Public Law - Judicial Review Flashcards

1
Q

What are the grounds on which a public decision can be challenged in the UK?

A

illegality,

Procedural Unfairness, and

Irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness)

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2
Q

Judicial review will look to the [—-] of a decision, but not the [—–].
Complete this phrase and explain it.

A

LEGALITY, NOT THE MERITS OF A DECISION.

JR looks at the legality (i.e. was this decision ultra vires / was a policy applied correctly / was there bias?).

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3
Q

What is the significance of the GCHQ case?

A

This was the first case in which a decision of the Executive (current government) based on PREROGATIVE POWERS was allowed to be subject to judicial review.

Ultimately, the claimants lost because the national security concerns outweighed fairness.

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4
Q

What is the significance of the Fire Bridges Union case?

A

In JR, the court will look to uphold the will of Parliament.
Held: SoS acted unlawfully as his decision was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

Facts: The Secretary of State announced his intention not to bring into force a statutory compensation scheme for criminal injuries, which had just been approved by Parliament. Instead, the SoS introduced a new, ‘radically different’ tariff scheme, using prerogative power. This flies in the face of the statute [Parliamentary Sovereignty] that was specifically designed for this purpose

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5
Q

What is the significance of the Jackson v Attorney General case?

A

The courts will assume that the Parliament (through legislation, decisions or policies) does NOT mean to interfere with fundamental rights unless it is made “crystal clear”.

Also known as the principle of legality: “Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost” (Lord Hoffmann in Ex Parte Simms).

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6
Q

What is the significance of the Gillick case and R v R, within the separation of powers?

A

In the absence of established law or legislation, the common law should keep pace with the times. The courts will uphold this, as shown in the case law.

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7
Q

Where an Act of Parliament gives discretionary powers (e.g. to draft a policy, set sentencing guidelines, appoint a board or committee), are these treated as more or less suspicious by the courts?

If treated more or less suspiciously, why is that the case?

A

Discretionary powers are treated with more suspicion in JR because they provide the Executive (current government) with greater flexibility and are more easily misused.

Secondly, the secondary legislation will not be scrutinised in Parliament (House of Commons + House of Lords), so there are fewer political checks and balances to prevent misuse of powers. This is why the courts take a stronger approach.

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8
Q

What sort of legal issues (related to statutes, powers to make law) and governmental issues (e.g. government discretion; secondary legislation-making powers) could potentially undermine the rule of law?

A
  • Poorly drafted and inaccessible legislation
  • Poorly reasoned and confusing judgments of the Senior Courts
  • Unfettered [unrestrained] government discretion
  • Unequal access to justice [consider the tribunal fees case - UNISON vs Lord Chancellor]
  • Inequality before the law (everyone should be equal before the law - including politicians and judges!)
  • Arbitrary use of draconian government powers
  • Government interference with judicial decision-making
  • Automated decision-making
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9
Q

What sort of decisions can be subject to judicial review?

Give examples of cases, and what factors are considered.

A

The act, decision, or failure to act must be relate to public law or PUBLIC FUNCTIONS.

This includes any public/hybrid body whose source of powers is STATUTE, SECONDARY LEGISLATION (Datafin), or PREROGATIVE POWERS (GCHQ).

For example, the Takeover Panel in London decides on companies’ M&A and whilst it may seem like a private body, its decisions cannot be appealed to another decision-making body, it uses statute as the source of its powers, and overall it performs a public function, i.e. government-like function (Ex parte Datafin).

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10
Q

If a body is self-regulating, does this indicate that it could be subject to JR or not?

A

It is an indication the body COULD be subject to JR, e.g. the Bar Council has been found subject to JR (ex parte Percival); the Takeover Panel (Datafin); the Advertising Standards Authority (ex parte Insurance Services plc).

Not all self-regulating authorities will be subject to JR, for example:
- Jockey Club (despite being public, the Club’s powers were in no way “governmental”);

  • United Hebrew Congregation (internal religious matters were of a private nature).
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11
Q

If the government “contracts out” some of its roles to a private institution - are these institutions subject to JR?

A

They can be, but it depends:

If the private body (e.g. housing association) derives its powers purely from contractual arrangements (not statutory powers!) and is not subject to statutory control, there is unlikely to be JR because they are not performing a public service (ex parte Goldsmith)

Contrast this with (R v Partnerships in Care) where a private psychiatric hospital was deemed to be performing a public service where the focus of one of its wards was changed, to the detriment of A. It was under a direct statutory duty (Mental Health Act) to provide professional, competent staff and treatment facilities.

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12
Q

What is the idea of “procedural exclusivity” in public law?

A

JR is the ONLY possible procedure for challenging a public decision; trying to challenge a public decision in any other way is an abuse of process.

Private law matters are dealt with by standard claims, e.g. negligence, breach of contract, etc…

Where there are mixed claims, a private claim can be pursued notwithstanding public law elements.
EG: Litigant is asserting a private law right, which incidentally involves examining a public law issue, he is permitted to pursue that private law action.

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13
Q

What is the time limit for bringing a claim in JR?

What factors around timing are important? Does this affect remedies?

A

3 months to bring a claim in JR; this can be extended very exceptionally.

There must be no “undue delay”, which can affect the type of remedies available.

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14
Q

Who has standing to claim in JR? Describe the type of claimants.

What is the test used?

A

Party must have “sufficient interest” but need not have suffered actual harm / loss.
- individuals
- associations / representative groups (e.g. UNISON for trade union)
- pressure groups (e.g. Liberty for human rights; Greenpeace for eco.)
- “Concerned citizens”, but not vexatious/busybodies; will not be granted if there are more directly interested individuals/”victims”.

“Sufficient Interest” is not defined but consider:
- public law duties in the matter;
- nature of the alleged breach(es)
- construction of any statutory material
- merits of the case are often considered alongside standing, even though it’s technically a 2-stage process (court permission before a claim can proceed).

Recent case law suggests pressure groups will be allowed, provided there is no individual with standing who has done so.

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15
Q

In ex parte Greenpeace, what factors did the court consider when granting standing to the pressure group?

What factors were considered in ex parte World Development Movement?

A

The national and international presence of the group;

Its “genuine concern” for the environment;

2,500 supporters in the Cumbria region;

Potential expertise in the matters at hand.

Ex parte WDM:
- vindicating the rule of law (there would be a lacuna in the law if pressure groups cannot sue on a technicality - Fleet Streets Casuals case. Remember the constitutional role of JR).
- Absence of any responsible challenger.
- Nature of the breach (seriousness of the matter)
- Expertise/Prominent role of the applicants in giving advice, guidance and overseas aid.

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16
Q

What is an ouster clause and are they valid?

A

A full ouster clause seeks to prevent decision(s) being subject to JR - “ousting” the jurisdiction of JR.

These are highly unlikely to work without highly, highly specific wording and are very negatively interpreted as invalid by the law (Anisminic; Privacy International).

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17
Q

Can the time limit for JR be made shorter than the usual 3 months?

A

Yes, if the parties agree a shorter time (“partial” ouster clause) or a different statute provides for a shorter time limit (ex parte Ostler; CPR 54.5(3)).

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18
Q

Do you need to exhaust all other possible alternative remedies before pursuing a JR claim?

If granted, what is the 2-stage procedure of pursuing a JR claim?

A

Yes, e.g. statutory procedure for appeal; internal complains procedure; right to complain to an Ombudsman.

The court can refuse permission to hear the JR.

Stage 1: application for permission (leave from the court).
Stage 2: A full inter partes hearing.

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19
Q

What are the main remedies that might be available in JR?

Are these reliefs interim or final?

A

All remedies can be either interim (until end of a defined period) or final (permanent). All remedies are discretionary (not available as of right).

Quashing Order (cuts down the disputed decision, e.g. arbitrary use of political policy. The public body must then take the decision again according to fair procedure)

Prohibitory Order (prohibits X body from taking Y unlawful action)

Mandatory Order (compels public body to perform X public law duty)

Declaration (e.g. legal decision setting out the rights of the parties)

Injunction (rare as the Orders achieve the same)

Damages (only if the court are satisfied that damages would have been given in a private law action OR there is a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998).

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20
Q

Explain the category (and sub-categories) of illegality as a ground of JR

A
  1. Basic Illegality is simply where the decision-maker acts ultra vires (outside the four corners of legislation; or without any proper legislation).
    EG: Legislation gave the local council permission to construct public toilets. When they did this, they built a subway under the road to access the public toilets - this was lawful because it was incidental and necessary to access the toilets (Westminster Corp).
    EG: The Lord Chancellor did not have authority under the Act to set court fees so high (£500) (ex parte Witham).
  2. Illegality can be found due to ERRORS OF LAW, e.g. misinterpreting statutory provisions
    EG: The Commission stopped Anisminic from claiming as on the basis it did not meet the conditions for compensation. The UKHL held that the Commission misinterpreted the statutory scheme for claiming compensation and quashed that decision (Anisminic).
  3. Illegality can exist due to ERRORS OF FACT, e.g. a proper reading of the facts do not support the decision-maker’s decision; the alleged facts are not supported by evidence; an established fact to a decision is ignored or misunderstood.
  4. ABUSE OF DISCRETION
    - considering irrelevant factors
    - not considering relevant factors
    - using power for an improper purpose
  5. RETENTION OF DISCRETION
    - cannot fetter/restrict one’s discretion
    - unlawful delegation of discretion (as this contradicts will of Parliament through the statute)!
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21
Q

Are all errors of law subject to JR.

(ground of review: illegality)

A

In principle, all errors of law are subject to JR, except:

  • where the error of law is NOT DECISIVE to a decision; it would have occurred anyway
  • special systems of rules, e.g. the statutes of an old university, the court will be reluctant to rule on this.
  • decisions of a senior courts, e.g. the High Court and above (Re Racal)
  • the wording is very imprecise (e.g. “a large part of the UK”) - just because the court would arrive at a different conclusion, this is not ultra vires/unlawful. [But note that you might pursue JR for Wednesbury unreasonableness!]
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22
Q

Think of a situation, or example, whether in case law or imagined, where “error of fact” would apply in a JR.

(ground of review: illegality)

A

Where the fact does not exist, e.g. “local authority could compulsorily purchase land, provided it was not “parkland”. The land bought was later revealed to be connected to a park. The court could JR this because the error of fact was fundamental to whether the local council had the power to act lawfully (White and Collins v Minister of Health); if an inspector’s report found that this was parkland, and the local authority went ahead anyway, they would have acted with no support evidence to challenge the inspector’s finding and this would be quashed for error of fact (Coleen Properties).

A person could be detained if they were an “illegal entrant”. As this was a “precedent fact” in detention powers, the court could review the facts through JR to ensure the person was, in fact, an “illegal entrant” (ex parte Khawaja).

If an established fact has been ignored or the decision-maker acts on the basis of a mistaken fact, this is an error of fact (assuming it was material to their decision and gave rise to unfairness) (E v SSHD)

Similarly, if their decision is based on other facts which ought not to have been taken into account (Lord Wilberforce, Thameside).

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23
Q

What is an example of “abuse of discretion”?

(ground of review: illegality)

A

The Home Secretary, in sentencing a notorious 10/11yr old murderer of a toddler, failed to take into account relevant factors (the child’s welfare) and considered irrelevant factors (emotive public “clamour”, petitions and protests).

24
Q

What is an example of “acting for an improper purpose”?

What happens if a statute does not have a defined purpose?

(ground of review: illegality)

A

The minister refused to refer a complaint to a committee for investigation because he believed he could be personally embarrassed (Padfield case).

Where the statute does not have a defined purpose, the courts may imply one. EG: A man who bought his TV license before prices went up should NOT have had his license revoked: the court implied that the statute’s purpose was to ensure licenses were not being obtained wrongfully, the licenses were NOT to raise revenue. (Congreve v Home Office).

25
Q

Give examples of “fettering discretion”, i.e. where the decision-maker impair or restrict their own ability to PROPERLY EXERCISE their discretion.

(ground of review: illegality)

A

This can include deciding to not even exercise their discretionary power.
EG: The SoS had the discretion to set a date for bringing into force a compensation scheme using statutory powers. The SoS did not set a date and instead set up his own scheme using prerogative powers - this was an unlawful fettering of discretion (Fire Brigades Union).

Decision-makers cannot restrict/bind their discretion by adopting blanket policies or rigid policies which effectively mean the decision-maker is shutting its ears to new applications, e.g. 300 appeals re. student grants that, despite wide wording, was never successful (ex parte Collymore).
- decision-makers must keep an open mind in their policy (ex parte Brent).
- a policy might be lawful/within the DM’s discretion if the decision-maker would be overwhelmed by trivial applications (British Oxygen).

26
Q

What is the general rule on decision-makers delegating their powers?

If a delegation does happen, when is this allowed and who is responsible?

A

Generally, decision-makers cannot delegate their powers as this contravenes the will of Parliament in giving them a statutory power to use in the first place!

For example, the Minister of Housing denying planning permission based on objections from the Minister for Agriculture (Lavender case).

However, the Carltona principle indicates that a decision-maker can delegate decisions to his civil servants within his own department (for practical purposes), even if a statute does not expressly allow for this. However, the intended decision-maker is ultimately responsible.

27
Q

What is meant by irrationality as a grounds for JR? What is the test for irrationality?

A

This is also called “Wednesbury unreasonableness”, and it is defined as:

“so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have EVER come to this decision” (very high bar!)

“So outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards” (GCHQ case)

28
Q

What are the 3 fact patterns / situations that give rise to “Wednesbury unreasonableness”?

A
  1. Material defects in the decision-making process
    - wrongly weighing up relevant factors
    - failure to provide a comprehensive chain of reasoning
  2. Oppressive decisions
  3. Decisions that violate constitutional principles
29
Q

Can you name some cases, or the reasoning in the cases, where irrationality/unreasonableness was found in JR?

A
  • wrongly weighing up relevant factors, e.g. no reasonable local authority would have placed more weight on X factor over Y factor (Rafferty).
  • failure to provide a comprehensive chain of reasoning, e.g. the SoS opened a public enquiry for planning applications over 3 days. A person came to object on the 2nd day but was told the enquiry was closed. The SoS had - without consultation - ordered a new enquiry. Held that the SoS’ decision was so unreasonable as to verge on the irrational, especially at the person’s views could have been considered in writing (ex parte Fielder Estates).
  • Bank Mellat case: ordering all parties in the UK financial sector under this Act to not engage with Bank Mellat due to its alleged connections with Iran’s nuclear programme was unlawful because it was ENTIRELY ARBITRARY and was not a proportionate response to the issue, and “proportionate” was a safeguard included in the Act.
  • The Parole Board acted unlawfully when releasing a serial rapist because no reasonable Parole Board would have failed to carry out further investigations before making its final decision (Johnny Worboys case).
30
Q

What sort of examples in the JR case law have we seen of “oppressive decisions” leading to a finding of Wednesbury unreasonableness?

A

A decision which is “unreasonably punitive” can be Wednesbury unreasonable, even if the decision is not illogical or immoral (Wheeler case).

A market trader had urinated in the street at night time. His market trading license was revoked but this decision was quashed, as the penalty was excessive and severely impacted his livelihood (ex parte Hook).

31
Q

Regarding “decision that violate constitutional principles”, can you give examples where this might lead to a finding of Wednesbury unreasonableness?

A

To uphold the rule of law, public bodies should not engage in retrospective sentencing, and must apply policies consistently across all citizens; ensure everyone is equally treated before the law, and ensure that rules are sufficiently certain so that they can be followed.

For example, an Irish IRA member was sentenced to a higher level than other non-Irish/IRA criminal convicted of a similar sentence. This inconsistent treatment was so against the rule of law that it constituted “Wednesbury unreasonableness” and the decision was quashed (ex parte McCartney).

Bank of Mellat case also shows violation of constitutional principles; the decision was arbitrary and legally uncertain.

32
Q

Can be the intensity of review differ case-to-case, and in what sort of cases is this likely?

(irrationality / Wednesbury unreasonableness ground of review).

A

This is a court’s decision on a case-to-case basis. Note that even standard Wednesbury unreasonableness is a very high bar.

  1. Higher standard of review - when the case involves fundamental human rights, e.g. right to liberty; right to life; freedom from torture, etc…; constitutional principles.

(Even this high bar is not always 100% successful, e.g. ex parte Smith which upheld dismissing gay/bi members of the army. A significant factor in this not being “unreasonable” was that this issue was debated in Parliament and was supported).
[NOTE: this is pre-HRA and the case later on in Smith v UK].

  1. Lower standard of review - when the case involves matters of high policy like the Annual Budget, taxes, public spending, national security, social or economic policy.

There are obiter dicta comments that suggest proportionality is an element to be considered with/as part of Wednesbury (Daly; Alconbury cases), and proportionality has been applied as the reasoning for certain decisions.

33
Q

“Procedural impropriety” covers two main areas - what are they?

A
  1. Failure to observe proper statutory procedure / procedural rules. “procedural ultra vires”
    - Failure to do a mandatory requirement, e.g. duty to consult all relevant groups before making a decision will VOID the decision.
    - Failure to do a discretionary procedural will not necessarily void the decision.
    - Nowadays, the court look at the CONSEQUENCES of non-compliance.
  2. Duty to act fairly (common law fairness)
    - rule against BIAS.
    - right to be heard of persons’ affected by public law decision.
34
Q

What regards to procedural impropriety, what is the courts’ general modern approach?

A

Nowadays, the court look at the CONSEQUENCES of non-compliance with a statutory procedural requirement/step, e.g. failing to pre-select a country for C’s deportation was a breach of a statutory requirement under the Immigration Regulation 2003 but C’s ability to appeal was not negatively affected by not knowing the country (JN v SSHD).

35
Q

Regarding procedural impropriety as a ground for JR cases, when does the duty to act fairly (common law) apply?

A

It occurs in all cases - whether judicial or administrative (Ridge v Baldwin).

In this case, a dismissed police officer was entitled to prior notice of the charge against him and a proper opportunity to contest it.

36
Q

What are some considerations that should be had in “procedural unfairness” cases?

Is it possible for different level of fairness to be owed in different cases? In what sort of cases, if this is the case?

A

Yes, the level of fairness that SHOULD have been owed to the D by the decision-maker will depend on WHAT IS STAKE for the affected individual, e.g. loss of liberty, loss of livelihood, deportation. Contrast this with emergency situation, where the court hold that the duty to act fairly is overridden, e.g. by national security concerns (GCHQ), or by emergency public safety demands demanding urgent action (ex parte Pegasus).

When applying for a license (e.g. boxing license), there is a lower standard of fairness owed compared to having a license revoked (e.g. TV license) because you would expect that a license would not be revoked WITHOUT GOOD REASON - but being a “mere applicant”, with NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION, meant that C could lawfully be refused a boxing license for 6 times in a row, and his REQUEST FOR AN ORAL HEARING WAS LAWFULLY DENIED (McInnes).

Consider also:
- the character of the decision-making body
- the kind of question under dispute that DM has to make
- the statutory framework underpinning the decision

37
Q

What are the 5 elements considered under the “right to be heard” in JR?

(relevant ground of JR is procedural impropriety)

A
  1. Notice of the case against the person
    - refusal to give notice generally is unlawful and amount to procedural unfairness, e.g. refusing to disclose the nature of serious allegations that led to a schoolboy being excluded (ex parte B).
  2. Right to make representations
    - no automatic common law duty to hold personal/oral hearings
  3. Witnesses
  4. Legal representation
    - not required and can be harmful
    - must consider seriousness of the charge; likelihood of point of law to arise; whether person can conduct their own case (here, a prisoner; consider disability); need for a speedy process.
  5. Right to receive reasons for the decision
38
Q

What is JR position on “right to representation”?

(Procedural impropriety ground).

A

Right to make representations
- no automatic common law duty to hold personal/oral hearings (Lloyd v McMahon)
- a blanket ban on not holding oral hearings can be unlawful, especially if there are SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF FACT that cannot be satisfactorily resolved on written evidence (Anderson)
- an oral hearing is not required every time a prisoner released on license is resisting being called back to prison (Smith and West).
- Parole Board should resist refusing an oral hearing in order to save on “time, trouble and expense” (Osborne), as there may be cases where an oral hearing is helpful for hearing evidence.

39
Q

Is there a common law right to receive reasons under the JR ground of “procedural impropriety”?

Consider the “right to be heard”.

A

No, an affected party is not automatically entitled to receive reasons for why the decision-maker took their initial decision (Hasan v SoS), but there is an increasing trend for them to be given, especially if fundamental rights are involved, and to promote values of accountability and good administration.

  • duty to give reasons might exist where the decision was wholly unexpected or “crying out” for an explanation (ex parte Doody).
  • likely no duty where it is unduly onerous on the DM to give reasons, e.g. because of the complexity of the decision or range of factors leading to the decision (ex parte Institute of Dentistry).
40
Q

What is the rule on bias?

(Procedural impropriety is the overall ground of JR)

A

“Justice should not only be done but manifestly seen to be done” (ex parte McCarthy)

This includes direct bias, indirect/apparent bias, i.e. THE RISK of bias (even if no biased decision was actually made!)

41
Q

Explain what “direct bias” looks like, and what it includes.

A

Direct bias is an automatic disqualification, e.g. the decision-maker having a financial interest in the decision.

This can include a non-financial interest, even within different departments of a wide charity/company

EG: Minister approving a planning permission when he has a financial interest in the property group.

EG: Lord Hoffmann was auto disqualified because he and his wife had done work for the charity arm of Amnesty International (human rights charity), when deciding on an alleged war criminal’s case (ex parte Pinochet). A retrial was ordered.

This shows that a financial interest will void the decision - it does not require actual, deliberate bias.

42
Q

Explain what is meant by “indirect/apparent bias” and the test for this.

Can you give fact patterns that would lead to a finding (or rejection) of indirect bias?

A

Indirect bias is found where “A FAIR-MINDED AND INFORMED OBSERVER, considering the facts, would conclude there is a REAL POSSIBILITY OF BIAS” (Porter v Magill). This applies to all public bodies.

EG: Palestinian woman’s asylum claim was rejected by a judge who was a member of the Association of Jewish Lawyers. This JR was dismissed, as her mere membership did not indicate that she shared the public, politically charged views of the president of the association (Helow).

EG: Juror was the next-door neighbour of the defendant’s brother. After conviction and sentencing, this became known and formed the basis of an appeal on the grounds of jury bias - but this was dismissed and no apparent bias was found (R v Gough)

EG: You cannot be both complainant/interested party AND the decision-maker. In (Hook), the man lost his market license for urinating in public. The manager of the market committee was also in attendance when the decision was made, which rendered the decision unlawful (it was also Wednesbury unreasonable to ruin the man’s livelihood).

43
Q

In terms of apparent bias, how does the law treat pre-formed opinions or views formed in advance, e.g. by dealing with the claimant before in a different situation?

A

EG: A police authority were considering retiring a man, and recommended he saw a doctor for a review. This doctor had already examined the man previously, and it was held that he should not have been (ex parte Godden).

EG: All manner of decision-makers (MPs, ministers and local councilors) will have publicly stated views on a variety of policy issues - these WILL NOT BE BIAS unless they refuse to consider objections or other relevant factors (ex parte Kirkstall).

EG: If local councillors have pre-disposed view on a planning permission application, this is likely acceptable, as it is justifiable to have a general political position - it depends whether the DECISION-MAKERS HAVE A CLOSED MIND in relation to the specific application (Lewis v Persimmon Homes). This is a strong decision in favour of JR respecting the political autonomy of the local council.

EG: (Gillies), the House of Lords found that there was no real possibility of bias of a member of a disability appeal tribunal because of her interest in and experience of preparing reports for the Benefits Agency.

44
Q

In terms of apparent bias, if a public policy is objected to (e.g. governmental policy on allowing appeals to revoking medical licenses), do decision-maker owe any obligations regarding objections to that policy?

A

The only obligation is to genuinely consider objections submitted (Franklin case).

(Note that policy cases overlap with a decision-maker unlawfully fettering/restricting their discretion, e.g. with blanket bans / blanket policies with no sincere chance of a success appeal).

45
Q

In rare cases, the duty to act fairly (e.g. avoid bias), can be overlooked due to necessity: i.e., without this decision being taken, the administrative process would grind to a halt.

A

True - these cases are very rare but do occur. Consider the separation of powers and how reluctant the courts would be to allow political/administrative decision to be unworkable if there was simply no other way.

EG: Local authority workers were given pension rights under statute. The legislation required that any disputes re. these pension rights were solved first by the local council, and then by the JR. Somewhat reluctantly, the Court of Appeal upheld the local council’s powers to solve the dispute, despite the obvious bias due to financial implications for the council (Wilkinson v Barking Corp).

46
Q

What is the difference between a “procedural legitimate expectation” and a “substantive legitimate expectation”?

A
  • Procedural: where a public body has either promised that a particular procedure will be followed, or past practice indicates that it should be followed.

EG: The Liverpool Town Clerk assured the Taxi Association that it would not increase the number of licensed taxis without hearing representations. When the Clerk departed from this assurance, it was held unlawful.

  • Substantive: where a public body makes an assurance or a promise that has led a person to believe they will receive a particular, tangible benefit.
    [tend to be rare cases]

EG: Ex parte Coughlan:
“The decision was an unjustified breach of a clear promise given by the Health Authority’s predecessor to Miss Coughlan that she should have a home for life at Mardon House. This constituted unfairness amounting to an abuse of power by the Health Authority. It would be a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention.” (Lord Woolf MR).

47
Q

When considering whether there is a legitimate expectation (as a ground of JR), what 3 elements must be present?

Explain with reference to case law / fact patterns, and in full detail.

A
  1. Has an expectation arisen?
    - EXPRESS PROMISE
    - REGULAR PRACTICE which C can reasonably expect to continue.
    - MUST COME FROM A PUBLIC AUTHORITY (politicians [speeches] do not count, as they do not represent a local authority!)

EG: The HK Gov had to honour the terms of their agreement with China to allow Chinese nationals to put forward a case for remaining in Hong Kong (this was an express promise (“representation”))
EG: The Gov promised in a White Paper to conduct the “fullest public consultation”, and failing to meet promise was unlawful (ex parte Greenpeace).
EG: For the past 20 years, the IRC (tax man) had accepted late “loss relief” claims in over 30 cases from Unilever plc. Despite there being no express promise, this was a regular practice on which there was a legitimate expectation to rely on.

  1. If so, is the expectation “legitimate”?
    - clarity of words used
    - legality
    - agency
    - knowledge
    - reliance
  2. Has the public body lawfully frustrated this legitimate expectation?
48
Q

When considering the factors for a “LEGITIMATE” expectation, what 5 factors does the law look for?

A
  1. CLARITY OF WORDS
    - “clear, unambiguous and without relevant qualifications”.
    - promise would have been reasonably understood by those to whom it was made [Objective Test].
    - regular practice must be so unambiguous, so widespread, so well-established and recognised so as to carry with it a COMMITMENT TO THE INTERESTED PARTY [taxpayers, in this case]. On the facts, the evidence was too thin and too equivocal to succeed.
  2. LEGALITY
    - must be a lawful promise; i.e. cannot contravene legislation.
    - the promise given by X government department (Home Office) can be binding on Z government department (Department of Health! (BAPIO Action).
    - even if the public authority mistakenly believed it was under a statutory duty to give a promise to do X, that promise is still binding (Bibi v Newham LBC)
  3. AGENCY
    - A public body is not bound by the representation of one of its agents if that agent ACTED OUTSIDE OF HIS AUTHORITY in making the promise/representation.
    (EG: A solicitor was appointed by a Local Council to prosecute some enforcement notices. He eventually made a plea deal and withdrew the notices).
  4. KNOWLEDGE
    - Earlier case law suggests that the C must KNOW of the representation (e.g. a compensation policy/scheme giving money to veterans injured in Iraq but not the Bosnian War). As C did not know the original criteria of the scheme, namely that the Bosnian War was excluded - despite this being announced in Parliament - he could not claim legitimate expectation (ex parte Walker).

Contrast this with (Rashid), whereby C’s asylum appeal was denied and, unbeknownst to him, there was a statutory scheme he could have benefitted from. In this case, C had no knowledge but the government consistently applied the wrong statutory asylum schemes to Rashid. These severe errors amounted to an abuse of power, therefore there WAS a legitimate expectation, namely, that the SoS would apply its own asylum policy correctly and uniformly (rare case).

This confused case law is generally treated as two different grounds of review: (1) legitimate expectation where C must know about a policy/promise on which to rely, and (2) in that policies must be applied consistently/fairly to all.
(Mandalia; Kambadzi case)

  1. RELIANCE
    - in modern cases, the requirement to rely on the legitimate expectation and suffer loss/harm is not strictly required; it is a non-determinative factor but is still considered by the court (Bancoult).
49
Q

What is the key test in deciding “whether the public body has lawfully frustrated the legitimate expectation”? [3rd limb of finding a legitimate expectation].

Who has the burden of proof re. proving it was lawfully frustrated?

A

The central question is whether THERE IS SUFFICIENT PUBLIC INTEREST TO OVERRIDE THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION? (Papponette), Lord Dyson.

The public authorities have the burden of proof, that the frustration of the LE was lawful.

50
Q

What sort of reasons would “override” a legitimate expectation?

Think about the separation of powers and how controversial it is for a court to inhibit (“fetter”) a public authority’s / the executive’s freedom to change policy when needed!

A

Re Findlay

  • 4 prisoners expected to be up for parole with their excellent records, a government policy held that for certain crimes, no parole is considered unless there are exceptional circumstances.
  • UKHL denied the appeal, as the most a prisoner can hope for is that he is examined individually “IN LIGHT OF WHATEVER POLICY THE SECRETARY OF STATE SEES FIT TO ADOPT…”, provided that the adopted policy is lawful and does not fetter the SoS’ discretion.
    In the appeal was allowed, it would unfairly restrict (“fetter”) the SoS’ discretion under the statute and it would prevent changes of public policy [which under the Separation of Powers, the courts are reluctant to do - especially on a sensitive issue like prisoners getting paroled out of prison!].
51
Q

What 2 principles are key, re. the development of the law on legitimate expectation?

Especially consider public policy changes overriding / frustrating a legitimate expectation.

A

FAIRNESS
- where there is a change of policy, this does not always mean that an applicant’s legitimate expectation is overridden.
- The court can look at FAIRNESS, not just the high standard of Wednesbury unreasonableness (whether the court’s duty to protect the person’s legitimate expectation outweighs the policy choice that threatens overriding the legitimate expectation)

PROPORTIONALITY
- regarding procedural & substantive legitimate expectations.
- Question: is frustrating the legitimate expectation proportionate to the legitimate expectation pursued?
- by itself, proportionality is NOT A STANDALONE GROUND OF JR, but it has been increasingly important to the rationale behind recent cases.

52
Q

What does ex parte Coughlan say about when procedural and substantive legitimate expectations will be frustrated?

A
  1. L.E. IS FOR THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY TO BEAR IN MIND ITS PREVIOUS POLICY / REPRESENTATION, the court is confined to the high bar of Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(Consider the strongly pro-executive case of Re Findlay); other cases have exercised caution re. points of high policy, e.g. national security, and these should only be subject to the higher Wednesbury unreasonable standard (ex parte Begbie)

  1. PROCEDURAL LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS should be complied with unless there is “overriding reason” to resile from it. The adequacy of the “overriding reason” is assessed against the FAIRNESS PRINCIPLE.
  2. SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS will be treated in the same way: fairness vs overriding reason to frustrate the legitimate expectation. Was the decision to frustrate the L.E. so unfair as to amount to an ABUSE OF PROCESS?
53
Q

How is the proportionality test formulated in legitimate expectation cases (both procedural and substantive procedural expectations)?

(Think: frustration of legitimate expectation cases).

A

Question: is frustrating the legitimate expectation proportionate to the legitimate expectation pursued?

Factors consider include:
- detriment suffered upon relying on the L.E.?
- whether the promise was unambiguous?
- whether the promise was made to an individual personally or made to a specific group?

54
Q

In high policy cases (“macro-political decisions”, it is a steeper hill to climb to find that a legitimate expectation was unlawfully frustrated.

In Re Finucane’s Application [2019] UKSC 7, the applicant had been given an undertaking by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that a public inquiry would be held into allegations of collusion by the security forces in the murder of her husband, a prominent lawyer in Northern Ireland, by loyalist paramilitaries.

Following a general election, a new government decided not to hold a public inquiry on the ground that it would be potentially lengthy, costly and procedurally difficult and might be unworkable in light of national security issues. It decided to hold a paper-based review by an independent person instead.

What was the result of this case?

A

This highly sensitive political issue was made in good faith and on genuine policy grounds (i.e. not made arbitrarily or in bad faith), therefore it would be nearly impossible to enforce a legitimate expectation. The appeal was dismissed.

55
Q

Where sensitive issues of policy arise, a legitimate expectation will have to climb a higher standard to be deemed enforceable, and not frustrated by changes in public policy - true or false?

Give examples of the sensitive political areas.

A

Areas of high policy include: anti-terrorism and protection of the; public health; protection of public morals and the vulnerable, e.g. children; national security; economic decisions on taxes or the financial system.

For example: R (W) v SoS
- The decision by the Secretary of State to prevent a teacher from working with children, despite a promise that no further action would be taken against him, was considered a proportionate response.
- This was because of the important public interest in protecting children from abuse by people in positions of trust; there was evidence against him, and there was an appeals process available.