Rectification Flashcards
Fitzwilliam (2 party)
Applying Malory v Cheshire Homes,
(i) S.58 only applies to legal title, and because of the void disposition B merely holds the title on trust for A
(ii) A disposition that would have been void for fraud in unregistered conveyancing is not a “disposition” within the meaning of the Act and thus does not receive protection by S.29
2 criticisms of Fitzwilliam; current status?
- The implication is that B’s title being merely formal, he will never be entitled to indemnity for alteration since his title was from its inception bound by A’s trust interest and he thus loses nothing by rectification – completely undermines the indemnity system of the LRA 2002.
- The decision was based on Malory, but Malory was decided under the old LRA and thus distinguishable; such an undermining of S.58 was NOT necessary
Yet Fitzwilliam was applied by the HC in Park.
Swift (2 party)
The judge resorted to Sch 8 to interpret Sch 4 (very artificial; logically Sch 4 comes first since indemnity is only awarded if there is rectification) to hold that a party taking an interest under a forged disposition had thereby suffered loss
A fraudster forges a disposition of registered land from A to B. In good faith B pays the fraudster and is registered as RP. Who bears the loss? What if the fraudster tricks A into conveying the land to B?
A mistake has been made if B’s title was registered pursuant to a forged, and therefore void disposition. (Lloyd LJ, Guy – “the registration of something that was not properly executed on the part of the RP must be a mistake”)
In the 2nd scenario then the disposition is not void, but voidable - no mistake is made, and no rectification is available (Ruoff and Roper).
Baxter v Mannion
It will be unjust under Para 3(2)c not to alter the register whenever there is a mistake, which makes the rest of Para 3(2) redundant/is entirely circular and must surely be wrong
Walker v Burton
There has to be a factor making it positively unjust not to rectify – it is not sufficient that rectification is “just” on general principles (though NOTE here those seeking rectification were NOT rightful owners)
When may the court refuse rectification if Para 3(2) does not apply?
Only if there are exceptional circumstances; otherwise the court has a DUTY to alter (Para 3(3)).
Guy (3 party)
Lloyd LJ thought (obiter) that unless it was shown that C at least had constructive notice of the defect in the title of B (and probably not even then), there was no way of arguing that C’s registration as RP/chargee of the property could be a mistake
Stewart
“To allow ex post facto removal of entries which were at the time lawfully made to reflect lawful dispositions” undermines the legislative aim of allowing investigation of title w/ the absolute minimum of additional enquiries; S.58 shows Parliament prefers certainty of title over the property rights of victims of fraud, who are to have their remedy by way of indemnity.
a) Ajibade + Gold Harp
Ajibade - “Correcting” a mistake means unravelling all its direct consequences.
Gold Harp - the court implicitly accepted that “correction” required amendment of the Register to reflect “that which ought to be the position had there been no mistake”, observing that this was also the Land Registry’s stance.
b) Guy (No.2)
(obiter) A’s removal from the register pursuant to a void disposition might also be construed as a mistake.
c) Knights Construction
The history of the LRA 2002 clearly indicates that there was no intention to alter the pre-existing law holding that A’s right to have the register rectified should persist even if C had acquired an interest in it for valuable consideration (e.g. Argyle BS v Hammond). Law Comm intended that S.82(1)g under the old act was to be collapsed into Para 2(1)(a), Sch 4.
S.82(1)(g), LRA 1925
“Where a legal estate has been registered in the name of a person who if the land was unregistered would not have been the estate owner”
d) Crawley
Since Malory has established that the right to alter the register is in itself a property right, this right can be, if protected by actual occupation, an overriding interest under Sch 3 Para 2, being prior in time to C’s later interest.
e) Fitzwilliam
A retains the beneficial interest in the property, w/ B only capable of passing on the legal title; A’s beneficial interest can then be protected by actual occupation under Sch 3 Para 2