Quiz #2 Flashcards

1
Q

Why Institutionalization?

A

 Routinized and predictable political and policymaking process
were deemed indispensable to China’s modernization
 Mao’s policies had led to chaos and economic underdevelopment
 Guard against concentration of political power

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Indicators of institutionalization

A

 Regular meetings for party congress and the Central
Committee
 A routine of consultation, review, and revision by organs
and constituencies for policymaking
 Restoration of organizational discipline in the party,
government, and military
 Establish rules for leadership turnover and succession

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Institutionalization of Leadership Succession

A

 Incorporated fixed term limits for top state posts in 1982
 Mandatory retirement ages for various level within the state
hierarchy
 Since the 1997,
members of the
Politburo who reach the age of
68 must retire by the end of their terms
 The deliberate and
prepared succession of members in the
Politburo

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

The ranking of CCP elites in the Central Committee (CC) took place took place when and in what organization?

A

Roughly once every five years at the National Party Congress (NOT the National People’s Congress)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

The ranking of CCP elites is highly coordinated by the…

A

Politburo Standing Committee

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

T/F: Starting at the 12th Party Congress in 1952, the CCP delegates receive ballots with
more names than there were seats in the Central Committee.

A

False: 1982

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Candidates were accepted into the CC in the order of what?

A

Their vote totals. (Alternate members of the CC were also elected in this way)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

The elected CC members then vote the members of the…

A

Politburo, the PSC, and
the party secretary general into office.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Voting in Party Congress

A

 Party delegates received strict
voting instructions.
 Potential candidates are
selected by leadership groups
 The selected candidates then
underwent a vetting procedure
carried out by the Central
Organization Department

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

The general party secretary was only “___ ___ ____”

A
  • “first among equals”
    - Reinforce collective decision making
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

The evolving composition of the Politburo Standing Committee…

A

 Moved from military to regional representation
 More emphasis on competence and expertise
 The average age of the Standing Committee drops to meet the age
limitation requirement
 From 72 in 1982 to
63 in 1997 then 60 in
2000, thus allowing a normal politburo
tenure of two five-year terms before
retirement

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Behavioral Implications of PSC Members: Collective Leadership System

A

 A balancing act of organizational constituency to sustain collective
leadership decision
 Politburo members often represent expertise in different functional areas
facilitate effective and rational decision making
 Every member on the standing committee counts
 The collective leadership system inevitably generates factional politics

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Behavioral Implications of PSC Members: Intra-party Political Competition

A

 Factional politics exist within the CCP, even though the party
does not admit it
 A patron-clientelist relationship within the faction
 Faction formation changes from time to time
 Faction organization is often informal

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Characteristics of Factional Politics: The limited nature of power does what?

A

 cultivates a code of civility that mitigate political conflict

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Characteristics of Factional Politics: What do factions try and do to weaken rivals?

A

discredit opposition faction members

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Characteristics of Factional Politics: The immediate concern of faction is to…

A

protect its own base instead of ridding the other factions

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Characteristics of Factional Politics: The defensive orientation encourages factions to…

A

unite against the emergence of strong
leaders

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

Characteristics of Factional Politics: T/F - Faction alliances shift over time.

A

True (today’s enemies may be tomorrow’s friends)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Characteristics of Factional Politics: Decisions without consensus …

A

could almost never be enforced

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

How did general party secretary Jiang Zemin rise to power?

A

Succeeded Zhao Ziyang after the June 4 student movement,1989

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

What were the political and economic environments like under general party secretary Jiang Zemin?

A

Political instability was witnessed inside and outside of China, and economic reform faced significant headwind in the early 1990s

22
Q

General Party Secretary, Jiang Zemin: What were the overriding concerns? What were the major party initiatives?

A
  • Maintaining political stability
  • “Three represents”
23
Q

General Party Secretary, Jiang Zemin: Elite politics

A
  • The erosion of authority
  • Fragmented authoritarianism at work
24
Q

General Party Secretary, Hu Jintao: Rise to power

A

Succeeded Jiang, first peaceful (normal) transition in PRC since 1949

25
General Party Secretary, Hu Jintao: political and economic environments
Relatively stable but social unrests were on the rise. Explosive economic growth began in China
26
General Party Secretary, Hu Jintao: The overriding concerns
Maintaining political stability and the status quo
27
General Party Secretary, Hu Jintao: Major policy initiatives
“Scientific Outlook on Development” and “Harmonious Society”
28
General Party Secretary, Hu Jintao: Elite politics
 Further erosion of authority, as Hu’s power was largely constrained  The rise of bureaucrats
29
General Party Secretary, Xi Jinping: Rise to power
Succeeded Hu, second peaceful (normal) transition in PRC since 1949
30
General Party Secretary, Xi Jinping: Political and economic environment
Intensified elite struggle and economic slowdown
31
General Party Secretary, Xi Jinping: The overriding concerns
Maintaining CCP’s monopoly power over the Chinese society
32
General Party Secretary, Xi Jinping: Major policy initiatives
“Chinese dream” and the anti-corruption campaign
33
General Party Secretary, Xi Jinping: Elite politics
Power consolidation and the departure from the “collective leadership” norm
34
Case Study: The downfall of Bo Xilai
 Son of the Bo Yibo, one of the eight powerful elders during the 1980s  Party Secretary of Chongqing (2007.11.30 – 2012.3.15)  Initiated mass anticorruption campaigns during early period of his tenure (“fighting the black” or Dahei “ 打黑 “)  The chief of Chongqing Police bureau entered the U.S. consulate in Chengdu (2012.2.6)  Removed from the party secretary position in Chongqing (2012.3.15)  Removed from the CCP Central Committee and Politburo, and was under the investigation by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (2012.4.10)  Denouncement from the Central Committee and under the investigation by the People‘s Procuratorate (2012.9.28)  Prosecuted by the Jinan Prefecture People‘s Procuratorate in Jinan’s Court. Was sentenced to life in prison. (2013.7.25 – 2013.9.22)  Appealed to the High Court in Shandong Province, and was rejected. (2013.10.25)
35
What were the norms established in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Party Congresses
 Leaders reaching the age of 68 or older in 2017 would retire from the Politburo and other top party organs  Five of seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee  Six of 18 regular members of the Politburo will retire.  At least four of 11 members of the Party Central Military Commission (CMC) will retire  Successors to the General Party Secretary and Premier will be named
36
How was the 19th Party Congress in 2017 a departure from the norms set in recent developments?
 Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns have led to the downfall of several candidates to these top positions  Some discussion by party media about the retirement age is only a “recommendation”
37
Outcomes of the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Did the institutionalization of elite succession continue?
Sort of...  Followed the age limitation rule  But did not name the successors
38
The outcomes of the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Did the institutionalization of elite succession continue?
No  Did not follow the age limitation rule (Xi Jinping, Wang Yi, Zhang Youxia)  Xi Jinping secured the third term as the General Party Secretary  Did not name the successors
39
Why is institutionalization of Elite Politics Hard to Sustain?
The dilemma of balancing political power among political elites  The need for a strong leader, but not too strong that refuses power sharing Sustain the equilibrium of power sharing among political elites is extremely challenging
40
The Local Party Standing Committee...
Consists of 5~9 members (sometimes up to 11)  Party secretary (first among equal)  Government executive  Head of the party organization department  Chair of local people’s congress  Chair of local People’s Political Consultative Assembly  Propaganda department chief  Deputy party secretaries and deputy government executive
41
What are some informal sources of power?
Factional ties  With higher-level government and/or party officials Mobilization capacity of human and financial resources  Peers in the standing committee  Political support from local bureaucracies
42
Motivations of Cadre responsibility system (CRS)
 Improve government efficiency  Allow higher-level governments to monitor and control lower-level agents
43
Reforms to improve cadre responsibility system:
- An attempt to use the performance of public officials as the key metrics in the cadre management system  The primary principle: quantification of performance - Passed national regulations on the evaluation of civil servants in 1993  Led by the CCP Organization Department  A scoring system, ranked among cadres at the same administrative level  Work achievement should account for 60% to 70% and political integrity, competence and diligence should together account for 30% to 40%of the evaluation  Specific performance criteria, such as industrial output, output of township- and village-run enterprises, taxes and profits remitted
44
The Performance Contract
- Different departments design various contracts - The contents of performance contracts vary between areas and over time, reflecting the priorities not only of the central but also of local authorities - The CCP continues to rely on quantitative targets - Performance targets are internally ranked  Soft target - Usually targets that are hard to quantify  Hard target - Example: Tax revenues  Priority target with veto power - Family planning - Local stability
45
Incentive structure 2: The Career Prospects
- Promotion and rotation are the common tactics to control local cadres  Promotion within and across gov. and party apparatus  Rotation (i.e., transfer) - Across different administrative level and different geographical locations - Rotation also reinforces control by the higher-level government - Race for promotion  A top-down appointment system - The decision mostly rests with the Party Standing Committee  “Icing on the cake” - Voting among peers and the “masses” - Government executives and bureau heads requires up-and-down votes by local people’s congress
46
What is the key criteria for promotion
- Factional ties  Strength of factional bosses at the top - Competence  Cadre responsibility system  Soft target  Hard target  Priority target with veto power
47
What were the two incentive structures?
1) Cadre system 2) The Career Prospect
48
What are some other criteria for promotion?
1) Age requirement for promotion  The necessity of rejuvenation and the promotion of youth and restricting the promotion of aging officials  Avoid the unregulated and disorderly promotion 2) Local experience  Rotation in appointment  Term limits - Cadres (i.e., party secretary and government executive) are supposed to fulfill at least a 5-year term in each position, and no more than two terms  Note that few served in the full term, especially for positions below provincial-level
49
Solutions to the "Age Dilemma"
1) The Communist Youth League route  CYL: The “army reserve” for the CCP  After serving in the CYL, cadres are required to undergo reassignment to regular government and party positions under strict—and low—maximum age limitations  The rise of the “CYL Clique” 2) Temporary transferred duty  Cadres being assigned by their original unit (dispatching unit) to a different, external unit (receiving unit)  Majority of the temporary transfer assignments are limited to one year  A “gold-plated” opportunity 3) Non-regulation promotion  “Non-regulation” here refers to promotion of cadres outside pre-defined regulatory criteria. That is, an ad hoc quota for...  Age, ethnicity, educational experience, gender and so on.  The promotion through open selection  “Open selection” refers to promotion earned through success in examination or interviews where the field is thrown open for application by any eligible cadre.  In general, the highest rank where open selection is permitted is Bureau Director.
50
Cadre Promotion: Opportunities? Constraints?
Opportunities - Factional ties - Job performance (e.g., fulfilling various targets) Constraints - Political competitions (inter-faction and intra-faction) - Age - Tenure uncertainty
51
Consequences of post-1980 cadre management re-forms:
1) The one-level down appointment system 2) The end of mass campaigns as the tool for policy implementation 3) The cadre responsibility system