for that reason.
Failure contributed to the claimant’s damage
The claimant’s fault must contribute to the damage suffered, although it need not contribute to the accident. Therefore, failure to wear a seat belt will be contributory negligent if wearing a seat belt would have reduced or avoided injury (Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286) even though failing to wear the seat belt does not cause the accident.
The same applies to failing to wear a crash /cycle helmet or not wearing it properly.