Regulating psychiatric practice Flashcards

1
Q

What are exceptions to informed consent

A
Incompetence
Emergency situations
Patient waives
Therapeutic privilege
Involuntary commitment
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2
Q

What are exceptions to inform consent in minors

A
Emergency situations
Emancipation
Maturity
Specific situation is covered by statute
Foster care exception
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3
Q

Canterbury v Spence

A

Informed consent

Reasonable person standard

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4
Q

The reasonable medical practitioner standard

A
Natason v Kline 
Nature of condition
Nature of treatment
Likelihood of success 
Alternative treatments 
Risks of untoward consequences
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5
Q

Subjective patient based consent

A

Scott v Bradford

All material risks that could affect decision

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6
Q

Three elements of informed consent

A

Information
Voluntary
Competence

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7
Q

What are elements of competence

A

1) communication of a choice
2) understanding relevant information provided
3) appreciation of the situation and its consequences
4) rational decision making

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8
Q

Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring

A

1) such services are appropriate
2) the affected persons do not oppose community-based treatment
3) community-based services can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the public entity and the needs of others who are receiving disability services from the entity.

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9
Q

Lake vs Cameron

A

Least restrictive environment for non dangerous people

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10
Q

Jackson v. Indiana

A

a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.

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11
Q

Elizabeth Packers

A

Dangerous to self and others

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12
Q

Lanterman Pettus Short Act

California

A

Ended indefinite commitment

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13
Q

Josiah Oakes (1845)

A

case introduced concept of “danger to self or others”

67 yr of age, Oakes committed by his family because he became engaged to younger woman instead of properly mourning death of his wife

court ruled that right to confine insane person applied only to those considered dangerous to themselves or others

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14
Q

Lake v Cameron (1966)

A

Lake v Cameron (1966): landmark case upheld concept of least restrictive treatment alternative; police found 60-yr-old Lake wandering; at commitment hearing, psychiatrists testified she had organic brain syndrome associated with aging; patient not dangerous but at risk for wandering and encountering harm;

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15
Q

Lessard v Schmidt (1972): Lessard picked up by police, confined for 10 days, and diagnosed with schizophrenia

A

Lessard brought class action suit with civil rights attorney, arguing that civil commitment statute in Wisconsin violated due process;

court held that statute unconstitutional

case set high-water mark for civil commitment and addressed criminalization of civil commitment

proposed safeguards similar to those required for criminal proceedings;

state required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that patient mentally ill and dangerous;

patient maintains Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination

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16
Q

O’Connor v Donaldson (1975):

A

Donaldson paranoid delusions; his parents committed him to state hospital, where he remained for 15 yr; patient repeatedly demanded friend offered to take patient home with him; Donaldson brought suit and jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages; Fifth Circuit Court affirmed decision and US Supreme Court reviewed case; issue for Court whether state can involuntarily commit nondangerous individuals capable of surviving safely in freedom by themselves or with help of willing family members or friends; Court cited constitutional right to liberty, ruling that state could not confine nondangerous individual

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17
Q

O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 1975)

A

Courts have interpreted this case in two different manners. Namely, either that a finding of dangerousness is constitutionally required to justify involuntary hospitalization (Stromberg, 1982), or that the nondangerous mentally ill cannot constitutionally be confined without the provision of meaningful treatment.

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18
Q

Addington v Texas

A

In Addington v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court shed light on, and set forth the acceptable evidentiary standards for, commitment proceedings. (See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 1979.)

The Supreme Court held that applying the “clear and convincing” standard provided an acceptable balance between providing due process protections and not making it burdensome to have an individual committed.

the Court ruled that the “clear and convincing” standard should be applied to commitment proceedings

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19
Q

What are standards of proof

A

“preponderance of the evidence” (i.e., more likely than not),

Clear and convincing an intermediate standard between preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt

the higher “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases).

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20
Q

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608, 1979.

A

In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a postadmission hearing was not necessary to protect a minor’s interests. Instead, the justices found that a neutral fact finder, such as a physician, could determine whether or not the commitment was appropriate, after a complete review of the reasons for the minor’s hospitalization. The Court preferred this method to full-blown legal proceedings and believed that a traditional medical evaluation was preferable to a more formal adversarial hearing. In fact, the Court found that turning to the judicial system rather than a “trained specialist” on such matters “can turn rational decision making into an unmanageable enterprise.”

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21
Q

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 1990.

A

The Court held that the hospital should have allowed the option of voluntary admission only to patients who were competent to consent to such an admission.

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22
Q

Can a voluntary patient be detained

A

a voluntary psychiatric patient must notify hospital staff of their request for discharge. In over 30 states, this must be done in writing. The hospital treatment team is then allowed to continue the hospitalization for a period ranging from 4 hours up to 5 days, depending on the state; in some jurisdictions, only business or court days are counted. In some states, the continuation of the admission is contingent on the hospital’s application for an involuntary commitment. In others, this is not required.

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23
Q

Kendra’s law: supports outpatient civil commitment in New York

A

Duke study found that outpatient commitment >6 mo in duration associated with fewer hospitalizations, less violence, and fewer arrests;

implementation of Kendra’s law associated with increased treatment adherence, improved social functioning, and lower rates of arrest, hospitalization, and homelessness;

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24
Q

American Psychiatric Association Council on Psychiatry and the Law issued position statement on involuntary outpatient commitment

A

stating that goal to mobilize treatment resources, enhance effectiveness, and improve adherence

council recommended that statutes authorize initial commitment period of 180 days and permit extensions based on specified criteria shown at hearings

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25
Q

Civil commitment

A

DsmV language and Language from statute definition

Causal connection between mental illness and behaviors

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26
Q

What is the effect of AOT in New York

A

Analyses of Medicaid claims and state reports on 3576 patients involved in New York’s AOT program yielded similar results (Swartz et al. 2010, 976). Compared to periods of time prior to the initiation of an AOT court order, AOT participants experienced a 25% reduction in psychiatric hospitalizations and over a 30% decrease in inpatient admissions after the AOT orders were renewed for 6 months. Significant declines in inpatient lengths of stay also were evident, with the average pre-AOT duration of hospital admission lasting approximately 18 days, compared to 11 days during the first 6 months of the court order and 10 days during subsequent months of mandated outpatient care.

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27
Q

Youngberg v. Romeo (1982)

A

the Supreme Court did finally address the substantive due process rights of mentally retarded persons involuntarily committed to institutions. The Court specifically addressed whether such persons had rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to “(i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraint; and (iii) training or ‘habilitation’” (Youngberg v. Romeo 1982, 309). The Court opine (Rosner)

Rosner, Richard. Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, 3rd Edition. CRC Press, 20161228. VitalBook file.

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28
Q

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997 et seq.

A

The “reasonable-modifications” regulation states that public entities must make “reasonable modifications” in order not to discriminate “‘on the basis of disability.” However, these public entities are not required to “fundamentally alter” the nature of their programs (28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7)).

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29
Q

What are the final Wyatt recommendations

A

Accreditation: All mental illness facilities must maintain Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-Care Organizations (JCAHO) accreditation.
Advocacy programs: All mental illness facilities must maintain an advocacy staff to educate patients about rights, investigate complaints of rights violations, and monitor conditions of facilities and certified community programs.
Census reduction: Specific target census reductions were set, but no facility closures were required.
Community placement: Facilities were required to develop and implement a plan for “out-placements” and concurrently increase community-based placements and services.
Public education: States were required to institute a comprehensive, state-wide plan to enhance the public’s appreciation for the abilities, needs, and rights of persons with mental illness.
Quality improvement: Facilities must maintain adherence to current policy and procedures and continue Continuous Quality Improvement Systems.
Safety and protection: Facilities must respond in a timely manner to allegations of abuse and neglect with trained employees using standard procedures.
Treatment and habilitation: Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program can have input into individualized treatment plans, and consultants will be hired to address special needs populations (e.g., the dually diagnosed mental illness/mental retardation, organic/brain injured, physically handicapped, HIV/AIDS, self-injurious, others) and to review and make recommendations concerning the use of seclusion and restraint (Wyatt v. Sawyer 2000). (Rosner)

Rosner, Richard. Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, 3rd Edition. CRC Press, 20161228. VitalBook file.

30
Q

The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) of 1980

A

United States federal law[1] intended to protect the rights of people in state or local correctional facilities, nursing homes, mental health facilities and institutions for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.

31
Q

CRIPA generally applies to five types of institutions:

A

Jails and prisons
Juvenile correctional facilities
State or locally-run mental health facilities
State or locally-run developmental disability and mental retardation facilities
State or locally-run nursing homes
Significant problems covered by CRIPA include:

32
Q

CRIPA

Abuse and neglect in nursing homes and juvenile facilities

A

Sexual victimization of women prisoners
Inadequate education in facilities serving children and adolescents
Unmet mental health needs of inmates and pre-trial detainees
Rights of institutionalized persons with disabilities to receive adequate rehabilitation and active treatment

33
Q

Dixon v. Weinberger (1975)

A

a case involving the patients of Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital in the District of Columbia, the court, in basing its decision on statutory grounds (the District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act), found that patients were guaranteed a right to treatment and that this right was no less than a right to treatment in the LRA

34
Q

Brewster v. Dukakis 1978

A

mandated a “comprehensive community mental health and retardation system to include no less than residential environments; non-residential treatment, training, and support programs; and management services to coordinate and monitor the network of environments and programs.” The consent decree focused on those persons of western Massachusetts who had been, were, or could be patients at the Northampton State Hospital. Although the overall outcomes have been mixed (Geller et al. 1990a,b; Geller 1991a), some achievements have been remarkable. A decade after the consent decree was signed, every patient in the hospital on the day of the signing had been discharged at least once (Geller et al. 1990).

In the area covered by the consent decree, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts managed to establish the best-funded community residential system in the United States (Geller and Fisher 1991).

By most accounts, few persons are still institutionalized in western Massachusetts or are at risk of hospitalization as a result of a lack of an appropriate, less restrictive alternative” (Schwartz and Costanzo 1987, 1400).

35
Q

Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health 1983

A

Rogers case, the courts concluded that a substituted judgment determination requires that evidence including the following should be considered: the patient’s stated preferences, experienced side effects of the medication, family preferences, prognosis with and without treatment, and any religious considerations that may have influenced the patient’s treatment decisions if competent

36
Q

In Hargrave v. Vermont (2003),

A

the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that a Vermont state law that permitted the override of durable powers of attorney, such as psychiatric advanced directives, in order to force treatment of civilly committed patients, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act

37
Q

Jaffee v. Redmond (1996)

A

Supreme Court of the United States, recognizing that “50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege” (p. 12), and observing that “the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment” (p. 10), ultimately held that this privilege should apply in federal courts as well.

38
Q

how to de-identify information.

A

It may be done by “(1) a formal determination by a qualified statistician; or (2) the removal of specified identifiers of an individual and of the individual’s relatives, household members, and employers is required, and is adequate only if the covered entity has no actual knowledge that the remaining information could be used to identify the individual.

39
Q

The Legal approach Prototypical legal case Key differences Rights-driven

A
Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health (1983)
Deference to judicial decision
Requires affidavit and court decision
Treatment-driven
Rennie v. Klein (1983)
Deference to medical decision maker
Often requires layered clinical reviews
40
Q

Who Must Get Consent?

A

The legal doctrine of informed consent is directed at physicians. The courts have not found a duty for hospitals or other providers to get informed consent, holding that this always flows to the physician

41
Q

The Community Standard Of consent

A

The community standard is the older standard and reflects the traditional deference of the law toward physicians. It is based on what physicians as a group do in a given circumstance. The community standard requires that the patient be told what other physicians in the same community would tell a patient in the same or similar circumstances. “Community” refers both to the geographic community and to the specialty (intellectual community) of the physician.

42
Q

Fraud in consent

A

Under either standard, a patient who asks to be told all the risks of a procedure is entitled to more information than a patient who sits mute. Failure to disclose a risk in reply to a direct question may constitute fraud, even if the appropriate standard for judging informed consent would not require that the risk be disclosed.

43
Q

Reasonable-Person Standard

A

The courts and legislatures of several states have abandoned the community standard in favor of the more patient-oriented reasonable-person standard. The reasonable- person standard requires that a patient be told all of the material risks that would influence a reasonable person in determining whether to consent to the treatment. Although ambiguous The reasonable-person standard is concerned with the modern problem of choosing among alternative treatments. To make an informed choice, the patient must be told about the risks and benefits of all the acceptable treatments and the consequences of no treatment.

44
Q

Statutory Disclosure Standards

A

Certain states and the federal government mandate specific disclosures in certain situations. Texas is a good example because it has the most detailed requirements. The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, a statutory body consisting of physicians and lawyers, promulgates lists of procedures and the risks that a patient must be told about each procedure.

45
Q

Canterbury v Spence

A

Dr. Spence acknowledged that he had told Canterbury and his mother only that the surgery might result in “weakness” without mentioning paralysis, and that he avoided a more specific warning so as not to deter the patient from pursuing the operation. Nevertheless, the jury ruled against Canterbury.[1][2] Case shifted our culture from a ‘professional practice standard’ to a ‘reasonable person standard’ in malpractice cases,

46
Q

Canterbury v Spence

A

shifted our culture from a ‘professional practice standard’ to a ‘reasonable person standard’ in malpractice cases,

47
Q

Zinernon v Burch

A

Respondent Burch, while allegedly medicated and disoriented, signed forms requesting admission to, and treatment at, a Florida state mental hospital, in apparent compliance with state statutory requirements for “voluntary” admission to such facilities. After his release, he brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court against, inter alios, petitioners – physicians, administrators, and staff members at the hospital – on the ground that they had deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. The complaint alleged that they violated state law by admitting him as a voluntary patient when they knew or should have known that he was incompetent to give informed consent to his admission, and that their failure to initiate Florida’s involuntary placement procedure denied him constitutionally guaranteed procedural safeguards.

48
Q

Natason v Kline

A

Kline administered cobalt radiation to natason with injuries. Kline did not understand the risk. The appellees argue that we are here concerned with a case where the patient consented to the treatment, but afterwards alleges that the nature and consequences of the risks of the treatment were not properly explained to her

49
Q

Exceptions to testimonial privilege

A

A number of exceptions to testimonial privilege exist, typically regarding such subject matter as proceedings for involuntary hospitalization, court-ordered evaluations, conditions that constitute an element of a patient’s legal claim or defense, and lawsuits or complaints filed against psychiatrists

50
Q

California’s Lanterman–Petris–Short Act (LPS

A

California’s progressive mental health code, which was signed into law in 1967 and became effective in 1972. LPS provided immunity for liability related to hospital admission and discharge decisions. (Rosner)

51
Q

Tarasoff evolution

A

(1) the Supreme Court of California formulated its well-known duty to protect, with warnings serving as an option for fulfilling this duty; (2) California enacted its original Tarasoff protective disclosure law (Cal. Civ. Code §43.92 [1986]) intended to clarify when the duty to warn exists and how it is to be discharged; (3) the Tilley v. Schulte (1999) decision required warning of a threat without further risk assessment and the Ewing cases (Ewing v. Northridge Hospital Medical Center 2004; Ewing v. Goldstein 2004) interpreted the law to require automatic warnings, in effect eliminating a duty to protect; and (4) now the amended protective disclosure law restores the Tarasoff principle of protection, which may be fulfilled with, but not necessarily by, warnings (Cal. Civ. Code §43.92 [2013]).

52
Q

Current Ca Tarasoff rule

A

there is no liability when the therapist “discharges his or her duty to protect by making reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victims or victims and to a law enforcement agency.”

53
Q

Jaffe v Redman

A

Acting as the representative of Allen’s estate, Jaffee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Redmond had used excessive force during the altercation. Witnesses testified that Allen was not armed during the altercation. During discovery, Jaffee discovered that Redmond had sought counseling from a licensed clinical social worker. Jaffee sought the social worker’s notes for the purpose of cross-examining Redmond at the trial. Redmond opposed the request, claiming that the notes were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The trial judge rejected this argument, and the jury later awarded Allen’s estate $545,000 in damages.

54
Q

Lipari v Sears

A

Ulysses L. Cribbs, Jr., purchased a shotgun from a Sears store located in Bellevue, Nebraska. Prior to purchasing this gun, Mr. Cribbs had been committed to a mental institution, and had been receiving psychiatric care from the Veterans Administration [V.A.]. Shortly after purchasing the gun, Mr. Cribbs resumed participation in psychiatric day care treatment at the V.A. This treatment lasted from September 23, 1977, until October 17, 1977, when Mr. Cribbs removed himself from this treatment, against the advice of his doctors. On November 26, 1977, Mr. Cribbs entered an Omaha night club and fired a shotgun into a crowded dining room, killing Dennis F. Lipari and seriously wounding his wife, Ruth Ann Lipari Court is of the opinion that under Nebraska law the relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient gives rise to an affirmative duty for the benefit of third persons. This duty requires that the therapist initiate whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to protect potential victims of his patient

55
Q

Driving responsibly

A

Driving I not a Psychiatic assessment

56
Q

Naidu v. Laird

A

Putney, who has a long history of mental illness, apparently drove his automobile deliberately into Mr. Laird’s vehicle. At the time of the accident, Putney was in a psychotic state. Putney was charged with manslaughter but found not guilty by reason of insanity. Five and one-half months prior to the fatal accident, Putney had been treated for a seventh time at DSH. Mrs. Laird alleged that the defendants were grossly negligent[2] in the care, treatment, and discharge of Putney from DSH and that such gross negligence was a proximate cause of her husband’s death.

57
Q

Reisner v Regents of University of California (1995)

A

: filed by boyfriend who contracted HIV after his partner received contaminated blood; court ruled physicians had obligation to inform patient so she could inform her boyfriend

58
Q

Cameron v lake

A

This confirms the view of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that “the entire spectrum of services should be made available, including outpatient treatment, foster care, halfway houses, day hospitals, nursing homes, etc.” The alternative course of treatment or care should be fashioned as the interests of the person and of the public require in the particular case. Deprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for their protection

59
Q

Hargrove v Vermont

A

Psychiatic advance directive can prevent treatment with psychotropic medication

60
Q

Preventing boundary violations

A

Maintain relative therapist neutrality.
Foster psychological separateness of patient.
Protect confidentiality.
Obtain informed consent for treatments and procedures.
Interact verbally with patients.
Ensure no previous, current, or future personal relationship with the patient.
Minimize physical contact.
Preserve relative anonymity of therapist.
Establish a stable fee policy.
Provide consistent, private, and professional setting.
Define time and length of sessions (Rosner)

Rosner, Richard. Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, 3rd Edition. CRC Press, 20161228. VitalBook file.

61
Q

Roe v. Doe (1977)

A

a psychiatrist was sued by a former patient for publishing a book that reported verbatim information from the therapy, including the patient’s thoughts, feelings, and fantasies.

62
Q

A fiduciary duty

A

ithe highest standard of care. The person who has a fiduciary duty is called the fiduciary, and the person to whom he owes the duty, is typically referred to as the principal or the beneficiary. If an individual breaches the fiduciary duties, he or she would need to account for the ill-gotten profit.

63
Q

Before the Roy v. Hartogs decision in 1976

A

In Hartogs, for the first time, large monetary damages were awarded after Dr. Hartogs attempted to treat his patient’s fear of being a lesbian by initiating a sexual relationship with her. The court held that the psychotherapist–patient relationship was a fiduciary relationship similar to a guardian–ward relationship. The court further stated, “there is a public policy to protect a patient from the deliberate and malicious abuse of power and breach of trust by a psychiatrist when the patient entrusts to him her body and mind

64
Q

In Simmons v. United States (1986)

A

In Simmons v. United States (1986), the court addressed the consequences of mishandling the transference:

65
Q

Darling v. Charleston Hospital

A

Darling v. Charleston Hospital (1965) 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill.) has led to many claims against hospitals, essentially for providing the domain in which an ill or impaired physician may practice. Because doctors are not normally employees of

66
Q

List schedule drugs

A

Schedule I drugs include heroin and marijuana. Schedule II drugs are defined as drugs with a high potential for abuse, though less abuse potential than Schedule I drugs. These drugs are also considered dangerous, and include the opioid pain medications oxycodone and hydromorphone, as well as psychostimulants. Schedule III drugs include buprenorphine and codeine-containing products. Schedule IV drugs include benzodiazepines and barbiturates, in addition to sedative–hypnotic agents (zolpidem)

67
Q

What predicts psychotropic use in children in placements

A

Gender: Males are more than two times as likely to receive psychotropic medications as fem
ales (19.6% versus 7.7%).
Age: The likelihood that a child will receive psychotropic medication increases with age (3.6% of 2- to 5-year-olds, 16.4% of 6- to 11-year-olds, and 21.6% of 12- to 16-year-olds). (

68
Q

What is prevalence of use of psychotropics in foster care

A

A 2009 study found that youth in foster care were almost nine times more likely to be prescribed antipsychotic medications than other youth covered by Medicaid (Crystal et al. 2009).

69
Q

What is re Gault decision

A

In the decision In re Gault, the Supreme Court held that Gault was denied due process of law and that juvenile proceedings must meet the constitutional standards of due process and fair treatment guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and previously believed by some to apply only to adults (In re Gault 1967).

70
Q

What happened in re Gault

A

Gerald (“Jerry”) Gault was a 15 year-old accused of making an obscene telephone call to a neighbor, Mrs. Cook, on June 8, 1964. After Mrs. Cook filed a complaint, Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were arrested and taken to the Children’s Detention Home. Gault was on probation when he was arrested, after being in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a woman’s purse. Due process was not followed and Gault got 6 years in detention

71
Q

What is substituted judgement in children

A

To protect the due process rights of children, Courts looked to the best interests of the child in making decisions about medical treatment, including treatment with psychotropic medications.