Quiz 1

Question 1

Necessary Conditions

Answer 1

P is true only if N is true (ONLY IF)

Question 2

Sufficient Conditions

Answer 2

If S is true then P is true (IF)

Question 3

JTB Account of Knowledge

Answer 3

S knows that P IFF

1. P is true
2. S believes that P
3. S is justified in believing that P

Question 4

Is belief necessary for knowledge?

Answer 4

Yes. Any attempts to define knowledge without including belief as a necessary and sufficient condition are problematic because it is nonsensical to say that S knows that P if S does not believe that P. For example, it would make no sense to say that S knows that it is raining outside if S does not believe that its raining outside.

Question 5

Definition of Justification

Answer 5

S is justified in believing that P if his belief that P is well supported, such as by being based upon some good evidence or reasoning.

Question 6

Gettier Coins Example

Answer 6

1. John has strong evidence for believing the proposition that Steve will get the job and that Steve has ten coins in his pocket.
2. This proposition entails that “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.”
3. John believes 2 on the basis of 1.

Twist: It is John who will get the job and who (unwittingly) also has ten coins in his pocket

Although John’s belief that 2 is justified, it is only a matter of luck that it is true.

Question 7

According to Gettier, what two points about justification does his argument rely on?

Answer 7

1. It is possible to be justified in believing something false
2. If P entails Q, and one accepts Q as a result of deducing it from P, then one is justified in believing Q.

Question 8

Gettier Ford Example

Answer 8

1. John has strong evidence for the proposition that James owns a Ford.
2. This proposition entails the proposition that “either James owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.”
3. John infers, and comes to believe 2 on the basis of 1.

Twist: While Smith’s belief of 2 is based on 1, it so happens (unbeknownst to John) that that 2 is true, not because of 1, but rather because Brown is in Barcelona.

Although John’s belief that 2 is justified, it is only a matter of luck that it is true.

Question 9

Perceptual Gettier Case

Answer 9

John sees two creatures in a nearby field and is justified in saying that “there are two lambs in the nearby field”.

Bad luck: The two creatures that John is looking at are dogs disguised as lambs.

Good luck: there happens to be a lamb in the nearby field that is hidden from Smith by a boulder.

Question 10

Overall Summary of Gettier’s Argument

Answer 10

JTB is not sufficient for knowledge

Question 11

Clark’s Account of Knowledge

Answer 11

JTB + Fully Grounded

S knows that P IFF:

1. S believes that P
2. P is true.
3. S is justified in believing that P
4. S’s belief that P is fully ground

Question 12

What does it mean for a belief to be fully grounded?

Answer 12

A belief is fully grounded if none of the grounds (i.e reasons) in the chain of supporting grounds (reasons) for belief are false.

Question 13

Is the chain of grounds infinite?

Answer 13

According to Clark, it is not. We eventually come to a place where it would seem inappropriate to ask for further grounds (e.g. asking someone what their grounds for seeming to remember something is).

Question 14

Clark’s First Getter Example

Answer 14

Clark’s First Example:
Smith forms the true belief that John owns a Ford because Brown, who is typtically reliable, told him that John has always owned a Ford.

Bad Luck: Brown mixed up John with someone else
Good luck: John just recently purchased a Ford

Upshot: Gettier counterexamples are effective in non-deductive contexts

Question 15

Clark’s Second Gettier Example

Answer 15

Smith forms true belief that John owns a Ford because Brown, who is typically reliable, told him that John has always owned a Ford.

Bad luck: Brown doesn’t know Jones and is uncharacteristically making the whole thing up
Good luck: Unbeknownst to Brown, Jones has always owned a Ford.

Clark’s Conclusion: adding the condition that an agent’s belief be based on true grounds is insufficient for knowledge

Question 16

Criticism of Clark

Answer 16

Fake Barn Country….

While John’s proposition that “that’s a nice barn” is believed by John justified, and fully grounded, the fact that John’s proposition is true is essentially a matter of luck given the fact that he is in Fake Bark country.

Goldman argues that Clark’s criterion of “fully grounded” is neither sufficient nor necessary. (e.g. Jones wins a Ford in a raffle example; Smith’s knows that someone in the office owns even if one of his grounds, such as John owning a Ford, is false and thereby his belief is not fully grounded)

Question 17

Goldman’s Account of Knowledge

Answer 17

S knows that p, where p is an EMPIRICAL PROPOSITION, iff the fact that p is causally connected in an “appropriate” way with S’s believing p.

S knows that P iff:

1. S believes that P
2. P is true
3. S’s believing that p is causally connected to the truth of P

Question 18

Volcano Example

Answer 18

S believes that a volcano erupted in a certain area, because he sees lava on the ground. In fact, a volcano did erupt there, but the lava was later removed; still later, someone else came and placed new lava on the ground.

Question 19

Knowledge of the future

Answer 19

a person can know a future fact if both that future fact and the person’s belief in that future fact have a common cause (i.e. one does not have to cause the other)

For example, I can know that this assignment is due at noon on January 30th insofar as both the due date and my belief in the due date are caused by my professor’s intention to have this assignment due on that date and time.

Question 20

Defeasibility

Answer 20

a belief’s liability to have its epistemic status downgraded

Question 21

Defeater

Answer 21

Something that causes a belief’s epistemic status to be downgraded

Question 22

Propositional defeaters

Answer 22

an unwittingly true proposition that downgrades the epistemic status of an agent’s belief

Question 23

Mental state defeater

Answer 23

a mental state of the cognizer that undermines an agent’s justification

Question 24

Lehrer Account of Knowledge

Answer 24

S knows that p only if there is no genuine, true proposition, d, such that if S were to believe d (or d were added to S’s evidence for p), S would no longer be justified in believing P.

S knows P iff

1. S believes that P
2. P is true
3. S is completely justified in believing that P
4. There is no genuine propositional defeater for S’s justification for believing that P

Question 25

Patrick the Pyromanic Example and Gettier Cases

Answer 25

Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that have been defeated.

Patrick believes the Sure-fire match will ignite when it is struck.

This belief is based on the true belief that Sure Fire matches have always ignited when struck in past

Bad luck = match in question is defective
Good luck = Match still lights due to random burst of Q-radition

Conclusion - although Patrick’s belief is justified and true, he lacks knowledge

Diagnosis… Patrick’s justification is defeated by the true statement that striking the match will not cause it to light.

Question 26

Genuine Propositional Defeater

Answer 26

an unpossessed true proposition that would correctly lead one to think that one’s justification is defective

Question 27

Misleading Propositional Defeated

Answer 27

an unpossessed true proposition that would incorrectly lead one to think that one’s justification is defective

Question 28

Mental State Defeaters

Answer 28

Unlike propositional defeaters, mental state defeaters refer to information that an agent actually possesses and thereby undermine an agent’s justification

Question 29

Defeater-Defeater

Answer 29

A mental state defeater that defeats a mental state defeater

Question 30

Nozick’s Account of Knowledge

Answer 30

S knows that P iff

1. S believes that P
2. P is true
3. If P weren’t true; S wouldn’t believe that P
4. If P were true; S would be that P and not (S believes that not P)

Question 31

Track the Truth and Knowledge

Answer 31

According to Nozick, S can know that P iff their belief that P tracks the truth. That is to say, S can be said to know P iff (in counterfactual worlds) S wouldn’t believe P is P weren’t true and S would believe that P if were true.

Question 32

Nozick v. Causal Theory

Answer 32

Weaknesses of Causal theory

1. Causal theory, as Goldman admits, fails to apply (or at least does not necessarily apply) to cases of mathematical or ethical knowledge.
2. Causal theory faces difficulties in specifying the appropriate type of causal connection (e.g. a brain in vat is caused by direct electro-chemical stimulation to believe that it is a brain in a vat; is not knowledge though there is a causal connection).

Question 33

Nozick’s Third Condition Example

Answer 33

Ford example.

Question 34

Limitations of Third Condition

Answer 34

The brain in the vat would not believe that it was in a vat if it were not envatted. If therefore fulfills Nozick’s third conditions, but does not constitute knowledge.

Question 35

Advantages of Nozick’s Fourth Condition

Answer 35

Explains why brain in vat, which is electrically caused to believe that it is a brain in a vat, does not know that it is a brain in a vat.

Also explains why man in dead dictator example who receives the one truthful newspaper does not know that the dictator is dead.

Question 36

Criticisms of Nozick’s Account

Answer 36

My Mom’s an assasin example (against necessity)

1. You have good reason to believe your mom isnt an assassin
2. But if she were an assassin you would not believe it
3. You may still count as knowing that your mom is not the assassin.

Kripke Barn Example (against sufficiency)

1. John is driving through fake barn country.
2. The only real barn in fake barn country is the red barn.
3. All the fake barns are blue
4. John’s believe that “there is a red barn in front of me” tracks the truth.
5. John’s belief that “there is a barn in front of me” does not track the truth

Question 37

Different definitions of Closure

Answer 37

If S knows that p, and p entails q, then S knows that q.

If S knows that p, and knows that p entails q, then S knows that q.

If S knows that p, ad comes to believe that q by correctly deducing it from her belief that p, then S knows q

Question 38

Moorean

Answer 38

someone who holds that we can know the falsity of skeptical hypotheses bas ed on our knowledge of ordinary facts

Question 39

Moorean anti-skeptical argumet

Answer 39

1. I know that I have hands.
2. I know that I have hands entails I am not a handless, artifically stimulated, brain in a vat.
3. If I know one thing, and I know that it entails a second thing, then I also know the second thing.
4. Thus, I know tat I am not a handless, artificially stimulated

From the fact that one knows that she has hands and this incompatible with a skeptical hypothesis under which her hands are illusory, one can infer, and thus comes to know, the falsity of the skeptical hypothesis.

Question 40

Skeptic

Answer 40

someone who denies common sense knowledge claims

1. I do not know that [I am not a handless, artificially stimulated BIV]
2. I do not know that [I have hands entails I am not a handless, artificially stimulated, BIV]
3. Closure
4. Thus, I do not know that I have hands.

The fact that one cannot know that the skeptical claim is false demonstrates that one does not in fact know that the common sense proposition is true either.

Question 41

Closure and Lottery Propositions

Answer 41

1. Ordinary proposition (e.g. I know that I will not be able to afford 10,000 shares of XOM this year).
2. Lottery propostion entailed by ordinary prop
3. By closure, I may know that I won’t win a big lottery this year.

Can I really say that I know that I won’t win a big lottery this year.

Question 42

Internalism

Answer 42

the grounds for justification have to be accessible to the consciousness of the believer

Question 43

Gettier Problems and Internalist

Answer 43

arise when there is nothing wrong with the internally accessible aspects of the cognitive situation, but there is a mishap in something inaccessible to the believer.

Since justification does not guarantee truth, it is possible for there to be a break in connection between justification and truth, but for the connection to be regained by chance

Question 44

Externalism

Answer 44

believers are justified when their belief is formed in a reliable, truth-conducive way

Question 45

Gettier cases and Externalism

Answer 45

arise when an ordinarily reliable method of belief formation yield the wrong verdict due to stroke of bad luck

since being reliable does not guarantee truth, it is possible for there to be break in the connection between justification, but for that connection to be regained by chance

Question 46

Z.’s description of Gettier cases

Answer 46

Gettier cases are situations in which an accident of bad luck is cancelled by good luck.

Question 47

Recipe for Constructing Gettier Cases

Answer 47

1. Begin with case of justified belief, where the the justification is connected with the true belief.
2. Bad luck severs the connection between the justification and the truth of the belief.
3. Good luck restores the truth of the belief, but there is still no connection between justification for the belief and the truth of the belief.

Question 48

Platinga’s definition of warrant

Answer 48

the property a belief B has for believers when B is produced in S by S’s faculties working properly in the appropriate environment, according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth