Reckless conduct/injury

Question 1

reckless conduct/ injury

Answer 1

‘causing culpable and reckless injury’ is an alternative charge to that of assault; unintentional but reckless

Question 2

HMA v Harris 1993

Answer 2

An accused person was charged on indictment with assault to severe injury and permanent disfigurement by seizing hold of his victim, pushing her on the body and causing her to fall down a flight of stairs and onto the roadway as a result of which she was struck by a motor vehicle. The indictment also libelled an alternative charge to the effect that the accused culpably, wilfully and recklessly seized hold of his victim and did all of the acts libelled in the assault charge to her severe injury and permanent disfigurement. The accused objected to the relevancy of the alternative charge on the ground that it did not disclose a crime known to the law of Scotland. At a preliminary diet the sheriff sustained the objection and dismissed the alternative charge. The Crown appealed, contending that reckless conduct resulting in actual injury constituted a crime and that it was not essential that the conduct be to the danger of the lieges. The accused maintained that the alternative charge was a duplication of the assault charge.
Held, (by a bench of five judges), that (1) reckless conduct to the danger of the lieges constituted a crime in Scotland and so too did reckless conduct which caused actual injury; (2) (Lord McCluskey dissenting) the charges were truly alternatives since the law drew a distinction between intent and recklessness, and the jury could conclude that the accused had the intent necessary for assault or alternatively that he lacked that intent but had displayed recklessness which caused the victim to fall and sustain injury; and appeal allowed ( Quinn (Daniel Dermott) v Cunningham 1956 J.C. 22, [1955] 12 WLUK 10 overruled). Per Lord McCluskey (dissenting): The alternative charge was irrelevant as there was no crime known to the law of Scotland consisting of wilfully seizing another human being, pushing her on the body and causing her to fall down a flight of stairs except the crime of assault.
overruled Quinn v Cunningham 1956

Question 3

Quinn v Cunningham 1956

Answer 3

• Accused charged with riding his bike in a reckless manner and colliding with a pedestrian
• Objective test required evidence that the recklessness was so high as to involve indifference to the consequences
• Case dismissed - this was no more than simple carelessness to ride with due care. reckless conduct per se need not be directed at the public

Question 4

Kimmins v Normand 1993

Answer 4

Searching, needle

Question 5

W v HMA 1982

Answer 5

Dropping a bottle out of the window of a 15th floor flat. Severely injuring a pedestrian. Utter disregard of what the consequences of the act in question may be so far as the public are concerne

Question 6

Reckless endangerment of the lieges

Answer 6

no injure require, potential harm

Question 7

Normand v Robinson 1994

Answer 7

Accused organised a ‘rave’ in a derelict building which possessed serious potential to cause injury. The building later caught fire putting people in a position of endangerment; the charge was culpably and recklessly promoting and organizing a rave. The averments specified defects in a building (in which a rave was to be held) stating these had a clear bearing on the safety of persons attending the rave. This was sufficient to give rise to a charge of culpable and reckless conduct against the organizers of the event.

Question 8

MacPhail v Clark 1983

Answer 8

burning straw next to a busy road = reckless indifference as to a foreseeable outcome of harm to others

Question 9

Khaliq v HMA 1984

Answer 9

(causing real injury) sniffing kit

Question 10

Ulhaq v HMA 1991

Answer 10

(causing real injury) no kit;U, a shopkeeper, appealed against conviction of culpably, wilfully and recklessly supplying quantities of solvents and lighter fuel for the purpose of inhalation, to the danger of health and life. U argued that the sheriff wrongly repelled a submission of no case to answer having regard to the ages of the purchasers (between 20 and 29), and the absence of evidence of instigation or the provision of abuse “kits”, the substances having been sold in their normal containers. He further appealed against sentence of two years’ imprisonment.
Held, refusing the appeal against conviction and allowing the appeal against sentence, that Khaliq (Raja Abdul) v HM Advocate 1984 J.C. 23, [1983] 11 WLUK 200, made it clear that the age of persons supplied and the form of the supply were only factors in drawing the necessary inference that the supply was a cause of the abuse; the fact that adults were involved here did not matter. In view of the frequency of sale, all to members of the one family, the variety and quantity of the items supplied, the fact that U had resisted remonstrations from other members and U’s reply to caution and charge, “As long as I don’t think they are addicted”, there was sufficient from which the jury could draw the necessary inference. However, in view of U’s previous good character and favourable reports, his having spent seven weeks in custody and the fact that the sheriff had wrongly disregarded the purchasers’ ages in considering sentence, 200 hours’ community service would be substituted. Observed, that severe sentences would be in order for such offences especially where children were involved.