Public Economics Flashcards

1
Q

government roles in modern economy (5)

A

price intervention (taxes, welfare etc); regulation (min wages); taxation; spending; macro-economic stabilisation (fiscal policy)

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2
Q

where is the tax base more elastic

A

tax base is more elastic at the top because the rich have more avenue to respond to taxation to reduce their tax burden

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3
Q

what do top 1% earners do when tax rate increases

A

reduce working hours, migrate, tax avoid/evade

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4
Q

How much tax income you raise is a result of 2 things:

A
  1. how elastic is your tax base? will people migrate if you raise taxes? 2. what are the citizens political preferences?
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5
Q

contract curve

A

all pareto efficient point

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6
Q

first fundamental theorem of welfare economics

A

private market outcomes are pareto efficient under a set of conditions. outcome due to market conditions will be efficeint but it is not necessarily fair

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7
Q

pareto efficiency

A

no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off

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8
Q

second fundamental theorem of welfare economics

A

under a broad set of conditions, any pareto-efficeint allocation can be achieved through a redistribution of initial endowments and then letting the markets work freely. if initial outcome unfair, pick another allocation (take from one and give to another), then go away and let them trade freely until they reach a new point

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9
Q

first welfare theorem assumptions (4)

A

no externalities, perfect competition (no price makers, free entry), perfect information, rational agents

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10
Q

when the first welfare theorem assumptions hold…

A

no need for a government

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11
Q

when the first welfare theorems do not hold…

A

market failure –> govt intervention may be desirable

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12
Q

internality

A

cost you impose on the future version of yourself

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13
Q

fallacy of 2nd welfare theorem

A

it requires lump-sum taxes based on individual characteristics and not behaviour (1st best tax) but govt doesnt have enough info to do this, so govt use distortionary taxes and transfers leads to conflict between efficiency and equity (2nd best taxation)

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14
Q

efficiency-equity trade off

A

as a result of private actions, you arrive at an allocation that isn’t fair. you redistribute. if you redistribute using taxes, you end up inside the utility possibility frontier. you must give up some efficiency to gain equity.

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15
Q

wealth tax - economic efficiency

A

a wealth tax could discourage investment and savings, impacting economic growth and job creation. it could correct inefficiencies and imbalances caused by extreme wealth concentration

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16
Q

wealth tax - fairness and equity

A

means to address increasing income & wealth inequality, ensuring that the wealthiest pay their fair share. it penalises success and could lead to double taxation

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17
Q

wealth tax - administrative challenges

A

valuation of assets, especially non-liquid assets like real estate and art. concerns about costs of complexities of admin and compliance.

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18
Q

excess burden

A

measure of the costs of substituting away from taxed activities - more leisure time, find loopholes in tax code, migrate. measures the cost of the changes in behaviour caused by the substitution effect

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19
Q

lump-sum taxes

A

the only taxes that create no excess burden as taxpayers cannot avoid or evade them. they create no behavioural responses and hence no excess burden

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20
Q

substitution effect

A

refers to the change in demand or supply due to a relative price change caused by the tax

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21
Q

income effect

A

change in demand for a good or service caused by a change in a consumer’s purchasing power, due to a change in real income. generally reinforces substitution effect of reducing consumption

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22
Q

when does income effect not reinforce substitution effect after tax

A

labour supply - lower disposable income means lower consumption of leisure and therefore higher labour supply

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23
Q

tax incidence

A

the effects of tax policies on prices and the distribution of utilities

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24
Q

effects of a tax change or introduction

A

effect on price –> distributional effects on consumers, profits of prodcuers, shareholders, farmers etc

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25
Q

economic incidence vs statutory incidence

A

statutory incidence is who is legally required to pay the tax, economic incidence is who ultimately ends up paying the tax

26
Q

partial equilibrium incidence assumptions (5)

A

two good economy: one relative price, no close substitutes/complements; tax revenue not spent on the taxed good; perfect competition among producers

27
Q

excise or specific tax

A

tax levied on a quantity

28
Q

ad-valorem tax

A

tax levied on price

29
Q

partial equilibrium incidence model setup

A

two goods x and y. government levies an excise tax on good x. let p denote the pre tax price of x and q = p + t be the taxed price

30
Q

partial equilibrium incidence model: demand

A

consumer has wealth Z and utility u(x,y). price elasticity of demand: eD = ∂D/∂q * q/D(q) = ∂logD/∂logq

31
Q

price elasticity of demand

A

percentage change in quantity demanded following a change in price - elasticities are unit free

32
Q

partial equilibrium incidence model: supply

A

cost of production c(S) units of y to produce S units of x. cost of production is increasing and convex: c’(S)>0 & c’‘(S)>=0. profit at pretax price is: pS - c(S). with perfect optimisation, the supply function for good x is implicitly defined by the marginal condition: p = c’(S(p)). price elasticity of supply: eS = ∂S/∂p * p/S(p)

33
Q

partial equilibrium incidence model: equilibrium

A

equil condition: Q = S(p) = D(p + t).

34
Q

perfectly inelastic demand graph

A

vertical demand curve

35
Q

perfectly elastic demand graph

A

horizontal demand curve

35
Q

formula for tax incidence

A

implicitly differentiate D(p+t)=S(p). incidence on consumers: dq/dt = 1 + dp/dt = eS / (eS - eD)

36
Q

the more open an economy is to capital movements….

A

the more the burden is likely to fall on labour

37
Q

evans, ringel, and stech 1999

A

idea: suppose federal govt implements a tax change, compare cigarette prices before and after the change: D = [P_A1 - P_A0]. identification assumption - absent the tax change, there would have been no change in cigarette price

38
Q

evans, ringel, and stech 1999: difference-in-differences

A

what if price fluctuates because of climatic conditions or trends in demand? relax ID assumption using diff-in-diff: DD = [P_A1 - P_A0] - [P_B1 - P_B0]. state A: experienced a tax change (treatment), state B: does not experience a tax change (control). captures changes due to external factors. identification assumption for DD - ‘parallel trends’ absent the policy change, P1 - P0 would have been the same for A and B

39
Q

tax is …

A

regressive on an absolute level

40
Q

general equilibrium analysis

A

all prices are flexible, move beyond 2-good partial equil model to analyse impacts on all prices. typical goal: trace out full incidence of taxes back to original owners of factors. capital owners vs. labour vs. landlord etc

41
Q

static general equilibrium model

A

many sectors or many factors of production

42
Q

dynamic general equilibrium model

A

characterise impacts over time or across generations

43
Q

static vs dynamic GE models

A

static models assume that all prices and quantities adjust immediately. in practice, adjustment of capital stock and reallocation of labour takes time. dynamic GE models incorporate these effects. static models can be viewed as a description of steady states

44
Q

deadweight loss of commodity taxation

A

consume X units of commodity at price p, govt imposes per unit tax t. q = p+t is consumer price. Change in DWL from small tax change: dDWL = - t dX. PED = (dX/X) / (dq/q). Obtain: dDWL/dt = t/q * e * X

45
Q

partial equilibrium analysis deadweight loss

A

consumer demand function Xi = Xi(qi). Assume: no income effect (uncompensated demand = compensated demand); independent market (no cross price effects). Choose optimal tax rate to minimise DWL: ∑_(i=1)^n DWL_i subject to revenue requirement R = t1X1 + … + tnXn >= R0. Lagrange: ∑DWLi - λ(R - R0). FOC: (∂DWLi/∂ti) / (∂R/∂ti) = λ = (∂DWLi/∂R). use dDWL/dt = t/q * e * X from before to obtain ramsey rule

46
Q

ramsey rule

A

ti/qi = (λ / 1 + λ) (1/ei). The tax rate on a good should be inversely related to its elasticity of demand. tax inelastic goods at higher rates

47
Q

optimal tax rule

A

choose tax rates such that the equiproportionate reduction in demand is equal across all commodities

48
Q

issues with differentiation in taxes (4)

A

ignorance - lack knowledge of elasticities; admin and complexity - costly, complex, line drawing problem; creation of new goods - how to treat new goods?; political economy - lobbying, bribery

49
Q

income tax marginal DWL

A

dDWL = - τ * w * dh = τ / (1-τ) * e * wh * dτ, where e = (dh/h) / (d(1-τ) / (1-τ))

50
Q

income tax DWL insights

A

first $ of tax had no DWL, marginal DWL is increasing in marginal tax rate, marginal DWL is increasing in labour supply elasticity, marginal DWL is increasing in the earnings level wh

51
Q

optimal income tax problem + simplifications

A

objective: a social welfare function W = W(U1, .., Un). choice: tax function T(Z) where z = wh is earnings. constraints: govt budget constraint and individual optimising behaviour. problem: design T(.) to max SWF subject to GBC and individual optimisation. Simplify by: restricting tax system (linear or piecewise linear taxes), consider special SWF

52
Q

Linear income tax problem

A

constant marginal tax rate and guaranteed minimum income G>0: T(z) = τz - G –> flat tax or negative income tax. Average tax rate: a = T(z)/z = τ - G/z. Implies ∂a/∂z = G / z^2, which is positive for G>0. System is progressive

53
Q

rawlsian SWF

A

W = min(U1, .., Un) so gov only care about the worst off person. Assume worst of person unable to work and lives on transfer G. Rawlsian gov wants to maximise G –> optimal income tax maximises revenue –> goes to top of Laffer curve

54
Q

laffer curve and optimal taxation

A

laffer rate is optimum under rawlsian social preferences. laffer rate represents an upper bound on tax rates: any tax system above is pareto inefficeint, any tax system below may be optimal under some SWF. laffer rate is only value-free statement on optimal tax policy

55
Q

high-income laffer rate setup

A

top MTR applies to income above z. denote ¯z the average income among taxpayers above z. total rev at top: R = τ(¯z - z)N. marginal change dτ creates: a mechanical revenue effect dM = dτ (¯z - z)N; a behavioural revenue effect dB = τ dz N.

56
Q

high income laffer rate

A

determined by dR = dM + dB = 0 and is: τ* = 1 / (1 + eα) where e = (d¯z / ¯z) / (d(1-τ) / (1-τ)) is the elasticity of taxable income and α = ¯z / (¯z - z*) >= 1

57
Q

tax base

A

amount of economic activity subject to the tax

58
Q

deadweight loss occurs because

A

economic agents move away from the taxed activity, substituting toward its alternatives

59
Q

what is the Lagrange multiplier of the Ramsey problem

A

the marginal cost of public funds. It represents the additional deadweight loss generated by extracting an additional unit of revenue on the good i

60
Q

fiscal externality

A

a situation in which an economic agent’s behaviour changes the cost of some subsidy or alters the revenues collected from some tax, thereby affecting the well-being of taxpayers in general