Public M&A Flashcards
2 main means of obtaining control of a public company are through?
- Cash tender offers or exchange offers.
2. One-step statutory mergers.
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, requiring the disclosure of an acquisition of ___% of a class of voting equity in a public company
Five percent
The five most common types of anti-takeover laws are:
- Control share acquisition statutes.
- Business combination or moratorium statutes.
- Fair price statutes.
- Constituency statutes.
- Endorsements of defensive action.
What is a control share acquisition statute? (An anti-takeover law.)
26 states deny voting rights to a bidder that acquires more than a specified percentage of target’s stock unless the target’s shareholders that are unaffiliated with the bidder approve the acquisition.
What is a business combination or moratorium statute? (An anti-takeover law.)
Business combination or moratorium statutes. 33 states restrict a bidder that acquires > [X]% of a target’s stock from doing force out merger of minority SH who did not tender. Usually only applies for LIMITED PERIOD and subject to FAIR PRICE EXEMPTIONS.
What is a fair price statute? (An anti-takeover law.)
Fair price statutes. 28 states prevent a bidder who crosses a specified ownership threshold (usually 10% - 20%) from engaging in a merger or other combination with the target unless the bidder either:
(A) pays a fair price in the second-step merger (e.g., highest price paid for the target’s shares by the bidder during the past 2 years); or
(B) before crossing the threshold, obtains approval from the board and/or from a supermajority of outstanding shares.
What is a constituency statute? (An anti-takeover law.)
Constituency statutes. 28 states permit a board to consider the interests of other related groups (such as employees, customers, suppliers and communities served by the company) in addition to the interests of the shareholders, in deciding whether to approve a merger or bid.
What is an endorsement of defensive action law? (An anti-takeover law.)
Endorsements of defensive action. 35 states authorize, either by statute or case law, a target’s board to defend against a hostile bid, including adopting a shareholders’ rights plan (a poison pill) without shareholder approval.
The DGCL prohibits an acquirer of 15% or more of a company’s outstanding stock from engaging, for a three-year period following the acquisition, in any business combination with the company. The prohibition does not apply if any of these three things occur:
- The business combination is approved by unaffiliated owners of two-thirds of the outstanding shares.
- The target’s board approves either the 15% acquisition or the proposed business combination, in each case before the shareholder acquires the 15% stake.
- On completion of the transaction resulting in the 15% acquisition, the shareholder acquires at least 85% of the target’s shares outstanding at the time such transaction commenced.
Confidentiality agreements for public company diligence of non-public company info typically contain a standstill provision, which provides…
A standstill prevents the bidder from acquiring the target’s shares without the target’s consent.
In general, you want a shareholder lockup voting agreement (which has to be disclosed in proxy), but the Omnicare lockup was invalid b/c preclusive for two reasons…
Omnicare invalidated b/c preclusive b/c:
- voting agreement had majority shareholders agree irrevocably to vote their shares in favor of a merger.
- A merger agreement that required the merger to be submitted to a vote of the shareholders despite the board’s withdrawal of its recommendation of the transaction in light of a higher third party offer.
Even though Omnicare lockup was preclusive, a DE court allowed ____ in 2004 (Orman v Cullman).
A court held to be acceptable a voting agreement with majority shareholders that required those majority shareholders to vote against any alternative acquisition proposal for 18 months following the proposed transaction (Orman v Cullman (Del. 2004)). In that case, the proposed transaction was subject to “majority of the minority approval”; so not preclusive.
What are the three factors the SEC and courts consider w/r/t whether an accumulation of direct or derivative interests in target is “creeping tender offer”?
- There was active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders (for example, through public statements or mailings).
- The offer price included a premium.
- The terms of the offer were non-negotiable, with a specified deadline for its acceptance.
The use of derivative positions to mask stakebuilding DOES or DOES NOT violate the SEC’s reporting requirements?
It MAY violate reporting requirement (see CSX Corporation v The Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP et al (SDNY 2008)).
Two common triggers for Target’s break fee
- Where the target’s shareholders decline to approve the merger (or to sell their shares pursuant to the tender offer) while a competing proposal is outstanding (often with the additional requirement that some other agreement is reached with another party within a defined period).
- The fiduciary out.